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Public Prosecutor v. Anandhan Annamalai & Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
These appeals were preferred by the Public Prosecutor against acquittals recorded in C.C. Nos. 2957 of 1949 and 990 of 1950 on the file of the Stationary Sub‑Magistrate, Cuddalore. Both appeals arise from the same set of transactions; the opinion sets out the facts as in C.C. No. 2957 of 1949.
The material facts (as recorded in the opinion) are: On 17‑7‑1948 the District Magistrate of South Arcot promulgated an order of detention under S.2(1)(a) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (Ex. P‑1) against Chottu alias Vasudeva. On the night of 26‑11‑1948, at about 8:15 p.m., Head Constable No. 811 (P.W.2), accompanied by other police witnesses (P.W.s 3, 4 and 5) and some villagers (including P.W.6), went to the house of Subramaniam (accused 2) on information that Vasudeva was there. P.W.2 questioned the occupants; finding Vasudeva in an inner room, police pulled him towards the street door assisted by P.W.s 4 and 5. Accused 2 and 6 and others protested and obstructed; women raised an alarm and a crowd formed. Vasudeva escaped. The persons who obstructed also fled, and only accused 2 was caught and taken to the police station. A special report was submitted and a charge‑sheet was filed against eight persons for obstruction and resistance to a public servant in the discharge of his duties and rescuing a person from lawful detention, charged under Ss. 353 and 225‑B, Indian Penal Code.
At trial the accused pleaded not guilty and raised as a principal point the legality of the apprehension of Vasudeva under the detention order. The learned Sub‑Magistrate accepted the defence contention regarding the legality of the apprehension and acquitted the accused, even though the Sub‑Magistrate found the factual core—obstruction and escape—to be true.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the acts complained of (obstruction of a public servant and rescuing/escape of a detainee) fall within Ss. 225‑B and 353 of the Indian Penal Code.
- Whether the apprehension/detention of Vasudeva (based on a general detention order under S.2(1)(a) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (Madras Act I of 1947), Ex. P‑1) was lawful, and if not, whether escape or rescue by others constitutes an offence.
- Whether S.13 of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (power of police to arrest without warrant) or S.23 of the Police Act V of 1861 could lawfully be invoked to validate the police action in the absence of steps taken under S.2(5) (including Ss. 87–89 Cr.P.C. where applicable).
Arguments of the Parties
Public Prosecutor / Prosecution
- The prosecution proceeded largely on the basis that the detention order (Ex. P‑1) amounted to an arrest warrant and that Head Constable No. 811 executed that order in apprehending Vasudeva.
- Implicitly relied upon the proposition that the police could effect the apprehension by reference to the detention order in Ex. P‑1.
Accused / Defence
- The principal contention was that Ex. P‑1 was only a general detention order and not a warrant addressed to any person directing arrest; it did not empower the Head Constable to arrest on that basis alone.
- S.13 of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act permits arrest without warrant only when a person is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence under that Act. The prosecution did not allege that Vasudeva had committed such an offence, nor did it rely on that ground to justify arrest.
- The invocation of S.23 of the Police Act V of 1861 to validate the arrest was a belated afterthought and not permissible; S.23 does not validate execution of an invalid warrant or extend a constable’s powers of arrest.
- Because the detention was not shown to be lawful (no action under S.2(5) or Ss.87–89 Cr.P.C. was proved), rescue or escape from that custody could not attract Ss. 225‑B or 353, unless unnecessary force was used.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Appasami Mudaliar v. King Emperor, 1924 I.L.R. 47 Mad. 442 | That a person about to be arrested is entitled to know under what power the constable is arresting him; objection and escape may be justified if arresting power is absent. | Relied upon to support the proposition that where the constable lacks lawful authority the detained person's escape and rescuers' resistance are not offences. |
| Empress v. Shasti Chura Nanit, 1882 8 Cal. 331 | Illustrative authority concerning the need for penal provision when a person escapes custody in certain circumstances (historical context for S.225‑B). | Used as part of historical background as to why S.225‑B was introduced to cover escapes from custody in specified cases. |
| Queen Empress v. Kandhala, 1885 7 All. 67 | Similar authority to Empress v. Shasti Chura Nanit on escape from custody prior to statutory amendment. | Adduced to explain the genesis of S.225‑B and the statutory gap it filled. |
| Emperor v. Po Han, 1914 15 Cr. L.J. 3 | Example that a law providing a supplementary form of punishment does not necessarily create a 'special law' under S.40/S.41 penal code definitions. | Applied in determining that Madras Act I of 1947 was not a 'special law' creating fresh offences but rather a local law providing supplementary measures. |
| Arunagirinath | Cited as authority relevant to the proposition that certain Acts may not be 'special laws' creating new offences. | Referred to in the discussion that the Madras Act created no fresh offences and thus was not a 'special law' in the sense of S.40/S.41. |
| Kartik Chandra v. Emperor, 1932 33 Cr. L.J. 706 | That S.23 Police Act does not cover execution of an invalid warrant or extend a constable's powers of arrest. | Relied upon to reject the contention that S.23 could validate the arrest in this case; supported finding that the apprehension was not lawful. |
| Bolai De v. Emperor, 1908 35 Cal. 361 | Authority for the proposition that rescuing a person from custody is not an offence if the custody was not lawful. | Used to support the principle that unlawful detention makes escape and rescue innocuous for criminal liability under S.225‑B. |
| Kesar v. Emperor, 1932 A.I.R Lah. 263 | Similar to Bolai De: escape/rescue not punishable if initial detention unlawful. | Applied in reinforcing the court's conclusion that unlawful custody precludes conviction for escape or rescue. |
| Sridhar | Cited among authorities on non‑punishability of rescue/escape from unlawful detention. | Part of the line of cases supporting non‑liability where custody was unlawful. |
| Vijoy Narain Singh | Cited among authorities on non‑punishability of rescue/escape from unlawful detention. | Referred to as part of the authorities establishing the proposition that rescue from unlawful custody is not an offence. |
| Emperor v. Lachu Kanara | Authority cited in the same context of non‑punishability for rescuers when custody is unlawful. | Used as supporting authority for the court's conclusion on non‑liability. |
| Somiah v. Emperor | Another precedent cited regarding rescue/escape from unlawful detention. | Included in the group of precedents that justify acquittal where detention lacked lawful authority. |
| Mousi Lal | Authority establishing that if rescuers use more force than necessary and cause unnecessary hurt, S.353 may apply. | Cited to clarify that excessive force by rescuers could lead to liability under S.353, though court found no such excess force here. |
| Emperor v. Ramara, 1908 7 Cr. L.J. 74 | Supports the proposition that escape from custody is not an offence unless the custody was lawful. | Applied to hold that Vasudeva's escape was innocuous because detention was unlawful. |
| Khanu v. Emperor, 1925 A.I.R Sind. 193 | Same proposition on escape and unlawfulness of custody. | Referred to in support of the court's view on escape not constituting an offence absent lawful custody. |
| Jograi Mahto v. Emperor | Included among authorities on escape and lawful custody. | Used to reinforce the conclusion that escape requires prior lawful custody for criminal liability. |
| Christie v. Leachinsky, 1947 A.C. 573 | House of Lords decision that a person about to be arrested must be informed of the charge or grounds of suspicion; arrest without such information may be unlawful. | Adopted to underline the rule that arrest without informing the person of the charge/suspicion can render the arrest unlawful and justify resistance/escape. |
| Ramjit v. Emperor, 1938 A.I.R All. 120 | Authority corroborating the rule that a person may object to arrest made under a power the constable does not possess. | Referred to in support of the court's reliance on established principles about informing the arrested person of grounds for arrest. |
| Muneshwar Bux Singh v. Emperor, 1939 A.I.R Oudh 91 | Where a police officer catches a person without informing the offence for which he is arrested, the person wrenching free may not be guilty under the Penal Code. | Applied to illustrate that failure to inform the arrested person can vitiate the lawfulness of arrest and preclude conviction for escape/rescue. |
| Gulabi Mahto v. Emperor, 1940 A.I.R Pat. 361 | Resistance to execution of an unlawful order/arrest or defective warrant is not an offence where direction for arrest was absent. | Relied on to support acquittal where the arrest direction was held to be lacking or defective. |
| Kandasami Thevan v. Emperor, 1934 M.W.N. 616 | Arrest in absence of proof (e.g., under the Gaming Act, absence of proof that shop was a common gaming house) led to obstruction to arrest being no offence. | Used as an example that defective basis for arrest makes obstruction non‑criminal, applied analogically here. |
| Jagannath v. King Emperor, 1932 A.I.R All. 227 | Where warrants not duly signed/scaled or execution is attempted by unauthorised persons, obstruction to such warrants is not unlawful provided minimal force used. | Applied as authority that defective warrants or execution beyond authorised scope render obstruction non‑criminal if only minimal force used. |
| Fattu v. King Emperor, 1932 55 All. 109 | Similar authority on defective warrants and non‑liability for obstruction where force is proportionate. | Relied on in the group of cases supporting the court's approach to defective or invalid arrest efforts. |
| Rajan Kanta Saha v. Emperor, 1931 A.I.R Cal. 443 | Authority on obstruction to execution of defective warrants and non‑criminality when reasonable force only is used. | Part of the authorities relied upon to uphold acquittal where the warrant/detention lacked lawful execution. |
| Subbaramiah v. Emperor, 1934 M.W.N. 399 | Also concerns defective warrants and obstruction; cited alongside like decisions. | Used to buttress the proposition that obstruction to defective warrants is not an offence provided minimal force was used. |
| In re Bhullikhan v. Mansab Khan, 1938 A.I.R Nag 45 | Authority touching on the limits of warrant execution and related consequences. | Cited among cases showing that defective or improperly authorised actions cannot sustain criminal liability for obstruction. |
| Bansorappan Singh v. Emperor, 1937 A.I.R Pat. 603 | Part of the line of cases on non‑liability where execution of warrants/orders is defective. | Included in the array of precedents that support acquittal in the present circumstances. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded step‑by‑step from statutory text and established principles to evaluate the legality of the apprehension and consequent criminal liability for rescue/escape and obstruction:
- Characterisation of the Madras Act I of 1947: The court examined whether the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act was a "special law" under S.40/S.41 of the Penal Code or a local law. It concluded the Act created no fresh substantive offences but provided supplementary or alternative measures and therefore was not a "special law" in the narrow sense; it could be regarded as a local law applicable to Madras.
- Effect of the detention order (Ex. P‑1): The detention order recited exercise of powers under S.2(1)(a) and drew attention to a general government order under S.2(5). S.2(5) and the remainder of S.2 contemplate two routes once a detention order exists and the detainee is absconding or concealing himself: (a) a written report to a First‑Class Magistrate, after which Ss.87–89 Cr.P.C. apply and the order is treated as a warrant; or (b) a Gazette‑published direction under S.2(5)(b) to appear, breach of which carries penal consequences.
- Absence of evidence of steps under S.2(5)/Ss.87–89 Cr.P.C.: The court observed that in the present case there was no evidence that action had been taken under cl. (5) of S.2 (no Gazette notification, no report to Magistrate invoking Ss.87–89). Consequently, the detention order remained at the stage of a promulgated administrative detention order and had not been transmuted into a prosecutorial or magistrate‑issued warrant permitting arrest under the wider powers envisaged.
- Limits of S.13 of the Madras Act and inapplicability in fact: S.13 of the Madras Act allows arrest without warrant of a person reasonably suspected of having committed an offence punishable under that Act. The prosecution did not allege that Vasudeva had committed an offence under the Act nor rely on such suspicion as the basis for arrest. Therefore S.13 could not be said to furnish lawful power for the arrest actually made.
- Rejection of validation by S.23 Police Act: The court considered and rejected the attempt to validate the arrest by invoking S.23 of the Police Act V of 1861. It held that S.23 lays down general duties of police officers but does not cover execution of an invalid warrant nor does it extend a constable's statutory powers of arrest. The judgment relied on precedent to the effect that S.23 cannot be used as a post‑hoc justification for an otherwise invalid arrest.
- Legal consequence for rescue/escape and obstruction: Given that the initial apprehension/detention was not lawful, the court applied established authorities to conclude that rescuing a person from custody or that person's escape from custody does not constitute an offence under S.225‑B (or related provisions) unless the custody was lawful. The court noted the caveat that if rescuers used more force than necessary and caused unnecessary hurt to the public servant, S.353 could apply; however, the learned Sub‑Magistrate found only minimal force had been used.
- Reliance on case law: The court relied on a long line of decisions (domestic and British) establishing 1) the requirement that a person arrested without warrant be informed of the charge or grounds of suspicion, and 2) that resistance to execution of an unlawful order or defective warrant does not attract criminal liability where only minimum necessary force is used. These authorities informed the court’s conclusion that the acquittals were legally sound.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeals are dismissed and the acquittals recorded by the learned Stationary Sub‑Magistrate are upheld.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the accused persons remain acquitted of the charges under Ss. 225‑B and 353 I.P.C. in the cited cases (C.C. Nos. 2957 of 1949 and 990 of 1950).
- The court's decision rests on statutory construction of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, the absence of evidence of steps required by S.2(5) (or the application of Ss.87–89 Cr.P.C.), and established authority that rescue/escape from unlawful custody is not criminal. The court emphasized that S.23 Police Act cannot be used to validate an invalid arrest.
- No broader or novel legal principle was stated as creating new precedent beyond the application of existing authorities: the opinion applies settled principles to the facts and concludes that the acquittals were correct. (The opinion does not assert that it is laying down a new rule of law.)
N.T.R
These are appeals against acquittal preferred by the Public Prosecutor in C.C Nos. 2957 of 1949 and 990 of 1950 on the file of the Stationary Sub-Magistrate, Cuddalore. Both the appeals relate to the same transactions and the facts are fully set out in C.C No. 2957 of 1949 and dealt with below.
The facts are: The District Magistrate of South Arcot had promulgated on 17-7-1948 an order of detention under S. 2 (1) (a) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act against Chottu alias Vasudeva (see Ex. P-1). On the night of 26-11-1948 at about 8.15 p.m P.W 2, Head Constable No. 811 attached to the N.V Pattu, Outpost, got information that this Chottu alias Vasudeva was in the house of Subramaniam (accused 2) in East Chetti Street in N.V Pattu and proceeded there accompanied by P.Ws 3, 4 and 5. This party was also accompanied by some of the villagers including P.W 6. On reaching the house P.W 2 found there accused 2 and 6 and questioned them about the presence of this Vasudeva and not being satisfied with the reply, P.Ws 2 and 3 got into the house and found the said Vasudeva in the northern room and he was pulled towards the street door assisted by P.Ws 4 and 5. Accused 2 and 6 protested and obstructed and the womenfolk raised an alarm and a crowd of 20 to 30 people gathered and they sided with the accused persons. In the course of this, this Chottu alias Vasudeva is stated to have made good his escape. On seeing this the people who obstructed also ran away. Only accused 2 was caught and taken to the police station and a special report was given to the Circle Inspector by P.W 2. Then a charge-sheet was laid against eight persons for obstruction and resistance to a public servant in the discharge of his duties and rescuing a person from lawful detention, offences under ss. 353 and 225-B, I.P.C
In C.C No. 990 of 1950 the self-same witnesses were examined and the evidence is practically the same as set out above.
The accused one and all denied the offence and pleaded not guilty to the charges framed against them and the main point taken was the legality of the apprehension of this Chottu alias Vasudeva.
The substance of this contention was as follows:
The detention order relied on is a general order of detention and is not a warrant addressed to any person directing the arrest. P.W 2 relied on Ex. P-1 for the apprehension of this Chottu. The power to arrest without warrant a subject named in the detention order arises under S. 13 of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act only when the person is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence under the said Act. It is not the case for the prosecution that Vasudeva has committed any offence under that Act nor was it a ground relied upon by the prosecution in support of the power to arrest claimed by P.W 2 and others. The prosecution has proceeded almost entirely on the footing that the detention order amounted to an arrest warrant and was entrusted to Head Constable 811 for execution. Both these asssmptions were unfounded because Ex. P-1 is only a detention order promulgated and did not empower any person to effect the arrest and inasmuch as the Head Constable left the Outpost with intention to apprehend Vasudeva only under this detention order and not because this Vasudeva was reasonably suspected of having committed an offence, S. 23 of Police Act V of 1861 could not be invoked and which invocation was both belated and an afterthought and not permissible as pointed out in Appasami Mudaliar v. King Emperor 1924 I.L.R 47 Mad. 442.
The learned Sub Magistrate accepted this contention and acquitted the accused, though on the facts constituting the gravemen of the charge viz. obstruction and escape, he found the prosecution case to be true.
The point for consideration is whether the acts complained of fall within S. 225-B and S. 353, Indian Penal Code. S. 225-B was substituted by the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act X of 1886, S. 24(1). The section was introduced to provide for cases referred to in Empress v. Shasti Chura Nanit 1882 8 Cal 331 and Queen Empress v. Kandhala 1885 7 All. 67 in which it was held that a person escaping from custody when being taken before a Magistrate for the purpose of being bound over to be of good behaviour not being punishable under S. 224 or 225 could not be punished, and for cases which S. 651 of the old Code of Civil Procedure was intended to meet. The requirements of this section are however the same as under S. 224 or S. 225.
The evidence requisite to prove the offence under S. 225 is, (i) that the person in question was detained in custody; (ii) that such detention was in respect of an offence; (iii) that such detention was lawful; (iv) that the accused rescued or attempted to rescue such person; and (v) that he did so intentionally. There must be a clear finding as to the inten- tion with which the accused acted: Alawala4; Geevarghese Khathanar v. State4a. It must be proved further that the case falls under a particular clause of the section.
The word ‘offence’ means a thing punishable under the Penal Code or of any special or local law (s. 40). A special law is defined in S. 41 as a law applicaple to a particular subject and a local law has been defined in S. 42 as the law applicable only to a particular part of British India (now Republic of India). Therefore, we have got to see whether Madras Act I of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is a local law or a special law. The special laws contemplated in ss. 40 and 41 are only laws such as the Excise Opium and Cattle Trespass Acts creating fresh offences, i.e, laws making certain things which are not already punishable under the Penal Code. The Whipping Act is not a special law in this sense. It creates no fresh offence but merely provides a supplementary or alternative form of punishment for offences which are already punishable primarily under the Penal Code, Emperor v. Po Han 1914 15 Cr. L.J 3 and Arunagirinath6.
The preamble to Madras Act 1 of 1947 states
“Whereas for the maintenance of public safety and to prevent and put down disorders involving menace to the peace and tranquillity of the Province, it is necessary to provide for preventive detention, imposition of collective fines, control of meetings and processions, control of services essential to the life of the community and certain other purposes; it is hereby enacted as follows.”
This Act creats no fresh offences but merely provides the supplementary or alternative punishment for offences already primarily punishable under the Penal Code or which can be dealt with under the preventive or reformative provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is made clear by S. 18 of the Act:
“The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other Act, Ordinance or Regulation for the time being in force.”
Therefore, this is not a special law. On the other hand, it can be considered to be a local law applicable to the State of Madras. A local law does not necessarily include all the Rules made under the provisions of a local law: Ganda Shah7 and Ma Khwet Kyi8. Where a local law declares a breach of the rules made under its authority to be punishable, then a breach of such rules might constitute an offence within the meaning of S. 40 of the Code. Therefore, when the act in respect of which apprehension or detention was made was in respect of an offence falling within a local law it will be a detention in respect of an offence falling within the meaning of S. 40 of the Penal Code, and a rescue by others and the escape by the detainee will attract the application of S. 225-B I.P.C provided the detention was lawful.
Was the detention in this case lawful is the further point for our consideration? S. 2 of the said Act deals with the powers to make detention orders. The detention order in this case has been marked as Ex. P-1 and it recites that Vasudeva was being detained in exercise of the powers conferred under S. 2 (1) (a) of Madras Act I of 1947 read with the order of the Government of Madras G.O.Ms No. 907 (Public) General (E) dated 21-3-1947 and that the attention of the said Vasudeva was being drawn to the general order of the Government of Madras under S. 2 (5) of the Act, a copy of which was being attached.
S. 2(5) states:
“So long as there is in force in respect of any person such an order as aforesaid directing that he be detained, he shall be liable to be removed to and detained in such place and under such conditions,………. as the Provincial Government may, from time to time by general or special order, specify.”
Then S. 2 proceeds to make provision for two sets of conditions:
“If the Provincial Government have reason to believe that a person in respect of whom such an order as aforesaid has been made directing that he be detained has absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed they may—
(a) make a report in writing of the fact to ….. a Magistrate of the first class …. … having jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily resides; and thereupon the provisions of Ss. 87, 88 and 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, shall apply, in respect of the said person and his property, as if the order directing that he be detained were a warrant issued by the Magistrate:
(b) by order notified in the Fort St. George Gazette and published in such other manner as they think fit direct the said person to appear before such officer, at such place, and within such period as may be specified in the order ….”
If the said person fails to comply with such direction provision is made for his punishment. Then, for persons harbouring or concealing these persons ordered to be detained or persons reproducing or publishing statements etc. made by persons ordered to be detained, offences are enacted and punishments prescribed.
S. 13 provides:
“Any police officer may arrest without warrant any person who is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence punishable under this Act.” S. 14 provides for attempts and abetments to contravene the provisions of this Act. In other words, after a detention order is made and the detainee is found to be absconding or concealing himself, provision is made in the Act for a report to a First Class Magistrate and then the detainee becomes a notified or proclaimed offender and all the incidents attached to Ss. 87 to 89 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply. S. 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with proclamation and attachment, S. 88 with the attachment of property and S. 89 with restoration of attached property of the proclaimed offender. In other words, by virtue of the report in writing to the First Class Magistrate the detention order becomes as if it were transmuted into a warrant issued by a Magistrate and thereupon and thereafter the provisions of Ss. 87, 88 and 89 can be applied and if applied thereupon it will be open to any police officer to arrest the detainee wherever he may be found under the third category of S. 54 Cr.P.C, viz., a person who has been proclaimed as an offender either under the Criminal Procedure Code or by order of the State Government. If the provisions of Ss. 87 to 89 have not been applied and the detention order remains at the stage of as if it were, a warrant issued by a Magistrate, even then it would be a case falling within S. 54 Cr. P. C, or s, 13 of this Act, viz, any police officer may arrest without warrant any person who is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence punishable under this Act, viz., becoming a detainee absconding or concealing himself after the Gazette notification had been made under sub-sec, (b) of cl. 6 of S. 2 of the Act and not complying with the terms of the detention order and thereby committing an offence punishable under the Act.
This has not been the case here as it will be seen that beyond passing the detention order there is no evidence that action had been taken under cl. (5) of S. 2 of the Act. This cannot be got over by invoking S. 23 of Police Act V of 1861, because as pointed out by the learned sub-magistrate, that section lays down nothing more than that,
“It shall be the duty of every police officer promptly to obey and execute all orders and warrants lawfully issued to him by any compentent authority, to collect and communicate intelligence affecting the public peace; to prevent the commission of offences and public nuisances; to detect and bring offenders to justice and to apprehend, all persons whom he is legally authorised to apprehend, and for whose apprehension sufficient ground exists; and it shall be lawful for every police officer, for any of the purposes mentioned in this section, without a warrant, to enter and inspect any drinking-shop, gaming house or other place of resort of loose and disorderly character.”
It will be seen that none of the clauses applies to this case. This section does not cover the execution of an invalid warrant or extend a constable's powers of arrest; Kartik Chandra v. Emperor 1932 33 Cr. L.J 706. Therefore, the apprehension of the person in question Vasudeva was not lawful and once the apprehension or detention is not lawful it is well settled law that his own escaping as well as the rescuing of such a person by others is no offence. The person from whose custody the rescue is effected or escape made must have authority to lawfully detain the person rescued. Otherwise no offence is committed in effecting the rescue: (Bolai De v. Emperor 1908 35 Cal. 361, Kesar v. Emperor 1932. A.I.R Lah. 263, Sridhar12 and Vijoy Narain Singh13; Emperor v. Lachu Kanara13-a, Somiah v. Emperor13-b). But if the person rescuing another who is arrested under an illegal warrant uses more force than is necessary and causes unnecessary hurt to the public servant who has custody of that person, he will be punishable under S. 353, I.P.C; Mousi Lal14. In this case it has been found by the Magistrate that no unnecessary force was used and that the force used by these rescuers was just the minimum necessary to obstruct the apprehension of Vasudeva.
This will also make the escape of Vasudeva from detention equally innocuous. A person cannot be convicted of escape unless the custody in which he was detained was lawful: Emperor v. Ramara 1908 7 Cr. L.J 74, Khanu v. Emperor 1925 A.I.R Sind. 193, Jograi Mahto v. Emperor16-a.
A person about to be arrested is entitled to know under what power the constable is arresting him and if he specifies a certain power which he knows that the constable has not got, he is entitled to object to such arrest and escape from custody such custody not being a lawful one. This has been well laid down in the decision of the House of Lords in Christie v. Leachisky 1947 A.C 573. It was held (affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal) “than an arrest without warrant can be justified only if it is an arrest on a charge made known to the person arrested and it is a condition of lawful arrest that the party arrested should know on what charge or on suspicion of what crime he is arrested; therefore just as a private person arresting on suspicion must acquaint the party with the cause of his arrest, so must a policeman arresting without warrant on suspicion state at the time (unless the party is already acquainted with it) on what charge the arrest is being made or at least inform him of the facts which are said to constitute a crime on his part. Even if circumstances exist which may excuse this, it is still his duty to give the information at the first reasonable opportunity after the arrest.” This embodies only the sound rule embodied in S. 80 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, viz., that the Police Officer shall inform the warrantee the substance thereof and if so required has got to show the warrant. This Court has laid down in Appasami Mudaliar v. King Emperor that a person about to be arrested is entitled to know under what power the constable is arresting him and if he specifies a certain power which the person knows the constable has not got, he is entitled to object to such arrest and escape from custody, such custody not being a lawful one. See also Ramjit v. Emperor 1938 A.I.R All. 120. Thus where an inspector of police catches hold of the wrist of the accused without informing him for what offence he was being arrested, accused wrenching himself free is not guilty of any offence under the Indian Penal Codes Muneshwar Bux Singh v. Emperor 1939 A.I.R Oudh 91.
There is a long line of decisions that resistance to the execution of an unlawful order, or unlawful arrest or defective warrant making out it is ex facie illegal is no offence. Where the Sub Inspector asked the constable to bring the accused to thana by force and there was a scuffle, Held as there was no direction for arrest accused not guilty of an offence under Ss. 224, 225, 353, I.P.C: Gulabi Mahto v. Emperor 1940 A.I.R Pat. 361. Under the Madras Gaming Act arrest of accused in a shop in the absence of proof that it was a common gaming house led to obstruction to arrest and it was held to be no offence; Kandasami Thevan v. Emperor 1934 M.W.N 616. Where warrants have not been duly signed or scaled or they are sought to be executed beyond duly authorised and authorisable persons obstruction to execution of such warrants is not unlawful provided the force used is the minimum necessary: Jagannath v. King Emperor 1932 A.I.R All. 227, Fattu v. King Emperor 1932 55 All. 109, Rajan Kanta Saha v. Emperor 1931 A.I.R Cal. 443, Subbaramiah v. Emperor 1934 M.W.N 399; Cr. 72, In re Bhullikhan v. Mansab Khan 1938 A.I.R Nag 45. Bansorappan Singh v. Emperor 1937 A.I.R Pat. 603.
Therefore, the acquittals made by the learned Stationary Sub Magistrate are correct and these appeals are dismissed.
N.T.R
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