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Abhyudaya Co-Operative Bank, Ltd. v. S.L Mehendale And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, a co-operative bank, terminated the respondent-employee on 4 June 1992 alleging acts of misconduct amounting to fraud. A domestic enquiry was conducted with the employee's full participation, and the termination order was based on the enquiry report, citing loss of confidence. The respondent challenged this termination by filing a complaint under Section 28 read with various items of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act) before the Industrial Court, alleging unfair labour practices. The petitioner contended the Industrial Court lacked jurisdiction over complaints under item (1) of Schedule IV, which pertain to discharge, dismissal or termination, asserting that such jurisdiction lies exclusively with the Labour Court under Section 5 of the Act.
The Industrial Court initially held the domestic enquiry fair but the findings perverse, allowing the bank to lead evidence to justify termination. Subsequently, the Industrial Court found the bank guilty of unfair labour practice under item (9) of Schedule IV, quashed the termination order, and directed reinstatement with full back wages. The bank challenged this final order by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Industrial Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint relating to termination of employment under item (1) of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act, 1971.
- Whether the Industrial Court erred in deciding the complaint on merits despite the jurisdictional objection raised by the petitioner-bank.
- The scope of jurisdiction of the Labour Court versus the Industrial Court under Sections 5, 7, and 32 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act, 1971, particularly concerning unfair labour practices related to termination, discharge, or dismissal.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner-Bank's Arguments
- The Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain complaints under item (1) of Schedule IV relating to discharge, dismissal, or termination; such jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the Labour Court under Section 5 of the Act.
- The termination was based on proven misconduct and loss of confidence, following a fair domestic enquiry.
- The complaint included other items (5), (9), and (10) only to improperly invoke the Industrial Court's jurisdiction.
- There was no retrenchment and hence no applicability of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
- The bank had paid all dues including wages for four days, negating the claim under item (9).
- Relied on precedents establishing that termination matters fall exclusively within the Labour Court's jurisdiction.
Respondent-Employee's Arguments
- The Industrial Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint under item (1) of Schedule IV.
- Supported the judgments relied upon by the petitioner-bank but maintained the Industrial Court's jurisdiction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 1995 (1) L.L.N 736; Dilip Son of Indrabhanji Wawande v. Industrial Court, Nagpur | Jurisdiction over termination complaints lies exclusively with the Labour Court under Section 7 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act. | Supported the proposition that Industrial Court cannot grant relief or interim orders in termination matters. |
| 2002 (1) L.L.N 891; R.P Sawant v. Bajaj Auto Ltd. | Clarified the compartmentalization of jurisdiction between Labour Court and Industrial Court under Sections 5, 7, and 32 of the Act. | Confirmed that Industrial Court cannot entertain complaints under item (1) of Schedule IV; however, it may mold relief within its jurisdiction. |
| 2002 (1) L.L.N 744; Supertex (India) Corporation v. Radheshyam K. Pandey | Industrial Court lacks jurisdiction to investigate complaints under item (1) of Schedule IV. | Reinforced that Industrial Court’s orders on item (1) complaints are without jurisdiction. |
| 1990 (2) L.L.N 387; National General Mazdoor Union | Interpretation of the non obstante clause in Section 32 of the Act regarding jurisdictional powers of Labour and Industrial Courts. | Referenced in the context of jurisdictional limits and powers of courts under the Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court observed that the Industrial Court erred in assuming jurisdiction over complaints relating to termination, discharge, or dismissal of employees, which are exclusively assigned to the Labour Court under item (1) of Schedule IV and Section 7 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act. The Industrial Court should have decided the jurisdictional issue at the outset rather than proceeding with the merits, which led to unnecessary expenditure of time and resources and prolonged the dispute.
The court emphasized the legislative intent reflected in the specific enumeration of jurisdictional items, whereby the Labour Court’s jurisdiction over termination matters excludes the Industrial Court from entertaining such complaints. The Industrial Court’s attempt to rely on other items such as (5), (9), and (10) to justify jurisdiction was found to be an overreach, especially since the substantive grievance was termination and not retrenchment or wage-related issues.
The court relied on binding precedents from this High Court that consistently held the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court over termination disputes and invalidated the Industrial Court’s orders as without jurisdiction. The non obstante clause in Section 32 was interpreted as allowing courts to mold relief within their jurisdiction but not to expand jurisdiction beyond that conferred by Sections 5 and 7.
Holding and Implications
The writ petition is allowed and the orders of the Industrial Court dated 21 August 1993 and 17 November 1995 are quashed and set aside as being without jurisdiction.
The direct effect of this decision is to restore the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court over complaints relating to termination, discharge, or dismissal of employees under item (1) of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act. The Industrial Court’s encroachment into this domain is invalidated. No new precedent beyond reaffirming established jurisdictional demarcations is set. The parties must approach the appropriate forum, the Labour Court, for adjudication of termination-related unfair labour practice complaints.
1. The petitioner, a co-operative bank, is aggrieved by the impugned judgment and orders, dated 21 August, 1993 and 17 November, 1995 passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint U.L.P No. 1158 of 1992 filed by the respondent No. 2-employee under S. 28 read with items (1)(a), (1)(b) (1)(d) (1)(f) and (1)(g), (5), (9) and (10) of Sch. IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, as he was aggrieved by the Order of termination, dated 4 June, 1992, passed by the petitioner-bank alleging several acts of misconducts committed by the respondent-employee.
2. The relevant facts, briefly stated, are that the respondent-employee was served with chargesheet alleging against him certain acts of misconducts which can be termed as fraud commited by him while in employment. I need not set out the details and the charges as it is not necessary for the present purpose. It further appears that a domestic enquiry was held in the said charges and the concerned employee had fully participated in the enquiry. On the basis of the report of the inquiry officer the petitioner-bank issued the aforesaid termination order terminating the respondent-employee from employment with effect from 4 June, 1992 on the grounds inter alia, that of loss of confidence.
3. The respondent-employee aggrieved by the said order of termination and, therefore, filed the complaint under S. 28 read with S. 30 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act, 1971, to challenge the order of termination as an unfair labour practice within the meaning of items set out by me hereinabove. The petitioner-bank appeared before the Industrial Court and contested the complaint on the grounds including the substantial ground of jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to entertain and try the complaint under item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act. According to the petitioner-bank the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint pertaining to item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act as that jurisdiction was exclusively conferred on the Labour Court under S. 5 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act. The Industrial Court's jurisdiction was in respect of the other items of Sch. IV of and other Schedules. According to the petitioner-bank the respondent-employee had challenged the order of termination being an unfair labour practice on various grounds, and therefore, it was for the Labour Court alone to have decided the said complaint.
4. By the first order, dated 21 August, 1993, the Industrial Court held that the enquiry held against the employee was fair and proper but findings were perverse. The petitioner-bank was, therefore, permitted to lead evidence to justify the order of termination before the Industrial Court. It appears that the bank has challenged the aforesaid order of the Industrial Court by filing a separate writ petition which is still pending. It further appears that since the proceedings were not stayed the bank adduced independent evidence before the Industrial Court to justify its action of termination. After recording the evidence the Industrial Court by the aforesaid impugned order, dated 17 November, 1995, held that the bank had engaged in an unfair labour practice under item (9) of Sch. IV of the Act and also quashed and set aside the termination order, dated 4 June, 1992, passed against the respondent-employee and further directed the bank to reinstate him in service in his original post with full back-wages and all consequential benefits from the date of termination. The petitioner-bank has filed the present writ petition against the final order of the Industrial Court to challenge its legality and validity under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
5. Sri S.M Naik, the learned advocate appearing for the bank has strenuously submitted that the Industrial Court had committed a serious and grave error of law in holding that the Industrial Court had jurisdiction to decide a complaint which squarely fell under item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act. According to Sri Naik, the main grievance of the respondent-employee was the challenge to the legality and propriety of the order of termination, dated 4 June, 1992. He further pointed out that the other items such as 5, 9 and 10 were only included by the employee to try to bring in the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. Sri Naik further submitted that the question of payment of retrenchment compensation did not arise as it was not a case of retrenchment of the concerned employee. But it was a punitive order of termination after serving a chargesheet and holding an enquiry in the chargesheet against the said employee. He further pointed out that in view of the proved acts of misconducts which amounted to fraudulent transactions which were detrimental to the interest of the bank, the management had lost confidence in the employee and therefore, he was terminated from service. Sri Naikpointed out that there was no question of compliance of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as it was not a case of retrenchment. In respect of the other minor point which was tried to be pushed under item (9) was payment of four days wages by the bank to the said employee. In this respect also Sri Naik pointed out that there was no failure on the part of the bank to pay even four days wages. As the employee was directed to collect all his legal dues including the wages for the four days of his employment. The Industrial Court has absolved the bank from the charge of unfair labour practice under items (5) and (10) and no submissions were rightly made by Sri Naik in this respect. Sri Naik has relied on the following judgments of this Court in support of his contention that for the matters covered under item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act, it was the Labour Court which had jurisdiction to entertain and try such complaints and that the Industrial Court was precluded from entering into that area:
(1) 1995 (1) L.L.N 736; Dilip Son of Indrabhanji Wawande v. Industrial Court, Nagpur
(2) 2002 (1) L.L.N 891; R.P Sawant v. Bajaj Auto, Ltd.
(3) 2002 (1) L.L.N 744; Supertex (India) Corporation v. Radheshyam K. Pandey
The aforesaid judgments relied on by Sri Naik fully support his contention.
6. Sri Raja Hegde, the learned advocate appearing for the employee has strongly supported the judgments and submitted that the Industrial Court had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and that the Industrial Court rightly held that it has jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint against the order of termination under item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act.
7. The Industrial Court, proceeded to decide the complaint regardless of the question whether it had jurisdiction to decide the complaint or not. In fact he ought to have decided the said question of jurisdiction which was specifically pleaded and raised by the bank. It was very obvious that the orders of discharge, dismissal or termination are covered by item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act and there was no item under Sch. IV of the Act which substantively covered the issue of discharge, dismissal or termination of an employee. The issue of jurisdiction was ex facie clear and the Industrial Court therefore ought to have concentrated on the said point of jurisdiction which was going to the root of the matter. Had the Industrial Court applied its mind to the said issue at the outset it would have saved lot of time, energy and stationery. Besides, the respondent-employee has also lost valuable period from 1992 till this date. Had the Industrial Court decided the said question which was obvious as a preliminary question both the parties would have known where they stood in the corridors of the Courts. However, the Industrial Court persisted to decide the complaint and finally held that the domestic enquiry which preceded the order of termination was procedurally fair and proper and that the respondent-employee was given reasonable and adequate opportunity of hearing and that all the principles of natural justice were complied with in the conduct of the enquiry. The Industrial Court however held that the findings were perverse as they did not flow from the material on record of the enquiry. Having held so it was incumbent on the part of the Industrial Court to have given an opportunity to the bank to justify its action of termination by adducing independent evidence before the Industrial Court. The bank was bound to obey the said orders and accordingly adduced oral and documentary evidence before the Industrial Court in support of its termination order. Even at this stage Sri S.M Naik the learned advocate for the bank was at pains to argue that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint regarding dismissal, discharge or termination of an employee which squarely and specifically falls under item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act. The Industrial Court however, continued to persist to decide the entire matter even on merits including, of course, the question of jurisdiction. On the point of jurisdiction the Industrial Court has held that the Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(f) and (1)(g) of the Act. It further appears that as far as the items (5), (9) and (10) are concerned the Industrial Court has held that the employee had not proved the case under the said items except to the extent under item (9) where it was alleged that he was not paid four days wages and the amount of retrenchment compensation and therefore his complaint under item (9) was held maintainable to that extent.
8. The impugned judgments of the Industrial Court do not stand scrutiny of this Court even for a minute. The Industrial Court was wholly wrong in usurping the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain and try the complaints of unfair labour practices which squarely fell under item(1) of Sch. IV of the Act. It is the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court under S. 7 of the Act. The Legislature has specifically enacted the said item and has specifically vested jurisdiction and power to entertain all such complaints relating to item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act in the Labour Court. The Industrial Court is vested under S. 5 the jurisdiction to decide all other matters which do not fall under item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act. It is very well established that if the Legislature has enumerated several items and if there are specific items in that case those specific items have to be excluded from any other general items which are enumerated in the list. The question of discharge, dismissal or termination of employees is squarely and specifically covered by item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act, and therefore, no question of termination can be decided by the Industrial Court under the general items such as items (5), (9) and (10) of Sch. IV of the Act. In the present case the substantive grievance of the employee was against the order of termination and therefore the Industrial Court ought not to have entertained the complaint which clearly lied before the Labour Court under S. 28 of the Act. The Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to decide it by overstretching the item (9) which possibly may be attracted only when there is a case of violation of mandatory statutory provisions of law, such as S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Even in such a case, justification of retrenchment cannot be decided which will require decision under item (10) of Sch. IV of the Act. The Legislature has specifically assigned the duties to decide the unfair labour practices to the two separate forums which cannot take away the mutually assigned jurisdiction of each other. When all the questions of unfair labour practice of discharge or dismissal orders are specifically assigned to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, nothing is left or carved out for the Industrial Court under this specific item which would excluded the general expression.
9. This point has been squarely dealt with by the aforesaid three judgments of our High Court. In the first judgment of Dilip Wawande, [1996 (1) L.L.N 736] (vide supra) the learned Single Judge of this Court (G.D Patil, J.) in Para. 7-A, at page 740, has observed as under:
“There is no dispute that the jurisdiction to try the dispute as regards the termination is with the Labour Court, having regard to the provisions of S. 7 of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act. This Court has already held and I concur with the same that if the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to give any direction in the matter of termination, it cannot have any jurisdiction even to grant interim relief in relation to that. The instant one is a case where a direction in the matter of termination was sought in the complaint and an interim relief was sought in relation to that. Since, it is for the Labour Court to entertain the complaint in relation to the termination, the Industrial Court could not have passed any order even at the time of final disposal of the complaint as regards the termination. Resultantly, it could not have granted any relief by way of the interim order under S. 30(2) of the M.R.T.U and P.U.L.P Act, in relation to the termination of the complaint's services. The impugned order passed by the Industrial Court in the instant matter, therefore, has to be held as being without jurisdiction and, therefore, it is liable to be quashed and set aside.”
Further the Division Bench of this Court (Srikrishna and Smt. Desai, JJ.) in the case of R.P Sawant, [2002 (1) L.L.N 891] (vide supra), in Para. 48, at page 904, has observed as under:
“A conjoint reading of Ss. 5, 7 and 32 of the 1971 Act would make it clear that, though, for the purpose of exercising initial jurisdiction in to a substantive complaint, the jurisdictions have been compartmentalised inasmuch as the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain complaints other than complaints falling under item (1) of Sch. IV of the 1971 Act and conversely, the Industrial Court has been given powers to entertain complaints in all other matters, it does not mean that the Industrial Court, while exercising jurisdiction within the sphere legitimately assigned to it, cannot pass an order which is required to be done in the interest of justice. It cannot be forgotten that S. 32 starts with a non obstante clause “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act” and provides that the Court trying the matter shall have the power to decide “all matters arising out of any application or complaint referred to it for the decision under any of the provisions of this Act.” In our judgment, the decision in National General Mazdoor Union, [1990 (2) L.L.N 387], does not recognize and give full effect to the amplitude of the non obstante clause in S. 32. In our judgment, the enumeration of the respective jurisdictional limits of the Industrial Court and Labour Court, provided in Ss. 5 and 7 of the 1971 Act, when read with the non obstante provision in S. 32 of the 1971 Act, means this: A substantive complaint can be entertained by the Court (Labour Court or Industrial Court) only with regard to the matters provided in S. 5 or S. 7. If a complaint is substantively made to the Industrial Court, then by reason of S. 5(b), it has no jurisdiction to entertain a complaint relating to unfair labour practices falling under item (1) of Sch. IV of the 1971 Act; conversely, a complaint of unfair labour practice falling only under item (1) of Sch. IV can be entertained by the Labour Court, but not any other complaint. This does not, however, mean that while trying a substantive complaint legitimately falling within its jurisdictional purview, the Labour Court or Industrial Court is precluded from moulding the relief as required by the facts of the case.”
(emphasis supplied.)
In the third judgment in the case of Supretex (India), [2002 (1) L.L.N 744] (vide supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court (Chandrachud, J.) has taken the same view as under, in Para. 8, at page 748;
“… The first issue is, with respect incomprehensible. The second issue which was raised was under item (9) of Sch. IV. The Industrial Court, in the body of its judgment has initially dealt with the issues with reference to item (9). However, in the operative part of the order the Court has found that the employer was guilty of unfair labour practices besides item (9), under items (1)(a) and (1)(b) as well. That part of the Order of the Industrial Court is clearly without jurisdiction because the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to investigate into a complaint under item (1) of Sch. IV.”
10. From the above law laid down it is very clear that there is an unanimity of the judicial opinion that the Industrial matters enumerated in item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act is the exclusive area left by the Legislature specifically for the Labour Court. The Industrial Court cannot usurp or encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Labour Court by deciding the complaints in respect of discharge, dismissal or termination of the employees. In the present case the substantive question was that of order of termination and challenge was on the basis of the violation of principle of natural justice in conduct of enquiry. All these questions squarely fall within the jurisdiction of item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act. It was therefore not proper and right for the Industrial Court to have proceeded with the complaint to decide the question of termination being an unfair labour practice under item (1) of Sch. IV of the Act. The Industrial Court has acted clearly without jurisdiction, and therefore, both the orders of the Industrial Court are hereby quashed and set aside being without jurisdiction. The petition succeeds. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Cl. (a). No orders as to cost.
Petition allowed.
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