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Voltas Limited v. M.M Kendrekar, Presiding Officer And Anr.

Bombay High Court
Jul 7, 1983
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Voltas Limited (the Company) challenged an award dated 9-3-1976 of the Presiding Officer, 4th Labour Court, Bombay, in Reference (I.D.A) No. 330 of 1974 directing the Company to reinstate an employee, Narayan (the workman), with full back wages. The workman had been employed intermittently as a "Sepoy" from 28-10-1965 to 24-9-1973 on temporary engagements. His appointment letter dated 18-9-1973 stated that his employment would automatically cease on 24-9-1973 unless in writing extended, and could be terminated earlier without notice or reason.

The workman stopped receiving work from 25-9-1973 and lodged a complaint with the Government Labour Officer on 16-2-1974. Conciliation failed (failure report dated 29-6-1974) and, by order dated 31-7-1974 under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10 read with sub-section (5) of section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Administration), Bombay, referred the dispute to the 4th Labour Court for adjudication. The workman's demand was reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages from 24-9-1973.

At trial the Labour Court found that although the workman was a temporary hand his services had been illegally terminated and awarded reinstatement with full back wages. The Company filed a Special Civil Application in the High Court. Initially, on 8-11-1976 the parties filed consent terms in the High Court and the workman accepted Rs. 7,000 as settlement; later the workman attempted to set aside those consent terms, unsuccessfully in the High Court, and ultimately the Supreme Court (by order dated 19-4-1983) allowed the appeal, set aside the earlier orders and remitted the special civil application to the High Court for disposal according to law. The present opinion proceeds to hear the matter on merits after the Supreme Court's remand.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the workman's services had in law "automatically" ceased on 24-9-1973 by virtue of the appointment letter clause, or whether that clause amounted to a termination by the Company.
  2. Whether termination (if any) was arbitrary, unjust, unfair or illegal — specifically whether the Company acted without holding a domestic enquiry and thus violated principles of natural justice and standing orders.
  3. Whether the Company's conduct amounted to unfair labour practice or victimization (including the practice of retaining employees as temporary/ casual/ badlis for long periods).
  4. What back wages (and for what periods) the workman was entitled to, taking into account the intervening monetary settlement dated 8-11-1976 and the period between 8-11-1976 and 19-4-1983.

Arguments of the Parties

Workman's Arguments

  • The workman asserted long intermittent service since 28-10-1965 and membership of the Provident Fund from 7-7-1968.
  • He contended he was senior and entitled to confirmation under a 31-12-1970 agreement signed before the Conciliation Officer, but was not made permanent while juniors were confirmed.
  • He claimed he was arbitrarily discharged without being charge-sheeted or given an opportunity of hearing; this amounted to unfair labour practice and breach of natural justice, entitling him to reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages.

Company's Arguments

  • The Company maintained the workman was a purely temporary, intermittent employee engaged when there was leave vacancy or rush of work; his last appointment was terminable by efflux of time on 24-9-1973.
  • It asserted the workman had earlier applied for and obtained employment at the Company's Thane establishment while still employed at another unit, and was terminated on 5-11-1971 by Thane; his subsequent re-employments were humanitarian and intermittent.
  • The Company relied on adverse work reports (argumentative, quarrelsome, unsatisfactory work) and said the workman was not dismissed as punishment for misconduct, so no enquiry was required; confirmation of other employees was based on performance and not strictly seniority.
  • The Company also contended that inclusion of the workman in the Provident Fund in 1968 was an oversight.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State Bank of India v. N. Sundaramoney, (1976) 1 L.L.J 478 The Court explained the concept of "termination": termination embraces both the act of termination by the employer and the fact of termination however produced (including expiry of stipulated term or clause in appointment). The High Court relied on this explanation to conclude that the appointment letter clause providing automatic cessation on 24-9-1973 amounted to termination by the Company (i.e., the services were terminated by the company through that clause) and therefore could not be treated as innocuous efflux of time.
Workmen of Williamson Magor & Co. Ltd. v. William Magor & Co. Ltd., (1982) 1 L.L.J 33 Sets out that the term "victimization" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court; principles regarding victimization and unfair, arbitrary treatment of workmen were laid down. The High Court cited this authority when discussing victimization, adopting the approach that unfair and arbitrary action amounting to victimization should be interpreted in favour of labour and using that reasoning to find mala fide and unfair conduct by the Company.
Bharat Bank Limited v. Employees of Bharat Bank Limited, 1950 L.L.J 921 Explained "victimization" as meaning being unjustly dealt with; where two interpretations exist, the one favourable to labour should be accepted. The High Court reproduced this reasoning (via the Williamson Magor discussion) to support the proposition that doubtful interpretations should be resolved in favour of labour and to characterize the Company's conduct as victimization.
K.C.P. Employees Association, Madras v. Management of K.C.P. Limited, 1977 (1) L.L.J 322 Holds that in industrial law the benefit of reasonable doubt on law and facts should go to labour and tribunals should apply a compassionate approach in favour of the weaker section without overstepping proved facts. The High Court relied on this principle to emphasize that doubts should be resolved for the benefit of the workman and to support the conclusion of unfair treatment by the Company.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal and factual findings, applying statutory principles and cited precedents exactly as articulated in the opinion:

  1. On the nature of the cessation clause: The Court rejected the Company's submission that services "automatically" ceased without there being a termination. Relying on the Supreme Court's exposition in State Bank of India v. N. Sundaramoney, the Court held that a clause providing automatic cessation in an appointment letter may constitute a termination and that "termination" embraces the fact of termination however produced. Consequently the Company's contention that there was no termination could not be accepted.
  2. On whether termination was lawful: The Court examined the factual matrix — the workman had obtained intermittent work from 1965 to 24-9-1973 and was not given work thereafter. The Company claimed poor performance and misconduct (argumentative and quarrelsome behaviour, and obtaining employment at Thane while in the Company's employment). The Court held that these allegations, if they formed the basis for removing the workman, amounted to punishment and that no workman can be punished without being afforded a reasonable opportunity of being heard; hence a domestic inquiry was required before effective termination could be effected.
  3. On the characterization of misconduct: The Court considered the meaning of "misconduct" (not defined in the Industrial Disputes Act) and relied on dictionary meanings presented in the opinion to conclude that being argumentative and quarrelsome and taking up employment at Thane while in employment could constitute misconduct in the circumstances. Because the Company did not charge-sheet or hold an inquiry, termination on such grounds was arbitrary and violated natural justice.
  4. On standing orders and applicability: The Labour Judge had relied on standing orders produced by the Company which prescribed procedure before imposing disciplinary action. One ground of challenge was that those standing orders did not apply to the commercial establishment where the workman worked. The High Court observed that the standing orders had been put in evidence by the Company and relied upon; even if the standing orders were assumed not to apply, the absence of any inquiry rendered the termination arbitrary and illegal in any event.
  5. On mala fides, unfair labour practice and victimization: The Court found mala fide conduct and unfair labour practice in the Company’s prolonged use of the workman as a temporary intermittent employee for eight years and in confirming juniors (notably Govind Keshav Dutt) in preference to the senior workman. The opinion specifically cited the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (and later amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act in 1982) to show that retaining employees as temporaries to deprive them of permanency has been treated as unfair labour practice. Applying the jurisprudence on "victimization" (as set out in the cited Supreme Court cases), the Court concluded the Company acted vindictively and unfairly toward the workman.
  6. On the Company's opportunity to lead further evidence: The Court refused the Company's request for remand or an opportunity to lead further evidence to prove misconduct, reasoning that the Company's witness had already testified to the alleged reasons (argumentative/quarrelsome conduct) during the Labour Court proceedings; the Company had not sought earlier to lead further evidence or request an inquiry before the Labour Court, and it would be unfair at the hearing stage of the present proceeding to permit such a belated opportunity.
  7. On back wages and the effect of the earlier consent settlement: The Court accepted that the award entitles the workman to back wages. However, it analyzed the intervening period between the initial settlement (8-11-1976) and the Supreme Court remand (19-4-1983). Because the workman had accepted and cashed a cheque for Rs. 7,000 on 8-11-1976 as part of settlement and did not repudiate it at that time, the Court held the Company should not be required to pay back wages for the intervening period 8-11-1976 to 19-4-1983. The Court ordered that the workman is entitled to full back wages from 25-9-1973 to 8-11-1976 and from 19-4-1983 until reinstatement; the Company may deduct the Rs. 7,000 already paid.
  8. Other incidental matters: The Court noted that it had earlier directed the Company to pay Rs. 500 to the workman for costs of the petition (which had been paid), and therefore made no order as to costs in the final disposal.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSITION / CORE RULING: The Court upheld the Labour Court's award that the workman's services were illegally terminated and affirmed his entitlement to reinstatement with back wages, subject to the temporal adjustments described.

Direct consequences and remedial measures ordered by the Court (as stated in the opinion):

  • The workman is entitled to full back wages from 25-9-1973 to 8-11-1976 (the date of the prior settlement) and from 19-4-1983 (the date of the Supreme Court order remitting the matter) until the date of his reinstatement.
  • The Company shall forthwith pay the back wages due to the workman, but shall be at liberty to deduct Rs. 7,000 (the amount earlier paid to the workman on 8-11-1976 under the consent terms) from the sum payable.
  • The Company is not ordered to pay back wages for the period 8-11-1976 to 19-4-1983 because the workman accepted the monetary settlement on 8-11-1976 and did not repudiate it at that time.
  • Rule discharged and the Special Civil Application dismissed subject to the clarifications above; no order as to costs (the Company had paid Rs. 500 earlier as directed).

The opinion does not state that it establishes any new, general precedent; it applies existing statutory provisions, standing orders (as produced in evidence), and established Supreme Court authorities to the facts of this dispute.

Show all summary ...

Per Kantharia, J.:— By this Special Civil Application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India Voltas Limited, a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, having their registered office at 19, Graham Road, Bombay-400038 and branch at Voltasagar, Dr. Ambedkar Road, Bombay-400033 (hereinafter referred to as the Company) challenges an award dated 9-3-1976 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, 4th Labour Court, Bombay, in Reference (I.D.A) No. 330 of 1974 directing the Company to reinstate Narayan ??? one of their employees (hereinafter referred to as the workman) with full back wages.

2. The workman had been in the employment of the Company as ‘Sepoy’ intermittently for a period of 8 years from 28-10-65 to 24.9.73 on temporary basis. His last employment in this manner was from 18-9-73 to 24.9.73 which was, as per the appointment letter dated 18-9-73, automatically to cease on 24-9-73 unless extended in writing; but it could be terminated on any day earlier without any notice and without assigning any reason. The appointment was on basic salary of Rs. 45/- per month plus dearness allowance as may be in enforce from time to time. He was not given work on and from 25-9-73. He felt aggrieved on account of termination of his services in this manner by the Company and therefore, lodged a complaint with the Government Labour Officer on 16-2-74. During the intervening period he was going to the Company off and on with a hope to get re-employment, but in vain. It appears that the Deputy Commissioner of Labour intervened and the matter was admitted in conciliation. Since it was not settled the Conciliation Officer submitted failure report on 29-6-74. Under the circumstances, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10 read with sub-section (5) of section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Administration) Bombay, made a reference by his order dated 31-7-74 to the 4th Labour Court, Bombay, for adjudication of the dispute between the Company and the workman. The schedule annexed to the order of reference indicates that the demand of the workman was that he should be reinstated with full back wages and continuity of the services with effect from 24-9-73.

3. The case of the workman as per his statement of claim was that he was an employee of the Company as ‘Sepoy’ and ‘Sepoy-cum Hamal’ on temporary basis. It was a regular practice with the Company that the employees in ‘Sepoy’ or ‘Sepoy-cum Hamal’ and similar categories were recruited initially as temporary employees and confirmed later according to their seniority. However, in his case, although he had joined the company on 28.10.65 and had become a member of the Company's Provident Fund on 7-7-68 and was the senior-most employee in the said category he was not made permanent inspite of the fact that there was an agreement dated 31-12-70 signed before the Conciliation Officer between the Company and the Union representing the workman like him. According to him, he was not made permanent with ulterior motive and juniors to him viz., (1) Suresh Gangan and (2) Govind Keshav Dutt were made permanent thus violating the terms of the agreement dated 31-12-70. He further contended that the Company had neither charge-sheeted him nor had conducted any enquiry and without assigning any valid reason or without giving notice in writing arbitrarily discharged him from services which amounted to unfair labour practice and violation of principles of natural justice. He, therefore, demanded reinstatement with continuity of service end back wages. The Company resisted his claim and as per written statement it was their case that the workman was purely temporary having been employed intermittently from 28-10-65 to 24-9-73 if and when there was a leave vacancy or rush for work. Thus he was under the employment at their Air-conditioning and Refrigeration department (Central Plant Sales) from 28-9-71 to 11-11-71. However, he did not attend work with effect from 1-11-71 and on 4-11-71 they came to know that he had applied for a post at the Company's factory at Thane and was given employment there. Subsequently, when Thane establishment of the Company learnt that although he was already an employee of the Company upto 11-11-71 he sought such employment with them at Thane without disclosing the facts, they terminated his temporary services by a letter dated 5-11-71. Thereafter, the workman requested the Company, after tendering an apology, to re-employ him and solely on humanitarian consideration he was again given temporary employment whenever such employment was available. He then worked with the Company intermittently upto 24.9.73 The Company further contended that from 1-11-71 to 24-9-73 there were adverse remarks regarding his performance in work. Therefore, at the end of his employment on 24-9-73 his services stood automatically terminated and he was not given work thereafter. Thus they did not terminate his services contended the Company. Regarding Suresh Gangan and Govind Keshav Dutt being confirmed the Company said that they were not employed on the same job as the present workman and their service record was good. Hence they were confirmed. According to Company, the temporary employees were not confirmed as per their seniority only, but according to performance in the discharge of duties. They then averred that the workman was made a member of the Provident Fund on 7-7-68 through oversight. The Company further canvassed that they did not charge sheet the workman because he was not dismissed or discharged as and by way of punishment for any mis-conduct. The Company thus neither indulged in unfair labour practice nor did they violate the principles of natural justice, added the Company. They, therefore, prayed for the dismissal of the claim of the workman.

4. At the trial the workman examined himself and the Company one of their officers. On consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary, the learned Labour Judge came to a conclusion that the workman was a temporary hand but his services were illegally terminated. He was accordingly entitled to re-instatement with full back wages. The reasons for such conclusions arrived at by the learned Labour Judge were that the Company found the workman quarrelsome and argumentative and his work was not satisfactory. According to the learned Labour Judge the Company wanted to get rid of the workman because he had sought employment at Thane factory during the period when he was already in employment of the Company. And the Company terminated his services without giving him an opportunity to explain the charges of mis-conduct, in violation of the standing orders, further concluded the learned Labour Judge. He accordingly passed the impugned award.

5. Being aggrieved, the Company filed the present Special Civil Application. The matter came up before the Division Bench of this Court on 8.11.76 to which one of us (Shah, J.) was a party. On that day the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Company and the workman filed consent terms which were admitted by the workman. He also then stated that he had received the cheque for Rs. 7,000/- from the Company as per the consent terms. Thus on a monetary settlement between the parties the matter was disposed of with no order as to costs. Later, the workman appears to have felt that the settlement was not advantageous to him. Therefore, he went on filing some kind of applications in this Court which he described as writ petitions numbering fifteen which were rejected by this Court from time to time. The last of such application was Civil Application No. 2339/82 praying for setting aside the consent terms dated 8-11-76 which was rejected by Chief Justice Madon (as he then was) and Pendse, J., on 3.9.82 It further appears that the workman then took the matter to the Supreme Court through the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee and filed Civil Appeal No. 563/83 after obtaining special leave. The matter came up before the Supreme Court on 19-4-83 when upon hearing the Counsel the Supreme Court made the following order:

“Mr. G.B Pal, Senior Advocate, for the respondent has fairly stated before the Court that since the petitioner who was an employee of the respondent carries a grievance in regard to the consent terms as a result of which Special Civil Application No. 3047 of 1976 filed by the respondent in the High Court of Bombay was settled, the respondent is willing that the consent order made on Special Civil Application No. 3047 of 1976 be set aside. This is a fair suggestion on behalf of the respondent and we accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order dated 3rd September 1982, as also the order dated 8th November, 1976 disposing of the Special Civil Application No. 3047/76 in terms of the consent terms and restore that special civil application on file and remit it to the High Court for disposal according to law. Since the case is an old one we would request the High Court to dispose it of as expeditiously as possible and in any event not later than the expiration of one month from the re-opening of the Court after Summer Vacation. The allegation, if any, made by the petitioner against the respondent will stand withdrawn.”

6. That is how the matter is back before us and we have fully heard it on merits.

7. Now, Mr. Ramaswami urged that the Company did not terminate the services of the workman, services having automatically come to an end as per the appointment letter dated 18-9-73 and he cannot claim right to resume work. Thus according to him there was no termination at all as the services of the workman came to an end automatically on 24-3-73. We are not able to persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Ramaswami on this proposition. Admittedly, the workman was employed initially on 28-10-65 and he worked with the Company intermittently for a period of 8 years. The employment of such a workman cannot come to an end automatically just because an averment is made in the appointment letter that his services would automatically cease on 24-9-73. Even temporary workmen have a light to continue in services if otherwise everything is alright. They cannot be thrown out of employment without following due procedure according to law. In the instant case the workmen was getting employment from time to time for all the eight years and in the ordinary course he was again entitled to such employment on and after 25-9-73. Just because he was employed on temporary basis intermittently it would be wrong to say that his services come to an end automatically. In a similar case the appointment of a workman was intermittent on a purely temporary basis and on the last occasion for a period of 9 days which could be terminated earlier without assigning any reasons as per the appointment letter. It was contended by the employer that the order of appointment carried an automatic cessation of service by efflux of time. The Supreme Court in that case of 1(State Bank of India v. N. Sundaramoney), (1976) 1 L.L.J 478 explained the terminology “termination”. That was the case of retrenchment but since every termination spells out retrenchment, the Supreme Court explained “termination” as under:—

“Verbal apparel apart, the substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master or the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination, howsoever, produced.”

8. The Supreme Court further observed:

“Words of multiple import have to be winnowed judicially to suit the social philosophy of the statue. So screened, we hold that the transitive and intransitive senses are covered in the current context. Moreover, an employer terminates employment not merely by passing an order as the service runs. He can do so by writing a compositive order, one giving employment and the other ending or limiting it. A separate, subsequent determination is not the sole magnetic pull of the provision. A pre-emptive provision to terminate is struck by the same vice as the post-appointment termination. Dexrarity of diction cannot defeat the articulated conscience of the provisions.”

9. Thus the services of the workman before us were terminated by the company by puting a clause in the appointment letter that his services would automatically come to an end on 24-9-73. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Ramaswami that the Company had not terminated the services of the work-man can not be accepted.

10. Next, whether the termination of services by the Company in this manner, in our case, was an arbitrary, unjust, improper, unfair and illegal act on the part of the company Admittedly, the workman was getting employment, of course intermittently, from 28-10-65 to 24-9-73 may be, in leave vacancy, sick vacancy or whenever there was a rush for work. What had happened on 25-9-73 that he was not given work thereafter? Do they suggest that thereafter nobody went on leave or no person proceeded on sick leave or there was no rush for work at all so as to re-employ the workman? No, that is not so. It is the case of the Company that the workman was not given work again because his reports were not good and his work was not found satisfactory. The evidence of the witness examined on behalf of the Company shows that further chance was not given to the workman because he was argumentative and quarrelsome. If that is so, the Company positively terminated the employment of the workman as and by way of punishment. It is well settled law that no workman can be punished without affording him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Thus before any action is taken against a workman a domestic inquiry should be hold and it is only when he is found guilty of mis-conduct alleged against him that a workman can be punished Mr. Ramaswami urged that the acts alleged against the workman by the witness of the Company being argumentative and quarrelsome would not amount to mis-conduct for which he could be punished and as such there was no necessity of holding inquiry against him. Now the expression “mis-conduct” has not been ??? in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The dictionary meanings of the words “mis-conduct” are “improper behaviour; intentional wrong doing or deliberate violation of a rule of standard of behaviour “And therefore, what would be a mis-conduct will depend upon facts and circumstances of each and every case unless acts of mis-conduct are enumarated in the service conduct rules governing the employees. To be argumentative and quarrelsome will definately mean improper behaviour or a deliberate violation of rule of standard of behaviour on the part of any workman. Again, the present workman had taken up in employment at Thane Factory of the Company when has was in fact already in the employment with the Company. That would be an intentional wrong doing by the workman. Therefore, it will be reasonable to say that the acts on the part the workman before us were acts of mis-conduct. Hence, when the company sought to terminate his services on these grounds it was incumbent upon them to have held an enquiry, so as to give him an opportunity to explain the charges levelled against him. Admittedly, he was neither charge-sheeted nor an enquiry held against him. And to terminate his services without charge sheeting and holding an enquiry can positively be said to be arbitrary. The Company thus terminated the services of workman without observing the principles of natural justice. The workman was condemned without being heard. It may be noted here that the learned Labour Judge relied upon certain standing orders by which the service conditions of the workman were governed. A perusal of the award under challenge shows that the said standing orders were produced by the Company in the Court of the learned Labour Judge. One of grounds in this Special Civil Application is that the workman was working in commercial establishment of the company to which no standing ??? were applicable and therefore the Labour Court erroneously held that the Company had contravened the standing orders. Since the standing orders were produced by the Company before the learned Labour Judge he relied upon them and according to those standing orders services of the workman could not be terminated as and by way of punishment although he was a temporary hand, without no being given an opportunity of explaining the charges of mis-conduct alleged against him. But assuming for the sake of argument that the standing orders were not applicable to the present workman, even then it is more than clear that the Company arbitrarily terminated the services of the workman which would be illegal any time.

11. That apart, what appears to us in this case is that the company also acted mala fide and indulged in acts of unfair labour practice. The way in which the company conducted itself was highly improper and unjust. First of all it was highly unfair on the part of the company to have employed the present workman for a long period of eight years purely on temporary basis and that too intermitrenty with no security of job. The Company thus indulged in an act of perpetual wrong which amounts to unfair labour practics. Such temporary emyloyments have been held to be unfair labour practice and so long as our State in concerned, in Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, such act has been enumerated as unfair labour practice under Schedule IV, item 6, according to which it would be a general unfair labour practice on the part of an employer to employ employees as badlis, casuals and temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees. Such a provision has now been introduced in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 when it was amended in the year 1982. The record further shows that at least two temporary employees viz.: (1) Suresh Gangan and (2) Govind Keshav Dutt who were junior to the present workman were confirmed in preference to him. So long as Suresh Gangan is concerned he was confirmed on 14-5-74 and his performance seems to be better than that of the present workman and as such we will exclude his case. But Govind Keshav Dutt who was very much junior to the present workman was confirmed as Mazdoor on 1-6-72, that is, much before the services of the present workman were terminated. He was also working us Sepoy. A comparison of the performance of the said Dutt and the present workman will show that there was hardly anything to choose between the two. Thus their service records, as produced by the company, show that both of them were average or poor in some respects and upto the mark in certain respects. In other respects both were positively good. If, therefore, Govind Keshav Dutt could be confirmed, why not the present workman. According to the Company Dutt was working in the category of Mazdoor whereas the present workman was a Sepoy and therefore both were not working in the same category. Nomenclatures of their designations apart, both belong to the same echelon among the employees of the Company and there was no reason for the Company to prefer one against the other in the matter of making them permanent. Even as per settlement dated 31-12-70 between the Company and the Voltas and Volkart Emyloyees Union, senior as the present workman was, he was entitled to become permanent. But for the reasons that he was argumentative and quarrelsome and had taken up job at Thana Factory when he was in fact working with the company, the employer here indulged in vindictive attitude against the workman and did not confirm him. All this goes to show that the company did not act bona fide. We would like to make it clear here that we are not dealing with the case of the workman either for confirmation or for permanency, as rightly the learned Labour Judge has also not done, because permanency was not the term of reference made by the Government to the Labour Court. We have incidentally referred to this aspect of the matter with a view to point out that the company was not fair to the workman. Not to be fair to the workman and to take arbitrary action against him would amount to an act of victimization. The term “victimization” has been interpreted and explained and the principles of law relating thereto have been laid down by the Supreme Court in 2(Workmen of Williamson Magor & Co. Ltd. v. William Magor & Co. Ltd.), (1982) 1 L.L.J 33 as follows:

“The word “victimization” has not been defined in the statute. The term was considered by this Court in the case of 3(Bharat Bank Limited v. Employees of Bharat Bank Limited), reported in 1950 L.L.J 921. This Court observed. “It (Victimization) is an ordinary English word which means that a certain person has become a victim, in other words, that he has been unjustly dealt with.” A submission was made on behalf of the management in that case that “victimization” had acquired a special meaning in industrial disputes and connoted a person who become the victim of the employer's wrath by reason of his trade union activities and that the word could not relate to a person who was merely unjustly dismissed.” This submission, however, was not considered by the Court. When however, the word (‘victimization’) can be interpreted in two different ways, the interpretation which is in favour of the labour should be accepted as they are the poorer section of the people compared to the Management.

This Court in the case of 4(K.C.P Employees Association, Madras v. Management of K.C.P Limited, Madras), reported in 1977 (1) L.L.J 322, observed:

“In Industrial Law, interpreted and applied in the perspective of Part IV of the Constitution, the benefit of reasonable doubt on law and facts, if there be such doubt, must go to the weaker section, labour. The Tribunal will dispose of the case making this compassionate approach but without over stepping the proved facts”. We would, therefore, accept the interpretation of the word “victimization” in the normal meaning of being the victim of unfair and arbitrary action and hold that there was victimization of the superseded workmen.”

12. Further, the company contended that the workman was made member of the Provident Fund somewhere in the year 1968 through oversight. If that was so, what steps did the Company take to rectify it. The record shows nothing. It indicates that this contention of the Company is an after thought. All these circumstances clearly point out that the Company did commit grave end gross injustice on an economically exploited person like the present workman. Therefore, we hold that the act of termination of the services of the workman was illegal.

13. Mr. Ramaswami submitted that when the learned Labour Judge held that the services of the workman were terminated as and by way of punishment without holding a domestic inquiry, the Company should have been given an opportunity to lead evidence to prove such mis-conduct and therefore, the matter should be remand. We are not able to agree with Mr. Ramaswami because when the Company's witness gave evidence in the Labour Court that the workman was not given further chance because he was argumentative and quarrelsome the Company knew it fully well that they were doing away with the services of the workman on account of such acts on the part of the workman. The company's intention in this respect was clear when it gave evidence. If the company wanted to prove such acts by holding an enquiry against the workman it was incumbent upon them to have requested the learned Labour Judge first to give them an opportunity to lead evidence in respect of such mis-conduct. Not having done that it cannot lie in their mouth now to ask for such an opportunity. It is not even one of the grounds on which this Special Civil Application is filed. It is only at the stage of the arguments that Mr. Ramaswami raised such a contention. We, therefore, decline such a concession to the company.

14. Regard being had to all these circumstances we find no infirmity in the impugned award made by the learned Labour Judge. We find no substance in this application which fails. Rule will have to be discharged. But before we do that we would like to make certain clarification on the question of back wages. As stated above, this matter had come up for hearing on 8-11-76 in this Court when it was settled by and between the parties and was disposed of. It is because the workman took the matter to the Supreme Court, in the circumstances stated hereinabove, that by an order dated 19-4-83 of the Supreme Court the matter came back here. So long as the back wages from 25-9-73 to 8-11-76 are concerned there is no problem and the company is bound and liable to pay the same to the workman in consequence of the award made by the learned Labour Judge. The problem is for the intervening period from 8-11-1976 to 19-4-1983. Here we may point out that on 8-11-76 the workman settled the dispute with the company on monetary basis by accepting the cheque for Rs. 7,000/-. When he felt that the settlement was not advantageous to him he should have returned the said cheque to the company and should have repudiated the settlement. He should have then taken proper steps according to law so that the matter could have been restored to the file of this Court and could have been heard on merits and decided one way or the other right at that point of time. After having pocketed a sum of Rs. 7,000/- the workman allowed the matter to linger on from 8-11-76 to 19-4-83 for which the company is in no way responsible. It is none of the fault of the company that the disposal of the matter was delayed from 8-11-76 to 19-4-83. Again, the matter was remanded by the Supreme Court to this Court not on merits but by the consent of the company. Record does not show that the company was in any way guilty for the so-called “lets advantageous” terms of settlement filed in this Court on 8-11-76. The company, therefore, cannot be punished by ordering them to pay back wages for this intervening period. That would be quite unjust and unfair to the company. The workman, however, would be entitled to full back wages again from 19-4-1983 till the day he is re-instated. In other words, the workman will be entitled to full, back wages from 25-8-73 to 8-11-76 and from 19-4-83 till the day he is reinstated. When the company pays the back wages to the workman which they shall do forthwith, they shell be at liberty to deduct the sum of Rs. 7,000/- which they have already paid to the workman on 8-11-1976. Subject to this clarification the application stands dismissed. Rule discharged accordingly.

15. Before the hearing of this matter began, at the request of the workman we ordered the company to pay an amount of Rs. 500/- to the workman to meet the costs, charges and expenses for conducting this petition. The company had accordingly paid the said amount to the workman. Hence, no order as to costs.