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Singh Trading Company v. Commercial Tax Officer, Srikakulam

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Mar 1, 1979
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

All 14 matters (a mix of writ petitions and tax revision cases) raise the same question: whether cashew kernel is exigible to sales tax at the point of first purchase in the State when the cashewnut from which it has been taken out had already been taxed under item 12 of the Second Schedule to the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957.

The undisputed facts in each case are: the petitioners are dealers in cashew kernel; they purchased kernel from dealers who had earlier purchased cashewnut, extracted the kernel, and paid sales tax as first purchasers in the State. The assessment year in all matters is 1974-75. The tax authorities issued demands requiring the petitioners to pay tax on their purchases of cashew kernel. The petitioners resisted on the ground that the cashewnut had already been taxed. Assessing authorities and, in some cases, the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal rejected the petitioners' contentions, leading to the present writ petitions and tax revision proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether cashew kernel is exigible to sales tax at the point of first purchase in the State when the cashewnut from which it was taken has already been taxed under item 12 of the Second Schedule to the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957.
  2. Whether the words "cashewnut" and "kernel" in item 12 denote distinct and separately taxable commodities (i.e., whether they are different commodities for taxation purposes) and, relatedly, whether the conjunctive "and" between them should be construed disjunctively (as "or") or as an exhaustive adjunctive enumeration.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Cashewnut and kernel are not two different commodities but, in substance, constitute one commodity (argument by Sri M. Suryanarayana Murthy).
  • Cashewnut includes and contains kernel; if cashewnut has been taxed, the kernel (being contained in it) cannot be separately taxed.
  • If more than one interpretation of an entry in taxation law is possible, the Court should adopt the interpretation favourable to the assessee (taxpayer).
  • Supplementary construction argument: the word "and" between "cashewnut" and "kernel" should be read as "or" (i.e., disjunctively), so that taxation at one form excludes the other.
  • Sri D. Venkatappayya Sastry added that the use of "and", even if adjunctive, may be intended simply to avoid ambiguity and provide exhaustive enumeration; after the 1974 amendment, taxation was intended to be at a single point and the dual wording was to remove ambiguity.

Revenue / Respondent's Arguments

  • The assessing authorities and the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal held that kernel is a different commodity from cashewnut and that both are liable to be taxed at the point of their respective first purchases in the State. This position was pressed before the Court by the learned Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes.
  • The revenue relied on earlier Supreme Court observations (including State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory and Hajee Abdul Shukoor & Co. v. State of Madras) suggesting that, after certain processing, the raw cashewnut and the edible kernel may be treated as commercially different commodities.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Deputy Commissioner (Sales Tax) v. Akbar Alikhan & Abdul Ruheem & Co. [1971] 27 S.T.C. 167 (Madras) Authority for accepting the meaning of a commodity in common parlance and commercial usage in construing taxing statutes. The Court relied on this decision to support the view that the ordinary/commercial meaning of "cashewnut" (as understood to mean the kernel) should be accepted in construing item 12.
Mangulu Sahu Ramahari Sahu v. Sales Tax Officer, Ganjam [1973] 32 S.T.C. 494 (S.C.) Establishes that the common parlance meaning controls (example: chillies and lemons being vegetables in common parlance). The Court invoked this Supreme Court authority to reinforce that common and commercial parlance should inform the meaning of "cashewnut" and "kernel".
Krishna Coconut Co. v. East Godavari Coconut & Tobacco Market Committee, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 973 Shows that the word "and" can, in some contexts, be construed as "or". The Court noted this principle but observed that in the Second Schedule items conjunctive/disjunctive words have been used indiscriminately and that "and" need not always be read disjunctively; hence the authority does not compel a disjunctive reading here.
Ishwar Singh v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1450 Also supports that "and" can be understood as "or" in appropriate contexts. The Court acknowledged the rule but emphasized that the legislative usage of "and" across items shows varied intent, so this precedent did not mandate treating "and" as disjunctive in item 12.
Baliah Setty v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1962] 13 S.T.C. 726 Determined that butter and ghee are different commodities because of physical/chemical change and popular concept. The Court relied on this decision to illustrate that "and" can indicate distinct commodities in some items, but used the comparison (e.g., item 7 palmyrah fibre and stalks) to show that "and" is not always exclusively conjunctive and depends on context.
State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory [1953] 4 S.T.C. 205 (S.C.) Incidental observation that raw cashewnuts and kernels manufactured from them were not commercially the same commodity (in context of Article 286(1)(b)). The Court observed that the Supreme Court's remark was incidental to a different principal issue (scope of Article 286(1)(b)) and not a definitive ruling on the commercial identity of cashewnut and kernel for present purposes; therefore it did not detract from the Court's conclusion.
Hajee Abdul Shukoor & Co. v. State of Madras [1964] 15 S.T.C. 719 (S.C.) Reference to conversion of raw materials into a commercially different commodity after certain processing (used by revenue). The Court noted the revenue's reliance on this case but treated the reference as not decisive for the present question; it was characterized as supportive of the revenue's position but not binding for the interpretation of item 12 here.
Motilal Hariprasad & Brothers v. State of Andhra [1955] 6 S.T.C. 654 Held that "groundnut" included kernel; the comprehensive term takes in shell and kernel. Used by the Court as supporting authority that a comprehensive commodity word may include its kernel/inner part; this analogy supported treating "cashewnut" as encompassing kernel.
Swasti Cashew Industries (P.) Ltd. v. State of Kerala [1961] 12 S.T.C. 691 Held that the word "cashew" includes "cashew kernel". The Court cited this decision to support the view that cashew (and by analogy cashewnut) includes kernel and thus the legislative intention could be to treat them as one commodity.
Motilal Hari Prasad & Bros. v. State of Andhra [1959] 10 S.T.C. 20 Another authority that "groundnut" takes in "groundnut kernel". The Court relied on this and a related decision (Berar Oil Industries) to show consistent judicial treatment where kernels are included in the generic term.
Berar Oil Industries v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [1959] 10 S.T.C. 199 Supports interpretation that "groundnut" includes its kernel for taxation purposes. The Court referred to this line of authority to bolster the proposition that kernels are often treated as part of the generic commodity term.
K. Seshagiri Pai & Co. v. Deputy Commissioner of South Kanara [1961] 12 S.T.C. 629 Held that coconut (from which oil can be extracted) qualifies as an "oil-seed" under the Central Sales Tax Act. The Court invoked this decision to demonstrate acceptance of a broad, ordinary understanding of a commodity where processing for use does not alter its classification.
State of Madras v. Saravana Pillai [1956] 7 S.T.C. 541 Held that produce subjected only to minimal processing necessary for sale retains its original character (horticultural produce in that case). The Court applied the reasoning analogously: cashew kernel is produced by processing necessary to make the cashewnut usable and therefore retains the character of the original commodity.
Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Kurnool [1960] 11 S.T.C. 827 (S.C.) Held hydrogenated oil continues to be "groundnut oil" despite processing that stabilizes it. The Court used this Supreme Court view to support the proposition that processing for usability does not necessarily change commodity identity; applied analogously to cashewnut/kernel.
Alladi Venkateswarlu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [1978] 41 S.T.C. 394 (S.C.) Held puffed and parched rice remain rice despite processing. The Court cited this recent Supreme Court decision to show consistent judicial approach that processing does not always change the essential character of a commodity; used as supporting authority for treating kernel and cashewnut as same commodity.
Controller of Estate Duty v. R. Kanakasabai [1973] 89 I.T.R. 251 at 257 (S.C.) Rule of construction: if a taxing provision is ambiguous and reasonably capable of more than one interpretation, adopt the interpretation beneficial to the subject (assessee). The Court invoked this settled principle to justify adopting the taxpayer-favourable construction—i.e., treating item 12 as dealing with cashewnut whether in nut or kernel form—if any ambiguity existed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a series of linked steps, each grounded in statutory text, context and cited authorities:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court examined Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. It explained that Sub-section (1) imposes a general turnover tax and does not by itself exclude possibility of multi-point taxation. Sub-section (2) introduces single-point taxation for some goods: Clause (a) prescribes single-point taxation at the point of sale for goods in the First Schedule; Clause (b) prescribes single-point taxation at the point of first purchase in the State for goods in the Second Schedule (which includes cashewnut and kernel in item 12). The proviso to Section 5(4) prevents both buyer and seller being taxed for same transaction and prevents re-taxation of a dealer who has been taxed on purchase when he sells the same goods.
  2. Effect of the 1974 amendment: Item 12 (cashewnut and kernel) was inserted into the Second Schedule by the 1974 Amendment (effective 1 March 1974). The Court noted the legislative purpose to levy tax only at point of first purchase in the State on items in the Second Schedule — i.e., single-point taxation at purchase for these listed goods.
  3. Legislative history and context: The Court referred to the National Council of Applied Economic Research report (June 1971) recommending transfer of some items to single-point taxation (including "cashew and its kernel"). The Court used this only as background for why the legislature included the entry, not as an interpretive aid to change ordinary meaning.
  4. Ordinary/commercial meaning: The Court emphasized the role of common and commercial parlance in interpreting taxing entries where terms are not defined in the statute. It concluded that, in commercial practice, "cashewnut" is commonly understood to mean the edible kernel; vendors sell kernel when buyers ask for "cashewnut". Therefore, the words "cashewnut" and "kernel" in item 12 were not used to denote distinct commodities but to remove ambiguity and indicate the same commodity in different forms.
  5. Construction of "and": The Court acknowledged authorities that "and" can sometimes be read as "or", but observed the legislature's inconsistent use of "and"/"or" across Second Schedule items. It compared items (e.g., palmyrah fibre and stalks) to show that where one term is a piece taken out of the other, the conjunctive may be used to achieve exhaustive enumeration rather than to denote two distinct taxable commodities. Thus, the mere presence of "and" in item 12 did not mandate treating cashewnut and kernel as separately taxable.
  6. Treatment of earlier Supreme Court incidental observations: The Court considered revenue reliance on Supreme Court observations in the Travancore-Cochin cashewnut case and Hajee Abdul Shukoor case, noting that in those cases the observations about cashewnut/kernel difference were incidental to other primary issues (e.g., Article 286(1)(b) or comparison with tanned hides). The Court held that those incidental observations did not override the textual and contextual analysis here.
  7. Supporting precedents: The Court surveyed multiple High Court and Supreme Court decisions holding that generic commodity terms (e.g., "groundnut", "cashew") include their kernels or that minimal processing does not change the essential character of goods (e.g., State of Madras v. Saravana Pillai; Tungabhadra; Alladi Venkateswarlu). These authorities reinforced the Court's conclusion that removing the shell to obtain kernel is a processing step that does not create a distinct taxable commodity for the purpose of item 12.
  8. Rule of construing taxing statutes: The Court invoked the settled principle (Controller of Estate Duty v. R. Kanakasabai) that if a taxing provision is ambiguous and reasonably capable of more than one interpretation, the construction beneficial to the assessee should be adopted. Applying this rule, and finding the construction that treats "cashewnut" and kernel as the same to be reasonable and favourable, the Court preferred that interpretation.
  9. Conclusion of analysis: On the statutory text (Single-point taxation at first purchase for goods in Second Schedule), ordinary commercial meaning, the pattern of legislative usage of conjunctions in the schedule, supporting authorities on minimal processing and commodity identity, and the taxpayer-favouring rule of interpretation, the Court concluded that cashewnut and cashew kernel are essentially the same commodity for the purposes of item 12 and that kernel cannot be taxed independently where the cashewnut has already been taxed as first purchase in the State.

Holding and Implications

Holding (Core Ruling): The tax revision cases and the writ petitions are allowed. Specifically, the Court held that cashew kernel cannot be independently taxed under item 12 of the Second Schedule when the cashewnut from which it was taken out has already been subjected to tax at the point of first purchase in the State.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The demands for tax on the petitioners' purchases of cashew kernel (where the cashewnut had already been taxed as first purchase) are set aside for the matters before the Court; the petitioners prevailing in these proceedings are relieved of the additional tax liability claimed on kernel purchases for the assessment year in question.
  • Costs and fees: The Court directed that parties bear their own costs and fixed a consolidated Advocate fee of Rs. 750.
  • Precedential effect: The opinion applies its statutory interpretation and cited authorities to reach a construction favourable to the assessee. The opinion does not purport to state that a new, broad precedent beyond these interpretive conclusions has been established; the immediate consequence is the relief granted to the petitioners in these matters.

This summary has been prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No information not contained in the opinion has been added.

Show all summary ...

1. Is cashew kernel exigible to sales tax at the point of first purchase in the State when the "cashewnut" from which it has been taken out had already been subject to tax under item 12 of the Second Schedule to the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1957 ? This is the question which is uniformly posed in all these 14 cases, both writ petitions as well as tax revision cases.

2. Fortunately, there is no dispute in regard to the facts in any one of these matters. All the petitioners are dealers in cashew kernel. They purchased the kernel from dealers who had purchased the "cashewnut" and brought out the kernel from it and who had also paid sales tax on the "cashewnut" purchases since they were the first purchasers in the State. The assessment year is 1974-75 in all these cases. There is now a demand on all these dealers that they should pay tax on their purchases of cashew kernel also. This was resisted by them on the ground that the "cashewnut" had already suffered taxation but the assessing authorities did not agree with them. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal also, when some of the cases were taken to it, declined to accede to the contention of the petitioners. That is how these writ petitions and tax revision cases have arisen.

3. The Tribunal and the sales tax authorities held the view that kernel is a different commodity from "cashewnut" and that both of them are liable to be taxed at the point of their first purchases in the State. Indeed, that is the point of view urged before us also by the learned Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes. Learned Counsel for the petitioners, on the other hand, vigorously argued that "cashewnut" and kernel are not different commodities and that, in fact, in common and commercial parlance, no distinction is made between the two. Therefore, the principal question that will have to be decided is whether "cashewnut" and kernel mentioned in item 12 of the Second Schedule are different commodities and are separately taxable.

4. Sri M. Suryanarayana Murthy, one of the petitioners' Learned Counsel, raised the three following contentions: (1) Cashewnut and kernel are not two different commodities but, in substance, are one commodity. (2) Cashewnut includes and contains kernel and, when the former has been taxed, the latter cannot be separately taxed. (3) In any case, when two views on the meaning of an entry in taxation law is possible, the courts should adopt that view which is favourable to the assessee. It is immediately seen that the first two points overlap each other. A supplementary argument based on construction was also raised by Sri Suryanarayana Murthy suggesting that the word "and" occurring between "cashewnut" and kernel should be construed as "or" and, therefore, if one is taxed, the other escapes taxation.

5. This argument was put before us somewhat differently by Sri D. Venkatappayya Sastry, another Learned Counsel for the petitioners, that the use of the word "and", even if it is construed as an adjunctive, is not conclusive and, it is used only to avoid ambiguity and to ensure exhaustive enumeration of the goods belonging to the category of ""cashewnut"s". Sri Dasaratharama Reddi, also appearing for some of the petitioners, reinforced the aforesaid arguments by pointing out that after the 1974 amendment, taxation was intended to be levied on "cashewnut"s at a single point and that both "cashewnut"s and kernel are used in item 12 to remove ambiguity.

6. In the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, the charging provision is Section 5. As Sub-section (1) stands now, if a dealer's turnover is not less than Rs. 25,000, he is required to pay a tax on his total turnover at the rate of four paise in a rupee. It is patent that Sub-section (1) does not exclude the possibility of taxation on the same goods at more than one point. In order to introduce a single point taxation on certain goods, Sub-section (2) has been made. According to Clause (a) thereof, despite the provision in Sub-section (1), tax shall be levied on the goods mentioned in the First Schedule at the rates and only at the point of sale specified as applicable thereto, effected in the State by the dealer selling them, on his turnover of sales in each year relating to such goods irrespective of the quantum of turnover. To put it in other words, this part of Sub-section (2) avoids double taxation on the goods mentioned in the First Schedule and prescribes rates of tax leviable at the point of sale effected in the State as specified in that schedule. Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) refers to goods in the Second Schedule and lays down that tax shall be levied on them at the rates and only at the point of purchase specified as applicable thereto, effected in the State by the dealer purchasing them. Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) deals with goods mentioned in the Fifth Schedule. Third Schedule contains the declared goods in respect of which a single point tax only is leviable under Section 6. These are the goods which are declared as goods of general importance under Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. Fourth Schedule contains goods exempted from tax under Section 8. The proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 5 says that in respect of the same transaction, the buyer or the seller, but not both, as determined by such rules as may be prescribed, shall be taxed. The second part of the same proviso lays an embargo against imposition of tax on any dealer who has been taxed in respect of the purchase of any goods when he sells the same goods.

7. Cashewnut and kernel occur in the Second Schedule and they are placed in item 12. Item 12 did not exist in the Second Schedule till 1974. By virtue of Section 14 of the A.P. General Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1974 (Act 5 of 1974), an amendment to the Second Schedule was effected with effect from 1st March, 1974, whereunder items 11 to 18 were added. Item 12 then introduced reads thus:

8. Read in the light of Clause (b) of Section 5(2) ""cashewnut" and kernel" are taxable only at the point of first purchase in the State. In contradistinction to a general sales tax levied under Section 5(1) on the total turnover, Sub-section (2) insists on single point taxation. While clause (a) of sub-section (2) fixes that single point as point of sale in regard to goods in the First Schedule, Clause (b) limits taxation only at the point of first purchase in the State on goods mention-ed in the Second Schedule.

9. This single point taxation on some of the goods was recommended by the National Council of Applied Economic Research in their report on "Review of Sales Tax in Andhra Pradesh" of June, 1971. In the Report, the committee examined the commodities then taxed under multi-point to see which, among them, were amenable to be taxed under single point in accordance with the criteria which they had laid down. After such review, they listed as many as 63 items recommending their transfer from multi-point to single point. The 57th item of the list is "cashew and its kernel". Accepting some of those recommendations, the 1974 amendment was brought about. We have referred to this circumstance only to give the historical background for including ""cashewnut" and kernel" in the Second Schedule and not as an aid to the construction of the item. The fact however remains that by including ""cashewnut" and kernel" in the Second Schedule, the legislature decided to levy tax only at the point of first purchase in the State on "cashewnut" and kernel.

10. Under item 12 of the Second Schedule "cashewnut" and kernel are taxable only at the point of first purchase in the State. The intention of the legislature is therefore discernible that "cashewnut" and kernel should be taxed on their first purchase in the State. It is difficult to think that the legislature wanted to tax both the first purchases of "cashewnut" and kernel taken out of the "cashewnut" which had already been subjected to tax. The intention of the legislature appears to be not to make any distinction between "cashewnut" and kernel and to make the first purchase point of that commodity in the State taxable, whether it was in the form of "cashewnut" or kernel. This understanding of the item is strengthened by the ordinary and commercial name given to the commodity in day to day life. The popular meaning of ""cashewnut"", as it is understood in the commercial world, is generally its kernel. When a purchaser goes to a market and asks for "cashewnut", he means its kernel and, in fact, the vendor gives him kernel when he asks for "cashewnut". Cashewnut and kernel are not separately defined in the Act or in the schedule. Particularly, in a taxing statute, the meaning given to a commodity in common parlance and commercial field should be accepted. If authority is needed for this proposition, vide the Madras decision in Deputy Commissioner (Sales Tax) v. Akbar Alikhan and Abdul Ruheem & Co [1971] 27 S.T.C. 167 and the Supreme Court's decision in Mangulu Sahu Ramahari Sahu v. Sales Tax Officer, Ganjam. [1973] 32 S.T.C. 494 (S.C.). In the latter case, the question arose whether chillies and lemons are vegetables. The Supreme Court held that, going by the meaning given in common parlance, chillies and lemons are vegetables. In our understanding, therefore, "cashewnut" and kernel occurring in item 12 are used, not in any distinctive and separate sense, but in the way as they are understood in common and commercial parlance to indicate the same commodity, viz., both "cashewnut" and its inside.

11. It is true that, on occasions, the word "and" can be understood as "or" as laid down by the Supreme Court in Krishna Coconut Co. v. East Godavari Coconut and Tobacco Market Committee, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 973 and Ishwar Singh v. State of U.P, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1450. Be that as it may, in items in the Second Schedule the adjunctive and disjunctive words like "and" and "or" appear to have been used rather indiscriminately. The word "or" is used only in item 17, while the word "and" is used in items 5, 7, 11, 12, 13 and 19, which items have been introduced under Act 49 of 1976.

12. It is true that this Court held in Baliah Setty v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1962] 13 S.T.C. 726 that butter and ghee as mentioned in item 5 are different commodities because butter on conversion undergoes physical and chemical changes and becomes ghee and also because even in the popular meaning and concept they are different. Likewise the word "and" is used between green gram and black gram in item 11. Both of them are different commodities. But it is worthy of note that the same word "and" occurs in item 7 between palmyrah fibre and stalks. It is common knowledge that fibre is only a piece taken out of palmyrah stalks. It is unthinkable that fibre can be separately taxed when palmyrah stalks, out of which fibre has been made, had already been taxed. We have referred to these different items only to point out that the word "and" has not been used by the legislature to denote only a conjunctive meaning. Therefore, occurring of the word "and" in item 12 need not mislead us. As it does in item 7, it only removes the ambiguity by putting into item 12 also the goods belonging to the same nature and category. Palmyrah fibre and stalks in item 7 and "cashewnut" and kernel in item 12 belong to the same category each and the word "and" is used between them to give an exhaustive enumeration of the goods belonging to the same category and to remove ambiguity. Whether they are in the form of "cashewnut" or kernel, they are of the same kind and once they have been subjected to tax at first purchase, the other form cannot be taxed.

13. This takes us to the important question whether "cashewnut" and cashew kernel are two distinct and separate commodities. As we have pointed out, cashew kernel is not a distinct commercial commodity from "cashewnut". The petitioners would have it that "cashewnut" cannot be used unless kernel is prepared out of it. On the other hand, the revenue's case is that "cashewnut" is dried and cashew kernel is taken out after breaking open the shell of the nut. Therefore, there is a process of taking out the kernel involved and, consequently, kernel is a separate commodity from "cashewnut". It is of common knowledge that "cashewnut" is different from its fruit and kernel is the inside portion of the nut. The cashew fruit is put to one use while kernel, which is called ""cashewnut"" in commercial parlance, is put to a different use. May be some sort of processing is involved in removing the outer crust of the nut and taking out the kernel. But it is difficult to postulate that kernel is distinctively a separate commercial commodity from "cashewnut". It is undoubted that kernel is the essential part of "cashewnut" and does not undergo any chemical change on removal of the shell.

14. However, reliance was placed by the lower authorities and also by the learned Government Pleader before us on State of Travancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory [1953] 4 S.T.C. 205 (S.C.) and Hajee Abdul Shukoor & Co. v. State of Madras [1964] 15 S.T.C. 719 (S.C.). The problem as to whether "cashewnut" and kernel are different commodities or not arose in the first of the two cases before the Supreme Court only in an incidental manner. The principal question which fell for decision in that case was as to the scope of Article 286(1)(b) and the amplitude of the exemption postulated by that clause in Article 286(1). The court decided by a majority view that Clause (1)(b) of Article 286 requires as a condition of the exemption that the export must be of the goods whose sale or purchase took place in the course of export. What was involved there was the purchase of "cashewnut" and export of its kernel. It was clearly decided by the majority that the purchases of "cashewnut" were not covered by the exemption postulated by Clause (1)(b) of Article 286 even if there was no difference between the raw materials purchased, viz., "cashewnut"s and the manufactured goods, viz., kernels, which were exported. In this context, it was incidentally taken note of by the majority opinion that the High Court had found that the raw "cashewnut"s and kernels manufactured out of them by various processes, partly mechanical and partly manual, were not commercially the same commodity. It is immediately seen that whether both are the same commodity or not did not really arise for decision in the case, because the learned Judges, who were in majority, had already expressed the view that the purchases of "cashewnut" were not covered by the exemption. Consequently, the distinction between "cashewnut" and its kernel, which had not been commercially the same commodity, was only incidental and did not really arise for decision in the case. Moreover, the learned Judges clearly pointed out at page 217 that the finding of the High Court was not seriously disputed before them. With the consequence it can be safely taken that it was not a conclusion by the Supreme Court as to the respective natures of "cashewnut" and its kernel. Reliance was also placed by the revenue's Learned Counsel on another decision of the Supreme Court in Hajee Abdul Shukoor & Co. v. State of Madras [1955] 6 S.T.C. 654 where the question arose as to whether tanned hides and skins were different from raw hides and skins. In that connection, Raghubar Dayal, J., who spoke for the court, only referred to the State of Travancore-Cochin's case [1953] 4 S.T.C. 205 (S.C.) and observed that it was held there that raw "cashewnut"s become a different commodity commercially after the application of certain process as a result of which they are converted into edible kernels.

15. We do not think that these incidental references by the Supreme Court to "cashewnut" and kernel would detract from the view we have taken. Further, these observations of the Supreme Court were with specific reference to the Travancore-Cochin Act. On the other hand, there are several decisions of this Court and some other High Courts, which lend support to the view we have taken. We will briefly refer to them.

16. Firstly, taking up the decision of the High Court of Andhra in Motilal Hariprasad and Brothers v. State of Andhra [1955] 6 S.T.C. 654 Subba Rao, C.J., and Satyanarayana Raju, J. (as they then were), held, while construing Rules 4(2), 18(1) and (2) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939, that groundnut included kernel. They observed that groundnut is a more comprehensive term, which obviously takes in kernel and the word "groundnut" was used to connote both the shell and the kernel within it. It may be noticed that in the same rule the comprehensive word "cashew" was used.

17. The Kerala High Court in Swasti Cashew Industries (P.) Ltd. v. State of Kerala [1961] 12 S.T.C. 691 held that the word "cashew" includes "cashew kernel". It is well to remember that, in the present item, the word "cashew", which may take in also the fruit, is not used but only "cashewnut" and kernel. The obvious intention is to treat both of them as one commodity.

18. Likewise, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held in Motilal Hari Prasad & Bros. v. State of Andhra [1959] 10 S.T.C. 20 and Berar Oil Industries v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [1959] 10 S.T.C. 199 that the expression "groundnut" takes in "groundnut kernel" as well.

19. In K. Seshagiri Pai & Co. v. Deputy Commissioner of South Kanara [1961] 12 S.T.C. 629 the Mysore High Court held that since oil can be extracted from coconut, it is an "oil-seed" within the meaning of Section 14(vi) of the Central Sales Tax Act. In the course of the discussion, the learned Judges pointed out that a coconut, as ordinarily understood, is the coconut grown on the top of a coconut tree with its husk and shell.

20. In State of Madras v. Saravana Pillai [1956] 7 S.T.C. 541 the question was whether arecanuts are horticultural produce. The learned Judges observed that the assessee gathered the arecanuts while they were still raw, then peeled them and thereafter sliced, boiled and dried. It was only after this process that arecanuts were fit to be marketed and there was no market for them as gathered from the trees. Despite all this it was held in the case that the goods thus processed and thereafter sold by the assessee were only subjected to the minimum processing absolutely necessary for their sale and, therefore, what the assessee sold still retained its character as horticultural produce. The same reasoning applies with equal force to cashew kernel....

21. The Supreme Court held in Tungabhadra Industries Ltd., Kurnool v. Commercial Tax Officer, Kurnool. [1960] 11 S.T.C. 827 (S.C.) that hydrogenated oil continues to be "groundnut oil" notwithstanding the processing which is merely for the purpose of rendering the oil more stable thus improving its keeping qualities for those who desire to consume groundnut oil.

22. We would like to add that "cashewnut" is processed only for the purpose of making it usable. Therefore, when the kernel is used it is commercially called

"cashewnut"
.

23. We may also usefully refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Alladi Venkateswarlu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [1978] 41 S.T.C. 394 (S.C) where it was held that puffed and parched rice, though some process was involved, continued to be rice.

24. In the light of the foregoing consideration, we are clearly of the opinion that ""cashewnut"" and "cashew kernel" are essentially the same commodity though some sort of processing is involved to take the kernel out of the "cashewnut".

25. In any case, even if there is any ambiguity about the meaning of item 12--we do not think that any such ambiguity exists--and more than one interpretation is possible, that interpretation which is beneficial to the subject must be adopted. Hegde, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, in Controller of Estate Duty v. R. Kanakasabai [1973] 89 I.T.R. 251 at 257 (S.C.) observed :

If a taxing provision is ambiguous and is reasonably capable of more than one interpretation, that interpretation which is beneficial to the subject must be adopted. This is a well-accepted rule of construction.

26. Therefore, even if two constructions are possible, we are inclined to adopt that construction which is beneficial to the assessee, viz., that item 12 deals only with "cashewnut", whether in the form of "cashewnut" or in the form of kernel.

27. It follows, therefore, that kernel cannot be independently taxed when "cashewnut" from which it has been taken out had already been subjected to tax as per item 12 of the Second Schedule. As we have stated, it is common ground that the "cashewnut" in all those cases had already been subjected to tax. Therefore, the "cashewnut" kernel with which we are now concerned in all these tax revision cases and writ petitions cannot be taxed again under item 12 of the Second Schedule.

28. The tax revision cases and the writ petitions are accordingly allowed. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. We fix a consolidated Advocate fee of Rs. 750.