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Kamalabai Harjivandas Parekh v. T.B Desai

Bombay High Court
Aug 7, 1964
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Kotval, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner claimed ownership of a 2 gunthas 5 annas plot (Survey No. 29A, Juhu), asserting succession by will from her deceased husband. On May 2, 1942 the land was requisitioned under rule 75A(1) of the Defence of India Rules for construction of a road leading to the military aerodrome at Juhu. Compensation was paid under requisitioning arrangements until a notification under section 7 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (Act XXX of 1952) was issued; the opinion records that such a notification was issued on December 29, 1952 and that publication in the Official Gazette occurred in the instant case on April 2, 1953.

Following the acquisition notification, the Collector (respondent No. 2) offered compensation at Rs. 11 per sq. yd. (amounting to Rs. 3,080 under that valuation). The petitioner sought a substantially higher figure (she initially claimed Rs. 100 per sq. yd. and in formal claim put forward Rs. 75 per sq. yd.), plus the usual 15% solatium for compulsory acquisition. No agreement being reached, the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, Bombay (Mr. T. B. Desai — respondent No. 1) was appointed arbitrator under s. 7. The petitioner filed the present Miscellaneous Petition in this Court on September 18, 1962 challenging the statutory provisions governing assessment of compensation under s. 8 of the Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 — which prescribes "twice the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in the open market if it had been sold on the date of requisition" and, together with clause (a), makes compensation payable "whichever is less" — is ultra vires Article 31(2) of the Constitution (as it stood prior to the Fourth Amendment) because it may deny the owner a "just equivalent" (fair market value) on the date of acquisition.
  2. Whether the opening words of s. 8(1)(e) directing the arbitrator to determine "the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just" can be construed to override or neutralise the alternative principles and the "whichever is less" provision in s. 8(3).
  3. Procedural questions: whether the petition was premature (since arbitration had not reached a concluded award) and whether there was inordinate delay in approaching the Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The petitioner (through Mr. Sorabjee) challenged s. 8(3)(b) of the Act as unconstitutional under art. 31(2) (pre-Fourth Amendment), contending that "compensation" must mean the just equivalent (market value on date of acquisition) and that fixation of an anterior date or a mechanism that permits payment of less than the true market equivalent would violate art. 31.
  • Originally the attack included both clauses (a) and (b) of s. 8(3), but counsel limited the argument to clause (b) in the course of proceedings.
  • The petitioner rejected an interpretation advanced by the State that the arbitrator's duty to award "what appears to him to be just" would in practice ensure just compensation irrespective of sub-s. (3), and indicated willingness to accept a concession to that effect.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Respondents (through Mr. Advani) relied on recent Supreme Court authority (notably W.R.E.D. Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras — referred to in the opinion) to contend that the statutory scheme could constitutionally provide alternative bases of valuation.
  • They argued that s. 8(1)(e) — directing the arbitrator to award "the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just" and to have regard to sub-ss. (2) and (3) — must be read as a plenary direction ensuring that the arbitrator will award just compensation, thereby obviating constitutional objections to sub-s. (3)(b).
  • The respondents also raised procedural defences: that the petition might be premature (the arbitrator had not yet made an award) and that the petitioner had delayed unreasonably in challenging the provision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee, [1954] S.C.R. 558 Established that "compensation" under art. 31 (pre-Fourth Amendment) means the just equivalent/market value; fixation of an arbitrary earlier date for valuation prima facie denies the just equivalent and is suspect. Cited as the leading authority: the court accepted its principle that compensation must be a just equivalent and that fixing an anterior date is prima facie arbitrary. The opinion treats Bela Banerjee as central to invalidating s.8(3)(b).
Than Singh v. Union of India, [1955] A.I.R. Punjab 55 Applied Bela Banerjee's principle in a later High Court decision (as recorded in the opinion). Referred to as one of the post-Bela Banerjee authorities applying its principle; cited in support of the settled rule relied upon by the Court.
H.P. Khandewal v. State of U.P., [1955] A.I.R. All. 12 Applied the Bela Banerjee principle on valuation date/arbitrariness. Listed among High Court decisions applying Bela Banerjee; used to show consistent judicial application.
Chhaya Devi v. State of Bihar, [1957] A.I.R. Pat. 44 Applied the Bela Banerjee principles regarding fixation of valuation date and adequacy of compensation. Cited as another High Court application of Bela Banerjee to support the Court's framework.
Ramdas Nathubhai Shah v. P.M. Shahane (This Court) — Poona Mutha River cases (Dec. 11, 1962, unrep.) Division Bench of this Court struck down statutory fixation of valuation date (post-Fourth Amendment context) as arbitrary; affirmed that an arbitrary valuation date can offend art. 31 principles. Referred to and distinguished: although that case was decided after the Fourth Amendment, this Court invoked it as showing the continuing force of the Bela Banerjee principle and applied similar reasoning in the present context.
W.R.E.D. Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras (West Ramnad), [1962] A.I.R. S.C. 1753 Considered alternative statutory bases of compensation (three bases) and held that the statute could still permit a just equivalent where, on the facts, a fair equivalent may be obtained; emphasised fact-specific inquiry and noted the statute gave the affected party the option among bases. Relied on by respondents. The court treated West Ramnad as not modifying Bela Banerjee; it affirmed Bela Banerjee's principle, distinguished West Ramnad on facts (there the citizen had an option; here the statute gives the State the effective choice by prescribing "whichever is less") and concluded West Ramnad did not support the impugned provision.
State of Madras v. Namasivaya Mudaliar (Nama Sivaya), [1959] A.I.R. Mad. 548 / Supreme Court appeal cited Confirmed that freezing valuation on an anterior date for a permanent act prima facie deprives the owner of appreciation and that the State must show otherwise with materials; reaffirmed Bela Banerjee's core principle. Used to reinforce that an anterior fixed valuation date is prima facie unconstitutional and that the burden is on the State to show that the fixation does not deny the true equivalent. The court applied this reasoning to s. 8(3)(b).
Bai Dahi… Applicant; v. Ghanashyam Haridas… Opponent, [1956] A.I.R. Bom. 102 Interpretation issues about statutory phrases such as "have regard to" in context of administrative duties. Referred to by parties on construction of "shall have regard to"; the court accepted the principle that precise meaning must be gleaned from context, but distinguished the present statutory context from the authority cited.
Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi, (Privy Council) 1943 L.R. 70 I.A. 129 Privy Council interpretation that the phrase "have regard to" generally means "to be guided by" and that exact force of the phrase depends on context. Quoted and relied upon for the point that "have regard to" may mean "be guided by", but the Court distinguished the present Act and concluded that the statutory expression "shall have regard to" in s. 8(1)(e) is mandatory in context and cannot nullify the protection intended by art. 31.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise, text-focused analysis:

  1. Structural reading of s. 8: the Court observed that s. 8 sets out both (a) the manner of determining compensation and (b) the principles for doing so, thus engaging the requirements of art. 31(2) (pre-Fourth Amendment). Sub-s. (2) addresses requisition compensation principles; sub-s. (3) prescribes principles for acquisition compensation.
  2. Characterisation of s. 8(3)(a) and (b): clause (a) values the property at market value on the date of acquisition (in the condition at requisition) — a principle consistent with art. 31 and precedent. Clause (b) prescribed an alternative — twice the market price on the date of requisition — and the two alternatives were linked by "or" and concluded with "whichever is less".
  3. Constitutional objection to clause (b) and the "whichever is less" qualifier: the Court held clause (b) introduces an anterior fixation (date of requisition) with no cogent connection to the date of vesting (acquisition). Requisition merely authorises possession/use; vesting (ownership) occurs on acquisition notification. Thus fixation of the date of requisition is arbitrary in the sense explained by Bela Banerjee and Namasivaya and prima facie denies the owner appreciation up to the acquisition date.
  4. The combined effect of alternatives and "whichever is less": even if both alternatives were thought to be theoretically capable of yielding a just equivalent, providing that the lesser of the two must be paid shows legislative preference for the formula that reduces the owner's entitlement. That preference demonstrates that the statute can operate to deny the just equivalent and so contravenes art. 31(2).
  5. Response to the State's construction that s. 8(1)(e) (the arbitrator must award "the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just") cures the defect: the Court analysed clause (e) in context and concluded it does not override sub-ss. (2) and (3). Clause (e) directs the arbitrator to have regard to circumstances of the case and to the provisions of sub-ss. (2) and (3); it is not a plenary power enabling the arbitrator to disregard the statutory principles. If sub-s. (3)(b) were followed, an award would still be unjust despite the exhortation to be "just".
  6. Interpretation of "shall have regard to": after considering Privy Council authority and local decisions, the Court held that in this constitutional and statutory context the phrase is mandatory and cannot be read so as to render sub-s. (3)(b) nugatory or allow the arbitrator to disregard the sub-sections that define the principles of compensation.
  7. On procedural defences: the Court rejected the arguments that the petition was premature (no award yet) and that the petitioner delayed. It explained that constitutional objections concerning the validity of a statute may be raised before a finalized award and that the petitioner only became aware of the State's valuation basis when the State filed its statement before the arbitrator (dated July 2, 1962); the Court found no inordinate delay and in any event would have condoned any delay.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the petition and made the rule absolute. It held that clause (b) of sub-section (3), including the words "whichever is less", of section 8 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (XXX of 1952) is ultra vires Article 31 of the Constitution and is therefore void. The assessment of compensation must be made subject to this declaration.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The impugned provision (s. 8(3)(b) and the "whichever is less" qualification) has been struck down; it cannot be applied in assessing compensation for acquisition under the Act in question.
  • The arbitrator and authorities must assess compensation without resort to s. 8(3)(b) and the "whichever is less" device; clause (a) (valuation at market value on date of acquisition, in the condition at requisition) remains an available and constitutionally permissible principle.
  • The petitioner was awarded costs against the respondents in the amount of Rs. 500.

The opinion grounds the declaration of invalidity on established Supreme Court authorities (notably Bela Banerjee and Nama Sivaya) and on the textual and structural reading of s. 8; it does not purport to create a novel constitutional principle beyond applying those precedents to the statutory scheme before it.


End of summary. All content above is derived exclusively from the text of the provided opinion.

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Kotval, J.:— The petitioner claims to be the owner of a piece of land admeasuring 2 gunthas 5 annas, out of S. No. 29A at Juhu. The land originally belonged to her husband, and after his death she claims to have succeeded to it by virtue of a will. The respondents have not admitted her title, but the question is hardly material to the points raised in the present petition.

2. On May 2, 1942, this piece of land was requisitioned for the purposes of the Union, under r. 75A(1) of the then existing defence of india rules. The notification (exh. 1) stated that it was required for military purposes, and it has now been explained that it was required for the construction of a road leading to the military aerodrome at Juhu during the period of the emergency occasioned by the last war. The owner of the plot was receiving the usual compensation for requisitioning until December 29, 1952, when a notification was issued under s. 7 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (XXX of 1952). That Act had been enacted by the Parliament on March 14, 1952, and by virtue of s. 24 thereof, it replaced several enactments which were passed after the operation of defence of india rules expired. The notification under s. 7 of the Act stated that the land, which was part of a much larger area at one time, and which had been requisitioned on May 2, 1942, was now being acquired by the Government of India, Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply. The land would ordinarily vest in the Government of India from the date of the notification under s. 7 and the notification itself so declared the land to have vested in the Central Government. Consequent upon this notification, the only right which the owner of the land had, was to claim compensation, and accordingly compensation was offered by the Collector of Bombay, respondent No. 2 to the petition, by his letter dated February 20, 1961, at the rate of Rs. 11 per sq. yd. According to this valuation, the petitioner would have got Rs. 3,080 for the land. The petitioner, however, wanted compensation for the land at a much higher rate. She claimed it at the rate of Rs. 100 per sq. yd.; which would give her an amount of Rs. … plus the usual 15 per cent solatium for compulsory acquisition. Since there was no agreement, the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, Bombay, Mr. T.B Desai, who is respondent No. 1 to this petition, was appointed the Arbitrator under s. 7. The Arbitrator gave notice to the petitioner to put in her claim, and also to respondent No. 3, the Government of India, to put in its statement of valuation. Accordingly, the petitioner put in a statement claiming compensation at the rate of Rs. 75 per sq. yard, plus 15 per cent solatium for compulsory acquisition and the State offered in its statement compensation at the rate of Rs. 11 per sq. yd. which according to it was the “fair value according to the said Act”. Respondent No. 3 also denied the petitioner's claim for the 15 per cent solatium for compulsory acquisition. Before the matter could proceed much further before the Arbitrator, the petitioner preferred the present Miscellaneous Petition in this Court on September 18, 1962.

3. In this petition, the petitioner challenges these provisions of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act, 1952, whereby the compensation is to be assessed. We will first refer to the provisions of the Act, and then indicate the precise nature of the objection and the question raised in the present petition.

4. Act XXX of 1952 was enacted to provide for the requisitioning and acquisition of the immoveable property for the purposes of the Union, and it was brought into force for a limited duration. By an amendment to s. 1 made by another central act no. xlviii of 1963, the act was to cease to have effect on March 14, 1970, with certain exceptions in favour of the things done or omitted to be done in the past. Section 3 deals with the power to requisition immoveable property, and s. 4 prescribes that consequent upon requisitioning the competent authority may take possession of the property by such force as may be necessary after requiring the owner to deliver possession by a notice served on him. Section 5 confers rights on the State to use the property for the purpose for which it was requisitioned and provides for repairs to the requisitioned property. Section 6 provides for the release of the property from requisitioning when the purpose for which it was requisitioned has been fulfilled.

5. Then follow the provisions regarding acquisition. Section 7(1) says that where any property is subject to requisition, the Central Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary to acquire the property for a public purpose, at any time acquire such property. In order to do that, it has to publish a notice in the Official Gazette, which we have stated was done in the instant case, on April 2, 1953. There is proviso to s. 7(1) which provides the usual safeguard of hearing the person interested before issuing the notification, and considering the cause shown by him if any, against acquisition. Sub-section (2) of s. 7 declares that upon the notification being issued under sub-s. (1), the property vests in the Central Government absolutely and free from all encumbrances, and from the date of vesting, the period of requisition of such property shall end. There are certain conditions to the acquisition of property under s. 7, and these are indicated in sub-s. (3) thereof Sub-section (4) enacts that the decision or determination of the Central Government in regard to whether the property should be acquired or not is final.

6. Next follow the provisions as to the award of compensation and it is with those provisions that we are principally concerned in the present petition. It will be convenient to reproduce here the provisions of s. 8 entirely in order to appreciate the points argued:—

“8. (1) Where any property is requisitioned or acquired under this Act, there shall be paid compensation the amount of which shall be determined in the manner and in accordance with the principles hereinafter set out, that is to say—

(a) where the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement;

(b) where no such agreement can be reached, the Central Government shall appoint as arbitrator a person who is, or has been, or is qualified for appointment as, a Judge of a High Court;

(c) the Central Government may, in any particular case, nominate a person having expert knowledge as to the nature of the property requisitioned or acquired to assist the arbitrator and where such nomination is made, the person to be compensated may also nominate an assessor for the same purpose;

(d) at the commencement of the proceedings before the arbitrator, the Central Government and the person to be compensated shall state what in their respective opinion is a fair amount of compensation;

(e) the arbitrator shall, after hearing the dispute, make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid; and in making the award, he shall have regard to the circumstances of each case and the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), so far as they are applicable;

(f) where there is any dispute as to the person or persons who are entitled to the compensation, the arbitrator shall decide such dispute and if the arbitrator finds that more persons than one are entitled to compensation, he shall apportion, the amount thereof amongst such persons;

(g) nothing in the Arbitration Act, 1940 shall apply to arbitration under this section.

(2) The amount of compensation payable for the requisitioning of any property shall consist of—

(a) a recurring payment, in respect of the period of requisition, of a sum equal to the rent which would have been payable for the use and occupation of the property, if it had been taken on lease for that period, and

(b) such sum or sums, if any, as may be found necessary to compensate the person interested for all or any of the following matters, namely:—

(i) pecuniary loss due to requisitioning;

(ii) expenses on account of vacating the requisitioned premises;

(iii) expenses on account of reoccupying the premises upon release from requisition; and

(iv) damages (other than normal wear and tear) caused to the property during the period of requisition, including the expenses that may have to be incurred for restoring the property to the condition in which it was at the time of requisition.

(3) The compensation payable for the acquisition of any property under section 7 shall be—

(a) the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in the open market, if it had remained in the same condition as it was at the time of requisitioning and been sold on the date of acquisition, or

(b) twice the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in the open market if it had been sold on the date of requisition, whichever is less.”

7. Sections 10 and 11 make the usual provisions regarding right of appeal. No right of appeal is prescribed against an order of acquisition though a right of appeal is prescribed in s. 10 from an order of requisitioning.

8. Now, it will be noticed that s. 8(1), in its opening clause, enacts that compensation shall be paid of an amount which is to be determined (a) in the manner and (b) in accordance with the principles hereinafter set out. The section, therefore, in express terms, deals with the manner of determination of compensation and the principles on which the compensation is to be determined—both being the plenary requirements of art. 31(2) of the Constitution. Sub-section (1) mostly deals with the procedure to be followed by the Arbitrator in arriving at the figure of compensation, excepting cl. (c), to the important provisions of which we will presently refer. Sub-section (2) deals with the principles of compensation when the property is requisitioned. Actually we are not concerned in the present petition with sub-s. (2), but reference was made to it only on a matter of construction of the other sub-sections of s. 8.

9. Sub-section (5) is the crucial provision by which the petitioner's case is governed. It opens with the words: “The compensation payable for the acquisition of any property under section 7 shall be” and then prescribes two modes of ascertaining that compensation. Clause (a) prescribes that the compensation shall be the price which the property would have fetched in the open market, “if it had remained in the same condition as it was at the time of requisitioning and been sold on the date of acquisition”. In other words, all that cl. (a) of sub-s. (3) enacts, is that the property should be valued at the market value on the date of acquisition, but in the condition in which it was on the date on which it was requisitioned. Clause (b) of sub-s. (3) however introduces a wholly different principle. It refers to twice the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in the open market, if it had been sold on the date of requisition. Thus sub-s. ((3)(b) has reference to the price on the date of requisition and it says that the compensation shall be twice that price. It is clear that the two clauses of s. 8(5) lay down two radically different principles for the determination of compensation. Clause (a) speaks of the market price on the date of acquisition, while cl. (b) speaks of the market price on the date of requisition. The provision for twice the price in the latter case affects merely the quantum of the compensation but not the principle of determination.

10. Now, between these two radically different principles of assessing compensation the choice is in favour of the State and not in favour of the person whose property is acquired. By sub-s. (3) the two principles are made alternative by the use of the word “or”, but what is of prime importance in considering the constitutionality of these provisions are the concluding words of sub-s. (3) “whichever is less”. The total effect, therefore, of sub-s. (3) of s. 8 is that substantially the valuation has to be made for the purposes of compensation upon one of the two alternative principles—(a) either the value on the date of acquisition, or (b) twice the market value on the date of requisition, but the person whose property is being acquired is to be paid that amount “whichever is less”.

11. It is cl. (b) of sub-s. (3), which is attacked as being ultra vires of the provisions of art. 31 of the Constitution. We may add that originally in the petition the attack was against both the cls. (a) and (b) of sub-s. (3), but Mr. Sorabjee on behalf of the petitioner has with much discretion limited the argument to cl. (b) of sub-s. (3) only. For the purposes of the decision of the constitutional question, which has been raised, it may be stated here that it is contended by counsel for both the parties before us that the constitutionality of the provisions affected falls to be determined under art. 31 as it stood prior to the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. Prior to that amendment, cls. (1) and (2) of art. 31 ran as follows:

“(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.

(2) No property, moveable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given.”

12. Now, it is argued that cl. (2) of art. 31 says that no property shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes unless two conditions are fulfilled viz., (1) that the law provides for compensation for the property, and (2) either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given. In any case, what is to be given under cl. (2) of art. 31 is “compensation”, and it has been urged that upon the interpretation placed upon the word by the Supreme Court, it is clear that it means the just equivalent of the property to be taken, or, in other words, the fair market value of the property. It is further contended that the provisions of cl. (5) of sub-s. (3) of s. 8 make it impossible to give fair compensation or a true market value.

13. Reliance has been placed in this respect upon the leading case—The State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee . [1954] S.C.R 558.. That also was a case in which art. 31 prior to its amendment by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. In that case, the provisions of s. 8 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948, were challenged. It provided for the determination of the amount of compensation, and it was challenged as ultra vires of art. 31. The proviso (b) to that section limited the compensation payable to an amount not exceeding the market value of the land on December 31, 1946, and it was urged on behalf of the owners that fixation of assessment of compensation as on December 31, 1946—a completely arbitrary date—and having regard to the fact that the State may actually acquire the property much later, the compensation payable would not be a full and fair money equivalent of the property to be taken. It was argued on behalf of the State in that case that compensation could not mean the full cash equivalent, but that it would mean such compensation as was determined on principles laid down by the law enacted in exercise of the legislative power conferred by Entry 42 of List III (the Concurrent List). The learned Chief Justice, who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Court, repelled the latter argument as follows (p. 563):

“We are unable to agree with this view. While it is true that the legislature is given the discretionary power of laying down the principles which should govern the determination of the amount to be given to the owner for the property appropriated, such principles must ensure that what is determined as payable must be compensation, that is, a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of. Within the limits of this basic requirement of full indemnification of the expropriated owner, the Constitution allows free play to the legislative judgment as to what principles should guide the determination of the amount payable. Whether such principles take into account all the elements which make up the true value of the property appropriated and exclude matters which are to be neglected, is a justiciable issue to be adjudicated by the court.”

14. Having regard to this important pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it must be taken now as settled beyond any controversy that the word “compensation” as used in art. 31, cls. (7) and (2), prior to the fourth amendment, means nothing more or less than the just equivalent of the property taken by acquisition. We shall show that in a subsequent judgment, the latter expression has been used interchangeably with the “just equivalent”. Therefore, any law for acquisition of property which made a provision, whereby it was possible that the just equivalent would not be paid to a citizen prior to the Fourth Amendment would necessarily be ultra vires of art. 31.

15. The other point that was raised in Bela Banerjee's case, and which is also of importance in the present petition, was that the fixation of an arbitrary date on which the compensation is to be assessed, which has no reference to the point of time when the property is actually acquired, is prima facie bad and it must be assumed that it would result in the “just equivalent” not being given to the citizen. In this respect, the Supreme Court did not in terms say that the fixation of an arbitrary date of this kind would in every case be bad, but the principle which they laid down was stated thus (p. 564):

“…Considering that the impugned Act is a permanent enactment and lands may be acquired under it many years after it came into force, the fixing of the market value on December 31, 1946, as the ceiling on compensation, without reference to the value of the land at the time of the acquisition is arbitrary and cannot be regarded as due compliance in letter and spirit with the requirement of article 31(2). The fixing of an anterior date for the ascertainment of value may not, in certain circumstances, be a violation of the constitutional requirement as, for instance, when the proposed scheme of acquisition becomes known before it is launched and prices rise sharply in anticipation of the benefits to be derived under it, but the fixing of an anterior date, which might have no relation to the value of the land when it is acquired, may be, many years later, cannot but be regarded as arbitrary.”

16. We have quoted not merely the principles laid down but also the illustration given by the learned Chief Justice in extenso, because, as we shall presently show, giving of the illustration to indicate a possible exception has resulted in giving rise to a large volume of discussion in subsequent authorities. The true principle, however, is as indicated by the learned Chief Justice in the first sentence of the passage we have quoted, that

“the fixing of the market value on December 31, 1946, (an arbitrary date), as the ceiling on compensation, without reference to the value of the land at the time of the acquisition is arbitrary and cannot be regarded as due compliance in letter and spirit with the requirement of article 31(2)”.

17. The statement of the principle in Bela Banerjee's case declared the fixing of an arbitrary date as not in compliance with the letter and spirit of art. 31(2), but in subsequent decisions, it is made clear that the effect of mentioning an arbitrary date of this kind as the date on which compensation is to be assessed gives rise, so to say, to a presumption that the just equivalent is not being paid unless the State establishes aliunde that what it is paying is the just equivalent. Subsequent to the decision in Bela Banerjee's case, several High Courts have applied it. Some of those decisions were cited and they are: Than Singh v. Union of India . [1955] A.I.R Punjab 55., H.P Khandewal v. State of U.P . [1955] A.I.R All. 12. and Chhaya Devi v. State of Bihar . [1957] A.I.R Pat. 44.. The decision was also applied by this Court in Ramdas Nathubhai Shah v. P.M Shahane . 1962 Special Civil Application No. 121 of 1962 with Special Civil Application Nos. 627, 698, 699, 706, 1026, 1141, 1150, 1168, 1171, 1346, and 1457 of 1962, decided by Patel and Palekar JJ., on December 11, 1962 Unrep.. a judgment to which my learned brother was a party. In that case, this Court was concerned with the provisions of the recent enactment necessitated by the bursting of the Panshet dam at Poona. Consequent upon that disaster, it became necessary to provide for the reconstruction of the devastated area and controlling the developed area by acquiring the lands on the two banks of the Mutha river. The Act known as the Poona Mutha River Flood Limits (Prohibition of Building) and Provision for Alternative Building Sites Act, 1961, was passed on September 25, 1961. In that Act the principle of compensation was laid down in s. 7 read with s. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act. The provision made was that the property should be valued and compensation paid in accordance with the value prevailing on the date on which a declaration is made in the Act or January 1, 1948. It was argued that the fixation of such a date was arbitrary, and this Court accepted the argument and struck down the provision. The important difference, however, between that case and the present one was that, in that case the Division Bench was concerned with a law which was passed subsequent to the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. By that Act, an important change was made in cl. (2) of art. 31 by the addition, inter alia, of the following clause:

“…and no such law shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate.”

18. Thus, after the amendment, mere deficiency or inadequacy of compensation is not a question which can go to show the unconstitutionality of any Act dealing with the acquisition of property. Despite that fact the Division Bench in that case took the view that the fixation of the arbitrary date as the date on which the value for the purposes of the compensation has to be assessed was unconstitutional, and the reasoning was thus stated by Mr. Justice Patel, who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Division Bench:

“In our view, once the interpretation put upon the word ‘compensation’ by the Supreme Court is accepted, it would not be possible to sustain this contention. It may not be the exact equivalent but it must in fairness amount to compensation before it can be declared valid. There would, therefore, be no difference in the approach to the case merely because in this case the principles have been fixed. If any thing that is called a principle of valuation is arbitrary then it ceases to be a principle and must be declared to be invalid.”

19. It was contended in that case also that the fixation of the value of the property acquired by reference to a date much anterior to the date of acquisition is a recognised mode of doing it, at least in national emergencies, but after considering several foreign and other authorities, the learned Judges stated the principle thus:

“It seems that article 31 with the amendment embodies these principles only and is not intended to permit expropriation of property by providing the payment of nominal compensation… such compensation as cannot reasonably be called compensation.”

20. Accordingly, the Division Bench held that s. 7 of the Act before them offended against art. 31, and was, therefore, ultra vires and void.

21. The decision shows that even after the amendment of art. 31 by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, the law still is that what is to be paid for the acquisition of property by the State is the true equivalent or the market value of the property to be acquired, and that fixing of an arbitrary date, on which such property is to be valued, which date is anterior to the date of acquisition, is bad. Thus, whether before or after the amendment of art. 31, the view has been taken that what is to be paid for the acquisition of property is a just equivalent; and that if a date is fixed arbitrarily on which the valuation is to be reached, which date is anterior to the date of acquisition, then, by the fixation of such date, fair market value or full equivalent cannot be paid and so would be hit by art. 31.

22. We may at once say that it is not necessary for us, in the present case, to consider the position after art. 31 was amended in 1955, for, in the present case, the acquisition is of 1952, and under an enactment which is also of 1952. The decisions also show that the principle of Bela Banerjee's case is not affected by the Fourth Amendment.

23. On behalf of the respondents, strong reliance was placed by Mr. Advani on a receipt decision of the Supreme Court in W.R.E.D Co. Ltd. v. State of Madras . [1962] A.I.R S.C 1753., to urge that the principle is not as stated above but is different. In that case, the provisions of Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, (29 of 1954), were challenged. By s. 5 of that Act provision was made for the payment of compensation to licensees whose undertakings were acquired under the provisions of the Act, and Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar, an he then was (now Chief Justice), who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Court, indicated the bases laid down in s. 5 for the payment of compensation in paras. 22, 23 and 24 of his judgment. It appears that the compensation was payable at the option of the licensee under any one or more of the three bases prescribed by s. 5. The three bases A, B and C were, to state them briefly, that compensation was to be paid (A) at 20 times the average net annual profit of the undertaking during a period of five consecutive account years immediately preceding the vesting date, (B) the aggregate value of the shares constituting the share capital of the undertaking reckoned in a certain manner, and (C) the aggregate value of the amount of the book value of all works in gross, the book value of all stores, the book value of all other fixed assets, of all plants and equipment, the book value of all intangible assets, and the amount due from consumers subject to certain limitations prescribed. The over-riding provision, however, was that it was for the licensees i.e the party whose property has been taken, to avail of the option given to choose any one or more of the three bases. These provisions were attacked as unconstitutional on the ground that they did not afford a just equivalent, of the property to be taken or, in other words, the market value.

24. Now, it has to be noticed that here again the Supreme Court was dealing with a pre-amendment statute. The Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act was Act 29 of 1954 and was, therefore, passed prior to the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, and the case, as their Lordships in terms pointed out, fell to be determined upon the provisions of the unamended art. 31. The Supreme Court did not in any way comment upon or touch the principle laid down in Bela Banerjee's case, that by the word ‘compensation’ is implied a just and fair equivalent of the property to be taken, or, in other words the market value. Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar, after considering all the provisions of the Act impugned before him, and particularly s. 5 thereof, held in para. 25 that the legislation itself showed that it was possible thereunder to give a fair and just equivalent of the property to be taken, or in other words, the market value. The learned Judge held thus (para. 25):—

“It is true that in none of the three bases does the Legislature refer to the market value of the undertaking, but that itself cannot justify the argument that what is intended to be paid by way of compensation must necessarily mean much less than the market value. The failure of the legislature to refer to the fair market value cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as conclusive or even presumptive evidence of the fact that what is intended to be paid under S. 5 does not amount to a just equivalent of the undertaking taken over. After all, in considering the question as to whether compensation payable under one or the other of the bases amounts to just equivalent, we must try to assess what would be payable under the said basis.”

25. Then the learned Judge pointed out that the real difficulty in the way of the appellant-company in the case before him was that the company had produced no material before the Court on which its plea could be sustained, and that in the absence of any satisfactory material, it would be difficult for the Court to come to any definite conclusion on the question whether just equivalent is provided for by s. 5 or not. It may, first of all, be noticed that in the whole of this case, the Supreme Court, after noticing the decision in Bela Banerjee's case, did not say a word in modification of any principle laid down therein, but, on the other hand, reaffirmed it. In para. 20, the Supreme Court said (p. 1762):

“…In support of his argument, Mr. Nambiar has relied on the decision of this Court in State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee. In dealing with the question about the scope and effect of the provisions of art. 31(2) in so far as they referred to the payment of compensation, this Court observed that though entry 42 of List III conferred on the Legislature the discretionary power of laying down the principles which should govern the determination of the amount to be given to the owner of the property acquired, art. 31(2) required that such principles must ensure that what is determined as payable must be ‘compensation’, that is, a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of. That is why in considering the validity of any statute in the light of art. 31(2) it would be open to the Court to enquire whether all the elements which make up the true value of the property acquired have been taken into account in laying down the principles for determining compensation”.

26. In this particular case upon the facts we have shown that the Supreme Court held that in that case the impugned statute had made it possible for a citizen to receive the just and true equivalent of the property to be taken from him. As to whether that was so or not in fact, the Supreme Court said that there was no material placed before it. Therefore, the West Ramnad case, in our opinion, did not alter the principle in Bela Banerjee's case. On the other hand, it affirmed it. Of course, in that case, the statute was held to be intra vires because those provisions were held not to infringe the provisions of art. 31(2) as interpreted in Bela Banerjee's case. We may also point out here that the West Ramnad case was a case where the provisions of the impugned statute were radically different from the provisions of the statute which is impugned before us, or the statute in Bela Banerjee's case. In West Ramnad's case, no question of the statute laying down an arbitrary date ever arose for consideration. There is one circumstance, however, which we may note here while we are discussing that authority, and that is the provisions in the Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1954, challenged in that case, laying down three alternative principles upon which compensation would be assessed, but unlike the Act before us, offering an option, to accept any one alternative, to the citizen or the third party, whose property has been acquired, and not, as in the present case, providing that only compensation under that alternative should be paid “whichever is less”. That was one of the important considerations which weighed in the decision of that case, and which also serves to distinguish the facts of that case from the facts of the present case.

27. Thus, barring the decision of this Court in The Poona Mutha River case (Spl. C.A No. 121/62 and others), all the decisions to which we have so far referred were decisions turning upon the provisions of art, 31(2) before its amendment by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.

28. We now turn to an important case which considered all these previous decisions and resulted in the latest decision by the Supreme Court on this question. That is the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Nama Sivaya Mudaliar,7a. The appeals were against the decision of the Madras High Court in Namasivaya v. State of Madras . [1959] A.I.R Mad. 548.. In that case, the Court was concerned with the acquisition of certain land, which was lignite bearing land, and the State Government, with a view to controlling lignite resources, proceeded to acquire the lignite bearing areas. To enable the State to do so, the Madras Lignite (Acquisition of laud) act xi of 1953 was passed. That Act directed that compensation was to be paid on the basis of the value of the land on April 28, 1947. The provisions as to the payment of compensation and the fixation of that date were challenged. It was explained that as soon as valuable lignite was discovered there was a great boom in the value of the lands and speculators were dealing in it, and therefore, on October 6, 1948, Government had issued a press-note warning the speculators, that the lands would be taken over by Government, and advising the owners not to part with them. It was argued on behalf of the State that the date in the Act was fixed with reference to the date when lignite was first discovered in the area, and that, therefore, it was not just an arbitrary fixation of any date, but the date was referable to an intelligible principle. Nonetheless the Madras High Court struck down the fixation of that arbitrary date, observing (p. 551):

“…This is a date which has no bearing on the value of the land at the time it was acquired. It is a wholly irrelevant circumstance. Since that date the value of the land—leaving out all speculative elements—may have gone up owing to quite legitimate causes. To deprive a person of the value that has accrued to his property owing to natural and lawful causes is also unconstitutional.”

29. This decision of the Madras High Court was confirmed by the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Nama Sivaya Mudaliar and after pointing out that the result of the Madras Act in that case was to freeze for the purpose of acquisition the prices of land in the area to which it applied, and to deprive the owners of the benefit of the appreciation of land values since April 28, 1947, Mr. Justice Shah, who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Court, reaffirmed the principle in Bela Banerjee's case, saying that the principles laid down in an enactment, for compensation must ensure that “what is determined as payable must be a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of”, and that “subject to this basic limitation the Constitution allowed free play to the legislative judgment as to what principles should guide the determination of the amount payable/The Supreme Court also emphasized another point, viz., that the impugned Act was a permanent Act, and that under it lands may be acquired many years after it came into force, and many years after the freezing of the market value on a particular date. Both these important considerations are, as we shall presently show, applicable to the enactment impugned before us. As regards the fixation of the date, the Supreme Court observed in the case referred to above:

“It would be impossible to hold that a law which authorises acquisition of land not for its true value, but for value frozen on some date anterior to the acquisition, on the assumption that all appreciation in its value since that date is attributable to purposes for which the State may use the land at some future date must be regarded as infringing the fundamental right.”

30. Elaborating this, the learned Judge observed a little further in the judgment:

“But any principle for determination of compensation denying to the owner all increments in value between a fixed date and the date of issue of the notification under s. 4(1), prima facie, must be regarded as denying to him the true equivalent of the land which is expropriated and it is for the State to show that fixation of compensation on the market value on an anterior date does not amount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee. No materials have been placed by the State before this Court which would support any such case.”

31. It will be noticed that the rule here stated is in less wide terms than the rule stated in Bela Banerjee's case. There, the Supreme Court did not advert to any possibility of the State providing anything otherwise if an arbitrary date was fixed by the Legislature but in Namasivaya's case, the Supreme Court has stated that fixation of an arbitrary date like this is to be regarded prima facie as denying to the citizen a true equivalent of the land which is expropriated. What is more, the last sentence in the passage quoted above indicates that the state could have shown that the fixation of compensation on the market value on an anterior date does not amount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee by reason of sufficient material before the Court. In Bela Banerjee's case, no doubt the Chief Justice Patanjali Shastri did give an illustration of a possible exception in the second sentence of the passage from his judgment, which we have already quoted, and presumably the principle as stated in Namasivaya's case is based upon that illustration.

32. The principles that these cases lay down, therefore, are well settled and clear. These principles as they appear to us on an analysis of these decisions are as follows:—

1. In all cases governed by art. 31 prior to its amendment by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, the compensation payable for acquisition of any land must be the just equivalent of what is being taken or the market value of the property on the date of acquisition. That in its turn means that a citizen, whose property has been taken, is entitled to a just indemnification for loss and for the appreciation in the market value of the land till the date of acquisition.

2. That where the law fixes a date for the assessment of compensation anterior to the date of acquisition and leaves the State free to acquire property at any time it chooses, then, prima facie, the law does not ensure a fair and just equivalent, and therefore in such a case, it is for the State to show that the legislation does nonetheless give a fair and just equivalent of the property to be taken.

3. That the mere use or non-use of the words “market value” or “fair or just compensation” in a legislation does not make it just or fair or vice versa but in every case the fair and just equivalent must be objectively established.

33. We turn then to apply these principles to the provisions of s. 8, and particularly to the provisions of sub-s. (3), cl. (b). It is quite clear that, so far as cl. (a) of sub-s. (3) is concerned, what is provided to be paid by that clause is the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in the open market on the date of acquisition, as if the property had remained in the same condition as on the date on which it was requisitioned. There can be no quarrel with that principle. It clearly gives the compensation on the basis of a fair market value or the “just equivalent”. That is precisely what the authorities show should be given under art. 31. But cl. (a) is followed by cl. (b), and the two clauses are connected by the word “or” and cl. (b) provides an alternative principle for payment of compensation viz., twice the market price oil the date of requisition. Now, it is quite clear that though a date is prescribed in cl. (b), it is not a date with reference to acquisition, and there appears no particular reason in fastening upon the date of requisition as the date on which to freeze the compensation payable.

34. We have already referred to the provisions of ss. 4 and 5 of the Act. The only effect of requisitioning is that the State or its officers can take possession of the property and use it for the public purposes for which it was acquired, but the property actually vests in the State not by virtue of its requisitioning, but by virtue of its acquisition, that is, by the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 7. Therefore, although the requisitioning only goes to justify the taking possession of the property, its ownership still remains with the party from whom it is requisitioned until the notification is issued, stating that it is being acquired. It is from the date of that notification that the property vests in the State. If then the true principle is that the citizen from whom the property is being taken is entitled to compensation which is the just and fair equivalent of what is being taken from him on the date of acquisition, we can see no point in arbitrarily fixing the date of requisition as the date for the purpose of assessing the compensation. That would be, in our opinion, as arbitrary as if the actual date had been fixed. Since requisitioning does not result in the property vesting in Government and the property vests only on the date of acquisition, it is with reference to that date that compensation must be provided. Thus, the provision of cl. (b) of sub-s. (3), which awards compensation on the date of requisition is, in our opinion, arbitrary, and prima facie, indicates that the law is not awarding a just and fair compensation thereby. The arbitrariness lies in this that it all depends upon the whim of the particular officer requisitioning the property and fixing a date for requisitioning, while the actual taking or acquisition of the property would be later on a date which is wholly uncertain.

35. But the matter becomes much worse when we turn to consider the impact of the total provisions of the entire sub-s. (3) of s. 8. As we have shown, cl. (a) gives a fair market price on the date of acquisition, but cl. (b) gives twice the price on the date of requisition. We presume that by these clauses it was intended to provide a fair equivalent of the property to a citizen whose property is acquired, and indeed that was the contention of Mr. Advani on behalf of the State. If then both the cls. (a) and (b) give what the Legislature consider a fair or just equivalent of the property which is being taken, then we can see no point whatsoever in the law providing further that of the two alternative principles of assessment indicated in the sub-section that compensation is to be paid to the citizen “whichever is less”. The very fact that as between two alternative modes of assessment of compensation that mode is to be preferred by the law which results in the lesser payment being made to the citizen, shows clearly, in our opinion, that the fair or just equivalent of the property is not being paid to the citizen. This is the second ground on which the provisions of s. 8(3)(b) would be rendered unconstitutional under art. 31(2).

36. We may here emphasise that in the case before the Supreme Court in West Ramnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. the provision of the Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, was the exact reverse. There, of the three alternatives provided as the bases on which compensation was to be assessed, it was the citizen who was given the option to accept the basis which he preferred; whereas here the legislation has itself provided that as between the two standards of computation of compensation, that standard is to be preferred, which gives less to the citizen. It seems to us that nothing could be more eloquent than this that the just or fair equivalent is not being paid to the citizen when of two alternatives that alternative is to be preferred which gives less to the citizen. In that view, it seems to us clear that under art. 31(2) read in the light of the authorities to which we have referred, cl. (b) of sub-s. (3) of s. 8 must be declared to be ultra vires of art. 31 of the Constitution.

37. Nothing moreover turns upon the fact that this Act is only put into force for a limited period, that is to say, up to March 14, 1970. In so far as the constitutional guarantee given by art. 31 is being infringed by the law, it is immaterial that it results in any infringement only up to a limited time and not for ever; and the offending clause would all the same be ultra vires. Where acquisition takes place the citizen loses his property or property right for all time and it profits him little to know that the Act is of temporary duration.

38. Realising these difficulties, Mr. Advani on behalf of the respondents, sought to steer clear of all the constitutional objections by seeking to give to the section an interpretation, which, if accepted, would obviate all the said constitutional objections. The argument is based upon the provisions of s. 8(1)(e). We have already shown that sub-s. (1) of s. 8 begins with the preamble that it is enacting the manner in which and the principles in accordance with which the compensation will be determined, and in cl. (e) of sub-s. (1), the arbitrator, assessing the compensation, is enjoined to determine “the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just”. Then follow the words: “and in making the award, he shall have regard to the circumstances of each case and the provisions of sub-section (2) and (3), so far as they are applicable”. What Mr. Advani says is that the opening words of cl. (e): “the arbitrator shall…. make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just….” are the key words which govern all subsequent principles laid down in the rest of the provisions of s. 8. He, therefore, urges that there is a clear direction to the arbitrator that he must award the amount of compensation which is just, and if that be so, then every requirement of art. 31 as also all the conditions indicated by the authorities, to which we have referred, are fulfilled, and it is immaterial, therefore, if sub-s. (3) provides for some other mode of evaluating the compensation. When this argument was advanced, Mr. Sorabjee, on behalf of the petitioner, pointed out that if this is the stand which the State wishes to take and if it is prepared to concede that position, then, the petitioner would have nothing more to say and would consider withdrawing the petition, for, he urged, the substance of the grievance which brought the petitioner to the Court would be met by the concession. He says that if the State were to say that compensation will be determined which is just, in spite of the other provisions of s. 8, and the arbitrator would act upon that principle, he would accept the compensation so determined. Mr. Advani on behalf of the State was not prepared to state it as a concession but he stated that he was merely urging it as legal argument on the basis of the statute before the Court, and that he on his part would leave it to the Court to determine what is its true construction. In that view of the matter, it seems to us that we must consider the construction put forward as a matter of argument by Mr. Advani.

39. An analysis of cl. (e) shows that it refers to three things—(1) firstly, the amount of compensation which appears to the arbitrator to be just; (2) secondly, the circumstances of each case, and (3) thirdly, the provisions of sub-ss. (2) and (3). In the first sub-clause of cl. (e), the arbitrator is directed to determine the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just; but, in the second sub-clause, he is not merely directed, but enjoined that in making the award (1) “he shall have regard to the circumstances of each case”, and (2) that he shall have regard to the “provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3)”. We do not think that the language of cl. (e) at all indicates that one or other of these three conditions is overriding, governs or controls the others. On the other hand, the clause appears to be dealing with these three concepts in equal terms. The effect of this clause, therefore, is, firstly, that the arbitrator must determine the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just, but in making his award he must have regard to the circumstances of each case and to sub-ss. (2) and (3).

40. We have already referred to the provisions of sub-s. (3), and to its alternative clauses. Considering sub-s, (3) in the light of the provisions of cl. (e) of sub-s. (1) of s. 8, it is clear that the arbitrator, though enjoined to determine the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just, cannot act outside the scope of sub-s. (3). If he has to have regard to sub-s. (3)(b) as sub-s. (1)(e) directs him to do it, he must award to the person whose property has been acquired, twice the price on the date of requisition, and within the principle of Bela Banerjee's case, that is prima facie not just compensation. Therefore, though cl. (e) directs him to be just, in awarding compensation, in following sub-s. (3)(b), he cannot but be unjust.

41. The contention of Mr. Advani that the opening words of s. 8(1)(e) “determining the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just” are plenary and govern the rest of the provisions of s. 8 fails if we consider the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 8. It is clear that cl. (e) refers to sub-s. (2) in the same breath as sub-s. (3). clause (6) of sub-s. (2) says that the amount of compensation payable for the requisitioning of any property shall consist of such sum or sums, if any, as may be found necessary to compensate the person interested for all or any of the following matters, and then follow the four clauses which provide, inter alia, for (1) pecuniary loss due to requisitioning; (2) expenses on account of vacating the requisitioned premises; (3) expenses on account of re-occupying the premises upon the release from requisition, and (4) damages, and other normal wear and tear. Now, cl. (b) of sub-s. (2) in terms says that such sum or sums of money shall be awarded as may be found necessary to compensate a person interested for all or any of the following matters etc. We cannot understand how, if the opening words of cl. (e): “determine the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just” are plenary and all pervasive, the Land Acquisition Officer can award only such sum or sums of money as may be found necessary for the four matters specially stated. There is a vast difference between finding out a sum which is just and finding out a sum which is necessary to compensate for our stated items only. Thus, the provisions of sub-s. (2) clearly show that the injunction in cl. (c) to find out the just compensation, cannot possibly control sub-s. (2). On the other hand, sub-s. (2) controls sub-s. (1)(e), just as we have shown that sub-s. (3) controls sub-s. (1)(e). We have referred to the provisions of sub-s. (2) only in order to indicate a point of construction. We are not concerned with them as such here. It seems to us that cl. (e) of sub-s. (1) cannot control the provisions of sub-s. (3) of s. 8 also. No doubt sub-s. (3) is referred to in cl. (e), but it is referred to in cl. (e) only in order to indicate that in his duty to award just compensation one of the matters which the arbitrator shall have regard to is the provision of law in sub-s. (3). The other matter he shall have regard to is the circumstances of each case. We have already shown that the provisions of cl. (b) of sub-s. (3) are such that they cannot possibly result in the assessment of just compensation. The construction, therefore, for which Mr. Advani contends cannot be accepted.

42. In order to reinforce the argument, reference was made to the words in cl. (e) “shall have regard to”. Mr. Sorabjee on behalf of the petitioners urged that the words meant “shall not disregard”, whereas Mr. Advani said that it simply implies that he must be guided by those principles, but is not bound by them. He referred in this respect to two decisions—one of this Court in Bai Dahi…Applicant; v. Ghanashyam Haridas,…Opponent. . [1956] A.I.R Bom. 102. and another of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi . 1943 L.R 70 I.A 129 S.C, 47 Bom. L.R 524.. We accept it that the true construction is as indicated by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Garabandho's case at pages 169–170. At page 170, their Lordships said:

“…The expression ‘have regard to’, or expressions very close to this, are scattered throughout this Act, but the exact force of each phrase must be considered in relation to its context and to its own subject-matter. Any general interpretation of such a phrase is dangerous and unnecessary, but it is fairly clear, as a matter of English, that the view taken by the majority of the Collective Board is nearer to the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘have regard to’, when it appears in a statute, than is that of the dissentient member.”

43. In that case, their Lordships held that the words occurring in the statute before them meant that the authority was only “to be guided by” those provisions. Their Lordships have themselves indicated that the exact force of each phrase “must be considered in relation to its context and to its, own subject-matter”. We do not think that the enactment before us, namely, the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, is in any sense in pari materia with the Act before the Privy Council in Garabandho case. That was an Act providing for the enhancement of rent fixed by a settlement, whereas the present Act is an Act providing for compensation payable for property acquired, which property is protected by the constitutional guarantee of fundamental right. We have no doubt here that the word “shall” in the expression “shall have regard to” shows that the arbitrator cannot in any case disregard sub-ss. (2) and (5). But even assuming that we are wrong and that the words “shall have regard to” occurring in cl. (e) of sub-s. (1) of s. 1 that “the arbitrator shall be guided by,” still it is clear that he has to be guided by the circumstances of each case and by the provisions of sub-ss. (2) and (3) as much as by the principles of determining the amount of compensation which is to be just, and this in itself would result in inequity in the award of compensation for if sub-s. (3)(b) results in the award of compensation which is not just being “guided by”, it will have the same result. There is also another consideration which we may here emphasis where the arbitrator is enjoined to fix the amount of compensation which appears to him to just, the whole clause is also preceded by the word “shall”. The composite expression used (shorn of inapplicable verbiage) is “shall… make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just”. Upon the argument advanced on behalf of the State, the word “shall” in this clause indicates a mandate which cannot be disobeyed. Any other argument would destroy their case that just compensation is compulsorily to be given. If so, is it to be supposed that the word “shall” in the subsequent expression “shall have regard to” occurring in the same sub-section imports only a direction which may or may not be obeyed? and that it really means “may”. We cannot accept such a construction. We have already said that the provisions of sub-s. (3)(b) must result in the award of some compensation which is not just upon the meaning given to it by the Supreme Court. If so, making use of sub-s. (3)(b) in any particular case must result in compensation which is not just. Now if the expression “shall have regard to” means as is contended “may be guided by”, then, having regard to its vitiating tendency which we have pointed out, it must always be disregarded, otherwise the award of just compensation is not possible. That would render the provisions of sub-s. (3)(b) nugatory. Such a construction, therefore, cannot be placed.

44. At any rate, if sub-s. (3) is to be a guiding principle for the arbitrator in assessing the compensation, then, having regard to the provisions of cl. (b) thereof, it is clear that the arbitrator will have to take it into consideration, at least, and the moment he takes it into consideration, we think that he cannot but reach a conclusion where the compensation which he awards will not be the just equivalent of the property acquired.

45. In answer to this point as to the construction of sub-s. (3) read with cl. (e) of sub-s. (1), Mr. Sorabjee referred to the opening words of sub-s. (1) and he pointed out that the opening words in terms say that they are providing for two matters—(1) the manner in which the amount of compensation shall be determined, and (2) the principles in accordance with which the compensation shall be determined. He says that the perusal of the remaining provisions of s. 8 indicate that sub-s. (7) in substance deals only with the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and it is only the provisions of sub-ss. (2) and (3) which deal with the principles in accordance with which the compensation shall be determined. In other words, the counsel argues that there is no principle involved in sub-s. (1) at all. It only deals with the manner of determination of compensation, and, therefore, any provision of that sub-section can have no effect so far as the principles laid down in sub-s. (3) are concerned.

46. Curiously enough, the opening words of sub-s. (1), upon which reliance has been placed, give no indication as to what subsequent portions of the section each of its clauses refers to. It rather seems to us on a perusal of the sub-section as a whole that the draftsman made several provisions both of procedure and principle, and did not incorporate them disjunctively or separately in different clauses of sub-sections. It seems to us that he relegated the principles of payment of compensation for requisitioning to sub-s. (2) and the principles for the payment of compensation for acquisition to sub-s. (3), but because of those provisions we cannot hold that he did not state any principles in sub-s. (1) at all. On the other hand, the provision in cl. (e) of sub-s. (1) enjoining on the arbitrator to determine the amount of compensation which appears to be just, could well be said to be a principle, and so too the direction to the arbitrator that he shall have regard to the circumstances of each case as well as the direction that he will have regard to sub-ss. (2) and (3). We cannot say that clause, therefore, is not concerned with any principle at all. If it was the intention of the Legislature that sub-s. (1) was only a sub-section dealing with the manner of determining the compensation, then, nothing could have been easier than to say in the opening words of sub-s. (1) “there shall be paid compensation, the amount of which shall be determined in the manner prescribed in sub-section (1) and in accordance with the principles prescribed in sub-sections (2) and (3)”. But that clear-cut demarcation was not possible for the reason that the draftsman realised that some principle is intermingled with the provisions as to the manner in which the compensation shall be determined, and therefore, he generally stated in the opening words of sub-s. (1) the provisions both regarding the “manner” as well as regarding the “principles”. What the counsel urged is no doubt true so far as the other clauses of sub-s. (1) of s. 8 are concerned, but not so far as cl. (e) is concerned.

47. There then remain to be considered two other short points which were raised on behalf of the respondents. It was urged that the petitioner has come to the Court prematurely, since the arbitrator has not even proceeded to consider the claim to compensation, or the objection to the valuation by the State. It was argued that the petitioner could only come when compensation was assessed in accordance with certain principles and she had a grievance against some definite amount assessed. It was urged that she may get the compensation which she asks for, in which case there would be no likelihood to approach this Court. A shade of the same argument is that so far as the constitutional objection is concerned, the unconstitutionality, which is being pointed out upon the provisions of s. 8(3)(b), arises because cl. (b) gives a compensation which may be different from the figure of compensation arrived at under cl. (a). But it was urged that it may be possible that the actual amount arrived at, whether under cl. (a) or under cl. (6), would be the same, in which case, the constitutional objection would fail.

48. We do not think that where the question involved is as to the constitutionality of a provision of law, we can have regard to any particular case or make it dependent upon the determination of the amount of compensation. It is clear that even if the amount was the same as is to be found under sub-cl. (a) if it is given on the basis that it is twice the price on the date of requisition, it would all the same infringe art. 31 of the Constitution. We do not think that simply because no actual assessment has been made by the arbitrator, a constitutional objection of this kind cannot be sustained in limine, when the aggrieved party approached this Court under art. 226.

49. The other objection is as to the delay in approaching this Court. It was urged that the petition is filed after inordinate delay. The original acquisition was made on December 29, 1952, when the notification under s. 7(2) was promulgated. So far as the compensation is concerned, it was urged, that the arbitrator was appointed on June 21, 1961, and when pursuant to the provisions of s. 7, the arbitrator was appointed for the purpose of assessment of compensation, whatever constitutional objection the petitioner had, arose, and therefore, she should not have waited till September 18, 1962, to file the present petition. This argument is the very reverse of the argument which we have just disposed of. There the objection was that the petition was premature, here the objection is that it is delayed. It seems to us that where a constitutional objection of this kind to the validity of a legislation is in question, what is involved is infringement of a fundamental right under the Constitution. In such a case, question of mere delay would hardly affect the maintainability of the petition, for, whether we consider the infringement of a fundamental right or consider the question of ultra vires, the objection is fundamental and omnipresent. It must be met and negatived or it remains at all future stages of a proceeding. It must be met at any subsequent stage of the litigation between the parties. In that view, we do not think that delay as such would be a good ground to defeat a constitutional objection of that kind.

50. Moreover, in the circumstances of the present case, we do not think that there has been in fact any delay. On behalf of the petitioner, it has been explained that the ground upon which the constitutional challenge arose was disclosed only when the respondents filed their statement before the arbitrator in reply to the petitioner's claim for compensation.

51. That was on July 2, 1962. It was only when the Collector valued the compensation, and on behalf of respondent No. 3 it was offered to the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 11 per sq. yard, and the petitioner knew the basis upon which that valuation was made, that she realised that it was being valued contrary to the principles of art. 31. If July 2, 1962 is the date on which the constitutional objection arose from which to approach this Court, the petition filed on September 18, 1962, can hardly be said to be delayed. In any case, having regard to the importance of the points raised, and assuming that there was any delay, we would certainly condone the delay.

52. For the reasons given, therefore, we allow the petition and make the rule absolute. We hold that cl. (b) including the words “whichever is less” of sub-s. (3) of s. 8 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (XXX of 1952) is ultra vires of art. 31 of the Constitution, and is, therefore, void. The assessment of compensation will, therefore, have to be made subject to this declaration.

53. The petitioner will be entitled to her costs from the respondents. We quantify these costs at Rs. 500.

54. Petition allowed Rule made absolute.