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Pugalumperumal Pillai v. Thangathammal.

Madras High Court
Nov 30, 1948
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of Rajamannar, J., reversing the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin in A.S. No. 10 of 1944, which itself had reversed the decree of the District Munsiff of Tuticorin in O.S. No. 236 of 1942.

The only substantive controversy in the case is the true construction of a deed of gift dated 8 May 1905 executed by Pichiyarammal in favour of her daughter Veeraperumal Ammal (referred to in the opinion as Ex. P-7). The narrow legal question is whether the donee (Veeraperumal Ammal) took an absolute estate under the deed or only a life estate (a woman's estate under Hindu law), with the gift over to her issue or a reverter to the donor and her male heirs in certain contingencies.

The operative portion of the gift deed (quoted in the opinion) includes the phrases: that the property is given "as stridhanam gift", that the donee "shall hold and enjoy the aforesaid property hereditarily and from son to grandson and so on as long as the sun and moon last", a provision that "after your lifetime, your, issues if there are any, shall get the aforesaid property", and a clause that if the donee has no issue the property shall revert to the donor and her male heirs.

The learned Judge below (Rajamannar, J.) held that the donee took the properties absolutely under the gift deed; the present appeal challenges that construction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the gift dated 8 May 1905 (Ex. P-7) conferred on the donee, Veeraperumal Ammal, an absolute estate or only a life estate (woman's estate) with a gift over to her issue or a reverter to the donor and her male heirs.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The donor intended to grant only a life estate to Veeraperumal Ammal, to be followed by a remainder to her issue, as indicated by the second sentence that the donor wanted the issue to get the property after the donee's death.
  • The clause providing reverter to the donor and her male heirs (if the donee has no issue) is a defeasance clause showing the donee had only a life estate.
  • No powers of alienation were expressly granted in the deed, and that absence suggests the donor intended only a life estate rather than an absolute one.
  • Reliance on Ex. P-4 (a sale deed executed by the donee on 12 February 1930) as evidence supporting the inference that the donee treated the property as not absolutely hers (the Court rejected using this later document to construe the 1905 gift).
  • Relied on authorities (notably Subbamma v. Ramanaidu and Swamidayal v. Ramadhar) and text (Theobald on Wills) to argue that a gift followed by a gift over or expressed enjoyments after death may cut down an apparent absolute gift into a life interest.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent's counsel pointed to decisions where somewhat similar wording had been construed as conferring an absolute estate (specifically Tiruchendur Sri Subramaniaswami Temple v. Ramasamia Pillai and Damodara Moothan v. Ammu Amma), arguing that Ex. P-7 should be read to give an absolute estate to the donee.
  • Implicitly, the respondent urged the court to give effect to the clear dispositive words used in the deed and to treat subsequent clauses as attempts to impose limitations that are repugnant to an absolute gift.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lalit Mohan Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (1897) L.R. 24 I.A. 76 : I.L.R. 24 Cal. 834 (P.C.) Two cardinal principles: (1) clear and unambiguous dispositive words are not to be controlled or qualified by general expressions of intention; (2) technical words of legal import must have their legal effect unless clearly used otherwise. The court applied these principles to hold that the clear dispositive words in Ex. P-7 indicate an absolute estate in the donee and are not to be qualified by other general expressions in the deed.
Subbamma v. Ramanaidu (1937) 1 M.L.J. 268 Illustrates the rule of construing a testamentary instrument as a whole; presence of a gift over may indicate the prior gift was a limited estate in order to give effect to the whole instrument. The court considered this decision but distinguished it: special circumstances in that case supported a limited estate; the court found Subbamma not persuasive for Ex. P-7 because Ex. P-7 contains clear and unambiguous words indicating an absolute estate.
Swamidayal v. Ramadhar (1931) I.L.R. 6 Luck. 715 Discusses use of certain words denoting proprietary rights (dicta relied upon by appellant). The court found no close resemblance between the document in that case and Ex. P-7 and held the authority did not support the appellant's position.
Sarajubala Debi v. Jyotirmoyee Debee (1931) 61 M.L.J. 501 : L.R. 58 I.A. 270 : I.L.R. 59 Cal. 142 (P.C.) Affirmed principles in Lalit Mohan Singh Roy and supports that earlier dispositive words prevail. The court relied on this later affirmation to support the proposition that where an absolute estate is granted by clear words, subsequent clauses attempting to restrict it are repugnant and void.
Mohamed Shumsool Hooda v. Shewukram Mulli (1874) 14 B.L.R. 226 : L.R. 2 I.A. 7 (P.C.) and Radhaprasad Mullick v. Ranee Mani Dasee (1908) 18 M.L.J. 287 : L.R. 35 I.A. 118 : I.L.R. 5 Cal. 896 (P.C.) Reflects the view that, as a general rule, Hindus desire to keep estate in the family and that women generally do not take absolute estates which they cannot alienate. The court acknowledged the general proposition but rejected its application here: because the donor was the sole absolute owner and Ex. P-7 contains words (e.g., "stridhanam", "hereditarily", "from son to grandson", "as long as the sun and moon last") indicating an intention to confer the same absolute rights the donor enjoyed.
Nandagopal v. Pareshmoni Debi (1910) 6 I.C. 354 Holds that the intention of the donor must be ascertained from the entire passage and that effect must be given to customary intentions of a Hindu testator/donor. The court observed that the case fits its facts but found it unnecessary to discuss at length; it noted that Nandagopal aligns with general principles but does not alter the conclusion reached from the clear words of Ex. P-7.
Tiruchendur Sri Subramaniaswami Temple v. Ramasamia Pillai (1910) 6 I.C. 354 and Damodara Moothan v. Ammu Amma (1943) 2 M.L.J. 332 Examples where words somewhat akin to those in Ex. P-7 were construed as conferring absolute estates. The court accepted these authorities as supportive of the view that similar words can denote an absolute estate and concluded it was unnecessary to discuss them at length once the first portion of the grant is found to confer an absolute estate.
Theobald on Wills (10th ed., p.332 — cited) Textual proposition that a gift without words of limitation may be cut down to a life interest in certain circumstances (e.g., where property is disposed of at the death of first taker and words indicate enjoyment by someone else after death). The court considered this text but found the analogy inapt to Ex. P-7 and therefore did not accept it as limiting the clear dispositive words in the deed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from the text of the operative portion of the gift deed and established principles of construction of wills and deeds. The key steps in the reasoning are:

  1. The court began with the operative language of Ex. P-7. It emphasized three distinct dispositive phrases in the opening operative sentence: (a) the property is given "as stridhanam gift", (b) the donee "shall hold and enjoy the aforesaid property hereditarily", and (c) the property is to be enjoyed "from son to grandson and so on as long as the sun and moon last." The court treated each phrase as independently indicative of an absolute estate and observed that any one of them would ordinarily be sufficient to construe an absolute grant.
  2. Applying the Privy Council principle from Lalit Mohan Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy, the court held that clear and unambiguous dispositive words in the deed are not to be controlled or qualified by general expressions of intention elsewhere in the instrument, and that technical words must be given their legal effect unless clearly used in a different sense. On that basis, the court found no difficulty in holding the donor intended to give an absolute estate to the donee.
  3. The court rejected the appellant's invitation to rely on a later sale deed (Ex. P-4) executed by the donee in 1930 for construction of the 1905 gift, holding that an altogether different document executed twenty-five years later could not guide the construction of the earlier deed.
  4. Authorities relied on by the appellant (Subbamma v. Ramanaidu and Swamidayal v. Ramadhar) were examined and distinguished. In Subbamma the presence of a gift over and special circumstances led a judge to construe a prior gift as limited; the court found those observations inapplicable because Ex. P-7 contains clear, unambiguous words denoting an absolute estate. Swamidayal dealt with different words and the court found no resemblance to Ex. P-7.
  5. The court considered the textual authority (Theobald on Wills) that a gift without words of limitation might be cut down to a life interest where a subsequent gift contemplates enjoyment by others after death, but the court held that the analogy was not apt to Ex. P-7.
  6. The appellant's argument that the reverter clause (to the donor and her male heirs if the donee had no issue) showed the donor intended only a life estate was rejected. The court treated the reverter clause, in the presence of the clear first clause conferring an absolute estate, as only an attempt to restrict the powers of an absolute owner — a restriction repugnant to an absolute estate and therefore void.
  7. The court addressed broader cultural and doctrinal considerations (Mitakshara notions that women typically take only a woman's estate) invoked by the appellant and authorities such as Mohamed Shumsool Hooda and Radhaprasad Mullick. It acknowledged the general rule about Hindu wishes to keep property within the family but held that, given the donor was the absolute owner and the deed's clear language, there was no basis in the four corners of the document to infer an intention to grant a lesser estate than the donor enjoyed.
  8. The court noted that other decisions cited by the respondent where somewhat similar wording had been construed as conferring absolute estates supported the conclusion that Ex. P-7 should be read as granting an absolute estate.
  9. Because the donee in fact left daughters, the contingency in the reverter clause (complete absence of issue) had not arisen; this factual state meant the court need not dwell on hypothetical consequences of that clause.

Synthesizing these steps, the court concluded that the clear dispositive words in Ex. P-7 govern and that the subsequent clauses cannot defeat the absolute estate created by those words.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The court upheld the conclusion that, on a true and proper construction of the deed of gift (Ex. P-7), Veeraperumal Ammal took an absolute estate in the properties.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Veeraperumal Ammal (and by extension her successors under the normal operation of an absolute estate) holds the estate absolutely; the appellant's claim based on a construction of the deed as conferring only a life estate (or woman's estate) fails. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
  • On precedent and doctrine: The court applied established principles (as stated in Lalit Mohan Singh Roy and affirmed in Sarajubala Debi) that clear dispositive words prevail over general expressions of intention and that technical dispositive words are to be given their legal effect. The opinion does not state that it establishes any new legal principle; rather, it applies existing authorities and textual interpretation rules to the facts of Ex. P-7.

This summary is strictly limited to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of Rajamannar, J., as he then was, reversing the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Tuticorin, in A.S. No. 10 of 1944, which in its turn reversed: the decree of the District Munsiff of Tuticorin in O.S. No. 236 of 1942. As the facts and circumstances have been stated in great detail in the judgment appealed against, we do not consider it necessary to set them out at all. What the true construction of the deed of gift dated 8th May, 1905, executed by Pichiyarammal in favour of her daughter Veeraperumal Ammal is, is the only subject of controversy. If the donee Veeraperumal Ammal took the property the subject-matter of the gift, as an absolute property, then, the appellant necessarily fails. If, on the other hand, what was donated under Ex. P-7 in favour of Veeraperumal Ammal is only a life estate, or a woman's estate as is known under the Hindu law, then it is the common case that the appellant will succeed.

2. The relevant portions of the gift deed are as follows:

As I have given away to you the property in the schedule herein worth Rs. 1,500 as stridhanam gift, you shall hold and enjoy the aforesaid property hereditarily and from son to grandson and so on as long as the sun and moon last. After your lifetime, your, issues if there are any, shall get the aforesaid property. If you have no male or female issues, the aforesaid property shall revert to me and to my male heirs. I shall, till my lifetime, reside jointly with you in the thatched house mentioned in the schedule.

The learned Judge, after an exhaustive consideration of some of the leading cases, relating to the construction of such deeds of gift and wills and relying upon the meaning of the terms mentioned in the deed, came to the conclusion that Veeraperumal Ammal took the properties absolutely under the gift deed.

3. The appellant's counsel urges as the first contention that what was intended by the donor was the granting of a life estate to Veeraperumal Ammal with a remainder to her, issues and that this is made plain by the second sentence showing that the donor wanted the issue of Veeraperumal Ammal to get the property after her death. He further contends that as the clause stood, in the absence of any issue for Veeraperumal Ammal, the property should revert to the donor and her male heirs. There is a defeasance clause or a reverter which shows. that the donee had only a life estate. No powers of alienation as such have been granted in favour of the donee and from this fact an inference is sought to be drawn that the intention of the donor was in favour of a life estate and not of an absolute one. For this purpose, Ex. P-4, a sale deed dated 12th February, 1930, executed by Veeraperumal Ammal, the donee, is referred to. But we are satisfied that no guidance in the construction of Ex. P-7 can be gained by looking at an absolutely different kind of document executed by the donee twenty-five years after the date of gift.

4. It is unnecessary to consider any long list of cases in construing this document. In the very first sentence of the operative portion of the deed itself, it is clearly stated that the donee is to have the property as stridhanam in addition to a further recital that she shall hold and enjoy the property hereditarily and from son to grandson and so on as long as the sun and moon last. This contains three distinct and clear phrases indicating the nature of the estate to be taken by the donee. Any one of such phrases occurring alone in a deed of gift will be sufficient ordinarily to enable the Court to construe the document as one granting an absolute estate. If the donor had stated that the donee shall hold and enjoy the property hereditarily, there would not be much difficulty in construing it as a gift absolute. But here other phrases such as " from son to grandson and so on " and also " as long as the sun and moon last" are indicative of nothing but an absolute grant. These are words of disposition so well known and accepted as implying absolute rights that they have come to be recognised as practically terms of art and as the learned Judge says, it is difficult to see what more words could have been used by any donor to confer an absolute estate on the donee than the words used in this deed.

5. As observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Lalit Mohan Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (1897) L.R. 24 I.A. 76 : I.L.R. 24 Cal. 834 (P.C.) there are two cardinal principles in the construction of wills, deeds and other documents. The first is that that clear and unambiguous dispositive words are not to be controlled or qualified by any general expression of intention. The second is that technical words, or words of known legal import, must have their legal effect, even though the testator uses inconsistent words, unless those inconsistent words are of such a nature as to make it perfectly clear that the testator-did not use the technical terms in their proper sense. Applying the principle mentioned above to the document in question, we do not feel any difficulty in holding that the intention of the donor was that her daughter should take an absolute estate. We need not discuss the effect of the last clause in the deed, because the contingency contemplated therein has not and cannot come to pass. The donee has left daughters: and the dispute in the case has arisen as a result of transfers and claims made either by one of them, or all of them on the one hand and the alienees from another.

6. Relying upon the decision in Subbamma v. Ramanaidu (1937) 1 M.L.J. 268, it is argued that there is a donation in this case to Veeraperumal Ammal with a gift over to her issue and such being the case the whole document should be given effect to which can be done only by construing the gift as a life estate. No doubt Varadachariar, J., in construing the will, the subject-matter of the dispute in that case, was of opinion that in order to avoid the possibility of not giving effect to certain portions of the will, the proper rule of construction has been to take the will as a whole; and the presence of a gift over, which is not a mere gift by way of defeasance, was held to be an. indication that the prior gift was only a limited estate. Special circumstances which were present in that will, also led the learned Judge to come to that conclusion. Having considered that case carefully, we are of opinion, that the observations therein do not afford much assistance for the construction of Ex. P-7, where, as stated already, there are clear and unambiguous words denoting the grant of an absolute estate in favour of Veeraperumal Ammal.-

7. Another decision on which the appellant's learned Counsel relied was Swamidayal v. Ramadhar (1931) I.L.R. 6 Luck. 715, in which the observations at pages 721 and 724 are stressed as indicating dicta supporting the appellant's argument. The principle underlying that decision of the Chief Court of Oudh at Lucknow was the use of certain words. denoting proprietary rights and therefore we are not able to find that there can be any resemblance between the document construed there and Ex. P-7. Words such as " Hakdar " in Subbamma v. Rama Naidu (1937) 1 M.L.J. 268 and "Malika" in Swamidayal v. Ramadhar (1931) I.L.R. 6 Luck. 715, might denote rights of ownership, but certainly they are not of such wide and untrammelled amplitude as those used in the document under consideration.

8. Learned Counsel for the appellant next relied upon certain observations contained in Theobald on Wills, 10th edition, page 332, to the effect that a gift without words of limitation may be cut down to a life interest, if the same property is disposed of at the death of the first taker and that words indicating that the property is to be enjoyed by some one else after the death of the first taker may have the effect of cutting down the first taker's estate to that of a life interest. It is further stated there that where the testator's whole property is given to a person absolutely, followed by a gift of the residue at his death, the first gift may be cut down to a life interest. An analogy is sought to be drawn between the second clause to the effect that on the death of the donee her issue, if there be any, shall get the property, and the circumstance envisaged in the portions considered above in Theobald on Wills.

9. We are of opinion that the analogy is not apt.

10. The second line of argument of Mr. K. R. Rama Aiyar is that the right of reverter to the donor and her male heirs is indicative that what was contemplated by the earlier portion of the deed was only a life estate. We do not think that it is possible to construe this document like that. We have already referred to the observations of the Privy Council in Lalit Mohan Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (1897) L.R. 24 L.A. 76 : I.L.R. 24 Cal. 834 (P.C.) and these have been affirmed in a later decision in Sarajubala Debi v. Jyotirmoyee Debee(1931) 61 M.L.J. 501 : L.R. 58 I.A. 270 : I.L.R. 59 Cal. 142 (P.C.), where the earlier case in Lalit Mohan Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (1897) L.R. 24 LA. 76 : I.L.R. 24 Cal. 834 (P.C.) has been specifically referred to. In view of the fact that by the first clause an absolute estate is granted to the donee, the next clause should be read rather as an attempt to restrict the powers of an absolute owner than as an intention to grant a life estate. Such a restriction is repugnant to an absolute estate and is void on the ground.

11. We are asked to hold that the intention of the donor would have been only to grant a life estate because ordinarily under the Mitakshara law what is known as a woman's estate enures only for her lifetime. To substantiate this argument, a passage from the well-known case in Mohamed Shumsool Hooda v. Shewukram Mulli (1874) 14 B.L.R. 226: L.R. 2 I.A. 7 (P.C.), cited by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Radhaprasad Mullick v. Ranee Mani Dasee (1908) 18 M.L.J. 287 : L.R. 35 I.A. 118 : I.L.R. 5 Cal. 896 at 902 (P.C.)., to the following effect, was stressed on us:

In construing the will of a Hindu, it is not improper to take into consideration what are known to be the ordinary notions and wishes of Hindus with respect to the devolution of property. It may be assumed that a Hindu generally desires that an estate, especially an ancestral estate, shall be retained in his family, and it may be assumed that as a general rule, at all events, women do not take absolute estates of inheritance, which they are unable to alienate.

But so far as the donor here was concerned, she was the sole owner entitled in absolute fee-simple to the estate she was making a gift of and from the words "stridhanam" and the other expressions which we have considered, we have necessarily to hold that her intention would have been that her daughter should have the same kind of rights in the property as she herself was enjoying. It is undisputed that she was the absolute owner and there are no materials gatherable from the four corners of the document from which it can even be surmised that the intention of the donor was to give a lesser estate to the donee than she was herself enjoying. In addition to the cases discussed above, our attention was also invited to a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Nandagopal v. Pareshmoni Debi (1910) 6 I.C. 354. The learned Judges there do not lay down anything contrary to the well-known accepted principles which can be ascertained from cases of highest authority, but on the other hand what the learned Judges have decided is that the intention of the donor must be ascertained from a consideration of the entire passage in the deed of gift, and that in considering that passage, effect must be given to what is known to be the usual intention of a Hindu in disposing of his property, which is to keep the property in the family so that it may pass to persons who may be able to confer spiritual benefits on the donor. The donor in that case was a father who made a gift in favour of his daughter and from the words of the document the learned Judges came to the conclusion that the intention was only to confer a woman's estate. It is unnecessary to discuss this case at any length because the observations there, if we may say so, fit in with the facts of that case.

12. Learned advocate for the respondent invited our attention to two cases, viz., Tiruchendur Sri Subramaniaswami Temple v. Ramasamia Pillai (1910) 6 I.C. 354 and Damodara Moothan v. Ammu Amma (1943) 2 M.L.J. 332, where words, though not very similar to those in Ex. P-7 but somewhat akin, have been construed as conferring an absolute estate. We do not think it necessary to discuss these cases at any length because when once it is found that by the first portion of the grant an absolute estate is intended to be conferred upon the donee, the subsequent clauses can only be read as a mode of devolution of property according to the known ideas of the community to which the donor and the donee belong. We are therefore in entire agreement with the learned Judge that on a true and proper construction of the deed of gift, Ex. P-7, Veeraperumal Ammal takes an absolute estate in the properties.

13. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.