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J. Loomchand Sait v. The Official Liquidators, Peerdan Joharmall Bank Ltd.

Madras High Court
Dec 17, 1952
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Structured Summary of the Opinion: Loomchand Sait (Appellant) — Peerdan Joharmal Bank Ltd. (in liquidation)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, J. Loomchand Sait, was the Managing Director of the Peerdan Joharmal Bank Ltd., then in liquidation. The Official Liquidators initiated proceedings under Section 282-A of the Companies Act alleging wrongful possession, withholding and wilful misapplication of the bank's property (including securities, jewels and cash). Krishnaswami Nayudu J. (the company judge) found the appellant guilty on the framed charges, sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000, ordered payment of specified sums (including Rs. 42,527-12-9 and Rs. 87,000 plus Rs. 199-12-0) and delivery of certain jewels, and directed that in default the appellant should undergo two years' imprisonment. The learned Judge fixed a date (12-9-1951) for compliance; on 14-9-1951, having failed to comply, the appellant was ordered to undergo the two-year sentence. The appellant appealed that order to the court delivering the present judgment.

The history includes an earlier order by Mack J. (11-1-1950) directing return of Rs. 2,00,000 and imposing similar penalties; that order was set aside on appeal and the matter remanded for fuller enquiry. On remand, charges were framed on 25-4-1951 and a full enquiry was held with cross-examination and opportunity for defence; the trial judge found the charges proved. On appeal before the present Bench the appellant was represented by Mr. Rajah Aiyar and others.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Official Liquidators were required to obtain previous (pre-institution) sanction of the Court under Section 179 of the Companies Act before instituting proceedings under Section 282-A, and whether the absence of such prior sanction vitiates the proceedings.
  2. Whether the complaint had to be instituted "in the name and on behalf of the company" (per Section 177) and whether the manner of describing the Official Liquidators vitiated the proceedings.
  3. Whether Section 282-A of the Companies Act creates a double punishment in contravention of Article 20(2) of the Constitution (i.e., whether fine plus imprisonment constitutes double punishment for the same offence).
  4. Whether the absence of rules framed under Section 45-G of the Banking Companies Act (for mode of proceedings) vitiates proceedings taken under that Act or deprives the High Court of jurisdiction.
  5. Whether, under Section 45-C of the Banking Companies Act, the trial should have been summary before a different Judge or a Presidency Magistrate (i.e., whether the same Judge dealing with winding up could also try the offence), and whether the procedure actually followed rendered the trial invalid.
  6. Whether the prosecution proved the requisite fraudulent intention required by Section 282-A (fraudulent misapplication/withholding) or whether the evidence showed only misapplication without fraud.
  7. Whether Section 281 (power to relieve persons who acted honestly and reasonably) entitled the appellant to relief.
  8. Whether a board resolution (purported condonation) absolved the appellant of liability in respect of Government securities.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Rajah Aiyar)

  • The Official Liquidators did not obtain the prior sanction of the Court as required by Section 179 of the Companies Act before instituting proceedings under Section 282-A; therefore the proceedings are vitiated.
  • The notice of motion and earlier appointment orders did not authorize criminal proceedings under Section 282-A; at least the section was introduced without prior sanction.
  • The complaint was not filed strictly "in the name and on behalf of the company" as required by Section 177; the applicants described themselves improperly, rendering proceedings defective.
  • Section 282-A purportedly imposes both a fine and imprisonment for the same offence; that would amount to double punishment prohibited by Article 20(2) of the Constitution.
  • Proceedings were also taken under the Banking Companies Act; because rules required under Section 45-G had not been framed, such proceedings are vitiated and the High Court lacks jurisdiction (or proper procedure was not followed).
  • If the matter was triable summarily under Section 45-C, it should have been tried by a Presidency Magistrate (or at least by a Judge other than the one dealing with winding up), not by the same Company Judge; trying the appellant before the same Judge amounted to a jurisdictional defect.
  • No fraudulent intention was proved; charges as framed referred only to wrongful withholding/misapplication and not fraud, and the evidence did not establish the required dishonest/fraudulent state of mind.
  • Section 281 (excusing those who acted honestly and reasonably) ought to have been invoked in favour of the appellant.
  • A Board resolution allegedly condoning disposal of Government securities should absolve the appellant from liability in respect of those securities.

Official Liquidators' Arguments (respondent)

  • Sanction under Section 179 is not a condition precedent in the mandatory sense urged; the power is enabling and the Court may give sanction even during proceedings; in fact the company Judge had given sanction (to act under 238-A and subsequently 282-A) in the course of proceedings.
  • Any defect in the description of the applicants was formal; the proceedings were in substance instituted in the name and on behalf of the company and prior authorities show substantial compliance.
  • Section 282-A prescribes a primary punishment (fine and order to refund or deliver up) and only permits imprisonment as a secondary, alternative sanction in default — not a separate double punishment — and so does not offend Article 20(2).
  • The absence of specific rules under Section 45-G of the Banking Companies Act does not render the proceedings void; existing Companies Act/Original Side rules apply until Banking Companies Act rules are framed, and the High Court is defined as the proper Court under that Act.
  • The Court may try an offence summarily under Section 45-C adopting the appropriate procedure; it was open to the judge to use summary procedures even if he examined witnesses; nothing in the record shows the trial was not summary and, accordingly, the judge trying the winding-up proceedings was competent to try the offence.
  • Evidence amply supported an inference of fraudulent and dishonest intention by the appellant in relation to cash, jewels and securities; fraud can be inferred from circumstances.
  • Section 281 relief was not appropriate on the facts: explanations did not show honest or reasonable conduct and the appellant had disbursed substantial sums to his relations leaving little prospect of recovery by the bank.
  • The board resolution relied upon did not constitute condonation or approval of the appellant's conduct; it recorded the disposal and directed rectification, which the appellant did not undertake.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King, AIR 1948 P.C. 82 Decision observed that Section 537 CrPC does not cure lack of leave (cited on question of necessity of leave). The court held the decision had no application to the present facts and did not affect its conclusion that Section 179 does not require previous sanction as a strict condition precedent.
Thangamani In re, AIR 1951 Mad 610 Cited to support contention that general power to institute proceedings is not sufficient and that leave may be a condition precedent. The court found this decision not to have bearing on the present facts and did not adopt its relevance to impose a requirement of prior sanction here.
Dowood Mohideen v. Sahabdeen, AIR 1937 Mad 667 Used to argue that leave of Court is necessary as a condition precedent for filing complaints. The court considered it, but held it did not apply to the present circumstances and did not support the appellant's contention.
Mrityunjay v. Provot Kumar, AIR 1953 Cal 153 Broad principle that the grant of leave is a matter between Court and receiver/official liquidator; administrative provision. The Official Liquidators relied on this principle; the court noted these authorities support that omission to obtain leave is primarily an internal matter between liquidator and court and can be rectified, but the court did not consider it necessary to decide further after finding sanction had been given in the proceedings.
The Official Receiver, Coimbatore v. Kanga, AIR 1922 Mad 51 Principle regarding leave being administrative and matter between court and receiver. Cited by Official Liquidators; court relied on the general thrust that leave provisions are administrative, and in any event held that sanction had been given during proceedings.
Emperor v. Bishan Sahai Vidyarthi, AIR 1937 All 714 Authority on practice regarding leave/sanction in insolvency/company proceedings. Cited for the broad proposition that leave is a matter between court and official receiver; court considered it supportive of the Official Liquidators' position.
Subramania Aiyar v. The Pondanur Bank Ltd., AIR 1947 Mad 343 Used in discussion about the necessity of leave / sanction. Cited by Official Liquidators; court treated it as part of the line of authorities indicating leave is administrative and could be given during proceedings.
Laduram Mathmul v. Nandalal, AIR 1920 Cal 113 Authority cited in similar context about leave and administrative nature of sanction. Counted among decisions relied upon by the Official Liquidators; court treated it as part of supporting jurisprudence but did not have to rest decision solely on it.
Bhagirath Chandra v. Emperor, AIR 1948 Cal 42 Authorities showing liberal interpretation of leave requirements (comparison of sections). Cited by Official Liquidators to support view that Sections differ in language and that previous leave is not required under Section 179 as strictly; the court considered such authorities in its analysis.
Sunilchandra v. Krishnachandra, AIR 1949 Cal 689 Another case relied on to show liberal interpretation of leave provisions. Cited and considered by the court in assessing the import of leave provisions; the court found Section 179 distinguishable and not requiring prior sanction rigidly.
Muhammad Yusuf v. The Himalaya Bank Ltd., All 18 198 (F.B.) On formal description of Official Liquidator and substantial compliance with statutory form. The court treated this as authority for substantial compliance: minor defects in manner of describing applicants do not vitiate proceedings.
Shiamlal Diwan v. Official Liquidator, U.P. Oil Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1933 All 789 Held proceedings by official liquidators must be deemed to be by the company through its liquidators even if formally imperfect. The court relied on this to hold that defective description of applicants did not defeat the substance that proceedings were by the company through its liquidators.
Barrett v. Markham, 7 C.P. 405 Authority that fraudulent intention must be proved in cases of withholding or misapplication. The appellate court had previously observed that fraud must be proved (directly or by inference). In the present appeal the court accepted that fraud can be inferred from circumstances and found evidence sufficient to infer fraudulent intention.
Madden v. Rodes, 1908 1 K.B. 534 Also establishes that fraud must be proved in similar offences. Cited by the appellate court; the present court accepted the need to infer fraud and found the trial judge's inference justified by the evidence.
Dovey v. Cory (1901) A.C. 477 Authority on directors acting as men of business; that imprudent act alone may not be criminal. Cited by appellant to argue conduct might be merely imprudent; the court considered it but rejected the appellant's reliance, holding the facts showed dishonesty rather than mere imprudence.
Blyth's case, 4 Ch. D. 140 Similar corporate law authority on directors' duties and business judgment. Invoked by appellant; court held these authorities did not bring appellant's conduct within honest/prudent business conduct and therefore did not negate criminal liability.
In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co., (1898) 1 Ch. 331 Case on corporate acts, approval and consequences of directors' decisions. Cited by appellant; court held it did not support a finding that the board resolution condoned the appellant's conduct or protected him from criminal charge.
Natesan In re, AIR 1949 Mad 657 Cited by appellant in support of argument about honest and bona fide payments to save credit of a bank. The court observed the authority but concluded the appellant's conduct did not fall within the rule of honest, reasonable or bona fide payments; thus it did not avail appellant.
Harishchandra v. Kavindranarain Sinha, AIR 1936 All 830 Invoked to argue lack of jurisdiction of High Court under company statute provisions. The court held that the Banking Companies Act defines the Court as the High Court for winding up banking companies, so Harishchandra did not support appellant's jurisdictional challenge.
K. Sundaresa Aiyar In re, AIR 1950 Mad 657 Cited by appellant on procedure/summary trial issues under Banking Companies Act. The court found this decision inapplicable to the present facts and did not accept the submission that the trial was invalid for want of proper forum.
In re Veerappan, AIR 1944 Mad 424 Cited in discussion about summary procedure and proper forum. The court held it did not apply to the circumstances before it and did not alter its conclusion about the propriety of the trial before the Company Judge.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of statutory interpretation and factual appraisal supported by reference to authorities where relevant. The principal strands of its reasoning were:

  1. Interpretation of Section 179 (sanction to Official Liquidator): The court distinguished between an enabling provision and a mandatory prohibition. Section 179 was read as an enabling provision that confers power on the Official Liquidator "with the sanction of the Court" to institute proceedings, but the court found nothing in the language to import an absolute requirement that sanction must be obtained prior to instituting proceedings. The court explained that if "previous sanction" were to be read in, ordinary administration by the liquidator would become impractical. It also observed that the Court may give sanction during the proceedings; on the facts, the company Judge had given sanction (reference to earlier orders and the notice of motion which invoked S. 282-A as well), so Section 179 had been substantially complied with.
  2. Formality under Section 177 (name/form of complaint): The court held that minor defects in describing the applicants (Official Liquidators) did not alter the substance that the complaint was by the company through its liquidators. Authorities were cited to show that substantial compliance suffices and that such defects do not vitiate the proceedings.
  3. Section 282-A and Article 20(2) (double punishment): The court analysed Section 282-A's structure: it first prescribes a fine (and an order to restore/deliver up property) upon conviction; imprisonment is provided for where the convicted person defaults in payment of the fine or compliance with the restoration order. The court viewed imprisonment as an alternative, default sanction rather than a second punishment for the same offence. Consequently, Section 282-A did not contravene Article 20(2).
  4. Banking Companies Act procedure and jurisdiction (Sections 45-A, 45-C, 45-G): The court held that the High Court is the Court contemplated by the Banking Companies Act for winding up bank matters, and absence of specially framed rules under Section 45-G did not render the proceedings void. Existing Companies Act/Original Side rules apply until specific Banking Companies rules are framed. On the question whether a different Judge should have tried the offence, the court found no evidence that the trial was not summary under Section 45-C(1); even where warrant-case procedure elements appeared in the record, that alone did not prove the absence of summary trial procedure or incompetence of the company judge to try the matter. The court therefore found the trial procedure and jurisdiction to be proper.
  5. Proof of fraudulent intention under Section 282-A: The court accepted that Section 282-A requires proof of fraudulent intention; however, fraud need not be shown by direct evidence but can be inferred from surrounding circumstances. After reviewing oral and documentary evidence, the court agreed with the trial judge that the appellant's conduct (handling of cash, disposal and withholding of jewels and securities, payments to relatives) supported an inference of fraudulent and dishonest intention.
  6. Section 281 relief argument: The court examined the appellant's explanations and concluded they did not establish that he had acted honestly and reasonably. Given the scale of disbursements to relatives and the lack of rectification, the court found no basis to exercise Section 281 relief.
  7. Board resolution re: Government securities: The court examined the resolution relied upon by the appellant and concluded it did not amount to approval or condonation of the appellant's conduct; rather it recorded disposition and directed rectification which was not done, so the resolution did not absolve him of liability.
  8. Cumulatively, the court found no substantial legal or procedural defect that would invalidate the conviction and sentence. The bench gave credit to the learned counsel for appellant for full argument but concluded there were no merits to the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED and the order under appeal (conviction and sentence by Krishnaswami Nayudu J.) is confirmed.

Direct consequences for the parties

  • The appellant's conviction under Section 282-A is affirmed, including the fine (Rs. 1,000) and the orders for payment, delivery of jewels and restoration of property; default consequences (two years' imprisonment) remain in force as ordered by the trial court.
  • The appellant was directed to surrender before the Registrar on 19-12-1952 (as recorded in the order).
  • The Official Liquidators were awarded their costs of the appeal to be paid out of the assets of the bank in their hands.

Broader implications and precedent

The court explained interpretive positions on Sections 179 and 282-A and on jurisdictional/procedural aspects of the Banking Companies Act (Sections 45-A, 45-C and 45-G). The opinion applies established principles (including that sanction may be given in the course of proceedings, that imprisonment under S.282-A operates as a default sanction and not a second punishment, and that form-related defects may be cured by substantial compliance). The opinion does not purport to establish a novel, sweeping legal precedent beyond these reasoned applications; the immediate effect is confirmation of the trial court's order and the practical consequences listed above.


End of summary. This document strictly summarizes only information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the text.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J.:— The appellant in this appeal is one Loomchand Sait, who was the Managing Director of the Peerdan Joharmal Bank Ltd., in liquidation. He has preferred this appeal against the order of Krishnaswami Nayudu J. who held that the appellant had acted fraudulently and had brought himself within the purview of Section 282-A of the Companies Act. The learned Judge found all the charges framed against him proved and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 and directed him to pay Rs. 42,527-12-9, deliver the jewels, particulars of which were given in the schedule to the charge excepting some three items referred to in the judgment and also to pay a sum of Rs. 87,000 plus Rs. 199-12-0 being the value of the securities wilfully misapplied by the said appellant on or before 12-9-1951. In default, he ordered that the appellant should undergo imprisonment for two years. The appellant was given time till 12-9-1951 to which date the matter stood adjourned. On 14-9-1951, the appellant having failed to comply with the order, dated 29-8-1951, the matter came up before the learned Judge on 14-9-1951. The respondent was ordered to undergo imprisonment as directed in the order dated 29-8-1951 for a period of two years and that the necessary warrant should issue. This appeal is preferred against the said order.

2. The earlier history of the application taken out by the Official Liquidators of the said Peerdan Joharmal Bank Ltd., in Thiruchirapalli (in liquidation) under Section 282-A of the Companies Act, for passing appropriate orders against the respondent, has been elaborately set out in the order passed by Krishnaswami Nayudu J. under appeal, and it is therefore unnecessary to traverse the entire ground in this judgment. Suffice it to mention that the application of the liquidators in its final form was ordered by Mack J. on 11-1-1950 by which he held that the appellant was liable to bring in a sum of Rs. 2,00,000, being the value of the securities, jewels and of the unaccounted cash balance. He was directed to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 under S. 282-A and ordered to pay up within three months the sum of Rs. 2,00,000 and in default sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of two years. The appellant preferred O.S.A No. 20 of 1950 against this order of Mack J. The appellate Court set aside the order of Mack J. and remanded the application to be heard and disposed of in an elaborate judgment delivered by the Honourable the Chief Justice sitting with Viswanatha Sastri J. On remand, Krishnaswami Nayudu J. after hearing the evidence on behalf of the applicants, the Official Liquidators, framed three charges against the appellant on 25-4-1951 under Section 282-A of the Companies Act. After holding an elaborate enquiry into the said three charges, which have been set out in the order of the learned Judge, and after giving every opportunity to the appellant who was represented by counsel to cross-examine the applicant's witnesses and also adduce defence evidence, the learned Judge, as already stated, came to the conclusion that the charges had been proved and imposed the sentence of fine of Rs. 1000 and imprisonment for two years. When the appeal came on for hearing before us the appellant wanted legal counsel to be appointed by the Court to conduct his case, but we could not persuade ourselves to comply with his request. Thereupon, the appellant engaged the services of Mr. Rajah Aiyar assisted by three other counsel. Mr. Rajah Aiyar argued the appeal at length and placed before us every aspect of the case which was in favour of the appellant. We are thankful to Mr. Rajah Aiyar for his able argument.

3. After having heard the arguments of Mr. Rajah Aiyar and those of the Official liquidators and having perused the entire evidence in the case, both oral and documentary, and having considered all the legal points raised by the learned counsel on both sides and having given our anxious consideration to the case, we have come to the conclusion, for the reasons set out hereinafter, that there are no merits in this appeal, that the order under appeal should be confirmed and that the appeal dismissed.

4. The first point that Mr. Rajah Aiyar has urged on behalf of the appellant is that no leave has been obtained by the Official Liquidators for instituting proceedings against the appellant under Section 282-A of the Companies Act, as required by S. 179 of the said Act. Mr. Rajah Aiyar has invited our attention to the language of Section 179(a) of the Companies Act which is to the following effect:

“The Official Liquidator shall have power, with the sanction of the Court, to do the following things: (a) to institute or defend any suit or prosecution, or other legal proceeding, civil or criminal, in the name and on behalf of the company, etc.”

5. And contends that the sanction of the Court for instituting criminal proceedings against the appellant was a condition precedent and that, inasmuch as no sanction was obtained by the Official Liquidators for the filing of the present application against the appellant the proceedings against him are vitiated by this serious legal defect. He also drew our attention to the fact that the order of appointment given to the Official Liquidators also did not contain any power authorising the Official Liquidators to institute proceedings under Section 179(a) of the Companies Act. The first order passed by Mack J. on 22-11-1949, it has been pointed out, does not give authority to the Official Liquidators to institute criminal proceedings under S. 282-A, but only under S. 238-A of the Act.

6. The notice of motion alone mentions for the first time S. 282-A along with other sections. This section has been introduced by the Official Liquidators without sanction from the Court in the said notice of motion. Therefore, it is urged by Mr. Rajah Aiyar that the proceedings are incompetent and improper. If reliance were to be placed on the order dated 11-1-1950, Mr. Rajah Aiyar would argue, that order having been set aside by the appellate Court which treated the application as one under S. 238-A did not hold the field any more. So, it was not of any avail, though it mentions that the advocate of two creditors made a request that the appellant might be dealt with under S. 282-A and that action was therefore taken under that section by the learned company Judge. Sec. 282-A says that action has to be taken “on the complaint of the company” and that it was not enough that the creditors of the company made a request to treat the application of the liquidators as one under S. 282-A; nor was it open to the learned Judge to take action ‘suo motu’, no complaint having been made under S. 282-A of the Act.

7. It must, however, be observed that though the appellate order says that S. 238-A did not apply and directed that the application should be enquired into and disposed of under S. 282-A still the point of want of previous sanction, was not raised before the said appellate Court, nor even before the learned company Judge, who passed the order under appeal.

8. We have carefully examined the language of Section 179(a) of the Companies Act and also the various other sub-clauses of which this section is comprised. We do not think that the language of the section warrants the interpretation put upon it by the learned counsel for the appellant that it enacts that previous sanction should be obtained by the Official Liquidators for instituting criminal proceedings against the defaulting managing director. If it were the intention that previous sanction should be obtained for instituting criminal proceedings, the language of the section would have been in a mandatory form as contained in various enactments such as the Code of Civil Procedure, and the Code of Criminal Procedure and certain other Acts where it has been provided that “no suit or proceedings shall lie or be taken without the previous sanction” of the Court or the authority concerned (Vide Sections 195 and 196 of the Cr PC, Section 92 of the CPC Section 70 of the Stamp Act, Section 223 of the Local Boards Act and Section 399 of the City Municipal Act). Par from being a prohibitory section, as is the case in other enactments, the section in the Companies Act is an enabling one which says that the liquidators shall have power, with the sanction of the Court, to institute criminal proceedings. We do not think that there is sufficient justification for us to import into the language of S. 179 the words “previous sanction”.

9. If the words “previous sanction” were to be imported into this section, then the administration of the affairs of the company in liquidation under the various sub-clauses of this section would become well nigh impossible, for, it would then become necessary that the liquidators should run up to the Court even for ordinary acts of administering the properties and affairs of the company. At that rate, it would be inconceivable that the administration of the company in liquidation could ever be carried on. So, it is that the section has provided in general terms that the liquidators shall have power, with the sanction of the Court, to do acts which are enumerated in the various sub-clauses without laying it down that such sanction is a condition precedent to the taking of steps for the administration of the company by the Official Liquidators. On the point that previous leave is necessary, the learned counsel has invited our attention to a decision in — ‘Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King’, AIR 1948 P.C 82 (A), wherein it has been observed that Section 537 of the Cr PC does not cure the lack of leave. We do not think that in the circumstances of this case that decision has any application. Reference has also been invited to the decisions in — ‘Thangamani In re, AIR 1951 Mad 610 (B), — ‘Dowood Mohideen v. Sahabdeen’, AIR 1937 Mad 667 (C), to support the contention that the general power to institute proceedings is not sufficient and that leave is a condition precedent for the filing of the complaint under the Companies Act. On the facts of this case, we are unable to see that these decisions have any bearing.

10. In the absence of specific terms that sanction should be previously obtained, it follows, as a necessary corollary, that the sanction required by the Official Liquidators could be given by the concerned authority at any time, even after the proceedings have actually been instituted or even in the course of the proceedings. On the materials placed before us by the Official Liquidators, we find that, as a matter of fact, the learned company Judge has given the sanction to institute proceedings under Section 238-A of the Companies Act even before the institution of the proceedings took place and has also given further sanction under S. 282-A of the Act, in the course of the application taken out by the liquidators for proceedings against the appellant. In the order passed by the learned company Judge in Appln. No. 3054 of 1949 on 22-11-1949, the Official Liquidators were directed to file an application for the commitment of the appellant to prison for violation of the directions given to him on 7 and 14-10-1949. In the notice of motion in Appln. No. 4572 of 1949, the applicants prayed for appropriate orders under Ss. 238-A and 282-A. This notice of motion was filed under four sections, viz., 183, 185, 238-A and 282-A of the Companies Act and under Rule 9 of the Original Side rules and under the Banking Companies Ordinance dated 23-9-1949. Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the affidavit filed in support of the notice of motion in Appln. No. 4572 of 1949 mention that the appellant had rendered himself liable to be dealt with under Ss. 238-A and 282-A of the Companies Act and that it was therefore, just and necessary that the Court should be pleased to summon Loomchand Sait, the appellant, and commit him for contempt of Court and pass appropriate orders under Ss. 238-A and 282-A of the Companies Act. It is, therefore, clear that the Court was approached by the Official Liquidators not merely under S. 238-A but also under Section 282-A of the Companies Act.

11. While the order of Mack J. proceeded at the outset to state that he had treated the application substantially as one under S. 238-A for punishing Loomchand Sait for breach of his obligations under sub-ss. 1 and 2 of S. 238-A, in the course of his order, at a later stage, the learned Judge has observed as follows:

“There is abundant material before me to commit Loomchand Sait immediately to prison to undergo the maximum sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment on these counts proved against him under S. 238-A (1)(b). I should have had no hesitation in adopting this course but for a plea made by Mr. Ganapati Aiyar on behalf of the two creditors that in their own interests and in the interests of the general body of creditors action may be taken instead under Section 232-A of the Companies Act as, if Loomchand Sait is sent to prison, the creditors may not recover a substantial dividend as they would be deprived of his assistance in recovering the bank's liabilities…… I have decided to give Loomchand Sait in view of his having run this bank for nearly 17 years an opportunity of implementing his assertion that he can still find 16 annas in the rupee to be paid to his creditors and to apply to this case S. 282-A under which also this application has been filed and not to send Loomchand Sait immediately to prison though he richly deserves it in view of my findings under S. 238-A.”

12. In para. 7 of his order, the learned Judge further discusses the scope of both Ss. 238-A and 282-A and the various requirements that have to be satisfied for action being taken under either of the sections and finally winds up by saying that it would be manifestly desirable in the interests of winding up administration and that he could see no legal impediment in the way of S. 282-A toeing applied in suitable cases in the interests of creditors, although the immediate commitment to prison of the delinquent director or managing agent under S. 238-A would be legally justified.

13. A reading of the relevant passages of the order of the learned company Judge referred to and extracted above would clearly prove that even if it were contended with any force that previous sanction had not been accorded to the Official Liquidators for instituting criminal proceedings, such sanction had been actually given to the Official Liquidators in the course of the proceedings by the learned company Judge. Since we are of the opinion that Section 179 of the Companies Act does not preclude the giving of sanction by the concerned authority even in the course of the proceedings or on application, we do not think that there is anything wrong in the learned company Judge having accorded sanction in the course of the proceedings. In this view, it will be futile to contend that the Official liquidators had not obtained sanction from the Court for instituting criminal proceedings which have terminated in the conviction and sentence of the appellant. We think S. 179 has been substantially complied with, there being no statutory prohibition against proceedings being instituted without the previous sanction of the Court. Section 17 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, we may state, has been interpreted to mean that sanction could be given even during the course of the proceedings.

14. The learned Official Liquidators have invited our attention to the decisions in — ‘Mrityunjay v. Provot Kumar’, AIR 1953 Cal 153 (D); — ‘The Official Receiver, Coimbatore v. Kanga’, AIR 1922 Mad 51 (E); — ‘Emperor v. Bishan Sahai Vidyarthi’, AIR 1937 All 714 (F); — ‘Subramania Aiyar v. The Pondanur Bank Ltd. Thiruvadamarudur’, AIR 1947 Mad 343 (G), and — ‘Laduram Mathmul v. Nandalal’, AIR 1920 Cal 113 (2) (H), wherein the broad principle has been enunciated that the grant of leave is a matter between the Court and the receiver or the Official Liquidators and that the sections requiring leave of the Court in the Companies Act and in the Insolvency Acts are only administrative provisions which are the matters entirely between the Official Liquidators or the Official Receivers and the Court. It is also urged by the learned Official Liquidators that if leave is not obtained, it will be merely an error which can be rectified at a later stage. In the view we have taken, we do not think that we need go into this question any further. The learned Official Liquidators have invited our attention to a comparison of S. 171 with Section 179 of the Companies Act and they urge that the language of the two sections is different, that whereas Section 171 of the Companies Act requires that leave should be obtained as a condition precedent, the same is not the case with S. 179 of the Act. They have also relied upon the decisions in — ‘Bhagirath Chandra v. Emperor’, AIR 1948 Cal 42 (1) and — ‘Sunilchandra v. Krishnachandra’, AIR 1949 Cal 689 (J). where even the requirements of S. 171 have been liberally interpreted.

15. Mr. Rajah Aiyar has next urged that the complaint in this case by the Official Liquidators ought to have been filed in the name and on behalf of the company, and that, in this case, it has been filed merely by the Official Liquidators of the company. The proceedings are not, according to him, in the name and on behalf of the company as required by law. He invites our attention to Section 177 of the Companies Act, which provides for the formalities to be observed in proceedings under the Companies Act. S. 177 is to the following effect:

“The Official Liquidator shall be described by the style of the Official Liquidator of the particular company in respect of which he is appointed, and not by his individual name.”

16. The question is whether the requirements of this section have been substantially complied with by the form in which the proceedings have been instituted by the Official Liquidators of the company before the Court dealing with the company matters. It is true that S. 282-A says that action is to be taken on the complaint of the company and Mr. Rajah Aiyar would urge that the Judge cannot take any action ‘suo motu’. In this case, the Official Liquidators it is that have moved the Court for the investigation into the default committed by the appellant and, as has already been pointed out, the notice of motion filed by the liquidators has been filed only under S. 282-A as well as the other sections. There is, therefore, no question of the Judge taking action ‘suo motu’ in this case. The complaint has been by the liquidators on behalf of the company for which they have been appointed Official Liquidators. Besides, an examination of the cause-title of the application and the notice of motion that have been taken out by the liquidators clearly set out that the applications are in the matter of the Companies Act 7 of 1913 and in the matter of the Peerdan Joharmal Bank Ltd. in liquidation and the proceedings are stated to be between N. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, the petitioner and Peerdan Joharmal Bank Ltd. the respondent and also between A. Balasubramaniam and C.S Vidyasankaran, joint Official Liquidators, applicants and J. Loomchand Sait, respondent.

17. It is true that the applicants in the said application and the notice of motion have not been described as the Peerdan Juharmal Bank Ltd. (in liquidation) by the joint official liquidators, Messrs A. Balasubramaniam and C.S Vidyasankaran. The question is as to whether by their inscribing their name as they have actually done instead of adopting the form which they should have done, it would be so serious a defect as to vitiate the entire proceedings and whether it would go to prove that the proceedings have not been in the name and on behalf of the company. In our opinion, the non-compliance with this formal requirement in the matter of the description of the applicants in the said notice of motion and the application, cannot and will not alter the substance of the applications which, we have to state, are substantially in the name and on behalf of the company. In — ‘Muhammad Yusuf…(Defendant); v. The Himalaya Bank Limited…(Plaintiff).*’, 18 All 198 (F.B) (K), it has been held that where the Official Liquidator described himself merely as “the Official Liquidators, the Himalaya Bank Ltd. in liquidation” and did not describe himself as “The Himalaya Bank Ltd. in liquidation, the plaintiff”, there was a substantial compliance with the provisions of Act 6 of 1882 (the Indian Companies Act) and that even if it was considered that any amendment was necessary under the Code of Civil Procedure such an amendment would not introduce a new plaintiff into the suit so as to let in the operation of S. 22 of Act 15 of 1877, Limitation Act. Even so, in — ‘Shiamlal Diwan v. Official liquidator, U.P Oil Mills Co. Ltd.’, AIR 1933 All 789 (F.B) (L), the learned Judges have held that even if the proceedings are not in the name and on behalf of the company, they must be deemed to be by the company through its liquidators when the Official Liquidators have taken the proceedings in the matter of the company in liquidation. We do not think, therefore, that there is any grave defect in the omission committed in the manner and form of description of the applicants in the two applications that have been filed by the Official Liquidators in this matter.

18. A more substantial point of law that has been urged by Mr. Rajah Aiyar, the learned counsel for the appellant, is that under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, no person can be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. He contends that Section 282-A of the Companies Act provides a double punishment, in that it provides for a fine not exceeding a thousand rupees also a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years for the same offence. The terms of S. 282-A are as follows:

“Any director, managing agent, manager or other officer or employee of a company who wrongfully obtains possession of any property of a company, or having any such property in his possession wrongfully withholds it or wilfully applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by this Act, shall, on the complaint of the company or any creditor or contributory thereof, be punishable with fine not exceeding one thousand rupees and may be ordered by the Court trying the offence to deliver up or refund within a time to be fixed by the Court any such property improperly obtained or wrongfully withheld or wilfully misapplied or in default to suffer imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years.”

19. A reading of this section shows that what is provided for in the first instance is a fine not exceeding Rs. 1000 to be imposed upon the director or other person found guilty and an order to be passed by the. Court directing the person complained of to deliver or refund the property improperly obtained or wrongfully withheld or wilfully misapplied by him; and in the second place, the section goes on to provide that, if the person against whom the fine and the order have been passed commits default, he may be ordered to suffer imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years.

20. This default clause imposing a term of imprisonment might come into operation either in case the person fined fails to pay the fine imposed or when he fails to comply with the order passed against him. It may also be that the said default clause might come into operation when the person against whom the fine and the order have been passed commit's default in both. The intention and the language of the latter part of S. 282-A seem to be that there should be a term of imprisonment imposed upon the person, who has already been fined and ordered to do a certain thing, if he fails to comply with either or with both. If the words “of either or both” had been inserted between the words “default” and “to suffer”, the language of the section would have become complete and explicit. Though these words do not actually occur in the language of the section, still we think that what has been aimed at by the section is only that in default of either paying the fine or complying with the order for delivery etc., or both, there should be a punishment by way of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. We do not think that the language of the section is capable of being so interpreted as to say that it provides for a double punishment for one and the same offence.

21. It provides a punishment in the first instance on proof of an offence, and enables the Court to pass an order along with the punishment, and in default of the party complying with the payment of the fine or the compliance with the order, a punishment for such default has been prescribed. It is only an alternative punishment arising when default is committed. It is quite in consonance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence on which our criminal laws are based, & we do not think that this S. 282-A offends against Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. Though the commentaries so far available on this Article 20(2) are meagre, still, the commentaries that have been placed before us, viz., that of Mr. Basu on the Indian Constitution and the Constitution of India by Mr. N.R Raghavachariar do not enable us to say that Section 282-A of the Companies Act, could be construed as providing for a double punishment. The commentators have discussed the point of double punishment while dealing with Article 20(2) and have opined that the word “and” in the phrase “prosecuted & punished” could be taken either as a conjunctive or a disjunctive word. Whatever might be the comment on that aspect of the language contained in Article 20(2), in this case, there can be no substance in the contention that the appellant has been prosecuted and punished twice over for the same offence; much less is it a case of the appellant being simply punished twice over for the same offence. In other words, whether the word “and” occurring in the phrase “prosecution and punished” be simply taken as a conjunction or a disjunctive “word”, in our opinion, it cannot be contended with any force that the appellant in this case has been either prosecuted twice or punished twice for the same offence. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the punishment imposed on the appellant in this case would amount to a double punishment fort one and the same offence.

22. The third point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that inasmuch as the present proceedings have been also taken under the Banking Companies Act and so far no rules having been framed by the Court under the Banking Companies Act, as required by Section 45(G) of the said Act, the proceedings out of which this appeal has arisen must be considered to be vitiated and void. Section 45(G) of the Banking Companies Act is in the following terms:

“The court may make rules consistent with this Act concerning the mode of proceedings to he had for the decision of all claims or questions and all other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, which are to be decided pursuant to the provisions of Part III or Part III-A and concerning all other matters for which provision has to be made for enabling the court to effectively exercise its functions under the said provisions.”

23. While it has not been brought to our notice that any rules have actually been framed for criminal proceedings under the said Act by the High Court, which is the Court defined under S. 45-A, no authority has been placed before us to show that simply because rules required by S. 45-G have not been framed, the proceedings taken under the Companies Act as will as the Banking Companies Act are null and void and that the High Court has no jurisdiction to inquire into the same and pass orders thereon. If the rules have not been framed as required by the said S. 45-G in our opinion, the existing rules framed under the Companies Act under which also this application has been taken out would be applicable to the proceedings in question. Even otherwise, if no rules have been framed under the Banking Companies Act under which this application is said to have been taken out since the matter is one that is dealt with on the Original Side of the High Court by the Judge dealing with company matters, we think that the procedure laid down by the Original Side rules will apply until such time as the rules required to be proved for under Section 45-G of the Banking Companies Act, have actually been framed. In any case, we do not think that it could be validly urged that the proceedings that have been instituted and have been investigated into by the learned Judge sitting on the Original Side and dealing with company matters are without jurisdiction or that they are in any way defective or vitiated by reason of the non-framing of the rules under Section 45-G of the Banking Companies Act.

24. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that under S. 45-G, the Court may, if it thinks fit, take cognisance of and try in a summary way any offence alleged to have been committed by any person who has taken part in the formation or promotion of the banking company which is being wound up or any past or present director, manager or officer thereof.

25. There is also a proviso to this section which is in the following terms:

“Provided that the offence is one punishable under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, 7 of 1913, with imprisonment for a term which does not exceed two years, or with fine which does not exceed one thousand rupees.”

26. The second clause of this section 45-C sets forth details as to what the trying Court should do if the case is tried summarily under sub-s. 1 of the said section. To this clause also there is a further clause which says that nothing contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 262 of the Cr PC, 1898, shall apply to any such trial. The third sub-clause of this section (S. 45-C) lays down thus:

“All offences in relation to winding up alleged to have been committed by any person specified in sub-sec. (1), which are punishable under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, 7 of 1913, and which are not tried in the summary way under sub-sec. (1) shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary, contained in that Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, 5 of 1898, or in any other law for the time being in force, be taken cognizance of and tried by a Judge of the Court other than the Judge for the time being dealing with the proceedings for the winding up of the banking company.”

27. The fourth sub-clause of the section says:

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, 5 of 1898, the Court shall take cognisance of any offence under this section without the accused being committed to it for trial and all such trials shall be without the aid of a jury.”

28. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that in so far as the offence complained of against the appellant is one which is capable of being punished with imprisonment for a period which does not exceed two years or with fine which does not exceed Rs. 1000, the case should have been tried in a summary manner. In which case, his contention is, that, as per the Code of Criminal Procedure, such cases should be tried only by a Presidency Magistrate in the Presidency town and not by the High Court. Reliance for this position is placed on the decisions in — ‘K. Sundaresa Aiyar In re’, AIR 1950 Mad 657 (M) and ‘In re Veerappan’, AIR 1944 Mad 424 (N)’. We do not think that these decisions apply to the facts of the present case. Even so, the learned counsel has invited our attention to the decision in — ‘Harishchandra v. Kavindranarain Sinha’, AIR 1936 All 830 (FB) (O) and argues that the High Court has no jurisdiction under Section 85 (sic) of the Companies Act. We are unable to agree with this contention. The Banking Companies Act has defined the Court as the High Court which has jurisdiction to try cases under the Banking Companies Act and the procedure has been prescribed by section 45-C of the said Banking Companies Act, and we do not think that there has been any irregularity in the procedure followed by the Company Judge in the trial of this case. But the argument is that if the trial has been in a summary manner as contemplated by S. 45-C, the proper Court vested with the jurisdiction to try the offence would have been the Presidency Magistrate's Court and not the High Court. We do not think that we can agree with this contention for the reason that the Court has been, defined in Section 45-A of the Banking Companies Act as the High Court exercising jurisdiction in the place where the registered office of the banking company which is being wound up is situated. Therefore, the proper and competent Court contemplated of the scheme of the Act would only be the High Court and not the Presidency Magistrate's Court, even if it is contended that the offence has been tried in a summary way.

29. In the alternative, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that if the offence has not been tried in a summary way under sub-s. (1) of S. 45-C, then it should have been tried by a Judge other than the Judge for the time being dealing with the proceedings in winding up of the banking company. His point is that in the present case, the procedure that has been followed is that of a warrant case, i.e, where witnesses have been first examined and the appellant has been called upon to enter into his defence. In such an event, according to the learned counsel, the Judge who should have tried this offence should not be the Judge dealing with the winding up proceedings of the Banking company but some other Judge. But, actually, in the present proceedings, the same Judge dealing with company matters has also been the Judge who tried the offence and imposed the punishment against the appellant. On this ground, the learned counsel for the appellant argues that the whole proceedings have been vitiated and they should be treated as incompetent and as a nullity. The appellant ought not to have been tried by the same Judge who was dealing with the winding up of the banking company of which the appellant has been the managing director. The Official Liquidators, however, contend that the offence, in the present case, has been tried only in a summary way but the procedure followed has been that prescribed for warrant cases. They urge that it is open to the Court which tries an offence in a summary way to adopt the procedure of a warrant case, and in this case, since the offence is one that is liable to be punished by a fine not exceeding Rs. 1000 and a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years, the Court has, in fact, tried the offence only in a summary way and not tried it as a warrant case, keeping in view the sub-cl. (1) and the proviso to section 45-C of the Banking Companies Act.

30. Merely because the procedure followed has, been that of a warrant case, while the case is being tried in a summary way, it cannot be said that the Judge dealing with the proceedings for the winding up of the Banking company was not competent to try the offence. Though a reading of the judgment of the learned Judge who tried the offence, ‘prima facie’, shows that the procedure followed has been the one prescribed for a warrant case, still it is not certain and no evidence has been placed before us to show that the offence has not been tried in a summary way. It has therefore to be presumed that the offence has been tried only in accordance with S. 45-C sub-cl. (1) and not tried as contemplated in sub-cl. (3) of the said S. 45-C. That being the case, we think that the Court which has tried the offence for which the appellant has been convicted, has jurisdiction and has exercised the power vested in it to try the offence in a summary way and the proceedings cannot, therefore, be said to be Vitiated. If the case has been tried in a summary way, as we think it has been, then S. 45-C sub-cl. (2) provides that sub-cl. (2) of Section 262 of the Cr PC, 1898 shall not apply to any such trial. We therefore cannot feel ourselves persuaded to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there has been any defect such as to nullify the trial of the appellant for the offence for which he has been convicted.

31. There was a further point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that in this case no fraudulent intention has been proved on the part of the appellant as is required by Section 282-A of the Companies Act. When the case was remanded by the appellate Court it did observe that to render the appellant liable to the penalties imposed by Section 282-A of the Companies Act, there should be proof of fraudulent intention. The learned Chief Justice, who delivered the judgment of the appellate court has referred to the decisions in — ‘Barrett v. Markham’, 7 Common Pleas 405 (P) and also to the decision in — ‘Madden v. Rodes’, 1908-1-K.B. 534 (Q), wherein it has been laid down that the person who is proceeded against for withholding or misapplying monies belonging to the company should be proved to have had a fraudulent intention in doing so. Of course, it has been observed by the learned Chief Justice in the said judgment that fraud cannot be directly proved but it could be inferred from the circumstances. In this case, the learned Judge, who has tried this appellant, has, in the last two paragraphs of his judgment found that the Official liquidators have established that the appellant has acted fraudulently and that the appellant had brought himself to be proceeded against under Section 282-A of the Indian Companies Act.

32. The learned Judge has further observed that the whole conduct of the appellant in regard to the cash in the safe and the jewels would show his fraudulent intention to utilise public money for private purposes and that there was no question of his acting honestly, and dealing fairly with the properties belonging to the bank, that therefore, it was a clear case of fraud and dishonesty on the part of the appellant. The point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant in this connection is that the charges have been framed in a wrong manner and as the charges stand they only state that the appellant had wrongly withheld the properties in his possession and not that he had acted fraudulently or dishonestly in doing so. The essence of the charge, according to the counsel for the appellant, is merely misapplication of properties and not that he had any fraudulent intention in such misappropriation. As has been pointed out by the learned trial Judge, the fraudulent intention on the part of the appellant could be inferred from his conduct in regard to the funds and properties of the bank of which he was the managing director. We have been taken through the entire evidence, oral and documentary, in this case, by the learned counsel on both sides and we do not think that any sufficient reason, has been shown to us to dissent from the conclusions which the learned trial Judge has arrived at in holding that the circumstances of this case prove beyond doubt that the conduct of the appellant was motivated by a fraudulent and dishonest intention to deprive the bank of its properties.

33. We do not also think that there is much substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Judge had prejudged the appellant's case by his order dated, the 25th April 1951 in which the learned trial Judge held that there was a ‘prima facie’ case made out to justify the court to frame charges, against the appellant.

34. The learned counsel for the appellant invites our attention to Section 281 of the Companies Act which provides that if it appears to the court hearing the case that the person proceeded against for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, has acted honestly and reasonably he ought fairly to be excused for the negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, that the court may relieve him either wholly or partly, from his liability on such terms as the court may think fit. We do not think that, on the facts of this case, the learned counsel for the appellant have succeeded in establishing to our satisfaction that there is justification to invoke the aid of this section in favour of the appellant. The explanations given by the appellant for his conduct in respect of the properties belonging to the company do not enable us to come to the conclusion” that he has acted honestly and reasonably. All the circumstances which have been placed before us go to prove only the contrary, namely, that the appellant has not acted in any ‘bona fide’ manner, much less honestly or reasonably. Except the point that at a time when there was a run on the bank the appellant had tried to meet the situation there is nothing else which can be said to his credit. The facts reveal that in dealing with the properties of the bank, the appellant has tried not merely to help himself at the expense of the bank, but also to help all his near and dear relations with funds belonging to the bank and the amounts thus disbursed to his relations amount to several lakhs of rupees and the Official Liquidators submit that there is no possibility of the bank recovering even a small proportion of these several lakhs disbursed to these close relations of the appellant.

35. Such a conduct on the part of the appellant cannot be said to be any circumstances that, should enable the court to think that the appellant could be fairly excused for his negligence, default or breach of duty, or breach of trust in order to deserve any relief either wholly or partly. In fact, notwithstanding this reprehensive conduct, on the part of the appellant as has been proved by the evidence in the case, we did give him an opportunity to prove his bona fides so as to see what relief could be afforded to him. We directed him to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000 in the aggregate in instalments to the Official liquidators within a reasonable time to be fixed and to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000 by way of first instalment thereof within a week. We also gave him time to consider over the matter and make up his mind whether he would be agreeable to the suggestions made by us, but his learned counsel represented that the appellant was not in a position to agree to the proposal A sum of Rs. 50,000 before a very infinitesimal proportion to the huge sum of about Rs. 18,00,000/- in which the Bank was indebted to its creditors and also bore a shall proportion to the sum of Rs. 2,00,000 that the appellant was called upon to pay by the order which is under appeal. We therefore find it impossible to exercise any indulgence in favour of the appellant even under Section 281 of the Companies Act, which was invoked by the learned counsel on his behalf.

36. On the question of the liability of the appellant in respect of the Government securities which formed also the subject matter of the charges against him, the learned counsel for the appellant relies upon a resolution of the Board of directors condoning the disposal of the Government securities by the appellant and contends that in the face of this condonation by the Board of directors, the charge in respect of the Government securities cannot stand. We have perused the resolution said to have been passed by the Board of directors and we do not think that it is capable of being interpreted in the sense in which the learned counsel for the appellant would like to have it. The resolution, in our opinion, is only a record by the company of what the appellant is said to have done and it does not appear to us to contain the approval by the Board of Directors of the conduct of the appellant in respect of the Government securities. In fact, the latter part of the resolution directs the appellant to rectify the position which resulted from his conduct. This the appellant has not chosen to do.

37. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the resolution of the Board of Directors affords any protection against the charge which he has been called upon to answer. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the decisions in — ‘Dovey v. Cory’, (1901) A.C 477 (R), Blyth's case, 4 Ch. D. 140 (S) and In re — ‘Kingston Cotton Mill Co.’, (1898) 1-Ch. 331 (T), and the learned counsel argues that the directors must be deemed to have acted as a man of business in having disposed of the Government securities and if his conduct has been merely imprudent, it cannot be criminally liable, and he must be deemed to have resorted to honest, reasonable and bona fide payments with a view to save the credit of the Bank. Such honest and reasonable conduct cannot be the subject of criminal charge under Section 282-A of the Companies Act, is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. He has invited our attention to a decision in Natesan In re, — ‘AIR 1949 Mad 657 (U), in this connection. We do not think that we can accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant on this aspect of the case. In our view, the conduct of the appellant cannot be brought within the scope of the rule laid down in these decisions. On a consideration of all the contentions and the arguments placed before us by the learned counsel for the appellant, we do not think that any sufficient ground has been shown to us to dissent from the order of the learned trial Judge. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the charges have been proved against the appellant on the evidence that has been, placed before the trial court and the conviction and sentence by the learned trial Judge are correct. We, therefore, while confirming the conviction and sentence, dismiss this appeal. The Official Liquidators will have their costs of this appeal from out of the assets of the bank in their hands. The appellant will surrender before the Registrar on 19-12-1952.

A/D.H

38. Appeal dismissed.