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C.J. Gelatine Products Ltd., In Re
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion — S.M. Jhunjhunuwala, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
C.J Gelatine Products Ltd. (the company) is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office in Bombay. By a tripartite agreement dated 24 August 1988, the company agreed to pay the petitioners Rs. 12,00,000 (due and payable by the company to Bharat Carbon and Ribbon Manufacturing Co. Ltd.) together with interest. The company failed to pay. On 8 September 1989 the petitioners served a statutory notice of demand under section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, claiming Rs. 20,50,946 with further interest.
When the company did not comply, the petitioners filed a petition for winding up on the ground that the company was unable to pay its debts and that it was just and equitable that the company be wound up. The petition was filed on 3 November 1990, presented and accepted on 7 November 1990, and notice was directed to be issued returnable 9 January 1991. The petition was placed for admission on the date of this opinion.
The company filed an affidavit (Siriram Lachhmandas Sethi, affirmed 14 January 1992) opposing admission, stating that on 2 April 1990 the company had been declared a "sick industrial company" under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA), and that a reference under SICA (Case No. 176 of 1989) had been registered and the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) declared the company sick on 2 April 1990 and appointed the State Bank of India as operating agency under section 17(3) to prepare a scheme. The fact of the company's declaration as a sick industrial company on 2 April 1990 was not disputed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a winding-up petition filed after an inquiry under section 16 of SICA has commenced, but without prior consent of the BIFR (or the appellate authority where applicable), is maintainable given the suspension provision of section 22(1) of SICA.
- Whether, as argued by the petitioners relying on a prior decision (Dhanuka J.'s judgment in Ramniklal and Co. v. Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd.), a petition presented before declaration as a sick unit must merely be kept in abeyance rather than being treated as void ab initio where declaration occurs prior to presentation or before notice/acceptance issues.
- Whether the company is estopped from raising the maintainability objection because it delayed in filing an affidavit opposing admission or because the petitioners were unaware of the company's sickness declaration when they filed the petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Company's Arguments
- The company contended that it was declared a sick unit under SICA on 2 April 1990 and that its reference before the BIFR was pending; consequently, section 22(1) of SICA applied to suspend winding-up proceedings and the petitioners were required to obtain the consent of the BIFR prior to presenting the petition.
- On that basis the company argued that the petition is not maintainable because the petition was presented without the prior consent of the BIFR, and section 22(1) imposes an absolute embargo on entertaining winding-up proceedings in such circumstances.
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners relied on a judgment delivered by Dhanuka J. (Ramniklal and Co. v. Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd.) to contend that the petition is maintainable and that, because the company had been declared a sick unit, the petition should be adjourned sine die until the petitioners obtain the consent of the BIFR or the appellate authority (or until section 22(1) ceases to operate).
- The petitioners argued that section 22(1) should be interpreted so as not to defeat proceedings already commenced without knowledge of the BIFR order declaring the company sick.
- The petitioners also submitted that they had applied to the BIFR for consent (an application pending) and that the company, having not filed an affidavit opposing admission until 16 January 1992, was estopped from later raising the maintainability plea.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramniklal and Co. v. Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd., [1993] 78 Comp Cas 546 (Bom) (Dhanuka J.) | Interpreted the words "be proceeded with further" in section 22(1) of SICA to require that winding-up petitions filed prior to a company's declaration as sick may be kept in abeyance (i.e., not dismissed) during BIFR proceedings. | The court found the facts of the present case different from those in Wallace Flour Mills and held that the Wallace decision did not apply to the instant case; accordingly the petition could not be treated as merely kept in abeyance but was void ab initio for want of prior consent where inquiry under section 16 had already commenced. |
| Testeels Ltd. v. Radhaben Ranchhodlal Charitable Trust, [1989] 66 Comp Cas 555 (Guj) | An earlier interpretation of section 22(1) (as described in the opinion) with which Dhanuka J. in Wallace Flour Mills disagreed on the meaning of "be proceeded with further." | The court here mentions Testeels as a decision with which Dhanuka J. disagreed in Wallace Flour Mills; the present court did not follow Wallace's approach (which disagreed with Testeels) because the factual matrix differed, and therefore Testeels is referenced only as part of the discussion of prior judicial approaches. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis centers on the text and operation of section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act (SICA). The court explains the statutory scheme: when an inquiry under section 16 has commenced, or a scheme under section 17 is under preparation/consideration, or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation, or an appeal under section 25 is pending, section 22(1) operates to suspend specified proceedings — including winding-up proceedings — except with the consent of the BIFR or the appellate authority as applicable.
The opinion construes the words "shall lie" in section 22(1) as meaning "shall be entertained." The court emphasizes that the starting point for the suspension is commencement of the inquiry under section 16 and the terminal point is implementation of the sanctioned scheme or disposal of the appeal by the appellate authority.
Applying this to the instant facts, the court finds that an inquiry under section 16 was already pending against the company before the petition was filed. Because the petition was filed without the prior consent of the BIFR, the filing itself was, in the court's view, void ab initio. The court reasons that SICA's provisions have an overriding effect over the Companies Act, 1956, and therefore the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in the absence of the required consent.
The court further addresses the petitioners' contentions: (a) an application for consent to the BIFR pending at the time of this hearing was held to be irrelevant because the filing was void from the start; (b) the petitioners' lack of knowledge of the company's prior declaration as a sick unit is immaterial to the question of maintainability; and (c) the company's delay in filing an affidavit opposing admission does not estop it from raising the jurisdictional defect created by the absence of BIFR consent. In short, when the petition could not lawfully be entertained the question of estoppel did not arise.
The court also considered and distinguished the Wallace Flour Mills decision (Dhanuka J.), which advocated keeping certain petitions in abeyance. The present court observed that the Wallace decision dealt with a different factual matrix and therefore held that Wallace had no application in the circumstances before it.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court's final decision was to dismiss the petition. The core ruling is emphasized as follows:
DISMISSED
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the winding-up petition filed by the petitioners is dismissed because it was filed after an inquiry under section 16 of SICA had commenced and without the prior consent of the BIFR (or appellate authority as applicable), rendering the filing void ab initio.
- The court ordered that there shall be no order as to costs.
- The opinion distinguishes an earlier decision (Wallace Flour Mills) on its facts and therefore finds that decision inapplicable here; the court did not purport to create a broader principle beyond the application of section 22(1) to the facts before it. The opinion does not discuss any broader policy consequences beyond the direct effect on the maintainability of the petition in the present case.
End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.
S.M Jhunjhunuwala, J.:— C.J Gelatine Products Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “the company”) has been incorporated and registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”), having its registered office situated at Bombay.
2. By a tripartite agreement entered by and between the petitioners, the company and one Bharat Carbon and Ribbon Manufacturing Co. Ltd. on August 24, 1988, the company agreed to pay to the petitioners the sum of Rs. 12,00,000 due and payable by the company to the said Bharat Carbon and Ribbon Manufacturing Co. Ltd. together with interest thereon. Since, despite repeated requests and demands, the company failed and neglected to pay the said amount to the petitioners, the petitioners by their advocate's letter dated September 8, 1989, duly served a statutory notice of demand upon the company under the provisions of section 434 of the said Act and demanded payment of Rs. 20,50,946 with further interest from the company as mentioned therein.
3. The company did not pay the amount demanded. Correspondence ensued between the petitioners and the company. Ultimately, on November 3, 1990, the present petition has been filed by the petitioners for winding up of the company on the ground that the company is unable to pay its debts and that it is just and equitable that the company be wound up by and under the directions of this court under the provisions of the said Act.
4. The petition has been declared on May 22, 1990, filed on November 3, 1990, and was presented for acceptance before the company judge on November 7, 1990, when the same was accepted and notice was ordered to be issued to the company returnable on January 9, 1991. Today the petition has been placed for admission.
5. On behalf of the company, an affidavit of one Siriram Lachhmandas Sethi affirmed on January 14, 1992, has been filed to oppose the admission of the petition. According to the company, on April 2, 1990, the company has been declared as a sick unit under the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the said SICA Act”). The reference submitted by the company under the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act was registered as Case No. 176 of 1989. The said reference was heard on April 2, 1990, and by its order dated April 2, 1990, the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter for short referred to as the “BIFR”) declared the company to be a sick industrial company in terms of the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act. By the said order, the State Bank of India was appointed as the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction's operating agency under the provisions of section 17(3) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act in order to prepare a scheme in relation to the company as provided in the said order. The fact that the company was declared a sick industrial company on April 2, 1990, is not in dispute.
6. Mr. Madan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the company, has submitted that since the company was declared a sick unit under the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act prior to presentation of the petition by the petitioners, in view of the provisions of section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, the petition is not maintainable as the consent of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction was not obtained by the petitioners prior to presentation thereof. Mr. Thakkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that in view of the judgment of this court delivered by Dhanuka J. on April 12, 1991, in Company Application No. 314 of 1990, and others taken out in Company Petition No. 512 of 1990 (Ramniklal and Co. v. Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd., [1993] 78 Comp Cas 546 (Bom), the petition is maintainable and since the company has been declared a sick unit, the petition has to be adjourned sine die till the petitioners obtain consent of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction or the appellate authority under the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, as the case may be, for proceeding with the petition or the conditions precedent prescribed under section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act ceasing to operate. Mr. Thakkar has further submitted that the provisions of section 22(1) are to be interpreted in such a manner so as not to defeat any proceedings which have already commenced without the knowledge of the order declaring the company a sick unit passed under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act. Mr. Thakkar has also submitted that an application for consent of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction has already been made on behalf of the petitioners which is pending. It is also the submission of Mr. Thakkar that as the company did not file any affidavit to oppose the admission of the petition till January 16, 1992, and did not raise any issue as to the maintainability thereof on the ground of the company having been declared as a sick unit, the company is now estopped from urging such plea or raising such contentions.
7. The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act has been enacted to make in the public interest, special provisions with a view to securing the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial undertakings, the speedy determination by a board of experts of the preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures which need to be taken with respect to such companies and the expeditious enforcement of the measures so determined and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act received the President's assent on January 8, 1986. By Notification No. G.S.R 24(E), dated January 12, 1987 (see [1987] 61 Comp Cas (St.) 231), issued by the Central Government (Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, Banking Division), the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act except sections 15 to 34 came into force as from January 12, 1987. By another Notification being S.O No. 444(E), dated April 28, 1987 (see [1987] 62 Comp Cas (St.) 171), issued by the Central Government, as from May 15, 1987, the said sections 15 to 34 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act have also come into force. The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act has complex provisions and covers a wide canvas.
8. section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act reads as under:
“22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc.—(1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the appellate authority.”
9. In respect of a company against which an inquiry under section 16 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act has commenced, section 22(1) provides for suspension of (i) any winding up proceedings, (ii) any proceedings for execution, etc., in respect of any properties of such company, and (iii) any proceedings for the appointment of a receiver (of the property or undertaking) of such company. But the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction may give consent so that such proceedings can be commenced or continued. However, if an appeal to the appellate authority under section 25 is pending against any order, scheme, etc., made by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, such consent has to be obtained from the appellate authority and not the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. The starting point of suspension is the commencement of the inquiry under section 16 and the terminal point is the implementation of the scheme or, as the case may be, the disposal of the appeal by the appellate authority. The words “shall lie” mean “shall be entertained”. Therefore, in respect of a company against which an inquiry under section 16 has commenced, unless prior consent of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction or, as the case may be, the appellate authority has been obtained, no proceedings for winding up of such company shall be entertained. For want of requisite prior consent of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction or, as the case may be, the appellate authority, the section imposes an absolute embargo on entertainment itself of winding up proceedings by the court. In the instant case, after the inquiry against the company under section 16 had commenced, the petition has been filed without the consent of the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction and as such, is not maintainable since the filing itself is void ab initio, the court having no jurisdiction to entertain the same. The provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act have overriding effect over the provisions of the said Act. The inquiry commenced against the company is still pending and the scheme is under preparation. Since filing of the petition itself is void, the pendency of the application of the petitioners with the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction for its consent at this stage is of no relevance or significance. Similarly, lack of knowledge on the part of the petitioners about the company being declared a sick unit at the time of filing of the petition as also the company filing the affidavit to oppose admission of the petition after lapse of some time are also of no relevance or significance. When, in the circumstances of the case, the petition could in law be not entertained the question of the company being estopped from challenging the maintainability of the petition on the ground of institution thereof itself being void ab initio does not arise.
10. In the matter of Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd., [1993] 78 Comp Cas 546 (Bom), Dhanuka J. was dealing with company applications taken out in company petitions filed for winding up of the company prior to the company's being declared a sick unit under the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act. While interpreting the words “be proceeded with further” as appearing in section 22(1) and in that context, disagreeing with the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Testeels Ltd. v. Radhaben Ranchhodlal Charitable Trust, [1989] 66 Comp Cas 555, Dhanuka J. has held that in such circumstances a winding up petition is required to be kept merely in abeyance pending the inquiry under section 16 or preparation of scheme under section 17 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act or implementation of a sanctioned scheme. The facts in the instant case being different from those in those applications, the decision in the case of Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd., [1993] 78 Comp Cas 546 (Bom) has no application.
11. In the result, the petition is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs thereof.
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act.Alert