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Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State Of Maharashtra & Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner challenged an order passed by respondent No.1 dated 3 May 2006. The petition was issued notice before admission, counter affidavits were filed and the matter was heard for final disposal.
The property in dispute originally belonged to the Thorat family. On 29 December 1956 Mrs. Krishnabai Gopalrao Thorat sold the property (Final Plot Nos. 473 and 473-B, 4,910 sq. m.) to Swami Dilipkumar Roy and Mrs. Indira Devi by registered sale deed. The property was transferred to the petitioner Trust on 12 March 1997. Final Plot No. 473 was divided by an order dated 20 August 1970 into Final Plot Nos. 473-B1, 473-B2, 473-B3 and 473-B4.
From 4 March 1986 the name of respondent No.3 (Pune Municipal Corporation) appeared as owner in respect of an internal road that had originally been part of the plot. The petitioner stated that, by letters dated 29 June 1996, 4 January 1997 and 18 January 1997, the Town Planning Department admitted that the internal road had never been acquired by the Pune Municipal Corporation and that the Corporation had been wrongly shown as holding the road.
Town Planning Scheme No.1 was sanctioned on 5 July 1979 and came into force on 15 August 1979. The scheme showed the division into subplots and an approach road. On 25 April 2000 the State Government directed respondent No.1 (through the Urban Development Department) to have the Pune Municipal Corporation cancel the internal road as shown in the layout for Final Plot No. 473-B and to merge the road area into adjoining sub-plots. Subsequent notices inviting objections and publications in the Government Gazette and newspapers occurred between 2001 and 2004. The Municipal Commissioner conducted inquiry and submitted a proposal. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 ultimately passed the impugned order refusing sanction for modification under section 91 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (the "Act"), which led to the filing of this writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the impugned order of the State Government (refusing sanction for variation under section 91 of the Act) was legally sustainable.
- Whether the land in question had vested in the Pune Municipal Corporation upon coming into force of the final town planning scheme (issue concerning the effect and scope of section 88 of the Act).
- Whether vesting under the scheme required a separate award under section 126 before the Planning Authority's ownership could be said to be complete.
- Whether the procedure adopted under section 91 (including publication and hearing/objections) complied with statutory requirements and principles of natural justice.
- Whether the proposed variation (conversion of a public/internal road into private plots) was a "minor" variation permissible under section 91(2), or a substantial change requiring different treatment.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC) had admitted that it was not the owner of the internal road, so the impugned order refusing variation was bad.
- Section 88 does not use the word "vest" in the sense that full ownership transfers; read with section 126, vesting is not complete unless an award is passed—thus the Planning Authority did not acquire full ownership automatically.
- An Arbitrator was not appointed in terms of section 91(6) where appropriate.
- The road in question was an internal road, not a public street, and therefore ought not to have been treated as vested public land.
- The impugned order was passed without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard (a breach of natural justice/procedural fairness).
Respondents' Arguments
- Respondent No.3 (Pune Municipal Corporation) stated that Town Planning Scheme No.1 came into force on 15 August 1979 and road area measuring 444.14 sq. m. was allotted to and vested in the Corporation under section 88(a) of the Act.
- The State Government directed variation under section 91(2) by its order dated 25 April 2000; the Municipal authorities followed statutory processes including publishing notices (with remedial steps where notice language issues were pointed out) and considering objections; a writ petition by others led to re-publication in English and further processing before the Government passed the impugned order on 3 May 2006.
- Respondent Nos.1 and 2 asserted that, in terms of section 83 of the Act, the land had vested with the Pune Municipal Corporation and the Government did not find it feasible to vary the scheme under section 91.
- The respondents also contended that converting the road to private would deprive future plot holders of necessary access to their plots.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Pune Municipal Corporation v. Promoters and Builders Association, (2004) (reported references in text) | Interpreting statutory provisions (section 37 of the Development Plan legislation) analogous to section 91 — the State Government's power to sanction modifications is a delegated legislative function; statute does not require a public hearing before Government accords sanction; an enabling phrase "such inquiry as it may consider necessary" permits the Government discretion to inquire as it thinks fit. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court analysis to interpret section 91 and to conclude that the Government has wide discretion in deciding a variation and that the statute does not, by itself, require a separate public hearing before the Government accords or refuses sanction. |
| Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd., (1987) 2 SCC 720 (cited in text) | Principle that an enabling provision allowing "such inquiry as it may consider necessary" is generally intended to empower the authority to obtain relevant information and to vest discretion. | Used to support the view that the State Government may make such inquiries as it deems fit under section 91 and that such a provision does not, by itself, require a hearing in the sense of natural justice. |
| HSSK Niyami v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 516 (cited in text) | General authority on delegated legislation and the limits of judicial interference where statute provides a procedure and the function is legislative in character. | Cited as supporting authority for the proposition that delegated legislative action (like sanctioning modifications) cannot be challenged on natural justice grounds unless statute requires it or unreasonableness/arbitrariness is shown. |
| Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, (2003) 4 SCC 557 (cited in text) | General principles concerning administrative or legislative discretion and judicial review. | Referenced as part of the line of authority that the Court may not read in procedural protections (like hearings) where the statute does not provide them and where the action is legislative in character. |
| ONGC v. Assn. Of Natural Gas Consuming Industries of Gujarat, (1990 Supp.) SCC 397 (cited in text) | Principle that while exercising legislative functions, courts will not interfere unless unreasonableness or arbitrariness is shown. | Used to reinforce the proposition that the Government's exercise of statutory discretion in sanctioning modifications will not be interfered with absent shown arbitrariness or unreasonableness. |
| Zahir Jahangir Vakil v. Pune Municipal Corporation, 2006 (4) All. M.R. 326 (Division Bench of this Court) | Held that the provision of section 126(2) (acquisition) applies prior to final sanction of a town planning scheme under section 86, and that vesting under section 88 is absolute and free from all encumbrances. | The Court relied on this Division Bench authority to support the proposition that vesting under section 88 is total and complete and that the petitioner's contention that vesting depended on an award under section 126 was without basis. |
| Laxminarayan R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra, 2003 (5) Bom.C.R. 549 (cited in text) | Considered the meaning of "vesting" under section 88 of the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966 and held vesting under section 88 to be absolute and free of all encumbrances. | Cited to reinforce the interpretation that once a final town planning scheme is sanctioned under section 86, vesting under section 88 is complete and no rights survive in respect of the original plot holders. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the pleadings, affidavits and submissions of all parties and proceeded stepwise:
- The Court observed that the petitioner, from 1979 until 2000, had accepted the final Town Planning Scheme which came into force on 15 August 1979 and had not earlier contested vesting by the Planning Authority. The Government order dated 25 April 2000 (requesting PMC to vary the scheme) was taken as evidence that the petitioner had previously treated the land as vested such that a variation was sought rather than a contention that the land had never vested.
- The Court interpreted section 88(a) of the Act, quoted in the opinion, to mean that "all lands required by the Planning Authority shall ... vest absolutely in the Planning Authority free from all encumbrances" once a final scheme comes into force. On that basis the Court rejected the petitioner's submission that vesting required an award under section 126.
- The Court analysed section 91 (power to vary scheme) in detail. It noted that section 91(1) permits the Planning Authority to apply for variation where the scheme is defective or needs a minor modification; section 91(2) permits the State Government to authorize a draft variation if it is satisfied that the variation is not substantial; section 91(5) permits affected persons to object; and section 91(6) permits the Government to (a) appoint an Arbitrator, or (b) sanction variation with/without modification, or (c) refuse sanction.
- The Court concluded that changing a public road into a private road is a variation of substantial nature and therefore not the kind of "minor" variation contemplated by section 91(2). This distinction informed the Court's view of the proper exercise of the Government's discretion under section 91.
- The State Government had given four reasons for rejecting the application for variation. The Court observed that even if the petitioner's first ground (concerning ownership by PMC) were incorrect, the other reasons remained and were sufficient to sustain the impugned order insofar as procedural or substantive statutory requirements were concerned.
- On the procedural/fair hearing point, the Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Promoters and Builders Association. That authority indicates that, in the context of statutory provisions like section 37(2) (and by analogy section 91), the Government, as a delegated legislative authority, has wide discretion to make or not make inquiries and the statute does not, by itself, require a public hearing before the Government accords sanction. Delegated legislative action cannot be equated with administrative adjudication that attracts the full scope of natural justice unless the statute provides for it.
- The Court also relied upon the Division Bench decision in Zahir Jahangir Vakil v. Pune Municipal Corporation which supports the proposition that vesting under section 88 is absolute and free of encumbrances and that section 126(2) applies in the pre-final-scheme stage.
- Balancing these considerations — the accepted vesting under section 88, the nature of the proposed variation (substantial), the statutory procedure under section 91, and precedents on the limits of natural justice in delegated legislative action — the Court concluded there was no merit in the petition.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition was dismissed. DISMISSED
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the impugned order of the State Government dated 3 May 2006 (refusing to sanction the modification under section 91 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act) stands and the petitioner's challenge to that order has been rejected.
- The Court endorsed the interpretation that vesting under section 88 of the Act upon the coming into force of a final scheme is absolute and free from encumbrances; the petitioner's contention that vesting required an award under section 126 was rejected as without basis in the circumstances described.
- The Court applied established authorities to hold that the Government's power to sanction or refuse sanction under provisions analogous to section 91 is a delegated legislative function in which the Government has wide discretion and that a separate public hearing is not mandated by statute unless the statute expressly provides for it. The Court did not find arbitrariness or unreasonableness sufficient to interfere with the Government's exercise of discretion.
- No new legal principle or precedent was laid down by this opinion; the decision applies existing statutory interpretation and precedent to the facts and dismisses the petition on those grounds.
Nazki Belal, J.:— By this writ petition, the petitioner assails the order passed by respondent No. 1 on 3rd May, 2006. Notice before admission was issued to the respondents. Counter affidavits have been filed and the matter has been heard for final disposal.
2. The facts leading to filing of this petition as narrated by the petitioner, are:
3. The property, which is the subject-matter of the writ petition, originally belonged to one Thorat family. One Mrs. Krishnabai Gopalrao Thorat sold the property comprising Final Plot No. 473 and 473-B admeasuring 4910 sq. mtrs. on 29th December, 1956 in favour of Swami Dilipkumar Roy and Mrs. Indira Devi by a registered Sale Deed. This property was later on transferred on 12th March, 1997 to the petitioner Trust. Final Plot No. 473, according to the petitioner, had been divided into four plots being Final Plot Nos. 473-B1, 473-B2, 473-B3 and 473- B4. The order of division of this plot was passed on 20th August, 1970. From 4th March, 1986 the name of respondent No. 3, namely, Pune Municipal Corporation, was shown as the owner with respect to an internal road, which originally was part of the plot. The petitioner further contends that by letters dated 29th June, 1996, 4th January, 1997 and 18th January, 1997 the Town Planning Department admitted and accepted the facts that the internal road has never been acquired by the Pune Municipal Corporation. They also admitted, according to the petitioner, that the Pune Municipal Corporation was wrongly shown and the road was not held by the Pune Municipal Corporation. The Town Planning Scheme No. 1 was sanctioned on 5th July, 1979 by which Final Plot No. 473-B have been shown to have been divided into Final Plot Nos. 473-B1, 473-B2, 473-B3 and 473-B4 and in addition to that another approach road had been shown. No separate number was given. On 25th April, 2000, respondent No. 1 through the Urban Development Department directed respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to cancel the internal road for which the Pune Municipal Corporation's name is shown in the layout of the Final Plot No. 473-B and to merge its area in the adjoining sub-plots. The Municipal Commissioner was approached for variation in the plan and on 6th July, 2001 he invited objections, which was published in Government Gazette on 23rd August, 2001. Notice was again issued on 8th September, 2004 and was published in Government Gazette on 16th September, 2004. Similar notice was also published in daily newspaper on 29th October, 2004. The Resolution No. 611 was passed on 23rd March, 2007 by the General Body of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 resolving that they would not claim any right in respect of Final Plot No. 473-B4. On 7th April, 2006, after conducting enquiry the Municipal Commissioner wrote a letter to respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 and proposal was submitted for approval for making the variation in respect of Town Planning under the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 passed the impugned order and refused to give sanction for making modification under the provisions of section 91 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act. Therefore, the writ petition.
4. On the basis of these assertions in the writ petition, the petitioner contended that since the Pune Municipal Corporation had clearly admitted that it was not owner of the property the impugned order was bad. It is also contended that by virtue of section 88 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, since the word “vest” is not used, it cannot be said that the full ownership had got transferred to the Planning Authority. This section has to be read along with section 126 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and unless an award was passed the land could not have been owned by the Planning Authority. It is contended that the Arbitrator was not appointed in terms of section 91(6). It is also contended that the road was internal road and was not a public street. After amendment of the writ petition, the petitioner had also submitted that the impugned order had been passed by the respondents without giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner.
5. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have filed counter affidavit through the Deputy Director of Town Planning and respondent No. 3 has filed counter affidavit through the City Engineer.
6. In the first instance, we make a reference to the reply affidavit filed by respondent No. 3 in which it is stated that the Town Planning Scheme No. 1 was sanctioned by the State Government by order dated 5th July, 1979 and it came into force with effect from 15th August, 1979. Divisions were made in this and road measuring 444.14 sq. mtrs. was allotted to the ownership of the Pune Municipal Corporation and having regard to section 88(a) of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act the area admeasuring 444.14 sq. mtrs. was allotted to Pune Municipal Corporation and vested in respondent No. 3. It is stated that the owners of Final Plot No. 473-B2 and 473-B3 requested the State Government to direct the Pune Municipal Corporation to vary the Town Planning Scheme to delete area admeasuring 444.14 sq. mtrs. of road and include the said area in adjacent Final Plot No. 473-B2 to 473-B4. The State Government by its order dated 25th April, 2000 directed the Pune Municipal Corporation to undertake the variation of the Scheme as per section 91(2) of the Act to merge the said road area in Final Plot Nos. 473-B2 to 473-B4. It is stated that pursuant to this direction of the Government, the approval of General Body for varying Town Planning Scheme under section 91 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act was sought. The Improvement Committee under Resolution No. 531 passed on 28th November, 2000 recommended the General Body to vary the Scheme under section 91 of the Act. Public notice was issued and the report was submitted to the State Government on 16th June, 2003. However, the Additional Secretary of Urban Development Department of the Government of Maharashtra addressed a communication dated 20th May, 2004 to the Municipal Commissioner stating therein that the public notice was issued in Marathi language and not in English language in the Government Gazette and local newspapers. He, therefore, called upon the Municipal Commissioner to send proposal only after removal of the infirmities. It is further contended that thereafter Dr. Vishwas S. Patil and Dr. Abhijeet V. Paul filed a Writ Petition No. 6240 of 2004, in this Court for striking down the notice dated 3rd January, 2002 published in Daily Sakal (newspaper) proposing to surrender the Pune Municipal Corporation road to private plot holders among others. The High Court directed the respondents therein to decide the issue under section 91 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act. Accordingly, public notice was published in English language in the Maharashtra Government Gazette on 16th September, 2004 and also in newspapers on 1st November, 2004. The opinion of the General Body was communicated by the Municipal Commissioner to the Additional Secretary of the Urban Development Department. The Government considered the objection of the Pune Municipal Corporation and passed the impugned order on 3rd May, 2006.
7. The counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 does not raise any dispute with regard to the facts. But they claim that in terms of section 83 of the Act the land had vested with the Pune Municipal Corporation and Government did not find it feasible to make changes in this in accordance with section 91 of the Act.
8. Now in the light of pleadings, the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned A.G.P appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are to be examined.
9. Much stress is laid by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Pune Municipal Corporation always maintained that the property did not belong to the Corporation.
10. A reference is made to the Government order dated 25th April, 2000. This order in fact goes against submissions that are now being made by the petitioner. This order says, amongst other things, “And whereas, the owner of the Final Plot No. 473-B2 and 473- B3 has requested the Government to direct the Pune Municipal Corporation to vary the said Scheme to delete the said road and include the area in adjacent Final Plot No. 473- B2 to 473-B4”. This shows that it was never the case of the petitioner that the land had not vested with the Pune Municipal Corporation which is now the main argument before this Court to assail the impugned order. The petitioner accepted the final scheme which came into effect from 15th August, 1979 and thereafter did not complain that the land did not vest with the Corporation, but submitted to the Government that the Scheme be varied and on 25th April, 2000 the Government directed the Corporation to undertake variation of the said Scheme under sub-section (2) of section 91 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act.
11. In the light of the fact that from the year 1979 till the year 2000 the petitioner never complained that the land did not vest with the Pune Municipal Corporation. Therefore, it is not fair for the petitioner to contend at this stage that the land never vested with the Pune Municipal Corporation although the petitioner had accepted this position, for a long time. section 88 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, lays down:
“88. Effect of final scheme.- On and after the day on which a final scheme comes into force—
(a) all lands required by the Planning Authority shall, unless it is otherwise determined in such scheme, vest absolutely in the Planning Authority free from all encumbrances;
(b) all rights in the original plots which have been reconstituted shall determine, and the reconstituted plots shall become subject to the rights settled by arbitrator;
(c) the Planning Authority shall hand over possession of final plots to the owners to whom they are allotted in the final scheme.”
12. Bare perusal of section 88(a) would make it clear that all lands required by the Planning Authority shall absolutely vest in the Planning Authority free from all encumbrances after the final scheme comes into force. Therefore, the question that unless an award was passed in terms of section 126 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, the vesting was not complete, is without any basis.
13. Now we come to the impugned order which has been passed under section 91 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act. section 91 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, reads as under:
“91. Power to vary scheme on ground of error, irregularity or informality.—
(1) If after the final scheme has come into force, the Planning Authority considers that the scheme is defective on account of an error, irregularity or informality or that the scheme needs the variation or modification of a minor nature, the Planning Authority may apply in writing to the State Government for variation of the Scheme.
(2) If, on receiving such application or otherwise, the State Government is satisfied that the variation required is not substantial, the State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, authorise or direct the Planning Au thority to prepare a draft of such variation and publish a notice in the Official Gazette and in such other manner as may be prescribed stating that a draft variation has been prepared.
(3) The notice of preparation of a draft variation published under sub-section (2) shall state every amendment proposed to be made in the scheme, and if any such amendment relates to a matter specified in any of the sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of Clause (b) of section 59, the draft variation shall also contain such other particulars as may be prescribed.
(4) The draft variation shall be open to the inspection of the public at the office of the Planning Authority during office hours and copies of such draft variation or any extract therefrom certified to be correct shall be available for sate to the public at a reasonable price,
(5) Not later than one month of the date of the publication of the notice regarding preparation of draft variation, any person affected thereby may communicate in writing his objections to such variation to the State Government, and send a copy thereof to the Planning Authority.
(6) Alter receiving the objections under sub-section (5), the State Government may, after consulting the Planning Authority and after making such inquiry as it may think fit, by notification in the Official Gazette.
(a) appoint an Arbitrator, and thereupon the provisions of this Chapter shall, so far as may be, apply to such draft variation, as if it were draft scheme submitted to the State Government for sanction;
(b) sanction the variation with or without modification; or
(v) refuse to sanction the variation.
(7) From the date of the notification sanctioning the variation, with or without modifications, such variation shall take effect as it were incorporated in the scheme.”
14. Sub-section (1) of section 91 of the Act gives power to the Government to make variation or modification of a minor nature and in our view under sub-section (2) of section 91 if the State Government is satisfied that the variation was not substantial, shall by causing for issuance of notification in the Official Gazette, authorise or direct the Planning Authority to prepare a draft of such variation. Because the power under section 91(2) can be exercised only if the State Government was satisfied that the variation required was not substantial and in our view the change of public road into a private road was a variation of substantial nature. Sub-section (5) of section 91 lays down that after publication of notice, any person affected thereby may communicate in writing the objections to such variation to the Government and after considering the objections, if any received under section 91(5) and after consulting the Planning Authority and after making inquiry as it may think fit, it has three options; either to appoint an Arbitrator or to sanction the variation with or without modification or refuse to sanction the variation.
15. The State Government considered and passed the impugned order and gave four reasons for rejecting the application for variation. Even if the argument of the petitioner is accepted that the first ground in the impugned order was not correct, that the Pune Municipal Corporation was the owner of the land, even then the other grounds remain that the impugned order was passed without following requirements of law. The learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the requirements of law were followed and it was also observed that if the road was converted into a private road there would be no access available to the holders of the new plots of land.
16. On the question of a hearing, the learned Counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Pune Municipal Corporation v. Promoters and Builders Association)1, reported in 2004 (6) Bom.C.R (S.C) 787 : 2004 DGLS (soft) 357; 2004 (3) Mh.L.J 360 : 2003 (12) S.C.C 587 : A.I.R 2004 S.C 3502 wherein section 37(2) was the bone of contention, which is para materia to section 91 as far as issuance of notices are concerned. Since we have already quoted section 91, it will be profitable to quote the relevant portion of section 37, which reads thus:
“37(1) Where a modification of any part of or any proposal made in, a final Development plan is of such a nature that it will not change the character of such Development Plan, the Planning Authority may, or when so directed by the State Government shall, within sixty days from the date of such direction, publish a notice in the Official Gazette and in such other manner as may be determined by it inviting objections and suggestions from any person with respect to the proposed modification not later than one month from the date of such notice; and shall also serve notice on all persons affected by the proposed modification and after giving a hearing to any such persons, submit the proposed modification with amendments, if any, to the State Government for sanction.
(1-A)…..
(1-AA)…..
(1-B)…..
(2) The State Government may, make such inquiry as it may consider necessary and after consulting the Director of Town Planning by notification in the Official Gazette, sanction the modification with or without such changes, and subject to such conditions as it may deem fit, or refuse to accord sanction. If a modification is sanctioned, the final Development plans shall be deemed to have been modified accordingly.”
17. Analysing this section, the Supreme Court held as under:
“4. Reading of this provision reveals that under Clause (1), the Planning Authority after inviting objections and suggestions regarding the proposed amendment and after giving notice to all affected persons shall submit the proposed modification for sanction to the Government. The deliberation with the public before making the amendment is over at this stage. The Government thereafter, under Clause (2) is given absolute liberty to make or not to make necessary inquiry before granting sanction. Again, while according sanction, Government may do so with or without modifications. Government could impose such conditions as it deem fit. It is also permissible for the Government to refuse the sanction. This is the true meaning of the Clause (2). It is difficult to uphold the contrary interpretation given by the High Court. The main limitation for the Government is made under Clause (I) that no authority can propose an amendment so as to change the basic character of the development plan. The proposed amendment could only be minor within the limits of the development plan. And for such minor changes it is only normal for the Government to exercise a wide discretion, by keeping various relevant factors in mind. Again, if it is arbitrary or unreasonable the same could be challenged. It is not the case of the respondents herein that the proposed change is arbitrary or unreasonable. They challenged the same citing the reason that the Government is not empowered under the Act to make such changes to the modification.
5. Making of DCR or amendment thereof are legislative functions. Therefore, section 37 has to be viewed as repository of legislative powers for effecting amendments to DCR That legislative power of amending DCR is delegated to State Government. As we have already pointed out, the true interpretation of section 37(2) permits the State Government to make necessary modifications or put conditions while granting sanction. In section 37(2), the legislature has not intended to provide for a public hearing before according sanction. The procedure for making such amendment is provided in section 37, delegated legislation cannot be questioned for violating principles of natural justice in its making except when the statute itself provides for that requirement. Where the legislature has not chosen to provide for any notice or hearing, no one can insist upon it and it is not permissible to read natural justice into such legislative activity, Moreover, a provision for ‘such inquiry as it may consider necessary’ by a subordinate legislating body is generally an enabling provision to facilitate the subordinate legislating body to obtain relevant information from source and it is intended to vest any in anybody. (Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd)2, 1987 DGLS (soft) 400 : (1987) 2 S.CC 720. (1987) 2 SCC 720 : A.I.R 1987 S.C 1802 paragraphs 5 and 27. See generally (HSSK Niyami v. Union of India)3, 1990 DGLS (soft) 421 : (1990) 4 S.S.C 516 : A.I.R 1990 S.C 2128 and (Canara Bank v. Debasis Das)4, 2003 DGLS (soft) 233 : (2003) 4 S.CC 557 : A.I.R 2003 S.C 2041. While exercising legislative functions, unless unreasonableness or arbitrariness is pointed out, it is not open for the Court to interfere. See generally (ONGC v. Assn. Of Natural Gas Consuming Industries of Gujarat)5, 1990 DGLS (soft) 293 : 1990 (Supp.) S.CC 397 : A.I.R 1990 S.C 1851. Therefore, the view adopted by the High Court does not appear to be correct.”
18. In so far as section 126 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act is concerned, this question has also been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Zahir Jahangir Vakil v. Pune Municipal Corporation)6, reported in 2006 (4) All. M.R 326, and it held, “this provision of section 126(2) providing for acquisition of the land will apply prior to the said town planning scheme is finally sanctioned under the provisions of section 86 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966”. The reasons have been given in detail in paragraph 24 of the said judgment and this judgment also lays down that vesting under section 88 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act is absolute and free from all encumbrances. In paragraph 27 of the judgment in Zahir Jahangir Vakil (supra) this Court says:
“27. Thus, the meaning of the word ‘vest’ has to be ascertained on the basis of the setting in which it is used and the context in which it is provided under the provisions of a particular statute. In our view, the provisions of section 88 provide for a total and complete vesting and de hors of any right, title and interest in favour of any of the original plot holders. This is so because the provisions of section 88(a) provides for a vesting absolute and free of all encumbrances. It would not be out of place to state that the word ‘vesting’ in light of section 88 of the M.R.T.P Act, 1966 itself also came up for consideration in the case of (Laxminarayan R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra)7, 2003 (5) Bom.C.R 549 (supra) in which also the Supreme Court while considering the provisions of the said M.R.T.P Act, 1966 section 88 held that vesting under section 88 is absolute and free of all encumbrances and no right survives of any party in respect of the original plot of land once the final town planning scheme is sanctioned under section 86 of the said M.R.T.P Act, 1966.”
19. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in the writ petition, which is hereby dismissed.
20. Petition dismissed.
sub-section (2) of section 91Alert