Bharucha, J.:— The definition of “public premises” in S. 2(e) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter called “the Eviction Act, 1971”) was extended by act 61 of 1980 (with effect from 22nd December, 1980) to cover “(2) Any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of,— (i) any company as defined in S. 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty-one per cent, of the paid up share capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary within the meaning of that Act of the first mentioned company, (ii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in S. 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government……” These writ petitions and appeal challenge the vires of the Eviction Act, 1971, in so far as it is made applicable to premises belonging to what we shall call “Government companies and corporations”. The challenge is based upon Arts. 14 and 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution of India. It is also contended that, having regard to Art. 254(2), the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter clled “the bombay rent act”) prevail over those of the Eviction Act, 1971.

2. It may be mentioned that it was also contended that Parliament had no legislative competence to pass the Eviction Act, 1971. That challenge already stands rejected.

3. The relevant provisions of the Eviction Act, 1971, are these: It extends to the whole of India “Premises”, as defined by S. 2(c) mean any land or any building or part of a building.

4. “Unauthorised occupation” is defined by S. 2(g) to mean “the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of public premises after the authority…..under which he was allowed to occupy the same has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever.”

5. Sections 4 and 5 read thus:

“Section 4. (1) If the estate officer is of opinion that any persons are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that they should be evicted, the estate officer shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made.

(2) The notice shall—

(a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made; and

(b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons who are, or may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in, the public premises,—

(i) to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or before such date as is specified in the notice, being a date no earlier than seven days from the date of issue thereof, and

(ii) to appear before the estate officer on the date specified in the notice along with the evidence which they intend to produce in support of the cause shown, and also for personal hearing, if such hearing is desired.

(3) The estate officer shall cause the notice to be served by having it affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises, and in such other manner as may be prescribed, whereupon the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons.

(4) Where the estate officer knows or has reasons to believe that any persons are in occupation of the public premises, then, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-sec. (3), he shall cause a copy of the notice to be served on every such person by post or by delivering or tendering it to that person or in such other manner as may be prescribed.

Section 5(1) If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under S. 4 and any evidence produced by him in support of the same and after personal hearing, if any, given under Cl. (b) of sub-sec. (2) of S. 4, the estate officer is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the estate officer may make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the public premises shall be vacated, on such date as may be specified in the order, by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises.

(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction on or before the date specified in the said order or within fifteen days of the date of its publication under sub-sec. (1), which is later, the estate officer or any other officer duly authorised by the estate officer in his behalf may, after the date so specified or after the expiry of the period aforesaid, whichever is later, evict that person from, and take possession of, the public premises and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary.”

6. Section 8 vests in the Estate Officer, for the purpose of holding an inquiry under the Eviction Act, 1971, the same powers as are vested in civil courts under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person, of examining him on oath and of requiring the discovery and production of documents. Under the provisions of S. 9 an appeal lies from every order of the Estate Officer in respect of any public premises. The appellate officer “shall be the district Judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial officer in that district of not less than ten years standing as the district Judge may designate in this behalf.” Under S. 10 the orders of the Estate Officer and the appellate officer are made final and cannot be called in question in a suit.

7. The contention based upon Art. 14 is that the Eviction Act, 1971, discriminates between two classes of tenants in that it makes a distinction between tenants of private landlords, which tenants are protected by the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, and the tenants of Government companies and corporations who are deprived of such protection. Even amongst the tenants of Government companies and corporations unguided discretion is given to pick and choose. Further, an arbitrary procedure is sanctioned and arbitrary powers conferred upon the adjudicating authority, viz., the Estate Officer.

8. The application of Art. 14 to the Eviction Act, 1971, and to similar earlier statutes has been considered by the Supreme Court in several judgments. In Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1581, the challenge was directed to the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, XXXI of 1959, whose terms are similar to those of the Eviction Act, 1971. It was contended that the Act XXXI of 1959 infringed the guarantee of Art. 14. The majority judgment of the Supreme Court held that it had been passed to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public properties and premises and to keep such properties free from encroachment and unlawful possession and to provide a speedier machinery for that purpose as against the lengthy proceedings under the ordinary law involving delay. The said Act no doubt differentiated between occupiers of public property and premises from other occupiers. Nevertheless, it was possible to say there was an intelligible differentia between the two classes of occupiers, that they were not similarly situated in that in the case of public properties and premises the members of the public had a vital interest and were interested in seeing that such properties and premises were freed from encroachment and unauthorised occupation as speedily as possible. It was also possible to contend that such classification was justified in that it was in the interest of the public that speedy recovery of rents and speedy eviction of unauthorised occupiers was made possible through the instrumentality of a speedier procedure instead of the elaborate procedure by way of suit involving both expense and delay. On these considerations, it could be contended that the segregation of tenants of private property was based on justifiable reason and that such segregation had a rational nexus with the object and policy of the said Act. The majority judgment held “Assuming that persons in occupation of Government properties and premises form a class by themselves as against tenants and occupiers of private owned properties and that such classification was justified on the ground that they require a differential treatment in public interest, those who fall under that classification are entitled to equal treatment among themselves. If the ordinary law of the land and the special law provide two different and alternative procedures, one more prejudicial than the other, discrimination must result if it is left to the will of the authority to exercise the more prejudicial against some and not against the rest.” In the minority judgment it was noted that the class of public premises to which the benefit of the said Act extended included premises belonging to the District Board, Municipal Committee, Notified Area Committee and Panchayat. It was there said, “The classification had reasonable relation to the object of the Act and does not offend Art. 14.” A similar classification, it was noted, had been upheld for the purposes of several other Acts. The minority judgment did not, however, agree with the majority view that the said Act violated Art. 14 because it gave a free choice of remedies and proceedings for the redress of the grievance.

9. In Maganlal Chagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, AIR 1974 SC 2009, the decision in Northern India Caterers case was reversed by the majority of a 7-Judge Bench and the view taken by the earlier minority judgment was affirmed. Bhagwati, J., speaking for himself and Khanna, J., came, however, to the conclusion that sufficient ground had not been shown for overruling the view expressed by the majority in the Northern India Caterers case. What is relevant for our purpose is to note that it had been “faintly argued” in Maganlal Chagganlal's case that the impugned provisions of the statutes under consideration, viz., the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act and the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act had, by providing a special procedure for the eviction of occupants of Municipal and Government premises, made unjust discrimination as between them and occupants of other premises and were on that ground violative of Art. 14. It was noted that in respect of several similar statutes the Court had upheld special treatment to the premises of Government or other public bodies. The concerned provisions had been enacted to provide a speedier remedy for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from Municipal and Government premises as against the ordinary remedy of a Civil suit involving expenses and delay. The element of public interest in speedy and expeditious recovery of possession from unauthorised occupants was absent in case of premises belonging to private parties. There was a valid basis for differentiation between occupiers of Municipal and Government premises and those of other premises, and there was a rational relation and nexus between the basis of the classification and the object of the legislation. The constitutional validity of the concerned provisions could not, in the circumstances, as assailed on the ground that they made unjust discrimination between occupiers of Municipal and Government premises and occupiers of other premises.

10. In Jain Ink Manufacturing Company v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1981 SC 670, the Eviction Act, 1971, was itself under consideration. Its provisions were considered in the light of those of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and the Slum Areas (Improvement) and Clearance Act, 1956. The Supreme Court said, “So far as the Premises Act is concerned it operated in a very limited field in that it applies only to a limited nature of premises belonging only to particular sets of individuals, a particular set of juristic persons like companies, corporations or the Central Government. Thus, the Premises Act has a very limited application. Secondly, the object of the Premises Act is to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises by a summary procedure so that the premises may be available to the authorities mentioned in the Premises Act which constitute a class by themselves. That the authorities to which the Premises Act applies are a class by themselves is not disputed by the counsel for the appellant as even in the case of Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab, (1967) 3 SCR 399 : (AIR 1967 SC 1581) such authorities were held to form a class and, therefore, immune from challenge on Art. 14 of the Constitution. Similarly, the summary procedure prescribed by the Premises Act is also not violative of Art. 14 as held by this Court in Maganlal Chagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1975) 1 SCR 1 : (AIR 1974 SC 2009).”

11. Reference may now be made to the latest judgment of the Supreme Court that touches the issue. In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, JT 1990 (3) SC 417, the provisions of the Eviction Act, 1971, were considered and it was held that they over-rode the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. It was argued on behalf of the appellants before the Supreme Court that “public premises” as defined in S. 2(e) of the Eviction Act, 1971, must be confined to premises let out for residential purposes and that if premises let out for commercial purposes were included, S. 2(e) would be rendered unconstitutional as being violative of the provisions of Arts. 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 read with Articles 39 and 41. The submission was that a construction which would sustain the constitutionality of the provisions of S. 2(e) should be preferred to a construction which would render them unconstitutional. The Supreme Court said that it found no force in this contention. It was unable to hold that the inclusion of premises used for commercial purposes within the ambit of the definition of “public premises” would render the Eviction Act, 1971, violative of the right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 or the right to freedom to carry on any occupation, trade or business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g). As indicated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, the Eviction Act, 1971, had been enacted to provide a speedy machinery for the eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises. It served a public purpose, viz., making available for use all public premises after eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation. The need to provide for speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation could not be confined to premises used for residential purposes. There was no reason to assume that such a need would not exist in respect of premises used for commercial purposes. No distinction could, therefore, be made between premises used for residential purposes and premises used for commercial purposes in the matter of eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises and the considerations which necessitated providing a speedy machinery for eviction of persons in unauthorised occupation of public premises applied equally to both types of public premises.

12. Mr. H.M Seervai, who led the arguments on behalf of the petitioners and appellant in these matters, submitted that in the Northern India Caterers case the Act had not been challenged on the ground that tenants of Government companies and corporations were being discriminated against by being denied the protection of a Rent Act available to the tenants of private landlords. In Maganlal Chagganlal's case the Supreme Court reconsidered its judgment in the Northern India Caterers' case. It was also relevant to note here that the authorities concerned in Maganlal Chagganlal's case, viz., the Municipal Corporation and the Government, were exempt from the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. Consequently, there was no question of sustaining a challenge such as that made here. In the Jain Ink case the contentions related to two Central Statutes and the conflict between them had been resolved on that basis. The statement that the object of the Eviction Act, 1971, was to provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises by summary procedure so that the premises may be available to the parties mentioned therein “which constitute a class by themselves” was not a finding by the court but a recognition of legislative intent. Secondly, that the authorities to which the Eviction Act, 1971, applied were a class by themselves was not disputed by counsel for the appellants because, according to him, even in the case of Northern India Caterers, such authorities had been held to form a class. Thirdly, and in any event, the statement was based on a factual error viz., of assuming, wrongly, that the authorities which were held to form a class in the Northern India Caterers case included Government companies and corporations. In Ashoka Marketing the challenge based on Article 14 was that if premises let out for commercial purposes were included in the definition of “public premises” that article would be infringed, and this was summarily rejected. No ratio was laid down in rejecting this limited challenge under Article 14.

13. Mr. Seervai drew attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ranchhoddas Atmaram v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 935. The Supreme Court there observed in respect of a particular question which had been treated as decided by several High Courts that “the question was never required to be decided in any of these cases and could not, therefore, have been, or be treated as decided by this Court.” He submitted that the challenge under Article 14 as made in these matters had not been made in the cases of Northern India Caterers, Maganlal Chagganlal, Jain Ink and Ashoka Marketing. It could not, therefore, have been or be treated as decided by the Supreme Court.

14. We must now refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151. The Supreme Court found that in an earlier case, State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, AIR 1955 SC 41, it had held that for a right under Article 19(1)(f) to hold property to be available to a person, he must have the property with respect to which he could assert such right. If the right to the possession of the property was taken away by a law protected by Article 31(5)(a), Article 19(1)(f) was not attracted. The decision of the Supreme Court had been followed in two other cases. In Somawanti's case the Supreme Court said, “All the decisions are binding upon us. It is contended that none of the decisions has considered the argument advanced before us that a law may be protected from an attack under Article 31(2) but it will still be invalid under Article 13(2) if the restriction placed by it on the right of a person to hold property was unreasonable. In other words, for the law before us to be regarded as valid it must also satisfy the requirements of Article 19(5) and that only thereafter can the property of a person be taken away. It is sufficient to say that though this Court may not have pronounced on this aspect of the matter we are bound by the actual decisions which categorically negative an attack based on the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f). The binding effect of a decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided. That point hasten specifically decided in the three decisions referred to above.”(Emphasis supplied). The same principle was set out again by the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherji, AIR 1978 SC 8. Counsel there submitted that in an earlier decision in regard to the vires of S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act the Supreme Court had been required to consider the objection raised on the score of Article 14 on a ground which was different from the one he took. The Supreme Court was unable to accept this submission and said, “If this Court held S. 10 as intra vires and repelled the objection under Article 14 of the Constitution it would not be permissible to raise the question again by submitting that a new ground could be raised to sustain the objection. It is certainly easy to discover fresh grounds of attack to sustain the same objection, but that cannot be permitted once the law has been laid down by this Court holding 1 that S. 10 of the Act does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The ratio decided of Niemla Textile Finishing Mills (supra) will apply while dealing with the objection under Article 14 of the Constitution in respect of the i present reference under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act. The submission of the learned counsel is, I therefore, devoid of substance.” (Emphasis supplied). The same point was made yet again by the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Neotia v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1353. The Supreme Court was of the view that the law declared by it in an earlier case was binding on the petitioners and was no longer res integra in view of Article 141 of the Constitution. The question was no longer open for agitation. It was no longer open to the petitioners to contend that certain points had not been urged. In Shri Krishna Investment v. Union of India, AIR 1976 Cal 333, it was observed “According to Mr. Ghosh the ground on which he contends the provision to be ultra vires was not raised before or considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Singh and as such that decision cannot conclude the points sought to be raised by him. We are, however, unable to accept such a contention. The Supreme Court held the material provisions of the Act to be intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and it is not permissible for Mr. Ghosh to contend or suggest that though the provision is ultra vires for reasons suggested by him, the Supreme Court overlooked the said aspect in declaring the provision to be intra vires.” The provision, incidentally, was the Eviction Act, 1971.

15. The Supreme Court in the cases of Northern India Caterers, Maganlal Chhaganlal and particularly, Jain Ink and Ashoka Marketing was called upon to decide and did decide that the provisions of the Eviction Act, 1971, were not ultra vires Article 14. In the Northern India Caterers' case the majority judgment held that the classification between tenants of public properties and tenants of private properties was justifiable and had a rational nexus to the object of the statute. It then proceeded to hold that if the ordinary law of the land and the special law provided two different and alternative procedures, one more prejudicial than the other, discrimination must result if it was left to the will of the authority to exercise the more prejudicial against some and not against the rest. The minority judgment expressly held that Article 14 was not infringed. The majority judgment in Maganlal Chhaganlal's case overruled the view of the majority in the Northern India Caterers' case in so far as it held that there was hostile discrimination in the matter of adopting one of two available procedures of eviction. It read the majority judgment in the Northern India Caterers' case as having accepted the position that there was an intelligible differentia between the two classes of occupants, viz., the occupiers of public property and the occupiers of private property, and that it was in the interest of the public that speedy and expeditious recovery of possession from unauthorised occupiers was made possible through the instrumentality of a speedier procedure and this was not overruled. The minority judgment in Maganlal Chagganlal's case also held that there was no violation of Article 14. Paragraph 8 of the judgment in Jain Ink, the greater part of which we have quoted, found that the classification made by the Eviction Act, 1971, was valid. Thereafter it noted that counsel had not disputed this. It then stated that even in the Northern India Caterers' case, such public authorities had been held to form a class and, therefore, the statute was immune from challenge under Article 14. The finding to the same effect in the Ashoka Marketing judgment is equally unambiguous (see paragraphs 26 and 28).

16. These decisions of the Supreme Court holding that the provisions of the Eviction Act, 1971, are not ultra vires Article 14 are, having regard to Article 141, binding upon this court. That these decisions were reached upon consideration of arguments other than the argument which is put before us does not make any difference to the position. It is true, as Mr. Seervai submitted, that the Supreme Court has entertained challenges to the vires of legislation though it had already held such legislation to be intra vires, but then the judgments of the Supreme Court are not binding upon the Supreme Court itself. In the case of Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661, the Supreme Court said, “Article 141, which lays down that the law declared by this Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India, quite obviously refers to Courts other than this Court.” We are, therefore, bound not to entertain the challenge to the provisions of the Eviction Act, 1971.

17. As will be seen from the quotation from the Ashoka Marketing case, the challenge to the Eviction Act, 1971, based upon Article 19(1)(g) was also negatived. For the reasons we have just stated in regard to Article 14, this is also a challenge that we are bound not to take note of.

18. This brings us to consider the challenge under Art. 19(1)(f). Put succinctly, it is this: The bombay rent act conferred protection against eviction, except in limited cases, upon the tenants of Government companies and corporations. This conferral created in the tenants a fundamental right to property under Art. 19(1)(f). The Eviction Act, 1971, took away the protection and, therefore, infringed to that extent Article 19(1)(f).

19. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that there was no fundamental right in the petitioners under Article 19(1)(f) which the Eviction Act, 1971, could violate. The bombay rent act placed restrictions upon the landlords' right to recover possession; put conversely, it protected tenants against eviction except in restricted cases. This protection could not be equated to a fundamental right to property, particularly when the bombay rent act was only a temporary statute, the duration of which had been extended from time to time, and also because, while it remained in force, there was power therein both to give exemptions as also to direct that the statute would apply or cease to apply to stated areas of the State of Maharashtra.

20. The Supreme Court has, as we read its judgment in Bombay Corporation v. Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008, held (in paragraph 18) that the rights conferred on tenants by the bombay rent act are fundamental rights and there, as far as we are concerned, the matter must rest. This was an appeal from this court and the question which fell for decision was whether a suit instituted by the plaintiffs (the respondents before the Supreme Court) in the City Civil Court at Bombay was maintainable. The plaintiffs were tenants of rooms in the Colaba Land Mill Chawls. The Municipal Corporation had made a clearance order in respect of the area on which the chawls stood, which had been confirmed by the State Government. The plaintiffs contended that the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, which entitled the Municipal Corporation to make the clearance order, were ultra vires Article 19(1)(f). The Bombay Rent Act had placed restrictions on the right of the landlord to evict a tenant by enacting in S. 12 that the tenant would not ordinarily be evicted so long as he paid the standard rent and permitted increases, whatever may have been the duration of his tenancy under his original agreement. The right conferred by this provision on the tenant existed independently of the landlord's right to own and possess property and it could not be interfered with or derogated from by the Municipal Corporation by making a clearance order behind the back of the tenants. In regard to this submission, the Supreme Court held that it had “no doubt that a tenant has both under the Transfer of Property Act and under S. 10 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, an interest in the demised premises which squarely falls within the expression property occurring in sub-clause (f) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitution.”

21. The contention that the protection given by the bombay rent act was an interest in property within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f) squarely arose for determination in the Pancham case and it was squarely decided by the Supreme Court. It is, therefore, not a judgment rendered, as it was contended on behalf of the respondents, perincuriam or sub-silentio. It is not open to us to hold, as it was suggested on behalf of the respondents that we hold, that the Supreme Court had failed to consider the most relevant sections of the bombay rent act, i.e, to say, Ss. 2, 3, 4 and 4A, and that, therefore, this could not be considered to be a binding judgment.

22. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that, in any event, the doctrine of eclipse applied and the petitioners could not be heard to invoke the guarantee of Article 19(1)(f). In this behalf reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in P. Rami Reddy v. State of A.P, AIR 1988 SC 1626. It was contended before a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court that certain provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation, 1959, were unconstitutional, being violative of Article 19(1)(f), in that they imposed unreasonable restrictions on “non-tribal” holders of properties in scheduled areas. It was held that “the challenge rooted in Article 19(1)(f) cannot survive after the repeal of the said Article with effect from June 20, 1979 by virtue of the 44th Amendment. It cannot survive inasmuch as the doctrine of eclipse would come into play.” It was contended that, on a parity of reasoning, the challenge rooted in Article 19(1)(f) to the provisions of the Eviction Act, 1971, could not survive after the repeal of Article 19(1)(f) with effect from 20th June 1979 inasmuch as the doctrine of eclipse would come into play.

23. Mr. Seervai countered the contention by reference to the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P, AIR 1963 SC 1019. It was there held, after a review of authorities, that the doctrine of eclipse would apply to pre-Constitution laws which were governed by Article 13(1) and would not apply to post-Constitution laws which were governed by Article 13(2).

24. A discussion is clearly called for.

25. Article 13 of the Constitution reads thus:

“13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights.—

(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.

(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.

(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(a) ‘law’ includes any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law;

(b) ‘laws in force’ includes law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either all or in particular areas.

(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under Article 368.”

26. The first of the cases that should be noted is Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State Of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 123. The Supreme Court there held that when a statute or a part thereof was declared by a court to be invalid the result of the pronouncement was that it was not law and was null and void and should be “notionally taken to be obliterated …. though it may remain written on the statute book and be a good law when a question arises for determination of rights and obligations incurred prior to 26th January, 1950, and also for the determination of rights of persons who have not been given fundamental rights by the Constitution.” In Sagir Ahmad v. State of U.P, AIR 1954 SC 128, the U.P Road Transport Act, 1951, was held to be void under Article 13(2) as it violated Article 19(1)(g) and it was held that it was “dead and cannot be vitalized by a subsequent amendment of the Constitution removing the constitutional objection but must be re-enacted.” Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P, AIR 1955 SC 781, reconsidered the question and enunciated the doctrine of eclipse in the context of an existing law. It was said, “The true position is that the impugned law became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being, by the fundamental right. The effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, was to remove the shadow and to make the impugned Act free from all blemish or infirmity………All laws, existing or future, which are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of our Constitution are, by the express provision of Article 13, rendered void to the extent of such inconsistency. Such laws were not dead for all purposes. They existed for the purposes of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and they remained operative, even after the Constitution, as against non-citizens. It is only as against the citizens that they remained in a dormant or moribund condition.” The question was considered yet again in 1. M.P.V Sundararamier & Co. v. (In Petition No. 220/55), AIR 1958 SC 468. The majority judgment was delivered by Venkatarama Aiyar, J. This case related to a post-Constitution law. The learned Judge, speaking for a majority of the Constitution Bench held that a law made without legislative competence and a law violating constitutional limitations on the power to legislate were equally unconstitutional and unenforceable but they did not stand on the same footing for all purposes. A law which was void for lack of legislative competence was absolutely null and void. Though the Legislature was subsequently given the power to legislate, which it earlier lacked, that law would not be revived but would have to be re-enacted, for it had been still-born. A law within legislative competence but which was violative of limitations imposed by the Constitution was unenforceable but became enforceable once the limitations were removed. Venkatarama Aiyar, J. said, “Where an enactment is unconstitutional in part but valid as to the rest, assuming of course that the two portions are severable, it cannot be held to have been wiped out of the statute book as it admittedly must remain there for the purpose of enforcement of the valid portion thereof, and being on the statute book even that portion which is unenforceable on the ground that it is unconstitutional will operate proprio vigore when the constitutional bar is removed, and there is no need for a fresh legislation……….” The judgment upon which Mr. Seervai placed reliance, namely, Mahendra Lal Jaini's case, was decided without reference to Sundararamier's case, and it was held: “……Therefore, where there is a question of a post-Constitution law, there is a prohibition against the State from taking away or abridging fundamental rights and there is a further provision that if the prohibition is contravened the law shall be void to the extent of the contravention. In view of this clear provision, it must be held that unlike a law covered by Art. 13(1) which was valid when made, the law made in contravention of the prohibition contained in Art. 13(2) is a stillborn law either wholly or partially depending upon the extent of the contravention. Such a law is dead from the beginning and there can be no question of its revival under the doctrine of eclipse. A plain reading, therefore, of the words in Art. 13(1) and Art. 13(2) brings out a clear distinction between the two. Article 13(1) declares such pre-Constitution laws as are inconsistent with fundamental rights void. Article 13(2) consists of two parts; the first part imposes an inhibition on the power of the State to make a law contravening fundamental rights, and the second part, which is merely a consequential one, mentions the effect of the breach. Now what the doctrine of eclipse can revive is the operation of a law which was operative until the Constitution came into force and had since then become inoperative either wholly or partially; it cannot confer power on the State to enact a law in breach of Art. 13(2) which would be the effect of the application of the doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution laws. Therefore, in the case of Art. 13(1) which applies to existing law, the doctrine of eclipse is applicable as laid down in Bhikaji Narain's case, (1955) 2 SCR 589; but in the case of a law made after the Constitution came into force, it is Art. 13(2) which applies and the effect of that is what we have already indicated and which was indicated by this Court as far back as Saghir Admad's case, (1955) 1 SCR 707.” A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court reviewed all the aforementioned judgments in State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills, AIR 1974 SC 1300. The question before the court was whether a post-Constitutional law which took away rights conferred by Article 19 on citizens was effective against non-citizens. Mathew, J., speaking for the court, said that it was difficult to understand why, if the meaning of the word ‘void’ in Article 13(1) was the same as its meaning in Article 13(2), a pre-Constitution law which took away or abridged rights under Article 19 should remain operative even after the Constitution came into force as regards non-citizens and a post-Constitution law which took away or abridged them should not be operative as respects non-citizens. The fact that a pre-Constitution law was valid when enacted could afford no reason why it should remain operative as respects non-citizens after the Constitution came into force as it became void on account of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Therefore, the real reason why it remained operative as against non-citizens was that it was void only to the extent of the inconsistency with the rights conferred under Art. 19 and its voidness, therefore, was confined to citizens, because, ex hypothesi, it was inconsistent only with their fundamental rights. If that were so, there was no reason why a post-Constitution law which took away or abridged rights conferred by Art. 19 should not be operative in regard to non-citizens as it was void only to the extent of the contravention of the rights conferred by Art. 19 on citizens. Just as a pre-Constitution law taking away or abridged fundamental rights under Art. 19 remained operative after the Constitution came into force as against non-citizens as it was not inconsistent with their fundamental rights, so also a post-Constitution law offending Art. 19 remained operative as against non-citizens as it was not in contravention of their fundamental rights. The same scheme permeated both the sub-articles of Article 13. In other words, the voidness was not in rem but to the extent only of the contravention of rights conferred under Part III. “Therefore”, it was said, “when Article 13(2) uses the expression ‘void’ it can only mean void as against persons whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged by a law. The law might be ‘stillborn’ so far as the persons, entities or denominations whose fundamental rights are taken away or abridged, but there is no reason why the law should be void or ‘still-born’ as against those who have no fundamental rights.” A law was void under Article 13(2) because it took away or abridged a fundamental right. There were many fundamental rights and they inhered in diverse types of persons, minorities or denominations. There was no conceivable reason why a law which took away the fundamental right of one class of persons or minorities or denominations should be void as against others who had no such fundamental right as the law did not contravene their right. There was nothing strange in the notion of a Legislature having no inherent legislative capacity or power to take away or abridge by a law the fundamental right conferred on citizens and yet having legislative power to pass the same law in respect of non-citizens who had no such fundamental rights. Mathew, J. referred to an authority of the Supreme Court to which we have not adverted, namely, Jagannath v. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, AIR 1972 SC 425, which held that a post-Constitution law which had been struck down for violating fundamental rights and was, therefore, stillborn had still an existence without re-enactment for being put in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. Mathew, J. said that this illustrated “that any statement that a law which takes away or abridged fundamental rights conferred under Part HI is still-born or hull and void requires qualifications in certain situations. Although the general rule is that a statute declared unconstitutional is void at all times and that its invalidity must be recognised and acknowledged for all purposes and is no law and a nullity, this is neither universal nor absolutely true, and there are many exceptions to it.” Upon this reasoning it was held that if a law was otherwise good and did not contravene any of their fundamental rights, non-citizens could not take advantage of the voidness of the law for the reason that it contravened the fundamental right of citizens and claim that there was no law at all.

27. The next authority of the Supreme Court is the judgment of the two-Judge Bench in Rami Reddy's case (ibid). All that it says in regard to the doctrine of eclipse is what we have quoted.

28. A pre-Constitution law which violates a fundamental right under Art. 19 remains on the statute book because, while it is not enforceable against citizens, it is enforceable against non-citizens and its pre-Constitutional operation remains valid. The Constitution in so far as it embodies the fundamental right eclipses the pre-Constitutional law to the extent that it operates against citizens. When the Constitution stands amended so as to delete the fundamental right, the shadow cast by the fundamental right upon the pre-Constitutional law moves away and the pre-Constitutional law becomes effective This is the theory of eclipse. Mahendra Lal Jain's case, which was decided without reference to Sundararamier's case, held that the theory of eclipse could not apply to a post-Constitution law which contravened the guarantee to a fundamental right because that post-Constitution law was ‘still-born’ and did not stand revived upon the fundamental right being removed from the Constitution. But the later Ambica judgment held, upon a consideration of all relevant authorities, that such a law was not ‘still-born’ in the sense that it was not erased from the statute book. It remained operative against those who did not enjoy the fundamental right, for example, non-citizens. While the Ambica judgment did not in terms deal with the theory of eclipse, it has great impact upon it. The conclusion that logically flows from the Ambica judgment is that both pre-Constitution and post-Constitution laws that contravene the guarantee to fundamental rights under, say, Art. 19 are not enforceable against citizens but are enforceable against non-citizens. For that purpose they stand on the statute book and just as an amendment of the Constitution to delete the concerned fundamental right removes the shadow upon the pre-Constitution law and makes it effective once more, so also an amendment of the Constitution to delete the concerned fundamental right removes the shadow upon the post-Constitutional law and makes it effective once more. This, as we see it, is the basis of the finding in Rami Reddy's case.

29. We are unable to accept Mr. Seervai's submission that Ambica's judgment inters the theory of eclipse or that the finding in Rami Reddy's case is contrary to that in the Ambica, case. In fact, the Ambica case suggests that the law laid down in Sundararamier's case is the operative law.

30. Assuming, therefore, that the provisions of the Eviction Act, 1971, contravened Article 19(1)(f) to the extent suggested, they were not enforceable so long as Article 19(1)(f) remained a part of the Constitution. Its deletion with effect from 20th June, 1979 made the Eviction Act, 1971, wholly enforceable. The challenge to the Eviction Act, 1971, rooted in Article 19(1)(f) cannot survive after the repeal of Article 19(1)(f).

31. Having so held, we must point out what appears to us to be a lacuna in the contention rooted in Article 19(1)(f). The argument is that the Eviction Act, 1971, when it was enacted, contravened Article 19(1)(f); it did so because it impinged upon the protection given by the bombay rent act to tenants of Government Companies and Corporations. Now, the provisions of Eviction Act, 1971, were extended to cover premises belonging to Government companies and corporations only after Article 19(1)(f) stood deleted. This argument cannot, therefore, support the contention that the Eviction Act, 1971, contravened Article 19(1)(f) when it was enacted, and there is, so far as we can discern, no other argument in support of that contention.

32. Bearing in mind the principle that the constitutionality of a statutory provision should not be adjudicated upon except when necessary, we refrain from further consideration of the challenge to the constitutionality of the Eviction Act, 1971, in so far as it operates against the tenants of Government Companies and Corporations, based upon Article 19(1)(f).

33. Grave apprehensions were expressed on behalf of the petitioners, that the powers given by the Eviction Act, 1971, would be abused by Government companies and corporations to evict existing tenants and induct new tenants only with a view to securing higher rents. Reference was made to the 12th Report, of July, 1979, of the Maharashtra State Law Commission on the subject of unification of Rent Restriction Laws in the State. The Report notes that a claim for total exemption from rent restriction laws was advanced before the commission on behalf of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd., which is one of the Government corporations involved in these matters. The exemption was sought by the LIC so that it might be able to make more and greater investments in socially oriented projects. It was stated on behalf of the LIC that the immovable property owned by it in Bombay was a liability, “there being no possibility of augmenting the earnings from the buildings on account of stringent position of rent restriction law. The net result is that the policy holders, who by and large, are the common masses of the country, are the ultimate sufferers.” Having regard to these apprehensions, and having heard counsel at length on the point, we deem it proper to set out the interpretation we place upon the relevant provisions of the Eviction Act, 1971.

34. The provisions of the Eviction Act, 1971, can be applied to persons who are in unauthorised occupation of public premises. A person, by reason of Section 2(g), is in unauthorised occupation if his occupation is without authority. He is in unauthorised occupation if he continues to occupy public premises after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the same has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. The provisions of the Eviction Act, 1971, therefore, entitle the Government company or corporation which is the owner of the public premises to terminate for any reason whatsoever the authority of the occupant to occupy the same and, by so doing, place the Government company or corporation and the occupant in the position of landlord and tenant governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Eviction Act, 1971, deal with the procedure for the eviction of an unauthorised occupant and must be read together. Section 4 prescribes that the unauthorised occupant must be issued with a notice in writing to show cause why an order of eviction should not be passed against him. That notice has to be issued by the Estate Officer provided he is of the opinion that the addressee of the notice is in unauthorised occupation of public premises and that he should be evicted. Prima facie satisfaction of the Estate Officer is a sine qua non of the issuance of the show cause notice. The prima facie satisfaction must be two-fold; firstly, that the addressee is in unauthorised occupation of public premises, and, secondly, that, he should be evicted. The notice must set out the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made. It must, therefore, i state not only why the addressee is thought to be in authorised occupation but also why it is thought the he should be evicted. It must inform the addressee that he is entitled to show cause against the proposed order of eviction. The addressee cannot effectively show cause unless he knows why the Estate Officer is of the opinion that he is in unauthorised occupation. He also cannot show effective cause unless he knows why his eviction is proposed. The provisions of section 4 make it clear that the addressee may seek a personal hearing from the Estate Officer and may lead evidence for the purposes of showing cause against the proposed order of eviction. This is clear also from the provisions of section 8 which vest in the Estate Officer the powers of a Civil Court in regard to the summoning of witnesses and examining them on oath and the discovery and production of documents.

35. Under Section 5 the Estate Officer must consider the cause that is shown by the addressee. Plainly, he must consider the addressee's case on both grounds, viz., whether he is in unauthorised occupation of public premises and whether he should be evicted. Even if he finds that the addressee is in unauthorised occupation, the Estate Officer is not obliged to make an order of eviction; he ‘may’ make it. It is, therefore, that he has to consider whether the addressee should be evicted. He is obliged, if he makes an order of eviction, to record his reasons. The Estate Officer's order must, therefore, state why he is satisfied that the addressee is in unauthorised occupation of public premises and why he should be evicted therefrom. The validity of the Estate Officer's conclusions would be tested in appeal, which is before a District Judge or equivalent judicial officer.

36. In the case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court said, “It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that many of the corporations referred to in Section 2(e)(2)(ii) of the Public Premises Act, like the nationalised Banks and the Life Insurance Corporation, are trading corporations and under the provisions of the enactments whereby they are constituted these corporations are required to carry on their business with a view to earn profit, and that there is nothing to preclude these corporations to buy property in possession of tenants at a low price and after buying such property evict the tenants after terminating the tenancy and thereafter sell the said property at a much higher value because the value of property in possession of tenants is much less as compared to vacant property. We are unable to cut down the scope of the provisions of the Public Premises Act on the basis of such an apprehension because as pointed out by this Court in Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay (1989 (3) SCC 293): “Every activity of a public authority especially in the background of the assumption on which such authority enjoys immunity from the rigour of the Rent Act, must be informed by reason and guided by the public interest. All exercise of discretion or power by public authorities as the respondent, in respect of dealing with tenants in respect of which they have been treated separately and distinctly from other landlords on the assumption that they would not act as private landlords, must be judged by that standard.” These observations were made in the context of the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 whereby exemption from the provisions of the Act has been granted to premises belonging to the Bombay Port Trust. The consequence of giving overriding effect to the provisions of the Public Premises Act is that premises belonging to companies and statutory bodies referred to in Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act would be exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The provisions of the companies and statutory bodies mentioned in Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises Act while dealing with their properties under the public premises act will, therefore, have to be judged by the same standard.” It may, therefore, be concluded that the Government company or corporation must so act not only when terminating the authority of an occupant of public premises of its ownership to occupy the same but also when, thereafter, it seeks his eviction therefrom. The Estate Officer, in making the inquiry under Section 5, would, therefore, have to consider whether or not the termination of the authority was informed by reason and guided by public interest and also whether his eviction satisfied the same tests. This, necessarily, would also apply in appeal.

37. We cannot accept Mr. Seervai's sub-mission that, in so construing Sections 4 and 5, we would be reading them down or reading words into them; we read them as they stand. Nor are we reading the standards laid down in the Marfatia and Ashoka Marketing cases into Sections 4 and 5. These cases set out the norms by which the actions of Government companies and corporations in respect of their tenants have to be judged. Government companies and corporations are obliged to conform to such norms and their actions must be judged by the Estate Officer and in appeal accordingly.

38. It was Mr. Seervai's submission that the Eviction Act, 1971, conferred unfettered power and unguided discretion. He referred in support of this submission to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in The Indian Bank Ltd. v. Blaze and Central (P.) Ltd., AIR 1986 Kar 258. Interpreting Section 5 of the Eviction Act, 1971, the Division Bench held that the only point for enquiry under Section 5 was whether or not a person was an unauthorised occupant of public premises and nothing more. If a person to whom notice was issued under Section 4 calling upon him to show cause why he should not be evicted were to plead that he was not in unauthorised occuaption, it became necessary for the Estate Officer to enquire whether such a plea was valid. But if he did not dispute that he had become an unauthorised occupant or, having raised a dispute, failed to prove that he was not an unauthorised occupant, the Estate Officer was empowered to pass an order of eviction under Section 5. The jurisdiction of the Estate Officer under Section 5 was “only to be satisfied as to the unauthorised occupation of the person concerned and not about the bona fide requirements of the public authority or about comparative hardship just because the respondent chose to raise the pleas as they were not relevant to the inquiry under S. 5 of the Act.”

39. With great respect to the learned Judges of the Karnataka High Court, we are unable to agree. Their judgment takes no account of Section 4. In our view, it is imperative that Sections 4 and 5 be read together and harmoniously. Further, no account is taken of the use of the word ‘may’ in Section 5. Thereunder, even if the Estate Officer is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation he ‘may’ make an order of eviction. The judgment does not hold that the word ‘may’ should be construed to mean ‘shall’. We have stated above that when Sections 4 and 5 are read together and harmoniously, it becomes clear that the word ‘may’ in Section 5 does in fact mean ‘may’ and that though the Estate Officer may be satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, he is not obliged to make an order of eviction unless he is satisfied that the person in unauthorised occupation should be evicted.

40. We are also unable to accept Mr. Seervai's submission that Section 4 does not contemplates two pre-conditions to the issuance of a show cause notice and that the only pre-condition is the opinion of the Estate Officer that the person to whom he addresses the notice is in unauthorised occupation of public premises. Nor can we accept the submission that the word ‘therefore’ has to be read into Section 4, that is to say that Section 4 has to be read so: “If the Estate Officer is of the opinion that any persons are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and therefore that they should be evicted, the Estate Officer shall issue…….” As we have stated, the Estate Officer must, before he issues the notice under Section 4, be of opinion that “persons are in unauthorised occupation of public premises and that they should be evicted……..” It is of significance that the words “and that” emphasised above have been used and not just the word “and”. They leave us in doubt that the Estate Officer must have formed the opinion on both counts before he issues the notice.

41. Support may be drawn from the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. V.D Tulzapurkar (ILR 1967 Bom 671). The Division Bench analysing Section 4 of the Eviction Act, 1971, said: “…… before commencing any inquiry against unauthorised occupation of public premises the Estate Officer is required to form an opinion that there are persons in unauthorised occupation of such premises and that it is necessary that they should be evicted from the premises unauthorisedly occupied by them. There is thus an indication in Section 4 of the Act that the Tribunal constituted under the Act has to initially form an opinion in respect of the matters to be decided finally by him after giving an opportunity to show cause and recording evidence.”

42. It is important to note that the Division Bench was of the view that the Estate Officer had finally to decide under Section 5 ‘matters’ in respect of which he had initially formed an opinion under Section 4, viz., that “there are persons in unauthorised occupation of such premises and that it is necessary that they should be evicted”. The judgment, therefore, supports also the interpretation that we have placed upon Section 5, viz., that the Estate Officer must thereunder decide both whether the person to whom he has addressed the notice under Section 4 is in unauthorised occupation of public premises and whether he should be evicted therefrom.

43. Reference was made by Mr. Seervai to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Standard Literature Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1968 Cal 1. In this judgment, it was held by a Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court that all that sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Eviction Act, 1958, required was that the notice under sub-section (1) should specify the grounds on which order of eviction was proposed to be made. If notice to quit had been validly served and the period specified therein had expired, then the person served was in unauthorised occupation. This was sufficient ground for an order of eviction. The person concerned had no defence because the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, did not apply to premises belonging to Government and, therefore, where the tenancy of a person had been properly determined under the Transfer of Property Act, then, in the case of premises belonging to Government, there was no defence to eviction.

44. With respect, this finding appears to have been reached only on the consideration that a tenant of property belonging to Government was in a “somewhat worse position than a person holding private land.” The finding appears to have been given without construing the terms of Section 4 and without harmoniously reading the provisions of Sections 4 and 5.

45. It may also be noted that these and Karnataka and Calcutta High Court judgments were delivered before the judgments of the Supreme Court in The Marfatia and Ashoka Marketing cases.

46. The third limb of Mr. Seervai's argument rests upon Article 254(2) which reads:

“(2). Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State:

Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.”

47. The Eviction Act, 1971 is a Central statute. It was amended by act 61 of 1980 with effect from 22nd December, 1980 to cover premises belonging to Government companies and corporations. The bombay rent act is a State statute. It is a statute of temporary duration. Its duration has been extended by Extension Acts from time to time. Each of the Extension Acts has received the assent of the President. The bombay rent act was extended twice after 22nd December, 1980 and these Extension Acts also received Presidential assent. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that by reason of such Presidential assent, and having regard to the provisions of Article 254(2), the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act prevailed over the provisions of the Eviction Act, 1971, to the extent that there is repugnancy between them.

48. That there is repugnancy between the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act and the Eviction Act, 1971, is not disputed.

49. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that the Eviction Act, 1971, was not an earlier law within the meaning of Article 254(2) so that the assent of the President to the Extension Acts did not make the bombay rent act a new law which, by reason of the assent, prevailed over the Eviction Act, 1971, to the extent of the repugnancy between them. Emphasis was laid in this behalf upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in The The State Of Bombay… v. Heman Santlal Alreja…., AIR 1952 Bom 16. Chagla, C.J, speaking on behalf of the Division Bench, said, “when an Act is passed extending the duration of some law, it cannot be said that some new law was created. The old law already on the statute book continues……Even temporary statutes which are made perpetual by subsequent Acts become perpetual not from the date of the subsequent Act but ab initio. … Therefore, to the extent that the Legislature enacted Section 2 of Act II(2) of 1950, it did not put on the statute book any new legislation. The old instead of expiring on 31-3-1950, continued till 31-3-1952.” This judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was followed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. The Benaras Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd., AIR 1973 All 74; the dictum enunciated by Chagla, C.J, was applied to the question: was an Extension Act new law for the purposes of Article 254(2). A Full Bench of the (sic) however, (sic) with the view taken by this Court in Heman Alreja's case.

50. There is a judgment of the Supreme Court, cited by Mr. Seervai, which, though it does not refer to any of the aforementioned judgments, appears to us to set the controversy at rest. This is the judgment in Kerala State Electricity Board v. Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd., AIR 1976 SC 1031. The Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961, was operative for 5 years. In 1967 it was amended and the words ‘5 years’ were substituted by the words ‘7 years’. This was done by an Extension Act to which the President granted assent. The Supreme Court said, “We agree that the assent should be deemed not merely to the substitution of the words “five years” by the words “seven years” in the Kerala Act, but to the Act as a whole, that is, as amended by the 1967 Act and any repugnance between the Kerala Act and the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 should be deemed to have been cured by such assent. When assenting to the 1967 Act the President should naturally have looked into the whole Act, that is, the 1961 Act as amended by the 1967 Act.”

51. Having regard to the decision in The Kerala State Electricity Board's case, we are of the view that the Extension Acts having received the assent of the President, the bombay rent act must be considered to be the new law and the Eviction Act, 1971, the earlier law for the purposes of Article 254(2). The contention of the respondents in this behalf cannot, therefore, be accepted.

52. Mr. Seervai submitted that having regard to the fact that the extensions to the bombay rent act had received Presidential assent, the bombay rent act prevailed in the State of Maharashtra over the Eviction Act, 1971, to the extent of the repugnancy between them. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the terms in which the assent was sought and given should have to be seen.

53. Letters of request were issued by this Court at the instance of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, which is a respondent in some of the matters before us, to various Central and State authorities to produce the documents by which the assent of the President to the Extension Acts extending the duration of the bombay rent act was sought and given. The authorities placed all the files in this behalf before the Court; therefrom, counsel culled out documents which have been tendered (Ex. F, Collectively). We are concerned with the Extension Acts subsequent to the amendment of the Eviction Act, 1971, with effect from 22nd December, 1980. The documents that were tendered show that a letter was written on 3rd January, 1981 by the Secretary to the Governor of the State of Maharashtra to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, forwarding a Bill extending the life of the bombay rent act for a period of 5 years from 31st March, 1981 which had been passed by the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly and the Maharashtra Legislative Council. The relevant portion of the letter stated: “As the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 are repugnant to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1881, which are existing laws relating to entries 6, 13 and 46 in the Concurrent Legislative List, and as Clause 2 of the Bill is intended to extend the life of the principal Act for a period of five years, it is necessary to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President with reference to Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India. The Governor has accordingly reserved the Bill for the consideration of the President under Article 200 of the Constitution of India.” That the President had assented to this Bill on 4th March, 1981 was communicated by the Secretary to the Governor of the State of Maharashtra to the Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Law and Judiciary Department, on 7th March, 1981. Again, on 30th January, 1986, a letter similar to that dated 3rd January, 1981 was written by the Secretary to the Governor of the State of Maharashtra to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. This letter referred to the Bill passed by the Maharashtra Legislative Council and the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly extending the duration of the bombay rent act for 5 years from 1st April, 1986. The letter stated: “As the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 are repugnant to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, which are the existing laws relating to entries 6, 13 and 46 in the Concurrent Legislative List, and as Clause 2 of the Bill is intended to extend the life of the principal Act for a period of five years, it is necessary to reserve the Bill for the consideration and assent of the President with reference to Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India. The Governor has reserved the Bill for the consideration of the President under Article 200 of the Constitution of India.” A telegraphic message dated 25th February, 1986 sent by the Special Commissioner, New Delhi, addressed to two Secretaries of the State of Maharashtra and the Secretary to the Governor of the State of Maharashtra shows that the President accorded his assent to this Bill on 23rd February, 1986.

54. Counsel on behalf of the respondents placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jamalpur Gram Panchayat v. Malwinder Singh, AIR 1985 SC 1394, and submitted that, inasmuch as the assent of the President had not been sought with specific reference to the Eviction Act, 1971, the Bombay Rent Act did not prevail over the Eviction Act, 1971. In the Jamalpur Gram Panchayat's case the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953, prevailed over the provisions of a Central Act called the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. Proceeding upon the basis that there was a repugnancy between the two statutes, the question was considered. The following extract from the Supreme Court's judgment is relevant:

“……. The judgment of the High Court shows that the hearing of the writ petitions was adjourned to enable the State Government to place material before the Court showing the purpose for which the Punjab Act of 1953 was forwarded to the President for his assent. The record shows, and it was not disputed either before us or in the High Court, that the Act was not reserved for the assent of the President on the ground that it was repugnant to an earlier Act passed by the Parliament, namely, the Central Act of 1950. In these circumstances, we agree with the High Court that the Punjab Act of 1953 cannot be said to have been reserved for the assent of the President within the meaning of Clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution in so far as its repugnancy with the Central Act of 1950 is concerned. The assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution is not a matter of idle formality. The President has, at least, to be apprised of the reason why his assent is sought if, there is any special reason for doing so. If the assent is sought and given in general terms so as to be effective for all purposes, different consideration may legitimately arise. But if, as in the instant case, the assent of the President is sought to the law for a specific purpose, the efficacy of the assent would be limited to that purpose and cannot be extended beyond it. Not only was the President not apprised in the instant case that his assent was sought because of the repugnancy between the State Act and the pre-existing Central Act in the vesting of evacuee properties but, his assent was sought for a different, specific purpose altogether. Therefore, that assent, cannot avail the State Government for the purpose of according precedence to the law made by the State Legislature, namely, the Punjab Act of 1953, over the law made by the Parliament, even within the jurisdiction of the State.”

55. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that the assent of the President was sought for the specific purpose of providing for the repugnancy between the bombay rent act on the one hand and the Transfer of Property Act and the Presidency Small Cause i Courts Act on the other so that the bombay rent act prevailed over the Transfer of Property Act and the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act to the extent of the repugnancy between them, but that the assent could not avail the petitioner for the purposes of contending that the bombay rent act prevailed over the Eviction Act, 1971, in respect of the repugnancy between them.

56. It was submitted by Mr. Seervai that the clear language of Article 254(2) established that if a State law in respect of any matter in the Concurrent List had been reserved for the consideration of the President and had received his assent that State law prevailed notwithstanding any earlier law made by Parliament. The Article did not envisage an assent being sought or given vis a vis particular Central statutes. That a State law to which the President had assented under Article 254(2) prevailed over an earlier law made by Parliament was clear from the judgment in U.P Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. R.K Shukla, (1970) 1 SCR 507. The Supreme Court there said: “act 1 of 1957 received the assent of the President and by virtue of Article 254(2) of the Constitution Section 6-R(2) of the U.P Act prevails notwithstanding any prior law made by the Parliament.” In the Jamalpur Gram Pan-chayat case there was no finding or obiter dictum or even a casual observation that the President's assent under Article 254(2) could be limited to specified Central statutes. The word “purpose” used in the judgment (as extracted above) referred to a constitutional purpose, that is to say that the assent was obtained either for the purpose of Article 31 or Article 31-A or Article 254(2) or such other Articles as contemplated the President's assent. The Supreme Court in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1019, had held that the consent of the President given under Article 254 was not justiciable. This meant that the Court could not entertain an enquiry into considerations which led the President to give his assent.

57. We have no doubt about the meaning to be assigned to the Jamalpur Gram Panchayat judgment, the relevant portion whereof we have quoted. It turned out from the record that was placed before the High Court that the Punjab Act “was not reserved for the assent of the President on the ground that it was repugnant to an earlier Act passed by the Parliament, namely, the Central Act of 1950.” (Emphasis supplied). This is first indication that the Supreme Court was of the view that a State Act which was reserved for the assent of the President under Article 254(2) should be reserved on the ground that it was repugnant to a specified Central Act. “In these circumstances”, the Supreme Court went on to say, “we agree with the High Court that the Punjab Act of 1953 cannot be said to have been reserved for the assent of the President within the meaning of Clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution in so far as its repugnancy with the Central Act of 1950 is concerned.” The words emphasised again clearly indicate the thinking of the Supreme Court, namely, that the reservation of the Bill for the assent of the President within the meaning of Article 254(2) had to be made with reference to its repugnancy to some specified Central statute. The Supreme Court then noted that the “assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution is not a matter of idle formality.” The most important words from our point of view follow “But, if, as in the instant case, the assent of the President is sought to the law for a specific purpose, the efficacy of the assent would be limited to that purpose and cannot be extended beyond it” (Emphasis supplied). Applying this to the case before us the assent of the President was sought to the Extension Acts for the purpose of overcoming its repugnancy between the bombay rent act on the one hand and the Transfer of Property Act and the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act on the other. The efficacy of the President's assent must, therefore, be limited to that purpose, namely, that the bombay rent act prevailed over the Transfer of Property Act and the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act and cannot be extended beyond that. The supreme Court went on to say, “Not only was the President not apprised in the instant case that his assent was sought because of the repugnancy between the State Act and the pre-existing Central Act…… but his assent was sought for a different, specific purpose altogether.” Applying these words to the instant case not only was the President not apprised that his assent was sought because of the repugnancy between the Bombay Rent Act and the Eviction Act, 1971, but his assent was sought for a different, specific purpose, namely, to overcome the repugnancy between the bombay rent act on the one hand and the Transfer of Property Act and the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act on the other. The President's assent cannot, therefore, be the basis for according precedence to the Bombay Rent Act over the Eviction Act, 1971.

58. The U.P Electric Supply Co. Ltd.'s case did not consider an argument relating to the ambit of the President's assent under Article 254(2) when it was asked for specified reasons. In any event, the Jamalpur Gram Panchayat judgment is a later judgment and of a Constitution Bench. In the case of Hoechst Pharmaceutical Ltd., a State Act to which the President had assented was challenged on the ground that it had not been necessary to reserve it for the assent of the President under Article 254(2) so that the assent of the President did not make it law and, since it had also not received the assent of the Governor of the State, it was not law at all. In this context it was held, “Even if it ultimately turns out that there was no necessity for the Governor to have reserved a Bill for the consideration of the President, still he having done so and obtained the assent of the President, the Act so passed cannot be held to be unconstitutional on the ground of want of proper assent. This aspect of the matter, as the law now stands, is not open to scrutiny by the Courts.” The validity of the President's assent is not under challenge; had it been we would) have held that it was not justiciable. To ascertain the purpose for which the assent was given is not to make it justiciable.

59. Mr. Seervai made a reference to the letter dated 5th December 1980 written by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs with reference to the Bill extending the duration of the bombay rent act up to 30th March 1986 (This letter is also a part of the compilation, Ex. F Colly.). While the letter did state that “the provisions of the Principal Act are repugnant to the provisions of some of the existing laws relating to entries 6, 13 and 46 in the Concurrent Legislative List such as Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882”, it was written to request the Secretary to the Government of India to move it “to kindly accord their administrative approval to the proposed Bill” which was intended to be introduced in the State Legislature. It was submitted that this letter showed that the State authorities were conscious of the fact that the bombay rent act was repugnant to the provisions of existing Central laws other than the Transfer of Property Act and the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act and that the request for grant of the President's assent should, therefore, be construed as being in general terms. This letter was written to seek the administrative approval of the Government of India to the proposed Extension Bill. It was not written to seek the assent of the President under Article 254(2) to an Extension Bill which had been passed by the State Legislatures. It is, therefore, not possible to take any account of this letter in this context.

60. In the result, we cannot hold that the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act prevail in the State of Maharashtra over those of the Eviction Act, 1971.

61. We must now note that no arguments have been advanced before us in regard to the facts of the petitions and appeal before us.

62. Lastly, we record our appreciation of the industry and assistance of counsel.

63. Each of the writ petitions is dismissed.”

64. In the appeal before us (Appeal No. 83 of 1989), the writ petition (OOCJ Writ Petition No. 3511 of 1988) was summarily dismissed by a learned single Judge by an order dated 11th January 1989. The order of summary dismissal is set aside, the appeal is allowed and the writ petition admitted. Having already been heard as aforementioned, the writ petition is now dismissed. This petitioner has preferred an appeal against the order passed against him by him Estate Officer which is pending before the City Civil Court at Bombay. The appeal shall now be heard and disposed of expeditiously. In so doing, no regard shall be had to the observations of the learned single Judge made in the aforementioned order of summary dismissal. We make it clear that we have not gone into facts and must not be taken to have made any observation in that behalf. Pending the decision of the appeal by the City Civil Court and for a period of 10 days thereafter, status quo in respect of the premises concerned shall be maintained.

65. We certify that substantial questions of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution arise in these petitions and appeal.

66. Each party to these petitions and appeal shall bear and pay its own costs.

67. We make it clear that each of the writ petitioners will be entitled, in proceedings before the Estate Officer and in appeal therefrom, to contend that the notices served upon them under Section 4 and the orders passed thereon are not valid having regard to the interpretation placed by us upon those provisions.

68. Upon the application of the petitioners, we stay our order in the writ petitions and appeal for a period of eight weeks from today. During that period of eight weeks no action shall be taken either by the respondents or by their Estate Officers in regard to any eviction proceedings under the Eviction Act, 1971.

Order accordingly.