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Srinivasa Mudaliar v. Abraham Pillai .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This revision arises from an order of the District Judge of West Tanjore dismissing a petition to implead the present petitioner as an appellant in A.S. No. 15 of 1947 (an appeal arising from O.S. No. 206 of 1943). The original suit, O.S. No. 206 of 1943, was filed by the appellant in A.S. No. 15 of 1947 in the District Munsif's Court, Tiruvadi, for dissolution of partnership and for accounts against Abrahim Pillai and others. The plaintiff (the present petitioner's predecessor-in-interest) claimed a half-share in a rice mill and alleged contributions to the business; the District Munsif dismissed that suit with costs. An appeal (A.S. No. 15 of 1947) was filed against the dismissal.
While the appeal remained pending the appellant (Thaipal Anni alias Meenambal Anni) executed a will bequeathing the subject matter of the appeal to the present petitioner, Srinivasa Mudaliar; the will described the interest as including rights in the rice mill and the right to continue the appeal and enjoy any monies arising from success in that appeal. The petitioner filed I.A. No. 368 of 1947 under Order 22, Rule 3, CPC, seeking to be added as the legal representative and as appellant. The petition opposing party contested the will and opposed on legal grounds.
The District Judge held that the will effected only a mere right to sue (invoking Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act and the decision in Rajamanickam Chetti v. Abdul Halim Sahib) and consequently dismissed the petition to bring the petitioner on record; the District Judge further declared that the appeal had abated. This revision petition challenges only the order dismissing the petition to be brought on record as legal representative.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the terms of the will vested in the petitioner an interest that entitled him to be treated as the legal representative of the deceased appellant for the purpose of the pending appeal (i.e., whether the will transferred more than a mere right to sue).
- Whether the present remedy by way of civil revision was competent against the District Judge's order refusing to bring the petitioner on record under Order 22, Rule 3, CPC, or whether the petitioner was required to prefer an appeal (procedural competence of revision versus appeal in this context).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The will transferred a tangible interest — specifically a half-share in the rice mill with its assets and liabilities, together with the right to continue the appeal and enjoy profits — and therefore the transfer was not a mere right to sue.
- Decisions such as Venkata Subadrayamma v. Venkatapati Raju, Mrs. Saradambal Ammal v. Kandasami Goundar, and Muhammad Maracair v. Bathumal Beevi support the proposition that an interest in partnership (including assets and liabilities) is a transferable tangible interest and not barred by Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act.
- The petitioner chose to file a revision against the refusal to be brought on record and was entitled to pursue that remedy without being compelled also to file an appeal against the abatement order.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended that the petitioner should have appealed against the order declaring the abatement of the appeal and that the civil revision petition did not lie in the circumstances.
- They relied on Rajamanickam Chetti v. Abdul Halim Sahib and Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act to argue that the will conveyed only a mere right to sue (which is not transferable).
- Relying on Harekrishna Mallik v. Narsingh Das, the respondent argued that, where a party could have appealed and did not, the party cannot re-agitate the matter by preferring a revision.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rajamanickam Chetti v. Abdul Halim Sahib, 1941-1 M.L.J. 22 : A.I.R. (28) 1941 Mad. 389 | Held that a right to recover damages (tort/contract) was a mere right to sue and could not be transferred; assignment of fruits of a pending action did not give assignee right to interfere in proceedings. | The court distinguished this authority: it found the facts of the present case materially different (here a half-share in partnership assets was transferred), and held that Rajamanickam Chetti was inapplicable to bar the transfer under the will. |
| Venkata Subadrayamma v. Venkatapati Raju, 48 Mad. 230 : A.I.R. (11) 1924 P.C. 162 | Authority cited as supporting transferability of partnership interest / tangible interest. | The court treated this decision as applicable and in point for the proposition that an interest in partnership is transferable and not a mere right to sue. |
| Mrs. Saradambal Ammal v. Kandasami Goundar, 1947-2 M.L.J. 874 : A.I.R. (36) 1949 Mad. 23 | Authority cited in support of transferability of partnership interest. | The court regarded this decision as applicable and supportive of the petitioner's contention that the will conveyed a tangible transferable interest. |
| Muhammad Maracair v. Bathumal Beevi, 1948-1 M.L.J. 298 : A.I.R. (35) 1948 Mad. 468 | Authority cited in support of the proposition that partnership interest is transferable and not merely a right to sue. | The court accepted this decision as relevant and consistent with allowing the petitioner to be brought on record as assignee of a tangible interest. |
| Venkatakrishna Reddi v. Krishna Reddi, 49 Mad. 450 : A.I.R. (13) 1926 Mad. 586 F.B. | Held that refusal to appoint a person as legal representative is not a final decree and that no appeal lies against such an order. | The court relied on this authority to hold that refusal to be brought on record under Order 22, Rule 5, is not a final decree and that the petitioner could competently prefer a revision petition against the refusal. |
| Harekrishna Mallik v. Narsingh Das, A.I.R. (22) 1935 Pat. 121 : 148 I.C. 333 | Held that where a party could appeal against an appellate decision and did not, he cannot re-agitate the matter in revision that could have been raised on appeal. | The court considered this decision but held it did not support the respondent's contention that the petitioner was barred from seeking revision merely because he did not also appeal against abatement; the court declined to apply it to bar the revision. |
| Glegg v. Bromley, 1912-3 K.B. 474 | Relied on (by respondent) in argument concerning transferability/existence of right when suit dismissed at time of transfer. | The court stated this decision did not apply to the facts of the present case. |
| Bhikaji Ramchandra v. Parushotham, 10 Bom. 220; Subbyaya v. Saminadayya, 18 Mad. 496 : 5 M.L.J. 63; Meenatchi Achi v. Anantanarayana Aiyar, 26 Mad. 224 : 12 M.L.J. 380; Suppu Nayakan v. Perumal Chetty, A.I.R. (4) 1917 Mad. 285 : 34 I.C. 372; Ayya, Mudalivelan v. Veerayee, 43 Mad. 812 : A.I.R. (7) 1920 Mad. 424; Raghbir Saran v. Mt. Sohan Devi, A.I.R. (12) 1925 Lah. 466 : 86 I.C. 104 | Group of decisions cited to show that an appeal lies against the order of abatement of a suit or appeal. | The court observed these decisions support the proposition that an appeal lies against abatement orders, but they do not establish that an appeal also lies against the refusal to bring on record a legal representative; therefore they did not prevent the petitioner from seeking revision. |
| Transfer of Property Act, Section 6(e) | Provision invoked to define "mere right to sue" and to argue non-transferability of such rights. | The court analysed Section 6 and held that the interest described in the will was not a mere right to sue within Section 6(e); therefore that provision did not bar the transfer as effected by the will. |
| Partnership Act — Sections 4, 6, 29 and 69 (statutory provisions referenced) | Referenced to show that an interest in partnership is an existing, tangible interest capable of assignment. | The court relied on the Partnership Act provisions to support the conclusion that partnership interest is tangible and assignable and is not covered by the mischief of Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) procedural competence to file revision; and (B) substantive character of the interest conveyed by the will.
A. Procedural competence (revision v. appeal)
The respondent argued that the proper remedy was an appeal against the order declaring abatement and against the refusal to bring the petitioner on record. The court examined authorities cited by both sides. It observed that several precedents supported the proposition that an appeal lies against an order of abatement, but these did not demonstrate that an appeal must be preferred against orders refusing to bring a legal representative on record. In particular the court relied on Venkatakrishna Reddi v. Krishna Reddi to hold that refusal to appoint a legal representative under Order 22 does not constitute a final decree and that no appeal lies against such an order. The court also considered Harekrishna Mallik (which the respondent relied upon) but held it did not compel rejection of the revision petition where the petitioner had not also appealed against abatement. The court concluded the petitioner legitimately chose revision as his remedy and that the revision petition was maintainable; the petitioner assumed the risk by that choice but was not procedurally barred.
B. Substantive question: nature of the interest conveyed by the will
On the substantive issue, the court examined the language of the will and the nature of the rights purportedly transferred. The will referred to disputes in respect of the petitioner's share in the rice mill, described the rice mill's components (machinery, superstructure, land, stock-in-trade), and expressly bequeathed the right to continue the appeal and to realise and enjoy monies obtained on success in the appeal. The respondent relied on Rajamanickam Chetti (which held that a right to damages is a mere right to sue and not transferable) and on Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act to argue the will transferred only a mere right to sue.
The court distinguished Rajamanickam Chetti: that case concerned recovery of damages for wrongful dispossession — a claim for damages — and the assignment of the fruits of that action. In contrast, the present will conveyed a half-share in partnership property and its attendant assets and liabilities plus the procedural right to continue an appeal. The court found that such an interest was a tangible transferable interest and not a mere right to sue under Section 6(e).
The court noted authorities (Venkata Subadrayamma, Mrs. Saradambal Ammal, Muhammad Maracair) supportive of the proposition that partnership interests are existing, tangible, and assignable. It also relied on the Partnership Act provisions referenced (Sections 4, 6, 29 and 69) to reinforce that an interest in partnership is an existing tangible property right not falling within the mischief of Section 6(e).
On these grounds the court concluded the District Judge erred in holding the will conveyed only a mere right to sue and in refusing to bring the petitioner on record as legal representative. The court set aside that order and held the petitioner entitled to be brought on record as the legal representative and valid assignee of the deceased appellant.
The court expressly refrained from deciding what relief, if any, the petitioner might obtain in separate proceedings challenging the order of abatement; it left the petitioner free to pursue such remedies.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court set aside the District Judge's order dismissing the petition to bring the petitioner on record and held that the petitioner is entitled to be brought on record as the legal representative of the deceased appellant. The petition was allowed with costs.
Core Ruling: The court allowed the revision petition and directed that the petitioner be brought on record as the legal representative/assignee of the deceased appellant; the earlier order refusing to do so was set aside.
Implications
- Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner will be brought on record as legal representative and may pursue the interest transferred by the will (including continuing the appeal as assignee). The District Judge's contrary order has been set aside and the petition allowed with costs.
- Procedural consequence: The court held that a revision petition against the refusal to bring a person on record under Order 22, Rule 3, CPC is maintainable and that the petitioner was not required to also file an appeal against the abatement order in order to seek revision.
- Scope of precedent: The court distinguished Rajamanickam Chetti and applied other authorities to support transferability of partnership interests; the opinion did not announce a sweeping new rule beyond applying existing authorities to the facts. The court expressly declined to express an opinion on remedies relating to the order of abatement; no definitive ruling was made on that point in this judgment.
Disposition: Petition allowed with costs.
1. This civil revision petition is filed against the order of the District Judge of West Tanjore dismissing the petition of the petitioner herein praying that he may be impleaded as an appellant in A.S No. 15 of 1947, which arose out of O.S No. 206 of 1943. The petitioner is the legatee under a will executed by the appellant in A.S No. 15 of 1947. The appellant in As. No. 15 of 1947 had filed a suit O.S No. 206 of 1943 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Tiruvadi, for dissolution of partnership and for accounts against one Abrahim Pillai and eight others. In the said suit the present petitioner's predecessor-in-interest who was plaintiff claimed that she was a partner in a rice mill along with defendant 1 in the suit, and that the partnership was started with the plaintiff and defendant 1 as partners they being entitled each to a moiety of the business, each having contributed a sum of as much as Rs. 1052 and odd. Defendant 1 paid the plaintiff some sundry amounts, but never divided the profits with the plaintiff in the suit. The business consisted of a rice mill with Blackston engine of 20 horse power and other accessories along with the superstructure and the land on which the superstructure stood. The learned District Munsif of Tiruvadi, who tried the suit dismissed the same with costs holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to any amount or other relief. Against this decision the plaintiff preferred the appeal, A.S No. 15 of 1947.
2. When the appeal was pending, the appellant, Thaipal Anni alias Meenambal Anni, executed a will in favour of the present petitioner. Srinivasa Mudaliar, and died some time later. By the will, the said appellant in A.S No. 16 of 1947 beqeathed the subject matter of the appeal to the petitioner. The relevant portions of the will dated 28th July 1947 are as follows:
“There were disputes with regard to my share in the rice mill at Ayyanapuram, Tanjore taluk, and in respect of the same I filed O.S No. 206 of 1943 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Tiruvadi. It was dismissed and on that I have filed an appeal A.S No. 15 of 1947 on the file of District Court, Tanjore, and the same is pending disposal. If per chance I should the before the said appeal is disposed of Srinivasa Mudaliar, son of Chokkappa Mudaliar of Neppukoil (my younger brother) shall after my death continue the said, appeal as my legal representative, himself realise the monies that may be obtained as a result of success in the said appeal and enjoy the same with all absolute rights. By this will I have given all my rights in the said appeal after my death to the aforesaid Srinivasa Mudaliar. I have consented thus and executed this will out of my free will. This will shall come into force after my death.”
The petitioner herein filed the petition, I.A No. 368 of 1947, under O. 22, R. 3 of the CPC, praying to add him as legal representative of the deceased appellant and as appellants. The counter petitioner to the said I.A No. 363 of 1947 opposed the petition on legal grounds and also put the petitioner to strict proof of the will.
3. The question that arose for decision by the learned District Judge was whether the terms of the will validly entitled the petitioner to be treated for the purpose of the appeal as the legal representative of the deceased appellant. The learned District Judge dismissed the petition for being brought on record as legal representative following the decision in Rajamanikam Chetti v. Abdul Halim Sahib, 1941-1-M.L.J 22 : (A.I.R (28) 1941 Mad. 389) and stating that what was assigned to the petitioner by the original appellant was only a mere right to sue and that under Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act, a mere right to sue cannot be transferred. The learned District Judge also dismissed the main appeal as having abated in consequence of having dismissed the petition of the present petitioner for being brought on record as legal representative of the deceased appellant, The present revision petition has been preferred only against the order of the learned District Judge dismissing the petition for being brought on record, while no appeal has been preferred against the order declaring that the appeal itself had abated. In the course of argument before this Court, a preliminary point was raised by the-learned counsel for the respondent that this civil revision petition did not lie. He contended that the proper remedy for the petitioner was to have filed an appeal against the order of the learned District Judge declaring the abatement of the appeal and also an appeal against the order declining to bring him on record as legal representative.
4. Mr. Durairaj referred to various decisions, such as Bhikaji Ramchandra v. Parushotham, 10 Bom. 220, Subbyaya v. Saminadayya, 18 Mad. 496 : (5 M.L.J 63), Meenatchi Achi v. Anantanarayana Aiyar, 26 Mad. 224 : (12 M.L.J 380), Suppu, Suppu Nayakan…Plaintiff v. Perumal Chetty…Defendant ., A.I.R (4) 1917 Mad. 285 : (34 I.C 372), Ayya, Mudalivelan v. Veerayee, 43 Mad. 812 : (A.I.R (7) 1920 Mad. 424) and Raghbir Saran v. Mt. Sohan Devi, A.I.R (12) 1925 Lah. 466 : (86 I.C 104). A reading of these decisions shows that while they are good authority for the contention that only an appeal lies against the order of abatement of a suit or an appeal, they do not seem to be authority for holding that an appeal also lies against the order refusing a petition to bring on record a legal representative. The question as to whether a revision or an appeal lies against an order passed by a Court under O. 22, R. 5, rejecting a petition to be brought on record as legal representative, appears to hive been concluded by the decision in Venkatakrishna Reddi v. Krishna Reddi, 49 Mad. 450 : (A.I.R (13) 1926 Mad. 586 F.B), where the learned Judges have held on a reference, that the refusal to appoint a person as the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or a deceased defendant cannot be regarded as a final decree and that no appeal would lie against such an order. The learned Judges also observed in that case, that they would give no expression of opinion as to what would be the consequence if the petitioner appealed against the actual order of abatement or dismissal of a suit or appeal. In the present case under revision, as pointed out above, the petitioner has preferred only a revision against the order rejecting his petition to be brought on record as legal representative of the deceased appellant and he has not preferred any appeal against the order of the abatement of the appeal pissed by the learned District Judge. Therefore, in so far as this revision petition against the order refusing to bring him on record as legal representative is concerned, I hold that the petitioner has followed the right procedure in filing a revision petition and there is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent.
5. Mr. Durairaj has also invited my attention to a decision in Harekrishna Mallik v. Narsingh Das, A.I.R (22) 1935 Pat. 121 : (148 I.C 333), where it has been held that where it was possible for a party to appeal against the decision of the appellate Court and he has not appealed, he cannot agitate the matter which might have been agitated in appeal by preferring an application in revision. Relying on this case the learned counsel for the respondent contends that in so far as the petitioner has not preferred an appeal against the order of abatement of the original appeal, he cannot be heard on this revision petition which is preferred against the order dismissing his petition for being brought on record as legal representative. I am afraid the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent does not support his contention. It is true that the petitioner has preferred only a revision petition against the dismissal of his petition for being brought on record as legal representative; but, it is nowhere stated that he should, at the same time, file a second appeal against the order of abatement of the original appeal and that unless this is done he should not be heard. There is nothing that compels the petitioner to file an appeal against the order of abatement in order to enable him to be heard on the revision petition against the order in the petition referred to above. It is open to any party to choose his own remedies against adverse orders passed and to proceed in such manner as he may be advised. A party may prefer a revision against the order passed refusing him to be brought on record and may not choose to prefer an appeal against the order of abatement which followed the dismissal of the petition under O. 22 R. 3 of the CPC. When he does so, he submits himself to risk by reason of his own choice.
6. It may be possible for the petitioner to prefer a petition to set aside the abatement or to prefer a second appeal against the order of abatement irrespective of the results of his civil revision petition under consideration. He may or may not get any relief, if he resorts to any of the steps stated above. It will all depend upon whether he has lost his rights under the law or whether he his still any left for enforcement. Under the circumstances, it is not possible for me to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that inasmuch as the petitioner has not preferred an appeal against the order of abatement, this revision petition cannot lie. On the other hand, I feel that the petitioner is entitled to maintain this revision petition whether or not he has filed an appeal against the order of abatement. Only he takes the risk with his eyes wide open. No authority has been cited to controvert the view I have taken.
7. It is next argued before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of the learned District Judge in dismissing the petition on merits is not sustainable. He contends that what is transferred under the will is not a mere right to sue but it is a tangible interest in the partnership which includes assets and liabilities etc. I find there is substance in this contention. A perusal of the relevant portions of the will extracted above does make it clear that what is assigned under the will is not a mere right to sue. On the other hand, it is a half share in the rice mill at Ayyanapuram with all its assets and liabilities, such as, stock-in-trade, machinery, superstructure, land, etc., as set out in the plaint filed in O.S No. 206 of 1943. In addition to this, the will also refers to the right of continuing the appeal and enjoyment of all the profits arising therefrom. When a transfer of such an interest, as is set out above, is made it is difficult to say how it can be a mere right to sue as defined in Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. A perusal of the decision in Rajamanickam Chetti v. Abdul Halim Sahib, 1941-1-M.L.J 22 : A.I.R (28) 1941 Mad. 389), referred to by the counsel for respondent, would show that what was involved in that case was a
“claim for damages for wrongful dispossession of premises in breach of a lease agreement and what was assigned by way of sale. In the said case was the profit and loss of the suit for damages which was based on wrongful dispossession.”
It was held in that case that the right to recover damages, whether for tort or contract, was a mere right to sue and could not be transferred. It was also held that “though the assignment of the fruits of a pending action was valid, it gave the assignee no right to interfere in proceedings in the action.” But the facts in the present case are far different from those in the case cited above. The learned District Judge has failed to appreciate the difference between a suit for damages arising out of mere tort or contract and the present suit which is one for a definite half share of the assets and liabilities of a partnership business. I am of opinion that the learned District Judge has erred in applying the decision in Rajamanickam Chetti v. Abdul Halim Sahib, 1941-1 M.L.J 22 : (A.I.R (28) 1941 Mad. 389) to the present case when the facts are quite different and are easily distinguishable. On the contrary, the decisions in Venkata Subadrayamma v. Venkatapati Raju, 48 Mad. 230 : (A.I.R (11) 1924 P.C 162), Mrs. Saradambal Ammal v. Kandasami Goundar, 1947-2-M.L.J 874 : (A.I.R (36) 1949 Mad. 23) and Muhammad Maracair v. Bathumal Beevi, 1948-1 M.L.J 298 : (A.I.R (35) 1948 Mad. 468) relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner seem to be applicable to the facts of the present case, and are quite in point. Following these decisions I hold that what is transferred under the will is not a mere right to sue but the tangible interest in the property and a transferable right to sue, and on this basis the petitioner is entitled to an order on his petition for being brought on record as a valid assignee from the deceased appellant.
8. Mr. Durairaj for the respondent would argue that any right or interest to be available for transfer must be existent and tangible in character. Though it is not always necessary that an interest should be in existence for being transferred, still I do think that the interest transferred by the will in question is certainly not only is existence but also quite tangible. It does not make any difference that the suit of the plaintiff had been dismissed at the time of the transfer, for the simple reason that the decision of the District Munsif had not yet become final by any means. He relies upon the decision in Glegg v. Bromley, 1912-3 K.B 474, but I do not think that decision applies to the facts of the present case. A reading of the sections of the Partnership Act, such as 4, 6, 29 and 69, do make it clear that an interest in partnership is nothing but an existing interest and tangible property which can be assigned and that it does not attract to itself the mischief of Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act. In these circumstances, I hold that the order of the learned District Judge under revision is not correct and I set aside the same and hold that the petitioner is entitled to be brought on record as the legal representative of the deceased appellant. I do not feel called upon to express any opinion as to what would be the case if the petitioner chooses to file an appeal or an application against the order of abatement.
9. In this matter he must be left to his own remedies which he may be entitled to under the law.
10. The petition is allowed with costs.
C.R.K/V.B.B
11. Petition allowed.
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