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Km. Kr. Kr. Ramanath... v. N.M Kandappa Goundan...

Madras High Court
Apr 21, 1950
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Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant instituted a suit on 9-8-1944 to recover principal and interest under three promissory notes dated 21-8-1929, 28-8-1929 and 4-9-1929. To avoid the bar of limitation, the appellant relied on four endorsements of payment; the last endorsement was made on 9-8-1941. Both courts below found that these endorsements were "open payments" and, under Section 20 of the Limitation Act as it stood before the amending Act (Act XVI of 1942/1943), such endorsements would not prevent the claim from being barred by limitation. The appellant argued that the Amending Act applied and that the endorsements would suffice under the amended Section 20. Both courts below concluded that the claim had become barred before the Amending Act came into force and dismissed the suit as time-barred. The appeal reached the present court for consideration by a Division Bench because the question was considered of frequent occurrence and sufficient importance.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Amending Act (Act XVI of 1942 / the amendment to Section 20 of the Limitation Act) applied to the appellant's suit so as to make the endorsements sufficient to save the claim from the bar of limitation.
  2. Whether a right of action which had become barred by the law of limitation in force before a subsequent amending enactment came into force is revived by that later enactment, or whether a barred right remains barred notwithstanding the subsequent amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (through Mr. N. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar) contended that the Amending Act applied to the suit and, therefore, the endorsements (including the last endorsement dated 9-8-1941) would be sufficient within the meaning of Section 20 as amended.
  • He urged a distinction between (a) cases involving immoveable property where extinguishment and acquisitive prescription operate (resulting in a statutory transfer of title), and (b) cases of debts where extinguishment in the same sense does not occur; in the latter, a barred debt remains an existing debt though remedies are barred, and therefore the amending Act should be allowed to operate to make the remedy available.
  • He relied on several Indian decisions and authorities he submitted supported the application of the amending Act even where, on the date of its commencement, the remedy to enforce the claim was time-barred under the earlier law.
  • He advanced two further contentions: (i) that retention of the proviso to Section 20(1) after amendment indicated legislative intent to apply the amendment to prior transactions; and (ii) that because Section 20(1) had been substituted, the new provision should be deemed retrospective. The opinion records that the court found no substance in either contention.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's arguments in this appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mangapathi Naidu v. Krishnaswami Naidu Decision directly covering the legal point before the court (treatment of amending Limitation Act where right possibly barred). The case is treated as directly applicable and supportive of the view adopted by the court in this appeal.
Hanumayamma v. Venkatanarasimharao (unreported, C. R. P. 148 of 1947) Expressed the same effect on the issue as Mangapathi Naidu. Noted as being to the same effect; used to reinforce the conclusion.
Appaswami Odayar v. Subramania Principle that if a right was barred under an earlier Limitation Act, later Limitation Acts do not revive the right. Quoted as an early Privy Council authority establishing the rule relied upon by the court.
Mohesh Narain v. Taruak Nath Reinforces that a later act (1877) could not revive a right already barred under an earlier act (1871). Cited to dismiss the contention that limitation should be determined by reference to a later statute when the right was already barred under an earlier statute.
Khunnilal v. Gobind Krishnanarain Nothing in later Limitation Acts can revive a right already barred. Used to support the principle that a barred right is not revived by later statutes.
Sachindra Nath v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh A later Limitation Act is not so retrospective as to revive a judgment or decree that had become unenforceable by lapse of time. Cited to show the Privy Council's view that later acts do not revive unenforceable decrees.
Ramayya v. Lakshmayya If a right of action was already barred under an earlier statute, subsequent Limitation Acts cannot defeat the title acquired under the earlier law. Quoted for the proposition that if defendants show the right was barred earlier, later Limitation Acts cannot be used to overturn that bar.
Soniram v. Kanhayalal Illustrates a factual situation where there was no question of reviving a barred claim because the claim was alive when the later Act came into force. Examined and held inapplicable to the appellant's situation; the court notes the facts show the earlier decision cannot assist the appellant.
Baleswar v. Latafat (Patna) Held (supporting appellant) that the provisions of the Limitation Act as amended should operate to decide limitation questions even for prior transactions. The court finds the reasoning flawed; later decisions have shaken its authority and it does not furnish proper assistance.
Jagadish v. Saligram (Patna) Patna decision relevant to the same issue; subsequently seen to diminish the authority of Baleswar. Noted as having shaken the authority of Baleswar; court treats these Patna decisions as not furnishing proper assistance.
Pitambar v. Lakshmidhar (Orissa) Held that where Section 28 did not apply, a barred debt is an existing debt and amending Act of 1942 applied even if remedy was barred when the amending Act came into force. The court respectfully disagrees: it emphasizes limitation deals with remedies and if the remedy was gone when the amending Act came into force there is no principle by which it becomes available again.
Mahesh Lal v. Basant Kumari (Calcutta) Supports appellant's argument based on the distinction between right and remedy. Recognized but noted as criticized in commentary (Mitra) and not generally followed on this point.
Vaha Thamturatti v. Vira Rayan Early authority; one judge indicated hesitation to hold that a new Limitation Act revives suits where the right had ceased under the old law. Quoted to show judicial caution about reviving barred rights by subsequent acts; supports the court's approach.
Teagaraya Mudali v. Mariappa Pillai Demonstrates a case where the claim was still alive at the commencement of a new Act, and hence the new Act applied. Used to show that where a claim is alive when a new Act commences, the new Act governs; court distinguishes such facts from the present case.
Pearylal v. Solu Gir Summarised the rule: if a claim is within limitation when the new Act comes into force, the new Act governs; but if the right was already barred, the new Act cannot revive it unless expressly retrospective. The court expressly agrees with this summary and applies it to the facts of the present appeal.
Moheshlal v. Busunt Kumaree Listed by the court among decisions adopting a contrary view on the revivability question. The court states it is compelled to dissent from decisions expressing the contrary view, including this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from well-established propositions and the facts found below. First, the court accepts the principle that the law of limitation applicable to a suit is ordinarily the law in force on the date the suit is instituted, and that limitation statutes are generally procedural and may operate retrospectively to govern causes of action that arose before their enactment.

However, the court explains a limiting qualifier to this generality: where a right of action has already become barred by the provisions of the law in force at the time a later amendment or new enactment comes into force, the later enactment does not revive that previously barred right unless the later statute contains an express provision to that effect. The court supports this with statutory history (Section 2 of the Limitation Act, 1877 and the General Clauses Act provision) and a preponderance of judicial authorities—in particular Privy Council rulings—which consistently hold that a right once barred is not revived by a subsequent Limitation Act.

Applying these principles to the facts, both courts below had found the endorsements to be "open payments" which, under the Limitation Act as it stood prior to the amending Act, did not prevent the claim from being time-barred. The appellant's primary contention—that the amending Act should apply so that the endorsements would suffice—was considered in light of the rule that a later Act does not revive a claim which had already become barred. The court examined Indian authorities relied upon by the appellant and additional decisions (including some High Court decisions that appeared to support the appellant) and explained why those authorities were either distinguishable on their facts, criticized, or of diminished persuasive value.

The court also rejected two further contentions raised by the appellant: (1) that the retention of the proviso to Section 20(1) in the amended text implied legislative intent to apply the amendment retrospectively to prior transactions (the court found no bearing on the core issue), and (2) that the substitution of a new sub-section for Section 20(1) should be interpreted as making the amendment retrospective (the court found no authority for such a broad retrospective operation and observed that clear language would be used if that had been intended).

On analysis of authorities and principles, including agreement with the summary in Pearylal v. Solu Gir and several Privy Council decisions, the court concluded that where a remedy was already gone by lapse of time when the amending Act came into force, there is no legal basis to hold that the remedy becomes available again by virtue of the amendment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded that the suit was barred by limitation and therefore the second appeal is dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the appellant's claim is time-barred and the appeal fails; costs were awarded against the appellant.
  • The decision reiterates and applies the established principle—supported by Privy Council authorities and affirmed by the court—that a subsequent Limitation Act or amendment does not revive a right to sue which had already been barred under the earlier law, absent an express retroactive provision in the later enactment.
  • The court explicitly declines to follow certain contrary High Court decisions it considered to be of limited persuasive value on the point; it indicates it is compelled to dissent from those conflicting authorities.
  • If the opinion discusses no broader implications beyond the parties, the immediate and controlling consequence is the dismissal of the appeal and confirmation that the claim was barred by limitation at the time the amending Act came into force.
Show all summary ...

1. The facts necessary for appreciating the question of law which arises in this appeal may be briefly stated. The appellant field a suit to recover amounts due for principal and interest under three promissory notes dated 21-8-1929, 28-8-1929 and 4-9-1929. The suit was filed on 9-8-1944. The appellant relied upon four endorsements of payment to save the claim from the bar of limitation. The last of such endorsements was made on 9-8-1941. It has been found by both the Courts below that these endorsements are of "open payments" which would not save the claim from the bar of limitation under Section 20, Limitation Act, as it stood before the Amending Act XVI [16] of 1943. The appeal was argued on that assumption. The contention on behalf of the appellant was that the Amending Act applied to the suit and the endorsements would be sufficient within the meaning of Section 20 as amended by it. Both the Courts held that the appellant could not rely upon the Amending Act, because the claim to recover the amounts due under the suit promissory notes became barred by limitation prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act and dismissed the suit as barred by limitation.

2. The case is directly covered by the decision of Viswanatha Sastri J. in Mangapathi Naidu v. Krishnaswami Naidu, . An unreported decision of Somasundaram J. in Hanumayamma v. Venkatanarasimharao, C. R. P. 148 of 1947, dated 11-11-1949 is to the same effect. Satyanarayana Rao J. before whom the appeal came on originally for hearing, however, thought that as the question raised was of sufficient importance and of frequent occurrence there should be an authoritative decision by a Division Bench.

3. We agree with Mr. N. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar, the learned advocate for the appellant, that the law of limitation applicable to a suit or proceedings is the law in force at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding unless there is a distinct provision to the contrary. It is also well settled that the law of limitation being procedural law, its provisions operate retrospectively in the sense that they apply to causes of action which arose before their enactment. But on an examination of the authorities on the point, we find it equally well established that if a right to sue had become barred by the provisions of the limitation act then in force on the date of the coming into force of a later enactment, then such a barred right is not revived by the application of the new enactment.

4. Section 2, Limitation Act, 1877, expressly provided as follows:

"A reference to the Limitation Act, 1871, shall be read as if made to this Act, and nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect any title acquired, or to revive any right to sue barred, under that Act or under any enactment thereby repealed."

No doubt a similar provision is not found in the Limitation Act, 1908, but this is probably because of Section 6(a), General Clauses Act, 1897, which embodies a similar provision. Apart from decided cases, it appears to follow on principle that the right of action barred by limitation at the time when a new Act or amendment comes into force cannot be revived by the subsequent change in the law brought about by the new Act or amendment.

5. The preponderance of decided cases also leads us to the same conclusion. There is a long catena of Privy Council rulings in which we find the same principle enunciated. One of the earliest of such cases is Appaswami Odayar v. Subramania, 12 Mad. 26; (15 I. A. 167 P. C.). The point is dealt with thus:

"By Section 1, Clause 13 of Act XIV [14] of 1859, a suit for a share of the family property not brought within twelve years from the date of the last participation in the profits of it would be barred. This Act continued in force until 1-8-1871, when Act IX [9] of 1871 came into force. Consequently, if there was no participation of profits between 1837 and 1871, the suit would be barred, and the later Acts for limitation of suits need not be referred to. If they altered the law they would not revive the right of suit."

In Mohesh Narain v. Taruak Nath, 20 Cal. 487: (20 I. A. 30 P. c.), their Lordships refer to the case in Appasami Odayar v. Subramania Odayar, 12 Mad. 26: (15 I. A. 167 P. C.) and dismiss the contention that the question of limitation should be determined with reference to the provisions of the later statute of 1877, though the right was barred by the earlier statute of 1871 thus:

"It is clear that on 1-4-1873, the plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation under the act of 1871, and the act of 1877 could not revive the plaintiff's right so barred, a point which was indeed decided in regard to the Limitation Act of 1859 and 1871, in the case of Appasami Odayar v. Subramania Odayar, 12 Mad. 26: 15 I. A. 167 P. C."

In Khunnilal v. Gobind Krishnanarain, 33 ALL, 386: (38 I. A. 87) dealing with a similar point, their Lordships said:

"No suit could be brought, even if the enactments referred to above had permitted it, to enforce the right after the lapse of 12 years from the time the cause of action arose' (Section 1, Clause 12 of Act XIV [14] of 1859). Nothing in Article 142 of Act IX [9] of 1871 or in Article 141 of Act XV [15] of 1877 could lead to the revival of a right that had already become barred."

In Sachindra Nath v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh, 49 Oal. 203: (A. I. R. (9) 1922 P. C. 187) One of the questions to be considered was which of the two Limitation Acts, that of 1877 or that of 1908, applied to the case to ascertain whether certain decrees were enforceable. It appeared to their Lordships that this question must be determined "by the condition in which the decrees stood when the latter Act came into force on 1-1-1909". The date of the original decrees was 26-8-1905. They became unenforceable by proceedings commenced after 26-8-1908 according to the law as it stood before Act 1 [1] of 1908. A certain amount was paid on 2-2-1910, one year and three mouths after the statutory period had elapsed and over 13 months after 1-1-1909, when the latter Act had come into operation. Their Lordships in dealing with the effect of the latter Act observed:

"There is no provision in this latter Act so retrospective in its effect as to revive and make effective a judgment or decree which before that date had become unenforceable by lapse of time."

The latest case of the Privy Council in which this point is dealt with is Ramayya v. Lakshmayya, I. L. R. (1943) Mad. 1: (A. I. R. (29) 1942 P. C. 54). It is sufficient to extract the following passage at p. 10:

"The next point to consider on this part of the case is whether the plaintiff's suit is barred under Section 1, Clause 12, Limitation Act, XIV [14] of 1859. Ordinarily, the suit would be governed by the Limitation Act, IX [9] of 1908, which is the law in force when the suit was instituted; but if the defendants are able to show that the right of action had become barred under the Act of 1859 then the title that they had acquired could not be defeated by the subsequent Limitation Acts."

6. Mr. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar, the learned counsel for the appellant attempted to get over these decisions of the Judicial Committee by relying upon a distinction between cases in which rights to immoveable property were concerned in respect of which after the lapse of the statutory period there will be an extinguishment of title in one and the acquisition of title by the other and cases in which there is no such extinguishment and acquisition of rights in property. In the latter cases, he contended that though the remedy at law may be unavailable, nevertheless the right is not lost. There is certainly authority for the position that though a debt cannot be recovered by action if the debtor pleads the statute it remains an existing debt and can be made available for certain purposes, as for example, when the creditor may settle it up without resorting to an action. Instances of the application of this doctrine are to be found in its application to several branches of the law. A barred debt is a good foundation for a written promise to pay signed by the party liable to be charged therewith. Even if the claim against the principal debtor is barred, the surety is not discharged on that account only. An executor or administrator may deduct time-barred debts against the legatees. They can even pay time-barred debts except when they have been adjudicated upon in Courts. A father can validly alienate joint family property to pay his barred debt, The fundamental principle underlying all these instances is that though remedies are barred, rights are not extinguished. But it does not follow that be cause, rights are not extinguished, such rights can be deemed to be enforceable in a Court of law. In respect of claims to eights to or interests in immoveable property, besides the law of limitation, there is also the law of extinctive prescription which comes into operation. In such cases there is a negative as well as a positive aspect. By the lapse of time, one person loses his right to enforce his claim to such property. This is the negative aspect. At the end of the period the other person acquires a title. This is the positive aspect. The right which one has lost the other has acquired. There is in effect a statutory transfer of title. But in the cage of debts, obviously this doctrine is totally inapplicable. The fact that the creditor cannot enforce his right to re-cover his debt does not help the debtor to acquire any right to the debt. The debt remains a debt; only it cannot be recovered by the creditor in a Court of law. What is significant to notice is that their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in none of the cases above referred deal with the question as one of acquisitive prescription. They deal with the point as one of limitation and remedial procedure.

7. Mr. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar cited, in support of his contention that the amending Act of 1912 would apply even though on the date of its commencement the right to enforce the claim was barred by time according to the original Act, certain decisions of the Courts in India. Before dealing with them we should refer to the Privy Council ruling in Soniram v. Kanhayalal, 35 ALL. 227 : (40 I. A 74 P. C.) which was also relied on. An examination of the facts of the case clearly show that the decision therein cannot be of any possible assistance to the appellant in this case. A suit was brought on 4-4-1907 for redemption of a mortgage dated 9-3-1813. At the time of the institution of the suit under Article 148 of Schedule II, Limitation Act of 1877, the period of limitation was 60 years from the time when the right to redeem accrued. To get over the bar of limitation two acknowledgments of 1866 and 1867 made by two limited owners of the property were relied on. These acknowledgments could not be effective against the defendants (mortgagors), because they were not signed by the party against whom such right was claimed or by persons through whom they claimed title. But the acknowledgments would have been valid under the provisions of Act XIV [14] of 1859. Their Lordships held that act xiv [14] of 1859 did not apply to the suit and that the Act which applied is Act XV [15] of 1877 and as the acknowledgments made by the two limited owners were not proper acknowledgments within the meaning of section 19 of act xv [16] of 1877, they could not give any new period of limitation, From this statement of facts, it will be seen that no question there arose of reviving a barred claim. The claim to enforce the mortgage was quite alive when the new Act came into force and, therefore, it was the new Act which was applied.

8. There are two decisions of the Patna High Court which undoubtedly support the appellant's contention, but when the reasoning is analyse, it will be apparent that they cannot be considered as useful precedents. Baleswar v.

Latafat, 24 Pat. 249 : (A. I. R. (32) 1915 pat. 368), is the earlier of the two. The learned Judges did not really meet the point raised on behalf of the respondent before them that the right of the plaintiff to institute a suit on the handnote was extinguished before the amending Act had come into force, Manohar Lall J., who delivered the judgment of Bench said :

''Now here the right of the plaintiff to recover the debt had not become barred when Act XVI [16] of 1942 was passed."

It is difficult to follow this statement. But if this were so then of course the new Act would apply. Apparently, what the learned Judge meant was that though the debt had become barred, it had not ceased to exist We have already held that this doctrine does not have any bearing on the question of limitation. In the later decision in Jagadish v. Saligram, 24 Pat. 391 : (A. I. R. (33) 1946 Pat, 60), Manohar Lall J. was not very happy about his prior judgment. When his attention was drawn to cases in which it had been decided that a new amending Act could not have the effect of reviving a claim barred according to the previous law of limitation he observed :

"But unfortunately . . . the matter hag been decided expressly by a Division Bench of this Court, of which I was a member in Baleswar v. Latafat, 21 Pat, 249 : ( A.I.R.(32) 1945 Pat. 368), in which we held that the provisions of the limitation act applicable to such a suit are the provisions which existed on the date when the suit was instituted, and the provisions of Section 20, Limitation Act, as amended by Act XVI [16] of 1942 must operate to decide the question of limitation ... I desire to observe that when we gave our decision in Baleswar v. Latafat, 24 Pat. 249 : ( A. I. R. (32) 1945 Pat. 368) our attention was not drawn to the authorities by Mr. N.K. Prasad No. 1 which at the first sight may appear to present some difficulty, but I am not prepared to differ from the decision which we gave on that date."

Das J., the other learned Judge of the Division Bench expressed his own opinion thus :

"Had the matter not been settled by a decision of this Court, I would probably have come to the conclusion that the amending Act (Act XV[ [16] of 1942) cannot operate so as to revive and make effective a barred debt."

Though he was personally inclined to hold otherwise, he refused to go back upon the prior decisions of the Court. In our opinion, the subsequent decision in Jagadish v. Saligram, 24 pat. 391: (A. I. R. (33) 1946 pat. 60) has considerably shaken the authority of the earlier decision in Baleswar v. Latafat, 24 pat. 249 : (A. I. R. (32) 1945 pat. 363) and neither case can furnish proper assistance in the determination of the question before us.

9. Our attention was also drawn to a recent decision of the Orissa High Court in Pitambar v. Lakshmidhar, A. I. R. (36) 1949 Orissa 64 : (I.L.R. (1949) 1 Cal. 281) in which it was held that in the case of a debt to which Section 28, Limitation Act, does not apply, even & barred debt is for all purposes an existing debt and no question of revival of an extinguished right arises, in applying the amending Act of 1942 and therefore it would apply even though the remedy to recover the debt might have been barred by time when the amending Act came into force. With great respect to the learned Judges, we desire to point out that the law of limitation as such only deals with remedies to enforce rights in a Court of law. If therefore the remedy was gone when the amending Act came into force, there is no principle on which it could be held that the remedy again became available.

10. An earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mahesh Lal v. Basant Kumari, 6 Cal. 340 : (7 C. L. R. 121) does certainly support the appellant's contention based upon the distinction between remedy and right. But this case has been adversely criticised by Mitra in his Commentaries on Limitation Act (1911 Edn. Vol. 1 at pp. 291 and 892) and does not appear to have been followed on this point.

11. Mr. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar also relied on two early cases of our Court. The first of these is Vaha Thamturatti v. Vira Rayan, 1 Mad. 228, of the two Judges who decided that case, Morgan C. J. did not think that any question of limitation arose as the lender of the money was constituted a trustee. But he observed :

"If it had been necessary in my judgment to consider the operation of the new Limitation Act, I should have hesitated to hold that it allowed a suit to be brought in any case where the right of suit bad already ceased to exist under the old law. When the appointed period of limitation is by the law for the time being in force, complete, the remedy by suit is for ever gone unless the legislature thinks fit to make the old tight again actionable."

In the other case in the same volume in Teagaraya Mudali v. Mariappa Pillai, 1 Mad. 264 it was held that the exception of payment of interest contained in Section 81 of the Act, IX [9] of 1871, was not confined to payments made after that Act came into force, but applied also to payments made before that date. But an examination of the facts discloses that on the date of the commencement of the new Act of 1871 the claim on the registered promissory note of 1867 was still alive. Undoubtedly in such a case the new Act would apply.

12. In Pearylal v. Solu Gir, I. L. R. (1945) ALL. 896 : (A. I. R. (33) 1946 ALL. 58), Malik J. (as he then was) took the same view as Viswa-natha Sastri J. in Mangapathi Naidu v. Krishnaswami Naidu, . He summarised the law on the point thus :

It is clear, therefore, that, in the absence of anything to the contrary, if a claim is within limitation according to the old Act, on the date when the new Act comes into force and a proceeding is commenced, after the coming into force of the new Act, it is the new Act which would govern all decisions on the point of limitation. If, however, the right to sue or the right to apply had already been barred by the provisions of the limitation act then in force, then unless there was something in the latter Act which could be deemed to apply retrospectively to revive claims which had already become barred, the new Act oould not be availed of for the purpose of saving limitation.

We respectfully agree with this statement of the law. We are compelled to dissent from the decisions which express a contrary view, namely Baleswar v. Latafat, 24 pat. 249 : (A. I. R. (32) 1945 pat. 368), Jagadish v. Saligram, 24 Pat, 391 : (A. I. R. (33) 1946 Pat. 60), Pitambar v. Lakshmidar, A.I.R. (36) 1949 orissa 64 : (I.L.R. 1949-1 Cut. 281) and Moheshlal v. Busunt Kumaree, 6 Cal 340 : (7 C.L.R. 121).

13. Mr. Sivaramakrishna Aiyar raised two other contentions, but we consider that there is no substance in either of them. He argued that the proviso to Section 20 Sub-section (1) was allowed to remain as it was before even after the amending Act of 1942, and, therefore, it must be presumed that legislature contemplated the application of the new amendment to transactions prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act. This may be so, but we fail to see how this has any bearing on the question to be decided by us. The other contention of his was that as by the amending Act Section 20 (1) a new section was substituted for the old sub-section, the new provision must be deemed to be retrospective in operation. No authority was cited for this extraordinary position. If it was the intention of the Legislature to say that not only that the law should be in future as embodied in the amendment but that the law should be deemed to have always been as laid down by the amendment, then appropriate language would have been used as in other statutes in which such an intention is apparent, e. g. the recent amendment to Section 28, Provincial Insolvency Act.

14. The Courts below were right in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.