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Dattatraya Baliram Naik v. Rambhabai Jairam Patil
Judgment Summary — Patel, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit for possession dismissed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jalgaon. The suit concerns lands that were purchased in execution proceedings by decree-holders who had obtained attachment before judgment in an earlier suit (Suit No. 63 of 1924) instituted by the plaintiffs' predecessors to recover dues on a promissory note. Attachment before judgment was levied on March 24, 1924, and a decree was passed on July 9, 1924, continuing the attachment. Over the years several execution applications (darkhasts) were filed. The darkhast No. 830 of 1924 was disposed of in December 1925 after part payment and consent to continuation of attachment. Darkhast No. 230/31 (disposed of June 15, 1931) was directed to be disposed of for want of particulars. A subsequent darkhast (No. 778/34) was sent to the Collector and the properties were sold on November 27, 1941, and purchased by the decree-holders (sale certificate exh. 225).
The plaintiffs (filed November 26, 1953) claim possession, alleging some sales were sham or were ineffective against their attachment. Several defendants had purchased parts of the attached properties at various times (some sales pre-dating attachment; others after). The trial Court accepted most defendant contentions and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. After the appeal was heard on merits, plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 4 and 5 (respondents 4–8 collectively in the judgment at one stage) reached a compromise; the only remaining contested questions concerned defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Order XXI, rule 57 of the Code of Civil Procedure (r.57) — which provides that where an application for execution is dismissed for default of the decree-holder the attachment made in execution ceases — applies to an attachment that was levied before judgment (i.e., whether dismissal of an execution darkhast for default vacates an attachment before judgment).
- Whether conveyances/sale-deeds executed in respect of properties after an attachment before judgment are operative as against a purchaser who later bought in execution, and relatedly whether the defendants who purchased from the judgment-debtor can claim title or adverse possession against the purchaser in execution.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants / Plaintiffs
- The sales in favour of various purchasers (including sales to Yadav Patil and Vyankat Mayaram Patti and others) were sham or intended not to operate as real alienations; the judgment-debtor (Daulat) and his brother continued in possession after ostensible sales.
- Sales made after attachment before judgment are not binding on the attaching plaintiff; the plaintiffs are therefore entitled to possession.
- Evidence supports that attachment was in fact levied and continued and that the trial judge erred in finding that the attachment was not levied or not legal.
Respondents / Defendants (in particular Nos. 6, 7 and 8)
- They contended that their purchases were genuine sales and that they and/or their predecessors had been in continuous, adverse possession as owners for over 32 years, thus barring the plaintiffs' claim.
- Some defendants (Nos. 4 and 5) argued their sales pre-dated the attachment and so were unaffected; several defendants challenged the validity/effectiveness of the attachment itself.
- Defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 specifically relied on the fact that Darkhast No. 230 of 1931 was disposed of on June 15, 1931 for default of the decree-holder, and invoked Order XXI, r. 57 (or related authority) to argue that the attachment, therefore, ceased and their titles were not affected.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar (1923 I.L.R 47 Mad. 483) | Majority view: an attachment before judgment becomes an attachment in execution (so r.57 would apply); minority view to the contrary also recorded. | The Court agreed with the minority reasoning in that Full Bench decision and held that r.57 does not operate in the case of an attachment before judgment; the judgment in Meyyappa Chettiar (majority) was treated as a forced construction and not followed. |
| Ardeshir v. Usman Gani (1929 31 Bom. L.R 1101) | Followed the Madras Full Bench (majority in Meyyappa) holding that attachment before judgment could be treated as attachment in execution. | The present Court disagreed with that construction and described it as a forced construction; it preferred the minority view in Meyyappa Chettiar instead. |
| Hari v. Srinivas (1931 33 Bom. L.R 1130) | Division Bench observations adopting the majority view in Meyyappa Chettiar. | The Court held those observations to be obiter in relation to the precise question and therefore not decisive; they do not bind the present decision. |
| Md. Abdulkhadir v. Padmanabha ([1952] A.I.R T.C 414) | Followed the Madras Full Bench approach (i.e., broader application of r.57 to attachment before judgment). | The Court noted this case followed the Madras Full Bench and said it was not necessary to consider it further for the present decision. |
| K. Kangayya v. J. Reddeyya ([1960] A.I.R A.P 634) | Followed the Madras Full Bench position on attachment before judgment. | The Court observed it followed the Madras Full Bench and indicated it was not necessary to consider it further for present purposes. |
| Abdul Hamid v. Musammat Asqhari Begam ([1953] All. 654) | Authority aligning with the minority view distinguishing attachment before judgment from attachment in execution. | The Court cited it among other authorities supporting the proposition that r.57 does not apply to attachment before judgment. |
| Bohra A. Khey Ram v. Basant Lal (1924 I.L.R 46 All. 894) | Authority supporting the distinction between attachment before judgment and attachment in execution. | The Court cited it as one of the decisions consistent with the minority view. |
| Ayezali Mir v. Mahanandabarui ([1948] A.I.R Cal. 320) | Authority cited in support of treating attachment before judgment as distinct from execution attachment. | The Court included it in the list of cases relied upon for the narrower construction (i.e., r.57 not applying to attachment before judgment). |
| Shibnath Singh Ray v. Sheik Saberuddin Ahmed (1928 I.L.R 56 Cal. 416) | Authority consistent with the view that attachment before judgment is different from attachment in execution. | Cited by the Court among the authorities supporting the distinction. |
| Moti Jha v. Jowala Prasad, Marwari (1937 I.L.R 16 Pat. 589) | Authority cited in the same group supporting the minority distinction. | Included by the Court as part of the supporting case law for the distinction. |
| Pallonji Shapurji Mistry v. Edward Vaughan Jordan (1888 I.L.R 12 Bom. 400) | Observation that attachment before judgment enures and becomes attachment in execution (in context of old Code provisions). | The Court noted this observation was made in relation to a specific old-Code provision and treated subsequent reliance on that observation as insufficient to displace the present analysis; the Court questioned the breadth and applicability of that observation. |
| Sewdut Roy v. Sree Canto Maity (1906 I.L.R 33 Cal. 639) | Followed the reasoning in Pallonji's case (that attachment before judgment may enure as attachment in execution). | The Court observed that Sewdut Roy followed the earlier Pallonji observation and treated that line of reasoning as distinguishable and not persuasive for present purposes. |
| Bhugwan Chunder Kritiratm v. Chundra Mala Gupta (1902 I.L.R 29 Cal. 773) | Interpreted language of an old Code section (corresponding to present s.63) so as to include attachment before judgment within expression “attached in execution of a decree”. | The Court expressed doubts about adopting such a forced construction and pointed to practical difficulties that would arise from that approach. |
| Arunachalam Chetty v. Periasami Chetty (1921 I.L.R 44 Mad. 902) | Applied Art. 11 (Limitation Act) to claim petitions where attachment was levied before judgment, using a uniformity argument about limitation periods. | The Court held the foundational reasoning for applying Art. 11 to such cases was unsound for present purposes and therefore declined to treat that as supporting the view that r.57 applies to attachments before judgment. |
| Namdev Krishna v. Gowardhan Nanabhai ([1939] Bom. 420, S.C 41 Bom. L.R 463) | Recognised that a decree for payment may be executed by sale without prior attachment — i.e., sale without attachment is permissible in certain circumstances under present statutory regime. | The Court cited this case to support the proposition that attachment is not an indispensable pre-condition to sale under the current Code and that the view in some earlier authorities (that re-attachment is necessary) is not obligatory. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed the central question first on principle and then by reference to authorities.
- Distinction between Orders: The Court analysed the distinct purposes of Order XXXVIII (attachment before judgment) and Order XXI (attachment in execution). - Order XXXVIII is a self-contained code regulating pre-judgment attachment; it borrows certain procedural provisions from Order XXI only where expressly made applicable. - Order XXI deals with execution proceedings and attachments for enforcement of decrees. The Court emphasised that the two provisions have different objects (safeguarding plaintiff's claim during litigation versus enforcing a decree).
- Textual Reading of r.57: The Court focused on the literal language of Order XXI, r.57 — which applies expressly "where any property has been attached in execution of a decree." The Court held that the words show r.57 is meant for execution attachments; to apply it to attachments before judgment would require omitting or altering those words, which the Court refused to do.
- Procedural Provisions and their Limits: The Court examined related rules (r.54–55 and r.58 of O.XXI; r.8 and r.11 of O.XXXVIII) and concluded that only limited procedural cross-application was intended. For example, O.XXXVIII, r.8 provides for investigation of claims "in the manner provided for" execution investigations, but that is a procedural borrowing, not a substantive assimilation that would turn pre-judgment attachments into execution attachments.
- Legislative Intent and Avoiding Forced Constructions: The Court stressed that if the Legislature intended that attachment before judgment become attachment in execution on passing of decree, it could have said so expressly; the Court would not adopt a forced construction to effect such an outcome. It refused to read Order XXI as applying to attachments before judgment by implication.
- Policy and Equity Considerations: The Court observed that it would be inequitable and anomalous if an attachment, continued for years, could be nullified because of a technical default in an execution application at some later point — particularly where the plaintiff may not be to blame.
- Case-law Analysis: The Court reviewed prior authorities. - It rejected the majority view of the Madras Full Bench in Meyyappa Chettiar (and cases following it) as a forced construction, instead adopting the minority reasoning that r.57 does not apply to attachments before judgment. - It found decisions that had followed the Madras majority (including Ardeshir, Md. Abdulkhadir and K. Kangayya) unpersuasive for the present facts and analysis. - The Court also criticised the reliance on historical limitation-Act reasoning (Arunachalam Chetty) as unsound for present statutory interpretation. - It accepted other authorities (including decisions from Allahabad, Calcutta and Patna High Courts) that had distinguished pre-judgment attachment from execution attachment.
- Statutory Interpretation on Mode of Sale: The Court referred to Section 51 of the Civil Procedure Code and Order XXI provisions to conclude that sales without prior attachment are permissible in some circumstances under the current Code; thus the idea that re-attachment is always necessary for a valid sale is not supported by the present legislative framework (citing Namdev Krishna).
- Application to Facts: Applying these principles, the Court held that Order XXI, r.57 does not operate to vacate an attachment before judgment merely because an execution darkhast was dismissed for default. Accordingly, the later conveyances in favour of defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 (made after attachment) were struck down as being hit by s.64 (as stated in the opinion) and therefore inoperative and void against the purchaser in execution.
- Assessment of Trial Judge's Factual Findings: The Court corrected the trial judge's finding that no attachment had been levied or that it was not proved legal. It relied on documentary orders (orders of attachment and continuation), admissions in the record (agreement to pay instalments and continuation of attachment), and the presumption under s.114 Evidence Act that official acts are properly done. The Court concluded the trial judge erred in finding there was no attachment.
- Adverse Possession Argument: The Court held that defendants deriving title from the judgment-debtor (Daulat) could not be said to have been holding adversely to him; thus, their adverse-possession plea could not defeat the purchaser's rights. Further, even counting from the date of sale to the purchaser, the defendants had not acquired adverse possession for the requisite period.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that Order XXI, rule 57 does not operate in the case of an attachment before judgment; accordingly the attachment continued and conveyances in favour of defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 (which were made after the attachment) are "clearly hit by s. 64" and are inoperative and void as against the purchaser in execution.
Direct Consequences and Orders Made
- The decree of the trial Court is set aside insofar as respondents Nos. 4 to 8 are concerned; the previously filed compromise involving plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 4 and 5 is to stand (a "consent decree" substituted in place of the trial Court's decree in respect of respondents Nos. 4–8).
- As to the remaining defendants, the trial Court's decree is set aside and the defendants are directed to hand over possession of the properties in their possession to the plaintiff.
- Defendants are ordered to pay mesne profits for three years prior to suit and from the date of suit until realisation; mesne profits to be determined under Order XX, rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as directed in the judgment).
- As to costs: no order as to costs for respondents Nos. 4 to 8; however, Defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 are ordered to pay proportionate costs to the plaintiff.
Broader implications: The opinion treats the question as one of statutory interpretation and precedent; the Court did not state that it was creating novel law beyond choosing a particular construction of the Code. The decision clarifies that — on the Court's reading — procedural provisions in Order XXI (including r.57) are not to be read as displacing the separate scheme of Order XXXVIII for attachment before judgment. The direct effect is to uphold the continuing effect of an attachment before judgment despite certain execution darkhast dismissals for default.
Patel, J.:— This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, whose suit for possession, is dismissed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Jalgaon, in respect of property which was purchased in an execution proceeding. A few facts, out of which the appeal arises, need be stated. The father of plaintiffs Nos. 1, 2 and 3 by name one Baliram Narayan Naik and a coparcener of his, filed a suit No. 63 of 1924 in the Court of Jalgaon against one Sakharam alias Dauiat Ramji Patil and Bhika Ganpat Chaudhari for the recovery of their dues on a pro-note. Daulat, was the son of Keshav and was adopted by his uncle Ramji. The family, however, apparently continued as before. On March 24, 1924, the plaintiffs obtained an attachment before judgment and actually levied the attachment. A decree (exh. 227) was passed in that suit on July 9, 1924. By the terms of the decree the attachment before judgment was continued. During the course of years several darkhasts were filed for execution of the decree. The first darkhast No. 830 of 1924 was filed on September 25, 1924. The judgment-debtor paid a sum of Rs. 1,000 and agreed to pay instalments as a result of which the darkhast was disposed of on December 23, 1925. Again by the terms of the order in that, darkhast, the attachment was continued with the consent of the judgment-debtor: consent being given by Dagdu Keshav, his natural brother and cousin by adoption. As no instalments were paid, a second Darkhast No. 230/31 was filed. It appears that the judgment-creditor-had not given particulars of the properties which were sought to be sold and they were, therefore, called upon to furnish the same. They failed to do so, and, therefore, the darkhast, was directed to be disposed of on June 15, 1931. That is exh. 205. The third darkhast, being darkhast No. 778/34, was filed on June 15, 1934, and it was sent to the Collector for execution. The property was ultimately sold on November 27, 1941, and it was purchased by the decree holders. The sale certificate in respect of those properties is at exh. 225. The properties purchased by the creditors were:
Survey No. 117 … 1 acre- 13 Cs. assessed at Rs. 32-0-0 Survey No. 3/1 … 1 acre- 12 Cs. assessed at Rs. 2-8-0 0 acre- 10 Cs. (Kharaba) — Survey No. 86 … 4 acre- 18 Cs. assessed at Rs. 11-15-0 Survey No. 110 … 3 acre- 6 Cs. assessed at Rs. 13-4-0
2. After the purchase of the properties by the creditors, the judgment-debtor Daulat made an application for setting aside the sale under 0. XXI, r. 19, but the application was dismissed for default. The decree-holder then made an application for possession and he was given symbolical possession on April 30, 1943, as some of the defendants claimed to be in possession in their own rights. Survey Nos. 110, 86 and 3/2 were sold by Daulat to Tadav Ganpat Patil father of defendant No. 4 and his brother defendant No. 5, who were his maternal uncles in the natural family. These sales were effected by exhs. 114 and 115 dated June 15, 1923, and August 15, 1923, before attachment. Defendant No. 6 Daji purchased parts of survey No. 117 by three separate deeds being exhs. 105, 106 and 107 dated May 22, 1933, July 16, 1931, and June 22, 1932. Defendant No. 7 is the nephew of defendant No. 6 and is jointly interested in those lands with him. Defendant No. 8 purchased part of survey No. 117 by exh. 207 dated May 31, 1933. All these defendants had raised objections and, therefore, the purchaser got only symbolical possession.
3. The present suit was filed on November 26, 1953, claiming possession from the defendants of these various survey numbers. At the date of the suit (Sakharam) Daulat was already dead. The plaintiffs alleged that the sale in favour of Yadav Patil and Vyankat Mayaram Patti is a sham transaction and was never intended to operate as a sale; that even after the sale Daulat and his brother continued to remain in possession of the property. At the date of sale as Daulat was dead, his daughters Rambhabai, Sunderabai and Shewantibai were made defendants Nos. 1 to 3. He also alleged the same infirmity in the other sales and also contended that these sales having been effected after his attachment before judgment in suit, they were not binding on him and he was entitled to claim possession of the property. Defendant No. 9 is the son of Dagdu, whose father Keshav, was the brother of Daulat. Defendants Nos. 10, 11 and 12 are alleged to be the tenants. The defendants hotly contested the suit. Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 contended that Daulat had alienated the properties in favour of the various purchasers and they had no connection with those properties and did not claim any interest in them. Defendant Nos. 4 and 5 contended that their sale was of a date prior to the date of attachment before judgment; that it was a genuine sale and that from the date of the sale they were continuously in possession of the properties and, therefore, as against them the plaintiff was not entitled to succeed. They also challenged the attachment itself as not having been effected. Defendants Nos. 6 and 7 made-the same contentions and also contended that even in their case the attachment was not effective to affect their interest. It was contended that Darkhast No. 230 of January 31, 1931, having been disposed of on June 15, 1931, for default of the decree-holder, O. XXI, r. 57, applied and the attachment, therefore, ceased. That being so, on the date on which they made the purchase, no attachment was in existence and, therefore, their title was not affected. It was also contended by all the defendants that they were holding possession of their respective properties sold to them for more than 32 years as owners adversely to Daulat and therefore, they were protected by their adverse possession as against the plaintiffs also.
4. The learned Judge accepted all the contentions of the defendants except some technical contentions, which no longer now survive. It is this judgment that is sought to be challenged in this appeal. After the appeal was heard on merits the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 4 and 5th i.e respondents Nos. 4 to 8, compromised. The terms of the compromise have been filed before us. It is, therefore, not necessary to deal with all the contentions raised in the appeal.
5. The only questions that survive now are those in relation to defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8. Substantially their contention is that inasmuch as the darkhast No. 230 of 1931 was disposed of on June 15, 1931, because the plaintiff failed to do what he was asked to do by the Court, the attachment before judgment came to an end and if it came to an end, plaintiff's title is subservient to their own. Reliance was placed for this purpose on the decisions reported in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar . 1923 I.L.R 47 Mad. 483, F.B, Ardeshir v. Usman Gani . 1929 31 Bom. L.R 1101., Hari v. Srinivas . 1931 33 Bom. L.R 1130., Md. Abdulkhadir v. Padmanabha . [1952] A.I.R T.C 414, F.B and K. Kangayya v. J. Reddeyya . [1960] A.I.R A.P 634.. On the other hand, Mr. Kotwal seeks to differentiate an attachment before judgment from an attachment in execution and contends that r. 57 has no application to such a case. He has, in this connection, placed reliance on the minority judgment in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar, Abdul Hamid v. Musammat Asqhari Begam . [1953] All. 654, F.b, Bohra A. khey Ram v. Basant Lal . 1924 I.L.R 46 All. 894., Ayezali Mir v. Mahanandabarui . [1948] A.I.R Cal. 320., Shibnath Singh Ray v. Sheik Saberuddin Ahmed . 1928 I.L.R 56 Cal. 416. and Moti Jha v. Jowala Prasad, Marwari . 1937 I.L.R 16 Pat. 589. The question is which of these rival contentions is the correct one.
6. It is desirable to consider the question on first principles apart from authorities in the first instance. Order XXI relates to execution proceedings in which provision is made for attachment of property during process of execution for realisation of the decree. Order XXXVIII makes provision for attachment of the property of a defendant during the pendency of a suit for the safeguarding of the interest of the plaintiff in respect of his money claim. The essential purpose and the ambit of both these provisions seem to be slightly different though in law the effect is almost the same. In the case of an attachment before judgment, the purpose is to safeguard the plaintiff against the disposal of property and to see that the plaintiff's decree is satisfactorily discharged. It is for this reason that two alternatives are provided (1) that of security and (2) on failure to furnish security, attachment of property. So far as 0. XXI is concerned, its essential purpose is to see that the process of the Court is not defeated once execution starts and no other. Separate provisions have been made in the Civil Procedure Code for attachment before judgment and attachment in execution proceedings. Provisions of 0. XXXVIII clearly show that it is a self-contained and a complete provision by itself and it is only in certain procedural respects that the provisions of 0. XXI in relation to attachment are made applicable to attachment before judgment. In other respects as shown by rr. 7, 9 and 12 of O. XXXVIII, there is material difference. If security had been furnished, it could not have been urged that it came to an end on the dismissal of the darkhast.
7. Now, by its terms 0. XXI, r. 57 applies to cases “where any property has been attached in execution of a decree”. Rule 57 occurs in 0. XXI along with several other provisions dealing with attachment in execution proceedings. Rule 54 deals with attachment of immoveable property. Rule 55 provides that where the conditions specified therein are satisfied, the attachment shall be deemed to be withdrawn and in case of immoveable property the withdrawal shall be proclaimed if the judgment-debtor so desires. The circumstances under which attachment levied has to be withdrawn are:
1. that the amount decreed with costs and all charges and expenses resulting from the attachment are paid in Court, or
2. that, the decree is satisfied otherwise through the Court, or
3. that the decree is set aside or reversed.
8. It is for that reason that r. 57 provides that if the Darkhast or the application for execution is dismissed for default of the decree-holder, then the attachment made in execution of decree ceases. Sub-rule (1) of r. 58 provides for investigation of claims to, and objections to attachment of, any property in execution of a decree. The very language would suggest that in a case where property is attached before judgment, it has no application. If by its own force the rule has to be applied, the words “in execution of the decree” must be omitted for which there is no justification. The words are used to make it abundantly clear that the rules are dealing with execution proceedings. As pointed out, difficulty also would be created in interpreting r. 58. The intention of the Legislature must be ascertained as expressed by the language used, or by the clearest implication in the language. Even if a certain effect was intended by the Legislature but it is not effectually expressed, then the Court is not entitled to alter the language of the section in order to fit in with the supposed intention of the Legislature. It is not possible, therefore, on the language, of 0. XXI to come to the conclusion that; in the circumstances of such a case attachment ceases. Order XXXVIII, which is again a self-contained Order, clearly provides by r. 8 for investigation of claim to property attached before judgment. It states that such claim shall be investigated in the manner provided for investigation of claims to property attached in execution of a decree for the payment of money. This rule only provides that the procedure for both the purposes must be the same. As there was a conflict at one time as to whether fresh attachment was necessary for the purpose of execution where an attachment before judgment was already taken out by the plaintiff, r. 11 provided that in such a case it was not necessary to apply for reattachment of the property. It is argued that this rule in effect makes attachment before judgment the same as an attachment in execution of a decree. But this argument, however, cannot be accepted. On the contrary, it clearly emphasises the distinction between the two and it is only because of the difference which existed between the two that it became necessary for the Legislature to provide that re-attachment was not necessary. If the Legislature intended that both should be the same and an attachment before judgment could be deemed to be an attachment in execution proceedings, the Legislature could easily have provided that an attachment before judgment would be deemed to be attachment in execution at least after a decree is made. It a best creates an exception to the ordinary rule that attachment is necessary for effecting a sale in execution for if an attachment is operative as it is intended to be until the decree is satisfied, then there would not be any necessity for protecting the property by re-attachment.
9. There are no overwhelming reasons either of equity or justice why we should adopt a forced construction either of r. 57, O. XXI or r. 11, 0. XXXVIII in order to hold that an attachment before judgment must be vacated merely because in execution proceedings the deeree-holder made some default. As pointed out by the learned Chief Justice in Meyyppa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar it may be due to several factors and it may be that a decree-holder may not be the person to be blamed. It has not been contended and there is no authority for the proposition that if the decree-holder, who has obtained attachment before judgment, sits quiet upto the last day of the three years provided for execution of the decree then the attachment suffers in any respect. It would be strange that if such a decree-holder made an application for execution of the decree next day after it) was passed but because of some exigency his application came to be dismissed, then the attachment ceases. We are in complete agreement with the reasons given in the minority judgment of the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Wallace in the above case for holding that r. 57 does not come into operation in the case of an attachment before judgment.
10. Coming to the case law, the most important case in favour of Mr. Gupte's contention is the majority view taken in the case of Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar. Mr. Justice Coutts Trotter, while agreeing with the other learned Judges, who were in favour of holding otherwise, expressed his disagreement with the view that mere passing of a decree converts an attachment before judgment into an attachment in execution. Mr. Justice Ramesam while dealing with 0. XXI r. 11 says (p. 504);
“…Sale without attachment is permissible only in a decree for sale. Therefore, in a decree for money, there must be an attachment in execution preceding the sale.”
11. He then poses the question: “Where is the attachment in execution preceding the sale as required by Order 21 rule 11 in a case where there has been an attachment before judgment and no re-attachment?” The foundation of the decision is the reasoning that for a valid sale attachment is necessary. It seems to us that this view cannot be supported under the present Civil Procedure-Code. Section 51 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that subject to such conditions, and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may order the execution of a decree by attachment and sale or sale without attachment of the property. It is true that 0. XXI prescribes the mode of executing the decree. But even 0., XXI, r. 11, recognises that sale may take place without attachment of property. By r. 30 it is provided that a decree for payment may be executed by detention or attachment and sale of property or by both. Yet the rules do not make attachment of property a condition of the exercise of jurisdiction to sell conferred by law. This view was taken in Namdev Krishna v. Gowardhan Nanabhai . [1939] Bom. 420, S.C 41 Bom. L.R 463.. Even if we are wrong in this view, in view of 0. XXXVIII, r. 11, the case of attachment before judgment can only be treated as an exception to the ordinary rule.
12. Mr. Justice Ramesam relied upon cases which held that an attachment before judgment becomes an attachment in execution. These are Pallonji Shapurji Mistry v. Edward Vaughan Jordan . 1888 I.L.R, 12 Bom. 400., Sewdut Boy v. Sree Canto Maity . 1906 I.L.R 33 Cal. 639. and Bhugwan Chunder Kritiratm v. Chundra Mala Gupta . 1902 I.L.R 29 Cal. 773.
13. In the first case, Pallonji Shapurji Mistry v. Edward Vaughan Jordan, the learned Judge was dealing with the question as to whether an application was necessary before a decree-holder became entitled to rateable distribution in a case where attachment was levied before judgment, and was concerned with s. 490 of the old Code which was in the same terms as r. 11 of 0. XXXVIII. The other provisions of the Code were not considered. The learned Judge made an observation that the only effect of s. 490 was that it did not require re-attachment of the property and added that the attachment before judgment enures and becomes an attachment in execution. It is this observation that has been followed in subsequent cases.
14. In Sewdut Roy v. Sree Canto Maity Mr. Justice Woodroffe also sitting as a single Judge followed the judgment of Mr. Justice Scott where the question that arose was similar to the one in Pallonji's case. In Bhugwan Chunder Kritiratna v. Chundra, Mala Gupta the question arose with reference to s. 285 of the old Code, a section corresponding to s. 63 of the present Code. It prescribes the Court which has to determine any claim to the attached property-and the objections to the attachment thereof, and the words “under attachment in execution of a decree” were construed to include attachment before judgment also. There seems to be some difficulty in the application of the section to a case where an attachment is levied by a Court in respect of property situate outside its jurisdiction, which it is entitled to do under the Code, since it is only the Court, which has issued the order, that can be requested to withdraw that order. It might also create difficulties in cases where different attachments are levied by different Courts in respect of properties in the jurisdiction of neither of the Courts. All these difficulties could be obviated if this forced construction of s. 63 or 0. XXXVIII, r. 11, is not adopted. We doubt very much the advisability of such a construction. Some Courts have taken the view that attachment before judgment can become attachment in execution when an order of sale is made. What is to happen at the earlier stage in such cases is difficult to imagine.
15. The second reason for the majority view is that the Court applied in Aruna chalam Chetty v. Periasami Servei . 1921 I.L.R 44 mad. 902, f.b art. 11 of the limitation act to a suit challenging an order in a claim petition when attachment was levied before judgment. In that case the main consideration for applying art. 11 was that in the Code of 1859 same period of limitation applied to a suit to challenge orders in claim petitions in cases where attachment was levied in execution proceedings and in cases where attachment was levied before judgment and that (p. 908):
“…this did not cease to be any the less a cardinal and most essential feature of this procedure, when in the supposed interest of uniformity the period of one year was omitted from the Code and transferred to the Limitation Act of 1871.”
16. It, was also not disputed in that case that the period of one year continued to be prescribed by the Limitation Acts of 1871 and 1877 and, therefore, it was said that it was unlikely that the Legislature could consciously intend to lay down the longer period under art. 120 (p. 908):
“…seeing that the effect of the alteration is to defeat what has always been the essential feature of this procedure, the speedy settlement of titles”.
17. It seems to us that the basis of the reasoning is not justified. By the Limitation Act of 1871 the last twelve words of s. 246 of the Code of 1859 were deleted. But no period of limitation was provided. By art. 14 one year's period was provided for setting aside only sales in execution. Article 15 could not apply in that the proceedings in execution would still be proceedings in a suit. It seems that by not providing any period of limitation for setting aside orders in claim petitions, s. 246 was brought into uniformity with s. 247. In 1877 both Codes were re-cast. The Civil Procedure Code was divided into several Chapters one dealing with execution, viz. Chapter 1, 9, and that dealing with attachment before judgment, viz. Chapter 34. Claims in execution were dealt with by ss. 278 to 282. Section 283 made the order final subject to the result of a suit. Section 487, which concerned with investigation of claims provided that the same procedure was to be followed as in the case of attachment in execution. It did not provide any finality to the order so passed. It seems, it is for this reason that in the limitation act of 1877 one year's period was provided for suits only in respect of orders under ss. 280, 281, 282 or 335 of the Code. The underlying assumption, therefore, in Arunachalam Chetty v. Pariasami Chetty was not justified. It is indeed true that we are not concerned with the construction of art. 11. It has become incidentally necessary to refer to this position to point out that the main reason by which the learned members of the Full Bench were impressed for holding that art. 11 applied even to a case of attachment before judgment does not exist. It is not necessary to consider Md. Abdulkhadir v. Padmanabha and K. Kangayya v. J. Reddeya since they followed the Madras Full Bench case.
18. We need now deal with only two more cases decided by this Court. In the case of Ardeshir v. Usman Gani Mr. Justice Madgavkar followed the Full Bench decision in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar, disagreed with the Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts and previous decisions of the Madras High Court in the other cases, observed that he preferred the wide construction adopted by the majority of the learned Judges in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram, Chettiar. With respect, that construction is a forced construction for which there is no justification. It also does not appear to us that it is a case of preference of the wider construction over the narrower. If security had been furnished by the defendant, it could not have come to an end merely because the darkhast was dismissed and we do not see any reason why attachment should cease when it is intended to take the place of security when the defendant is recalcitrant and does not furnish security. We agree, with respect, with the natural and ordinary construction placed by the learned Judges in the minority view in Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar and in other cases which accept that view.
19. The decision in Hari v. Shrinivas is the decision of a Division Bench to which again Mr. Justice Madgavkar was a party. In that case the question, under review did not specifically arise. The real question was as to whether the attachment ceased even in respect of those properties for sale of which, no darkhast was filed, and in the view taken by the Court Mr. Justice Madgavkar said: (p. 1138):
“…Strictly speaking, it is not necessary for us to consider the first aspect of the case.”
20. The observations, therefore, adopting the majority view in the Full Bench case of Meyyappa Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chettiar must be regarded as obiter.
21. In the result it must be held that in the case of an attachment before judgment 0. XXI, r. 57, does not operate and the attachment still continues. If this is so, the conveyances in favour of defendants Nos. 6 and 7 and defendant No. 8 are clearly hit by s. 64 and they are inoperative and void against the purchaser.
22. Mr. Gupte invited our attention to the finding made by the learned trial Judge wherein he says that attachment was not in fact levied and if it was levied it was not proved to have been legal. With all respect to the learned Judge, we find it very difficult to appreciate his reasoning for this conclusion. It must be remembered that the attachment was levied as early as in 1924 and the first, suit that could possibly have been filed could no have been earlier than in 1944 when the purchaser received possession of the property. The record by that time was bound to have been destroyed. The decree holder producted the intimation of the Court that the record was not available and was destroyed. The documents produced were an order of attachment and the order which continued the attachment. The provisions of s. 114 of the Evidence Act enable the Court to raise a presumption that official work is properly and legally done in the course of business as required by law. The fact that attachment was made has also been admitted when the judgment debtor agreed to pay instalments and the attachment was continued. It is no doubt true that the document at exh. 219 is signed by Dagdu Keshav as ‘Khud’ but that does not mean that the judgment debtor had not authorised him to sign the document. The learned trial Judge has not even noted the fact that Daulat and Keshav, the father of Dagdu, were true brothers and that Daulat was adopted by his own uncle. Normally, therefore, unless it was shown by any one that Dadgu and Daulat were separated members, the ordinary presumption would be that they were members of a joint family and the remark of the learned Judge, therefore, that Dagdu was a stranger and that there could be no consent on behalf of Daulat cannot be accepted. These statements both in the decree and in a subsequent application clearly must enable the Court to raise the presumption that attachment was levied and properly levied. The plaintiff gave evidence to that effect, and so far as we are able to see, there is no cross-examination on that matter. It is clear, therefore, that the learned trial Judge was in error in holding that there was in fact no attachment of the property.
23. The learned advocate has also contended that his clients were holding adversely to the judgment-debtor and also to the plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to succeed. Now, it must be remembered that the title of these defendants was derived from Daulat. There can be no question, therefore, of their holding adversely to Daulat in the sense in which that expression is understood in law. The decree and the execution proceedings were-binding on the judgment-debtor, and inasmuch as the defendants claimed their title by virtue of a sale-deed after the properties were attached, it cannot be said that they were holding adversely to the purchaser. The right of the purchaser for recovering possession came into existence for the first time when; he purchased the property and got symbolical possession. Even counting from the date of the sale, it cannot be said that the defendants were in adverse possession for the requisite period. There is, therefore, no substance in this contention also. In the result the decree of the learned trial Judge will be set aside so far as respondents Nos. 4 to 8 are concerned. The consent decree will be substituted in place of the trial Court's decree. So far as the rest of the defendants are concerned, the decree of the trial Court is set aside and it is directed that defendants do hand over possession of the properties in their possession to the plaintiff. Defendants also to pay mesne profits for a period of three years before suit] and from the date of suit till realisation. Mesne profits to be determined under 0. XX, r. 12, of the Code of Civil Procedure. So far as respondents Nos. 4 to 8 are concerned, there will be no order as to costs. Defendants Nos. 6, 7 and 8 will pay proportionate costs to the plaintiff.
24. Order accordingly.
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