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Dilipbhai Chhaganlal Patel v. State Of Maharashtra And Another
Summary of the Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Respondent No. 2, Smt. Bhanumati, filed a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for divorce and a notice of motion (No. 4551 of 1981) for interim alimony under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The notice of motion was initially decided ex parte, but that ex parte order was subsequently set aside. After hearing both sides, the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay, by order dated 20 January 1982, made the notice of motion absolute and awarded Rs. 150 per month as interim maintenance to the petitioner-wife from 1 October 1981 and Rs. 500 towards expenses. The order of the City Civil Court, Bombay is the subject of challenge in the writ petition considered in this opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the City Civil Court had jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act without first following the procedure contemplated by Section 23(2) and (3) (i.e., attempting reconciliation and, if appropriate, referral for a report) in the specific circumstances of this case.
- Whether an order under Section 24 (maintenance pendente lite and expenses) is independent of, and can be exercised before compliance with, the reconciliation procedure prescribed by Section 23(2) and (3).
Arguments of the Parties
Argument of Shri Vyas (original respondent husband)
- The order of the City Civil Court granting relief under Section 24 was without jurisdiction because the learned Judge failed to follow the mandatory provisions of Section 23(2) and (3) of the Hindu Marriage Act before granting relief.
- Unless the procedure in Section 23(2) and (3) was followed (i.e., endeavours at reconciliation and possible adjournment/referral for report), the court could not proceed to grant maintenance under Section 24.
- Specific attention was, according to Shri Vyas, drawn to Section 23(2) but the court proceeded without making efforts at reconciliation.
Arguments of Shri Vichare (respondent-wife) and Shri Salik (Assistant Government Pleader)
- Section 24 is an independent provision and is not controlled by Section 23(2). Therefore an application under Section 24 for maintenance pendente lite and expenses can be entertained without first invoking the reconciliation procedure in Section 23(2) and (3).
- Reliance was placed by counsel for the respondent-wife on decisions of the Delhi High Court (AIR 1977 Delhi 76 and AIR 1977 Delhi 176) to support the contention that Section 24 stands independently.
- Shri Salik, the Assistant Government Pleader, supported this contention and relied upon a decision of this Court (AIR 1979 Bom 264, Smt. Gangu Pundlik Waghmare v. Pundlik Maroti Waghmare).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1977 Delhi 76, Mrs. Arti Singh v. Lt. Col. Kanwar Pal Singh | Relied upon by respondent-wife's counsel to support the proposition that Section 24 is independent of Section 23(2). | The opinion records that the decision was relied upon by counsel. The court's reasoning does not state that it based its decision solely on this precedent; rather, the court conducted a statutory interpretation of Sections 23 and 24. |
| AIR 1977 Delhi 176, Smt. Chitra Lpkha v. Ranjit Rai | Relied upon by respondent-wife's counsel to support the proposition that Section 24 is independent of Section 23(2). | The opinion notes reliance by counsel. The court's decision is grounded in its own analysis of the statutory language and purpose; the opinion does not indicate exclusive reliance on this case. |
| AIR 1979 Bom 264, Smt. Gangu Pundlik Waghmare v. Pundlik Maroti Waghmare | Relied upon by the Assistant Government Pleader in support of the contention that an order under Section 24 can be valid without first complying with Section 23(2) procedure. | The opinion records that this Court's decision was relied upon by Shri Salik. The court's own statutory analysis is set out in the opinion and the court reached the conclusion that Section 24 is independent; the opinion does not state that the Waghmare decision alone determined the result. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a close textual and purposive comparison of Section 23(2) & (3) and Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act:
- Statutory text and meaning:
- Section 23(2) imposes a duty on the court "before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act" to make every endeavour to bring about reconciliation where it is possible to do so "consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case", with a proviso excluding certain grounds of relief under Section 13(1).
- Section 23(3) permits adjournment up to fifteen days and referral to a person (named by the parties or nominated by the court) to report whether reconciliation can be effected.
- Section 24 authorises the court in "any proceeding under this Act" to order, on application, payment of expenses of the proceedings and monthly maintenance pendente lite to a spouse without independent income sufficient for support and expenses of the proceeding.
- Interpretive conclusion:
- The court observed that the word "proceeding" in Section 23(2) contemplates substantive proceedings in which relief such as restitution of conjugal rights, judicial separation, nullity or divorce is sought; Section 24 likewise uses the phrase "where in any proceeding under this Act" but contemplates summary proceedings for maintenance pendente lite and expenses.
- The nature of Section 24 proceedings is summary and interim; no appeal is provided against an order under Section 24 and the object of Section 24 is twofold: (a) to prevent vagrancy arising from a strained marital relationship and (b) to ensure that an indigent litigating spouse can properly prosecute or defend proceedings.
- Given these purposes, the court held that the words in Section 23(2) — "before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act" — do not extend to cover the summary proceeding under Section 24. Thus, an application for maintenance pendente lite under Section 24 could be filed even before the reconciliation procedure in Section 23(2) is followed.
- Discretion under Section 23(2):
- The court emphasized that Section 23(2) is not absolute; it qualifies the duty to attempt reconciliation by the phrase "where it is possible to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case".
- The court compared this to Order XXXII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (which similarly contemplates attempts at reconciliation in family-suited matters) to illustrate that while reconciliation is desirable, failure to attempt it before granting maintenance pendente lite does not render a Section 24 order illegal.
- Nature of Section 24 orders:
- The court concluded that orders under Section 24 are interim and incidental — they are not final adjudications of the rights of the parties within the contemplation of Section 23.
- Consequently, the absence of an effort at reconciliation prior to passing a Section 24 order does not vitiate that order.
- Scope of review in the writ petition:
- The court stated that other contentions related to the merits were not being considered at this stage. Having held the impugned order to be within the jurisdiction of the trial court, the writ court found no basis to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with the order.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Petition dismissed.
Implications:
- The court held that the order passed by the City Civil Court under Section 24 (granting Rs. 150 per month interim maintenance from 1 October 1981 and Rs. 500 towards expenses) was within the jurisdiction of the trial court and was not vitiated by the trial court's not having followed the reconciliation procedure in Section 23(2) and (3) beforehand.
- Because the impugned order was held to be intra vires, the High Court declined to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution. The effect on the parties is that the City Civil Court's order stands and continues to have effect unless altered by a competent forum in appropriate proceedings.
- The opinion focuses on statutory interpretation and the interim nature of Section 24 orders; it does not purport to lay down any broader new principle of law beyond the interpretation applied to the facts of this matter.
Disposition
The writ petition was summarily rejected in the terms recorded: "Petition dismissed."
1. The Respondent No. 2 Smt. Bhanumati filed a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for divorce. She also took out a notice of motion bearing No. 4551 of 1981 for interim alimony under S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It appears that initially the said notice of motion came to be decided ex parte. However, the said ex parte order was set aside and ultimately after hearing both sides the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay by his order dated 20th January 1982, made the notice of motion absolute and granted Rs. 150/- per month as interim maintenannce to the petitioner-wife from 1st October 1981. He also granted Rs. 500/- towards expenses. It is this order of the City Civil Court, Bombay which is challenged in this writ petition.
2. Shri Vyas the learned counsel appearing for the original respondent husband contended before me that the order passed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, Bombay is without jurisdiction since the learned Judge has failed to follow the mandatory provisions of S. 23(2) and (3) of the Hindu Marriage Act. According to Shri Vyas unless this procedure was followed it was not open to the court to proceed further in the matter and grant relief under S. 24. He also contended that the attention of the court was specifically drawn towards this provision of the Act and in spite of this the learned Judge without making any efforts to bring about reconciliation has passed the order under Section 24, which is wholly without jurisdiction.
3. On the other hand it is contended by Shri Vichare the learned counsel for respondent-wife that Section 24 of the Act is an independent provision and is not controlled by Sec. 23(2). In support of his contention he has placed reliance upon the decisions of the Delhi High Court in AIR 1977 Delhi 76, Mrs. Arti Singh… v. Lt. Col. Kanwar Pal Singh…. and AIR 1977 Delhi 176, Smt. Chitra Lpkha v. Ranjit Rai. Shri Salik the learned Assistant Government Pleader supported the contention raised by Shri Vichare and also placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in AIR 1979 Bom 264, Smt. Gangu Pundlik Waghmare v. Pundlik Maroti Waghmare. Section 23(2) and (3) of the Hindu Marriage Act reads as under:
“23(2) Before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the duty of the court in the first instance in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case, to make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties;
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any proceeding wherein relief is sought on any of the grounds specified in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv), clause (v), cl. (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 13.
(3) For the purpose of aiding the court in bringing about such reconciliation, the court may, if the parties so desire or if the court thinks it just and proper so to do, adjourn the proceedings for a reasonable period not exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to any person named by the parties in this behalf or to any person nominated by the court if the parties fail to name any person with directions to report to the court as to whether reconciliation can be and has been, effected and the court shall in disposing of the proceeding have due regard to the report.”
Then comes Section 24 which deals with the maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings. S. 24 reads as under:
“Where in any proceeding under this Act it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband, as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the husband order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly during the proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner's own income and the income of the respondent, it may seem to the court to be reasonable”.
4. From the bare reading of these two provisions it is quite obvious that the word “proceeding” referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 23 deals with the proceedings where substantive relief is asked for by the petitioner under the Act for restitution of conjugal rights, judicial separation, nullity of marriage or divorce etc. In Section 24 the legislature has again used the phraseology i, e. ‘where in any proceeding under this Act’ which clearly indicates that in the substantive proceedings, such as judicial separation, divorce, restitution of conjugal rights or nullity of marriage etc., an application for maintenance pendente lite can be filed. In such proceedings a power is conferred upon either party i.e wife or husband who has no independent income, sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding, to approach the court for payment of maintenance pendente lite and expenses of the proceedings. The nature of proceedings contemplated by Section 24 are obviously summary in nature. No appeal is provided for against the order passed under Section 24, The object behind Sec. 24 appears to be twofold, firstly to prevent vagrancy resulting from the strained relationship between the husband and wife and secondly to ensure that the indigent litigating spouse is not handicapped in defending or prosecuting the case for want of money. That is why courts have always insisted that whenever an application is made under Section 24 it must be disposed of before any further steps are taken in the main case. In a given case, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case an attempt to bring about a reconciliation might become difficult if not impossible, unless some provision is made for maintenance and expenses. Such a provision might become necessary even for an active participation in reconciliation proceedings, by the concerned spouse. Therefore in my opinion it cannot be said that the words used in Section 23(2) i.e ‘before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act’ will cover the summary proceeding under S. 24. If the provisions of sections 23 and 24 are read harmoniously it is more than clear that the expression used in Sec. 24, i.e ‘where in any proceeding under this Act makes it clear beyond doubt that an application for maintenance pendente lite and expenses of the proceedings could be filed even before the procedure prescribed under Section 23(2) is followed. If it is construed that the order under Section 24 for maintenance pendente lite cannot be passed unless the procedure prescribed by sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 23 is followed then the very purpose and object of Section 24 will be frustrated. Therefore it is not possible for me to accept the contention of Shpi Vyas that the impugned order is without jurisdiction.
5. Even otherwise an order passed under Section 24 of the Act, could not be termed as illegal only because the court did not make any endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the parties. The provisions of Sec. 23(2) are not absolute in nature. While casting a duty upon the court to make every endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the parties a discretion is left to the court, by the use of the qualifying phrase, ‘where it is possible to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case’. Similar provision is made in Order XXXII-A of Code of Civil Procedure for the suits relating to matters concerning family. An attempt to bring about a reconciliation is always laudable but failure to do so before granting maintenance pendente lite, will not vitiate the order, passed under Section 24 of the Act. To say the least, Section 24 is independent of other provisions of the Act, and is not controlled by Section 23. The order passed under S. 24 is interim in nature and does not amount to final determination of the right or of the case. This incidental and interim direction to pay maintenance pendente lite is not a final and comprehensive adjudication of the rights of the parties within the contemplation of Section 23 of the Act.
6. So far as the other contentions raised and sought to be argued before me are concerned, they relate to the merits of the matter with which I am not concerned at this stage. Once it is held that the order passed is wholly within the jurisdiction of the trial court then obviously this is not a fit case wherein any interference is called for under the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Hence this writ petition is summarily rejected.
Petition dismissed.
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