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Manilal Premji Gala v. Boman P. Irani & Others

Bombay High Court
Feb 22, 2001
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Per B.N. Srikrishna, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges an order of the learned Single Judge dated 4 August 2000 which dismissed a Notice of Motion (No. 1819 of 2000) with costs. The Notice of Motion had been filed under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking a stay of proceedings in Suit No. 3699 of 1995 pending the hearing and final disposal of Declaratory Suit No. 1750 of 1994 that was then pending in the Small Causes Court, Mumbai.

The factual matrix as stated in the opinion is as follows. The appellant (original defendant No.1) had instituted a declaratory suit (Suit No. 1750 of 1994) in the Small Causes Court asserting tenancy rights in respect of Shop No.7 in Zaveri Gallery, Mumbai. The present suit (filed by the first and second respondents, who are original plaintiffs) seeks declarations concerning dissolution of a partnership called "Roopsons" and consequential reliefs against the appellant and the third respondent (original defendants).

At an interlocutory stage, the first and second respondents took out Notice of Motion No. 2737 of 1995 for interim reliefs. The appellant challenged jurisdiction, contending the tenancy issue was exclusively triable by the Small Causes Court and that the partnership-versus-tenancy question was directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted Small Causes Court suit. A preliminary issue was framed and evidence was to be recorded. The appellant then applied under section 10 CPC for a stay of the present suit on the ground of a previously instituted suit between the same parties.

The learned Single Judge heard the competing notices and refused the stay, taking the view that the Small Causes Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the reliefs sought in the present suit and that the issues in the present suit (existence/dissolution of partnership) were beyond the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court. This resulted in the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied so as to require a stay of the subsequent suit when a previously instituted suit (in the Small Causes Court) was pending and the matters in issue overlapped.
  2. Whether the insertion of Explanations VII and VIII in section 11 (by the 1976 Amendment) altered the legal position so as to change the application or interpretation of section 10 — specifically, whether issues decided or adjudicated by a Court of limited jurisdiction can now prevent trial of a subsequent suit in another Court by operation of section 10.
  3. Whether the Small Causes Court had competence to grant the reliefs claimed in the later suit (and conversely whether the Court before which the later suit was filed had competence to grant the reliefs claimed in the earlier suit) such that "competence to grant the relief" requirement of section 10 was satisfied.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The learned Single Judge erred in law in refusing to apply section 10 CPC and in dismissing the Notice of Motion for stay.
  • The law changed after the insertion of Explanations VII and VIII into section 11 by the 1976 Amendment; those Explanations make res judicata applicable to issues decided by Courts of limited jurisdiction and therefore sections 10 and 11 should be read harmoniously so as to permit a stay of the subsequent suit if the matter in issue is directly and substantially the same.
  • Reliance was placed on Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair (1994) to argue that Explanation VIII widened the effect of res judicata and thus affected the interplay between sections 10 and 11 — the appellant contended that this change warranted applying section 10 in the present circumstances.
  • Additional reliance was placed on several authorities (including Life Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. v. Bengal Medical Hall and other High Court decisions) arguing tests and formulations supportive of a stay where the prior suit could render the later matter res judicata if decided in the earlier suit's favour.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Bepin Behary Mozumdar v. Chandra Ghosh Cited as authority for the uniform view on interpretation of section 10 (requirements for its attraction). Used among a series of cases to support the tripartite test for section 10 (same matter in issue; same parties or parties under same title; previously instituted suit pending in a Court competent to grant relief claimed).
Kalipada Banerji v. Charubala Dasee Authority for the principles governing section 10. Applied as part of the body of decisions establishing the uniform test for section 10.
Somasundaram Chettiar v. A. Venkata Subbayya Authority for the interpretation of section 10. Relied upon as part of the consistent line of authorities outlining the requirements for section 10 to apply.
Kamal Distillery Co. Ltd. v. L.P. Jaswat Authority supporting the uniform approach to section 10. Counted among precedents affirming the requirement that the earlier court be competent to grant the relief claimed.
Nunu Singh v. Muni Nath Singh Authority on section 10 jurisprudence. Referred to as part of the established caselaw on when section 10 is attracted.
Nirmal Singh v. Om Prakash Authority for interpreting section 10. Used to demonstrate the uniform judicial approach to section 10.
Manta Subbaramayya v. Batchu Narasimha Swamy Supporting authority on section 10's requirements. Included among decisions emphasising the need for competence of the earlier court to grant relief claimed.
Channabasappa Kamadal and Sons v. Kishan Chand & Co. Authority cited in relation to section 10. Referred to as part of the established line of High Court authorities on section 10.
Mirta Lina P. Ltd. v. The Finlay Mills Ltd. Authority on section 10 and related principles. Counted among precedents demonstrating the uniform view on the application of section 10.
Minocher Behramji Damania v. Hema N. Dadachanji High Court authority cited on section 10 jurisprudence. Used as part of the catalogue of cases supporting the tripartite test for section 10.
Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. Principle that section 10 bars "trial" of a subsequent suit but does not prevent the Court from dealing with the later suit for other purposes, and that "trial" is not to be given an unnecessarily wide interpretation; interlocutory orders are not barred. The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to explain the proper scope of section 10 (i.e., to prevent simultaneous trials of parallel suits but not to oust a court's power to make interlocutory orders or otherwise deal with the later suit).
Senaji Kapurchand v. Pannaji Devichand Authority cited as consistent with the interpretation in Indian Bank regarding section 10. Referred to for similar observations on the purpose and scope of section 10.
Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair Interpreted section 11 with Explanations VII and VIII: Explanation VIII expands res judicata to issues decided by Courts of limited pecuniary or special jurisdiction so that such issues may operate as res judicata in subsequent suits. The appellant relied on this Supreme Court decision to argue that the effect of Explanation VIII required a re-reading of section 10; the Court examined and rejected that contention in the present opinion, explaining that insertion of Explanations VII and VIII in section 11 does not alter the established interpretation of section 10.
P.M. Kavade v. A.B. Bokil Earlier authority on the requirement that the earlier court must have jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit for res judicata to apply (prior to Explanation VIII). Cited in the discussion of Sulochana Amma to explain the historical rule and the purpose of introducing Explanation VIII to cure the anomaly.
Life Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. v. Bengal Medical Hall Held that the test under section 10 is whether the matter in the later suit would be res judicata if the prior suit were decreed as prayed. The appellant pressed this Calcutta High Court view; the opinion notes that the decision pre-dates the amendment (Explanation VIII) and treats it as a proposition advanced by the appellant but does not accept that it displaces the uniform interpretation of section 10.
Jai Hind Iron Mart v. Tulsiram Bhagwandas Sets out the underlying legislative policy behind section 10 — to avoid parallel proceedings and conflicting decisions; emphasises the necessity that the Court entertaining the subsequent suit be able to grant relief claimed in the earlier suit. The Court referenced this Division Bench decision to support the view that "parallel jurisdiction" implies competence of the subsequent-court to grant the relief claimed in the prior suit; the opinion agrees with this interpretation.
Minguel Francis D'Costa v. Sultan Gulamali Karim Chhatriwala Outlined the conditions required to apply section 10 (common issue; earlier suit in same Court or prior Court competent to grant relief; same parties litigating under same title). The opinion observed that this decision, contrary to the appellant's claim, supports the view that all conditions for section 10 must be satisfied and therefore does not aid the appellant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the statutory provisions and the consistent line of authorities interpreting section 10 CPC and the effect of the 1976 Amendment to section 11 (i.e., the insertion of Explanations VII and VIII).

First, the Court recited the long-established tripartite test applied by courts when deciding whether section 10 is attracted:

  1. The matter in issue must be directly and substantially the same in both suits;
  2. The suits must be between the same parties or parties claiming under the same title;
  3. The Court in which the previously instituted suit is pending must be competent to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit.

The Court then reviewed relevant authorities, including the Supreme Court decision in Indian Bank, which clarified that "trial" in section 10 does not have the widest meaning — section 10 prevents the "trial" of a subsequent suit where it would lead to simultaneous parallel trials and inconsistent findings, but does not deprive a Court of power to deal with the later suit for other purposes such as interlocutory orders.

The appellant's central contention was that the introduction of Explanations VII and VIII in section 11 altered the legal landscape so that issues decided by Courts of limited jurisdiction could operate as res judicata and that this change should lead to a different application of section 10 (i.e., require a stay of the subsequent suit). The appellant relied heavily on Sulochana Amma which interpreted Explanation VIII as expanding the operation of res judicata to issues decided by Courts of limited jurisdiction.

The Court rejected this contention. It reasoned that (i) section 10 itself was not amended by Parliament and (ii) the consistent judicial interpretation of section 10 — that the Court entertaining the subsequent suit must be competent to grant the relief claimed in the earlier suit for section 10 to apply — stands unaffected by subsequent amendments to section 11. The Court held that the insertion of Explanations VII and VIII, though it expanded the operation of res judicata under section 11, did not and could not detract from the prior construction of section 10, because Parliament left section 10 unchanged when it enacted the amendment to section 11.

Applying these legal principles to the facts, the Court agreed with the Single Judge's finding that the reliefs claimed in the suit before the Small Causes Court and the reliefs claimed in the present suit were mutually exclusive. The Small Causes Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the reliefs claimed in the suit pending before this Court, and this Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the reliefs claimed in the Small Causes Court. Because the competence requirement (the third limb of the tripartite test) was not satisfied, section 10 had no application to warrant a stay of the subsequent suit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed. The Court upheld the Single Judge's order dismissing the Notice of Motion and held that section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application on the facts of this case because the Court in which the earlier suit was pending (Small Causes Court) was not competent to grant the reliefs claimed in the subsequent suit and vice versa.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Notice of Motion for a stay under section 10 was rightly dismissed; the subsequent suit may therefore proceed in this Court. The appeal against the Single Judge's order is dismissed and there is no order as to costs.
  • No alteration of existing legal principle: The Court expressly held that the amendment to section 11 (Explanations VII and VIII) did not change the well-established interpretation of section 10; the statute governing section 10 was not amended and the consistent judicial interpretation pertaining to the competence requirement remains binding.
  • No new precedent beyond application of existing principles: The decision applies settled principles to the facts and does not purport to create any novel rule of law; the Court noted the legislative choice not to amend section 10 when section 11 was amended and treated that legislative inaction as significant in upholding the existing construction of section 10.
  • Administrative directions: The Court expedited issuance of the certified copy and directed parties to act on an ordinary copy of the order authenticated by the Associate of the Court.

This summary is strictly confined to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that opinion.

Show all summary ...

Per B.N Srikrishna, J.:— This appeal is directed against an order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the Notice of Motion taken out by the first and the second respondents for stay of Suit No. 3699 of 1995 under section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, pending hearing and final disposal of Suit No. 1750 of 1994 filed in the Small Causes Court, Mumbai. The learned Single Judge by his order dated 4th August, 2000 dismissed Notice of Motion No. 1819 of 2000 with costs. Hence, this appeal.

2. The appellant (original defendant No. 1) had filed a Declaratory Suit No. 1750 of 1994 in the Court of Small Causes, Mumbai. The case pleaded therein is that the first and third respondents are landlords of the premises being Shop No. 7 situated on the ground floor of the building known as Zaveri Gallery, situated at 63, Bhulabhai Desai Road, Bombay 400026 and that the appellant is a tenant of the premises. That suit seeks declaration of the status and rights of tenancy of the appellant in respect of the said suit premises. The present suit is filed by the first and the second respondents (original plaintiffs) against the appellant and the third respondent (original defendants) for a declaration that the suit partnership styled as “Roopsons” stood dissolved with effect from 31st March, 1994 or within a period of one month from the date of receipt of dissolution notice dated 26th May, 1994 or from the date of the suit and in the alternative for dissolution of the said partnership firm by an order of the Court and for consequential reliefs.

3. The first and the second respondents (original plaintiffs) in the suit took out Notice of Motion No. 2737 of 1995 for certain interim reliefs. The appellant (original first defendants) raised an objection to the jurisdiction of this Court contending that the appellant is a tenant of the first and second respondents and the third respondent in respect of the aforesaid premises and therefore, the suit was exclusively triable by the Small Causes Court and that this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. An application was made to frame a preliminary issue and accordingly a preliminary issue was framed for which evidence was to be recorded. At that stage, the present Notice of Motion No. 1819 of 2000 was taken out by the appellant contending that the issue of his tenancy in respect of suit being exclusively triable by the Court of Small Causes and as the Suit No. 1750 of 1994 had already been filed in the Small Causes Court for a declaratory and consequential reliefs by the said defendant, any decision given by this Court on the issue of partnership was likely to have “adverse effect on the decision of the suit pending before the Small Causes Court. It was contended that the issue of partnership versus tenancy was directly and substantially in issue in a previously filed suit before the Small Causes Court. An application was made under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for staying the proceedings in this suit. We may mention here that certain ad interim reliefs had already been granted in the plaintiff's Notice of Motion. The learned Single Judge heard both the Notices of Motion and disposed them of by the common order under appeal. The learned Single Judge took the view that as the Small Causes Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the reliefs prayed for in the suit filed before this Court and as the material issue in the present suit is whether a partnership exists or existed and whether it was dissolved or had to be dissolved and as those were issues beyond the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court, the present suit could not be stayed.

4. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is erroneous in law and contrary to decisions of the Supreme Court. It would be necessary to advert to the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as “Code”).

5. section 10 of the Code provides that a Court shall not proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed. section 11 of the Code deals with res judicata and provides that if such a suit has already been tried earlier and decided by a competent Court, it is not open to a Court to decide the said matter once again. By the Amendment Act, 1976 (with effect from 1st February, 1977), Explanations VII and VIII were inserted in section 11 of the Code. They are to the following effect:

“Explanation VII.— The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and references in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to a proceeding for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.

Explanation VII.— An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.”

6. section 10 of the Code has been the subject-matter of interpretation in a series of judgments and the uniform view taken was that section 10 would be attracted if the following requirements were fulfilled:

(1) The matter in issue is directly and substantially the same in both the suits.

(2) The suits are between same parties or parties claiming under the same title.

(3) The Court in which the previously instituted suit is pending is competent to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit.

7. (See in this connection (Bepin Behary Mozumdar v. Chandra Ghosh)1, A.I.R 1917 Cal. 248, (Kalipada Banerji v. Charubala Dasee)2, A.I.R 1933 Cal. 887, (Somasundaram Chettiar v. A. Venkata Subbayya)3, A.I.R 1938 Mad. 602, (Kamal Distillery Co. Ltd. v. L.P Jaswat)4, A.I.R 1951 Simla 275, (Nunu Singh v. Muni Nath Singh)5, A.I.R 1954 Patna 314, (Nirmal Singh v. Om Prakash)6, A.I.R 1965 J. & K. 52, (Manta Subbaramayya v. Batchu Narasimha Swamy)7, A.I.R 1972 A.P 186, (Channabasappa Kamadal and Sons v. Kishan Chand & Co.)8, A.I.R 1972 Mys. 112, (Mirta Lina P. Ltd. v. The Finlay Mills Ltd.)9, A.I.R 1982 Cal. 41 and (Minocher Behramji Damania v. Hema N. Dadachanji)10, 1983 (2) Bom. C.R 218 : A.I.R 1982 Bom. 151 : 1981 Mh. L.J 783.

8. In (Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd.)11, 1998 (4) Bom. C.R (S.C) 165 : (1998) 5 SCC 69 : A.I.R 1998 S.C 1952 : 1998 (2) Mh. L.J 101, the Supreme Court pointed out that the course of action which the Court has to follow under section 10 is not to proceed with the “trial” of the subsequent suit. That, however, does not mean that it cannot deal with the subsequent suit any more or for any other purpose. The Supreme Court pointed out that the word “trial” used in section 10 is not used in its widest sense and in view of the object and nature of the provision of the fairly settled legal position with respect to passing of interlocutory orders, wider interpretation of the word “trial” was not called for. The Supreme Court indicated the reason for the prohibition contained in section 10 against the trial of the subsequent suit in the following words (vide paragraph 8):—

“………… The object of the prohibition contained in section 10 is to prevent the courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits and also to avoid in-consistent findings on the matters in issue. The provision is in the nature of a rule of procedure and does not effect the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain and deal with the later suit nor does it create any substantive right in the matters. It is not a bar to the institution of the suit. It has been construed by the Court as not a bar of the passing of interlocutory orders such as an order for consolidation of the later suit with the earlier suit or appointment of a Receiver or an injunction or attachment before judgment.”

9. To similar effect are the observations of this Court in (Senaji Kapurchand v. Pannaji Devichand)12, A.I.R 1922 Bom. 276.

10. Against this consistently held view, the learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the situation in law has changed a result of the insertion of Explanations VII and VIII in section 11 of the Code. The decision of the Supreme Court in (Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair.)13, (1994) 2 SCC 14 : A.I.R 1994 S.C 152 : (1994) 2 SCC 14, was pressed into service. The following observations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said judgment are relied upon:

“4. Section 11 of the C.P.C embodies the rule of conclusiveness as evidence or bars as a plea of an issue tried in an earlier suit founded on a plaint in which the matter is directly and substantially in issue and became final. In a later suit between the same parties or their privies in a competent Court to try such subsequent suit in which the issue has been directly and substantially raised and decided in the judgment and decree in the former suit would operate as res judicata. Section 11 does not create any right or interest in the property, but merely operates as a bar to try the same issue once over. In other words, it aims to prevent multiplicity of the proceedings and accords finality to an issue which directly and substantially had arisen in the former suit between the same parties or their privies, decided and became final, so that parties are not vexed twice oven vexatious litigation would be put to an end and the valuable time of the Court is saved. It is based on public policy, as well as private justice. They would apply, therefore, to all judicial proceedings whether civil or otherwise. It equally applies to quasi judicial proceedings of the Tribunals other than the Civil Courts.

5. The words “competent to try such subsequent suit” have been interpreted that it must refer to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the earlier Court to try the subsequent suit at the time when the first suit was brought. Mere competency to try the issue raised in the subsequent suit is not enough. A decree in a previous suit will not operate as res judicata, unless the Judge by whom it was made had jurisdiction to try and decide, not that particular suit, but also the subsequent suit itself in which the issue is subsequently raised. This interpretation had consistently been adopted before the introduction of Explanation VII. So the earlier decree of the Court of a limited pecuniary jurisdiction would not operate as res judicata when the same issue is directly and substantially in issue in a later suit filed in a Court of unlimited jurisdiction, vide (P.M Kavade v. A.B Bokil)14, (1971) 3 SCC 530 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 2228 : (1971) 3 SCC 530. It had, therefore, become necessary to bring in the statute Explanation VIII. To cull out its scope and ambit, it must be read along with section 11, to find the purpose it seeks to serve. The law Commission in its report recommended to remove the anomaly and bring within its fold the conclusiveness of an issue in a former suit decided by any Court, be it either of limited pecuniary jurisdiction or of special jurisdiction, like Insolvency, Court Probate Court, Land Acquisition Court, Rent Controller, Revenue Tribunal, etc. No doubt main body of section 11 was not amended, yet the expression “the Court of limited jurisdiction “in Explanation VIII is wide enough to include a Court whose jurisdiction is subject to pecuniary limitation and other cognate expressions analogous thereto. Therefore, section 11 is to be read in combination and harmony with Explanation VIII, The result that would flow is that an order or an issue which had arisen directly and substantially between the parties or their privies and decided finally by a competent Court or Tribunal, though of limited or special jurisdiction, which includes pecuniary jurisdiction, will operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit or proceeding, notwithstanding the fact that such Court of limited or special jurisdiction was not a competent Court to try the subsequent suit. The issue must directly and substantially arise in a later suit between the same parties or their privies……….”

11. Placing reliance on the above observations in Sulochana Amma (supra), it is contended that the result of addition of Explanation VIII in section 11 of the Code is that an order on an issue which had arisen earlier and substantially between the parties and their privies and decided finally by a competent Court or Tribunal, though of limited or special jurisdiction, which includes pecuniary jurisdiction, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding, notwithstanding the fact that such Court of limited or special jurisdiction was not a competent Court to try the subsequent suit.

12. The judgment of the Calcutta High Court in (Life Pharmaceuticals (Private) Ltd. v. Bengal Medical Hall)15, A.I.R 1971 Cal. 345 is also pressed into service wherein the learned Judge vide paragraph 12 held that the test to be applied in deciding an application under section 10 of the Code is “……whether the matter in the later suit will be res judicata if the prior suit is taken to have been decreed in the manner as prayed in the plaint”. We may point out that this judgment appears to have been made pertaining to the suit prior to the amendment of section 11 by addition of Explanation VIII.

13. The judgment of our High Court in (Jai Hind Iron Mart v. Tulsiram Bhagwandas), A.I.R 1953 Bom. 117 was also relied upon by the appellant. In this judgment, the Division Bench pointed out that the principle underlying section 10 seems to be that the policy of the legislature is opposed to two courts with parallel jurisdiction proceeding simultaneously with two suits when there is a possibility of the two courts coming to different conclusions and thereby resulting in conflict of decisions. We agree with the learned Single Judge's view that the exclusive “parallel jurisdiction” would necessarily mean that the Court trying the subsequent suit should have the jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for in the former suit. This is consistent with the uniformly held view.

14. The appellant also relied on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in (Minguel Francis D'Costa v. Sultan Gulamali Karim Chhatriwala)17, 1999 (3) Bom. C.R 170 : 1999 (2) Mh. L.J 473. We are afraid that the judgment, far from supporting the appellant, is against them for the Judge has indicated that “In order to apply section 10 of C.P.C the statute requires four points to be satisfied: The issue must be common in both the suits; the previously instituted suit should be in the same Court in which the subsequent suit is filed. If it is in different Court, the Court where earlier suit is pending must have jurisdiction to grant reliefs claimed in the subsequent suit; both the suits must be between the same parties. Such parties must be litigating in both the suits under the same title. If so read any of the condition is lacking, section 10 will not have any application”.

15. Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that in Sulochana Amma (supra), Supreme Court notices that as a result of Explanations (VII) and (VIII) being added to section 10 of the Code, two drastic changes have taken place. First, the principle of res judicata would apply irrespective of the fact that the earlier Court was a Court of limited jurisdiction and second, the principle of res judicata now applies not only to final judgment but also in respect of issues, previously adjudicated. It is urged that the Supreme Court has pointed out that sections 10 and 11 of the code have to be read as mutually complementary. While section 11 deals with the situation of a suit or an issue having been decided previously by a Court and provides for the consequence that the said issue shall not be reagitated. Section 10 provides as preventive remedy and enables the Court to stay the subsequent suit if the conditions prescribed therein are fulfilled. Hence, learned Counsel contends that whatever may have been the interpretation given to the expression “any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed”, that interpretation would now have to yield to what the Supreme Court has held in Sulochana Amma (supra).

16. It is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant. We have already pointed out that, consistently and overwhelmingly, the courts in this country have interpreted section 10 and held that the Court entertaining the subsequent suit should have the jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the first suit in order to enable the stay of the second suit. It is undoubtedly true that when all these decisions were rendered, Explanations VII and VIII were not on the statute book. That, however, makes no difference to the situation, in our judgment. The fact that Parliament has now introduced Explanations VII and VIII does not and cannot detract from the interpretation consistently given to section 10 of the Code which in no way has been amended. In our judgment, therefore, notwithstanding the amendment made in section 11 by addition of Explanations VII and VIII, the interpretation consistently given to section 10 of the Code must remain unaffected.

17. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that if section 10 is continued to be interpreted as done previously, then the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Indian Bank (supra) of treating section 10 and section 11 as complementary, would stand negated. If that is the result, it must be deemed to have been intended by Parliament. Parliament must be deemed to have been aware of the interpretation consistently put on section 10 of the Code by various High Courts in this country. Knowing that full well the legislature introduced Explanations VII and VIII. True that the Supreme Court indicated in Indian Bank (supra) that the two sections must be read in a complementary manner. If Parliament amends only section 11 by introduction of Explanations VII and VIII and introduces no such amendments in section 10, we must ascribe to Parliament an intention to change the earlier situation. We say so, in view of the fact that, despite introduction of Explanations VII and VIII in section 11, the legislature made no change whatsoever in section 10. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that despite the catena of judgments uniformly interpreting section 10 of the Code, we must depart therefrom only for the reason that Explanations VII and VIII have been added in section 11 of the Code.

18. The learned Single Judge was right in his view that the reliefs claimed in the suit before the Small Causes Court and this Court are mutually exclusive; the Small Causes Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the reliefs which are claimed in the suit before this Court and vice versa, this Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the reliefs claimed in the Small Causes Court in the previously instituted suit in the Small Causes Court. Consequently, we agree with the view, of the learned Single Judge that section 10 of the Code has no application. The Notice of Motion has been rightly dismissed.

19. Appeal dismissed. No order as to costs. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of the order duly authenticated by the Associate of this Court.

20. Issuance of certified copy expedited.

21. Appeal dismissed.