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Sangnbhotla Venkatramaiah v. Kallu Vankataswamy
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff-appellant instituted a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage dated 25-6-1946 and for possession. The opinion states that the plaintiff was the mortgagor, identified as Kale Papaiah, described as "husband of 4th defendant and father the defendants 1 to 3 was the mortgagee" (text as given). The mortgage was for Rs. 200 and concerned land in Kankanampadu Shortrium village, an estate later taken over under the provisions of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotiwari) Act.
The defendants pleaded that they and their predecessors had occupancy rights in the land (it being ryoti land), that what the plaintiff mortgaged was only his melwaram interest, that the mortgage recitals were inoperative or formal, and that the melwaram right ceased when the estate was taken over by Government under the Estates Abolition Act. The defendants also pleaded they had been granted rough patta under Section 11 of the Estates Abolition Act.
The trial Court and the first appellate Court found that the land was not the private land of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff's interest was only a melwaram interest which was extinguished on takeover, and that the plaintiff's right of redemption ceased. Those concurrent findings of fact were not challenged before the learned single Judge who first heard the Second Appeal.
Before the learned single Judge Sri T. Veerabhadrayya raised two principal questions (see Legal Issues Presented). The single Judge rejected the estoppel contention and held the suit was not barred as premature; he referred a point of law (citing Sri Someswaraswari Varu v. Sri Rajitam) for reconsideration and sent the papers to the Chief Justice. A Division Bench directed that the matter be considered by a Full Bench. The Full Bench (the present Court) dismissed the second appeal with costs and dismissed the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defendants (as mortgagees) were estopped from contending that the mortgagor had no right to redeem the mortgage.
- Whether the suit was premature and therefore liable to be dismissed because the plaintiff's application for grant of ryotiwari patta was pending enquiry under Section 15 of the Estates Abolition Act.
- Whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for possession or redemption is ousted by the special jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal under the Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, particularly where questions within the competence of those statutory bodies arise incidentally in civil proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Sri T. Veerabhadrayya) Arguments
- The Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a landholder was entitled to a ryotiwari patta; until a landholder obtained a ryotiwari patta the landholder could not maintain a suit for possession — hence the present suit was premature.
- The defendants, as mortgagees, were estopped from asserting that the mortgagor lacked the right to redeem the mortgage.
- Relied on the decision of Venkatesam and A.D.V. Reddy, JJ in Sri Someswaraswami Varu v. Sri Rajitam (1971 1 Andh WR 14) for the proposition that suits for possession by erstwhile landholders are premature until the question of patta is determined by statutory forums.
Respondent's (Sri S. Ranga Reddy) Arguments
- The Settlement Officer and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs prayed for in the civil suit (e.g., possession and mesne profits); if it became necessary to decide questions that fall within the statutory fora incidentally, that did not oust the Civil Court's jurisdiction to grant civil reliefs.
- Where the relief sought is one that the special tribunal cannot grant (for example, possession), the Civil Court's jurisdiction is not excluded merely because the case involves questions that the statute contemplates should be decided by the special forum.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sri Someswaraswami Varu v. Sri Rajitam (1971) 1 Andh WR 14 | Held that suits for possession by erstwhile landholders may be premature until grant of patta; suggested that possession relief was closely connected to patta entitlement and could be a camouflage to obtain patta determination. | The Full Bench reviewed and distinguished this decision. The Court accepted that if a plaint is a camouflage to obtain a patta it is barred, but disagreed with any broad rule that would require all suits for possession to be dismissed until patta is obtained; to the extent the Someswaraswami Varu judgment held otherwise, the Full Bench rejected/overruled that view. |
| Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gopalakrishnayya (Full Bench) | Held that Section 56(1)(c) had no connection with Section 11 and related only to claims for arrears of rent under Section 55. | The Court cited this Full Bench to note limits of Section 56(1)(c) and its lack of connection with Section 11; the decision was used to show that statutory provisions previously thought to resolve rival ryot claims did not necessarily do so. |
| Chigurupati Venkatasubbayya v. Ravi Punnayya (1957-2 Andh WR 204) | Held that Civil Courts' jurisdiction is not ousted where the Settlement Officer/Tribunal cannot grant the primary relief sought (e.g., possession, mesne profits); plaintiff should not be required to split causes of action between forums. | The Court relied on this principle to support the proposition that Civil Courts can entertain suits for civil reliefs (possession/mesne profits) even if incidental questions fall within statutory tribunals' competence, provided the suit is not a disguise to obtain statutory relief. |
| Appanna v. Sriramamurthy (1958-1 Andh WR 420) | Concerned maintenance of suit for arrears of rent between two persons each claiming to be lawful ryots; held not maintainable when case fell directly within Section 56(1) and thus mischief of Section 56(2). | The Court noted Appanna and observed that while Appanna accepted limits where the matter fell squarely within Section 56, Subba Rao C.J.'s remarks disagreeing with an expansive reading of Chigurupati were confined to disputes between rival claimants to ryot status. The Full Bench treated Appanna as not undermining Chigurupati's principle where the Settlement Officer cannot grant the civil relief sought. |
| Sriramamurthy v. Batchu Dhana Raju (AIR 1957 Andh Pra 495) | Interpretations concerning Section 56 and the proviso to Section 3(d) — that a landholder prima facie entitled to a patta pending determination could remain in possession and could evict trespassers. | The Court cited these observations to underline that possession may be protected pending statutory determination and that the Act does not necessarily strip a landholder of possession until a patta is issued. |
| Ramayya v. Brahmayya (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 100) | Held that rights to obtain a ryotwari patta must be enforced before the special forums constituted under the Act; but civil reliefs flowing from possession by other ryots are not necessarily taken away from Civil Courts until a patta is obtained. | The Court accepted the distinction drawn in Ramayya: statutory forum exclusivity for patta claims, but Civil Courts remain competent to entertain civil reliefs like possession where appropriate. |
| Mahalakshmi v. Ammayamma (1960-1 Andh WR 13) | Reiterated the principle of Chigurupati Venkatasubbayya v. Ravi Punnayya that Civil Courts' jurisdiction is not necessarily ousted when statutory forums exist, especially where those forums lack competence to grant the relief sought. | The Court cited Mahalakshmi as a supportive affirmation of the Chigurupati principle relied upon in the present case. |
| Ravu Gopala Rao v. Official Receiver (1961-2 Andh WR 339) | Affirmed Chigurupati's principle and observed that Appanna did not contradict Chigurupati's ratio. | The Court relied on Ravu Gopala Rao to reinforce that Appanna did not displace the established rule that Civil Courts may hear suits for reliefs outside the competence of special tribunals. |
| Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan (1959-1 Mad LJ 195) | Stated that if the relief claimed in Civil Court is not one created by the Act (e.g., patta) but a civil right (e.g., possession), the Civil Court's jurisdiction is not ousted merely because deciding the issue may require adjudicating who was the ryot of the holding. | The Court approved and relied on Soosai Udayar to hold that Civil Courts can entertain suits for possession when the relief is not one given by the statute and where the statutory tribunal cannot grant the relief sought. |
| Adakalathammal v. Chinnayya Panipundar | Approved the approach in Soosai Udayar emphasizing that statutes do not implicitly extinguish pre-existing civil remedies when they do not expressly exclude them. | The Court cited this approval to reinforce that civil remedy jurisdiction survives unless expressly or by necessary implication ousted. |
| Desikacharyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh | Held that a suit to declare whether a village was an estate fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal under Section 9(4) and was therefore barred; decision affirmed by the Supreme Court. | The Court treated this authority as distinguishable and of no practical assistance to the present case, noting that Section 9 confers exclusive jurisdiction for the specific issue there. |
| Swaminatha v. Asan (1947) 1 Mad LJ 83 = AIR 1947 Mad 276 (Full Bench) | Referenced as part of the established principle that Civil Courts need not be ousted of jurisdiction where special tribunals cannot grant the principal reliefs (possession/mesne profits). | Cited as supporting authority for the general doctrine that a plaintiff should not be forced to split causes of action between forums where the special forum cannot grant the relief sought. |
| Sukh Dev v. Basdev (AIR 1935 All 594) | Another authority cited in support of the principle that Civil Courts retain jurisdiction where special fora cannot grant particular civil remedies. | Cited as part of the doctrinal background underlying the Court's decision to allow Civil Courts to grant civil reliefs not within the competence of the special tribunals. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began from the uncontested concurrent findings of fact by the trial and first appellate Courts: the suit land was ryoti land and not the plaintiff's private land; the plaintiff's interest was only a melwaram right which ceased upon government takeover under the Estates Abolition Act; consequently the plaintiff's right of redemption had ceased. Those findings were not challenged before the learned single Judge and, being concurrent findings of fact, could not properly be challenged in a Second Appeal.
Addressing the two principal questions raised by Sri T. Veerabhadrayya, the Court considered (a) the estoppel contention and (b) the contention that the suit was premature because the plaintiff's application for a ryotiwari patta was pending under Section 15. The single Judge (earlier) had rejected the estoppel contention and held the suit not barred as premature; the present Court reviewed the statutory scheme and case law.
The Court reviewed the object and scheme of the Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and the relevant provisions: Section 3 (consequences of notification), Section 3(d) proviso (protection of possession pending determination of a patta claim), Sections 11 to 15 (rights to obtain ryotiwari pattas, and the Settlement Officer/Tribunal procedure), and Section 56 (interpretation issues including relation to Section 11). The Full Bench noted prior judicial interpretations, including a Full Bench holding that Section 56(1)(c) had no connection with Section 11 (Cherukuru Muthayya).
The Court then addressed the principle of exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction by a statutory tribunal: it acknowledged settled doctrine that jurisdictional exclusion may be express or implied. Where a special tribunal is given final authority to determine rights created by statute, the Civil Court is excluded in respect of those matters. However, the Court emphasized a countervailing principle repeatedly stated in prior authorities: if the relief sought in a civil suit is one which the special tribunal cannot grant (for example, possession or mesne profits), the Civil Court is not ousted merely because the suit will necessarily involve adjudication of some questions within the tribunal's competence. The critical inquiry is whether the plaint (and reliefs sought) bring the action within the tribunal's jurisdiction or whether the suit is a camouflage to invoke the Civil Court to decide what the statute assigns to the tribunal.
The Court analyzed the case law: Chigurupati Venkatasubbayya v. Ravi Punnayya was cited for the proposition that Civil Courts may entertain suits for possession where the Settlement Officer lacks competence to grant possession; Appanna v. Sriramamurthy was discussed as an authority where the dispute fell squarely under Section 56 and thus the suit was not maintainable; Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan and Adakalathammal v. Chinnayya Panipundar were relied upon to support the view that where a relief is a civil right not created by the statute (e.g., possession), the Civil Court's jurisdiction survives.
Turning specifically to Someswaraswami Varu v. Sri Rajitam (the authority principally relied on by counsel for the appellant), the Full Bench examined that decision's reasoning and conclusions. While acknowledging that a plaint which is a mere attempt to obtain a statutory patta by camouflaging the claim as a possession suit should be dismissed, the Full Bench rejected any categorical rule that every suit for possession by an erstwhile landholder must be dismissed until a ryotiwari patta is obtained. The Court held that a suit for a civil relief which the Settlement Officer cannot grant is not barred merely because it incidentally involves questions within the competence of the statutory fora. The essential test remains whether the plaint determines the forum (i.e., whether the relief sought is within or outside the special forum's exclusive competence) and whether the defendant can demonstrate that the plaint is a mere camouflage to circumvent statutory jurisdiction.
The Court also observed procedural propriety: the plaintiffs (appellants) should not be allowed in the Second Appeal to raise the prematurity point when they had maintained the suit's maintainability in the lower Courts and only advanced prematurity after adverse findings on the merits.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench dismissed the second appeal and awarded costs against the appellants. The Court's core ruling is emphasized as follows:
DISMISSED (Second appeal dismissed with costs).
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the plaintiff-appellant's second appeal is dismissed and the adverse findings of the lower Courts (that the land was ryoti land, the plaintiff's melwaram interest was extinguished on takeover, and the plaintiff's right of redemption had ceased) stand. Costs were awarded against the appellant.
- On jurisdictional law under the Estates Abolition Act: the Court confirmed and restated the governing principle that Civil Courts are not automatically ousted from entertaining suits for civil reliefs (such as possession and mesne profits) merely because the dispute incidentally involves questions which the Settlement Officer or Estates Abolition Tribunal are empowered to decide. Where the statutory tribunals cannot grant the civil relief sought, the Civil Court may hear the suit unless the plaint is a mere camouflage to obtain statutory relief.
- On precedent: the Full Bench limited the scope of Someswaraswami Varu v. Sri Rajitam insofar as that decision had been read to require dismissal of every suit for possession by an erstwhile landholder until patta was obtained. The Full Bench held that such a categorical rule is incorrect and must yield to the test whether the suit is essentially an attempt to obtain statutory rights under the Act by disguise.
Note: This summary is derived exclusively from the language and content of the provided opinion. No information beyond the text of the opinion has been added.
1. The plaintiff-appellant filed the suit, out of which the Second Appeal arises, for redemption of usufructuary mortgage dated 25-6-1946 and for possession. The plaintiff was the mortgagor, Kale Papaiah, husband of 4th defendant and father the defendants 1 to 3 was the mortgagee. The mortgage was for a sum of Rs. 200 and it was in respect of land in Kankanampadu Shortrium village, an estate which was later taken over under the provisions of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotiwari) Act. The plaintiff is one of the erstwhile Shortrimdars of the village. The defendants pleaded that they and their predecessors had occupancy rights in the land, that the plaintiff and his predecessors were landholders, that the plaintiff had borrowed a sum of Rs. 200 from Papaiah mortgaging his melwaram interest in the land, that the recitals in the mortgage deed were inoperative and that the recitals had only been made to give a form to the deed of mortgage. They pleaded that the occupancy rights possessed by the could not be extinguished by the mortgage. The land was never the private land of the plaintiff. The only interest which the plaintiff had in the land was the melwaram right which ceased on the estate being taken over by the Government under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act. The defendants also pleaded that they had also been granted rough patta under Section 11 of the Estates Abolition Act.
2. It was found by the trial Court and the first appellate Court that the land which was the subject-matter of the mortgage was not the private land of the plaintiff and that what was mortgaged by the plaintiff was only his melwaram interest in the land. The land was ryoti land in which the defendants and their predecessors had occupancy rights. The melwara right of the plaintiff became extinguished on the taking over of the estate by the Government and the plaintiff's right of redemption ceased. The concurrent finding of the lower Courts that the land was ryoti land i which the defendants and their predecessors had occupancy rights and not private land of the plaintiff was not challenged before the learned single Judge who heard the Second Appeal in the first instance. Indeed the concurrent finding of fact could not be challenged in Second Appeal.
3. Sri Veerabhadrayya raised two questions before the learned single Judge: (1) The defendants who were mortgagees were estopped from contending that the mortgagor had no right to redeem the mortgage. (2) The suit should have been dismissed as premature, without any adjudication on the merits as the application of the plaintiff for grant of ryotiwari patta was pending enquiry under Section 15 of the Estates Abolition Act. The learned single Judge rejected the first contention. In regard to the second contention, he was of the view that the suit was not barred and need not be dismissed as premature. The decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sri Someswaraswari Varu v. Sri Rajitam, (1971) l Andh WR l4 was pressed for the acceptance of the learned Judge. He was of the view that the decision required reconsideration. He, therefore, directed that the papers be placed before the learned Chief Justice for appropriate orders. The matter was then considered by a Division Bench consisting of Kondaiah and Gangadhara Rao JJ., and they directed that the matter should be considered by a Full Bench. This is how the matter has come before us.
4. Sri Veerabhadrayya argued that the Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction to consider the question whether the landholder was entitled to ryotiwari patta and that until a landholder was able to get a ryotiwari patta any suit by him for possession of land had to be dismissed on the ground that it was premature. He pressed for our acceptance the decision of Venkatesam and A.D.V. Reddy, JJ, in Sri Someswaraswami Varu v. Sri Rajitam, (1971-l Andh WR 14).
5. The object and scheme of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act have been explained in several decisions of this Court and of the Madras High Court. We do not think it necessary to make a re-statement of the object and the scheme of the Act. We will refer to the relevant provisions of the Act necessary for deciding the question raised before us. Section 3 enumerates the consequences of notifying an estate under Section l of the Act. In particular, section 3 (c) provides that all rights and interests created in and over the estate by the landholder shall cease and determine as against the Government. Section 3 (d) empowers the Government to take possession of the estate but saves from dispossession any person who the Government considers is prima facie entitled to a ryotiwari patta until the question whether he is actually entitled to such patta is decided by the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal in the case of landholder. Section 3 (f) provides ryot shall be extinguished as between them. Section 3 (g) provides that ryots in the estate shall, as against the Government, be entitled only to such rights and privileges as are recognised or conferred on them by or under the Act. Section 11 confers on every ryot in an estate the right to obtain a ryotiwari patta in respect of ryoti land which was included or ought to have been included in his holding on the notified date. sections 12, 13 and 14 confer on the landholder the right to obtain a ryotiwari patta in respect of private land in a Zamindari, Inam and Under Tenure estate respectively. section 15 (1) provides for enquiry by the Settlement Officer into claims by a landholder for a ryotiwari patta under Sections 12, 13 or 14. Section 15 (2) provides for an appeal to the Tribunal from the decision of the Settlement Officer and it declares that the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any Court of law. While Section 15 provides for the determination of claims of landholders to the grant of ryotiwari pattas under sections 12, 13 and 14 there is no corresponding provision for determining the rival claims of persons to the grant of ryotiwari patta as ryots under Section 11 of the Act. For several years it was understood that Section 56 (1) (c) enabled the Settlement Officer to decide such rival claims. But it has recently been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gopalakrishnayya, (FB) that having regard to its setting in the Act. Section 56 (1) (c) had no connection with Section 11 and that the decision under Section 56 (1 (c) had relevance only to a claim for arrears of rent under Section 55 of the Act. Sri Veerabhadrayya argued that a Sections 12 to 15 were a complete code in themselves and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was excluded from deciding any question which would fall for decision under Section 15 of the Act. The answer of the respondent's counsel, Sri S. Ranga Reddy to the contention of Sri Veerabhadrayya was that the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for in the suit. If for the purpose of granting it became necessary to adjudicate upon questions which under the Act had to be decided by the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal, it could not be said that the Civil Court was barred from deciding such questions. Sri T. Veerabhadrayya relied on Appanna v. Sriramamurthy, (1958) l Andh WR 420, Ravu Gopala Rao v. Official Receiver, (1961) 2 Andh WR 339; Desikacharyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1959)2 Andh WR 412; Desikacharyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, and Sri Someswaraswari Varu v. Srirajitam, (1971) l Andh WR 14. Sri Ranga Reddy relied on Chigurupati Venkatesubbayya v. Ravi Punnayya, (1957)2 Andh WR 204; Sriramamurthy v. Batchu Dhana Raju, (1957) l Andh WR 332 = (AIR 1957 Andh Pra 495); Ramayya v. Brahmayya, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 100; Mahalakshmi v. Ammayamma, (1969) l Andh WR 13; Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan, (1959) l Mad LJ 195 (196) and Adakalathammal v. Chinnayya Panipundar ,.
6. The principles relating to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Court by statutory Tribunals are fairly well settled. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of a Civil Court from entertaining a suit of a civil nature may be expressed or implied. Where a special Tribunal is created by an Act of Legislature for the purpose of determining the rights created by the statute and finality is given to the orders of the Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be considered to be excluded with regard to those matters. But where the subject-matter of the suit falls outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal or where the relief sought in the suit is one which the Special Tribunal is incapable of granting, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted merely because the question which has to be incidentally but necessarily decided is a question within the competence of the Special Tribunal. The forum has to be determined by the plaint. If the allegations in the plaint and the reliefs sought do not bring the action within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal there is no reason to exclude the Civil Court from trying the action merely because the defence put forward involves the adjudication of matter within the competence of the Special Tribunal. Of course, it is always open to a defendant to show that the allegations in the plaint are a mere camouflage to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal. Where the Court is satisfied that the plaint is but a trick to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and to oust the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal the Civil Court will naturally dismiss the suit. We do not propose to refer to the legion of cases on the question of the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. We will confine our consideration to cases which arose under the provisions of the Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotiwari) Act.
7. In Chigurupati Venkatasubbayya v. Ravi Punnayya (1957-2 Andh WR 204), the question arose whether Section 56 of the Act ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit for ejectment if one of the issues related to occupancy rights. Section 56 (2) provides that the decision of the Tribunal in an appeal preferred against the decision of the Settlement Officer under Section 56 (1) shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law. Chandra Reddy J, (as he then was) held that the Civil Court's jurisdiction was not ousted since it was beyond the competence of the Settlement Officer to grant the relief of possession. He said,
"The Civil Courts can certainly take cognizance of suits in which the title to the holding forming part of an estate is put in issue. Further, the relief of possession and mesne profits cannot be granted by the Settlement Officer they being beyond his competence, and within the purview of Civil Courts. The principle is now firmly established that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is not excluded when special forums could grant certain prayers. See Swaminatha v. Asan, ( 1947) l Mad LJ 83 = ( AIR 1947 Mad 276) (FB)and Sukh Dev v. Basdev ( AIR 1935 All 594). In my opinion the ratio of this doctrine is that a plaintiff cannot be required to split up his cause of action and seek redress partly in Civil Court and partly before a Special Tribunal. There is no reason why he should be compelled to choose different forums to get different reliefs."
8. In Sriramamurthy v. Bachu Dhana Raju (AIR 1957 Andh Pra 495), Chandra Reddy, C.J. and Krishna Rao, J., dealing with Section 56, observed :
"Under proviso (ii) to Section 3 (d), the Government shall not dispossess a landholder of any land in any estate in respect of which they consider that he is prima facie entitled to a ryotiwari patta pending the decision of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal, if any, to is as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta. If the suit land is a private land of which the landholder is entitled to possession under the said proviso he is entitled to continue in possession. The Government is not entitled to dispossess him and he is surely entitled to evict any trespasser from the land. There is nothing in the Act to support the view that the landholder has no right to possession of private land until he gets a ryotiwari patta in respect of it under Section 12."
In Appanna v. Sriramamurthy, (1958-l Andh WR 420) the question arose whether, after the estate was taken over, a suit could be laid for recovery of arrears of rent which had accrued prior to the taking over of the estate. Both the plaintiff and the defendant claimed to be the lawful ryots of the land. The case fell directly within Section 56 (1) and therefore, attracted the mischief of Section 56 (2). The suit was held to be not maintainable. Referring to the decision of Chandra Reddy, J, (as he then was) in Chigurupati Venkatasubbayya v. Ravi Punnayya (1957-2 Andh WR 204), Subba Rao, C.J. did not express any dissent with the proposition that the Civil Court could take cognizance of suits for possession and mesne profits which were beyond the competence of the Settlement Officer. Subba Rao, C.J. however, observed :
"But if the learned Judge meant to lay down that the Civil Court is not barred even in respect of a dispute between two persons claiming to be lawful ryots, with great respect, we cannot agree with that view."
Of course, Subba Rao, C.J. must have had in mind a dispute with reference to one of the rights granted by the Act.
9. In Ramayya v. Brahmayya (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 100) Krishna Rao, J, held that the rights to obtain a ryotiwari patta could be enforced only before the special forum setup under the Act and that relief could not directly or indirectly be sought elsewhere. But, he said, there was nothing in the Act to show that until the ryotiwari patta was obtained, all reliefs in respect of other, ryots, flowing from possession were taken away and could not be claimed in the ordinary Civil Courts.
10. In Mahalakshmi v. Ammayamma (1960-1 Andh WR 13) the principle of Venkatasubbayya v. Punnayya (1957-2 Andh WR 204) was reiterated by Chandra Reddy, C.J. and Mohammed Ahmed Ansari J. In Ravu Gopala Rao v. Official Receiver (1961-2 Andh WR 339), Satyanarayana Raju J, (as he then was) speaking for himself and Chandra Reddy, C.J. affirmed the principle of the decision in Chigurupati Venkatasubbayya v. Ravi Punnayya, (1957-2 Andh WR 204) and further observed that there was nothing in the decision of Appanna v. Sriramamurthy, (1958-l Andh WR 420)which can counter it.
11. In Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan (1959-1 Mad LJ 195) Rama Chandra Iyer J, stated the position clearly :
"But if the relief claimed in Civil Court is not what is created or granted by the Act, e.g. the right to obtain a patta, but a civil right the jurisdiction of the civil court which always existed cannot be held to be ousted as the statute does not either expressly or impliedly extinguish such rights. It may that for the granting of such relief the question to be decided is as to who was the ryot of a holding. Such a determination would necessarily be incidental and cannot be deemed to be impliedly excluded by Section 56. There is no provision in the Act to stay all suits which involved the determination of the question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding or one to refer to that issue to the statutory tribunals for adjudication and to dispose of the suit on receipt of a finding from such tribunals. I am not able to see anything on principle or in the terms of the Act to hold that the Civil Court has been rendered powerless to decide a necessary issue between the parties though such an issue is one contemplated under Section 56, for the purpose of deciding rights other than those created or provided for by the Act."
Ramachandra Iyer J, then proceeded to accept as correct the principle of the decision in Chigurupati Venkatasubbayya v. Ravi Punnayya (1957-2 Andh WR 204) the learned Judge also referred to Appanna v. Sriramamurthy (1958-1 Andh WR 420) and observed tat the dissent expressed by Subba Rao C.J must be considered to be with reference to the rights granted by the Act. Finally he said,
"In the instant case the relief claimed is one of possession. Neither the Settlement Officer nor the Tribunal has any jurisdiction to grant such a relief........... Such being the case I am of opinion that the Civil Court should entertain the suits. To hold otherwise would led to certain practical difficulties. Let us take a case where the plaintiff is a lawful ryot but the defendant trespassed into the property. If the plaintiff's suit for possession is not entertained by the Civil Court and if he is asked to go and agitate his right to patta before the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal, it may be that by the time he gets his right to the patta declared by those Tribunals the claim for possession would have become time barred by adverse possession by the defendant."
12. The decision of Ramachandra Iyer, J., in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan (1959-1 Mad LJ 195) was approved by Rajamannar, C.J and Ganapati Pillai J, in Adakalathammal v. Chinnayyan Panipundar . Rajamannar, C.J. expressly referred to the following sentence from Ramachandra Iyer, J's decision :
"If the relief claimed in a Civil Court is not what is created or granted by the Act, for example, the right to obtain patta, but a civil right the jurisdiction of the Civil Court which always existed cannot be held to be ousted as the statute does not either expressly or impliedly extinguish such rights."
13. In Desikacharyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh for a declaration that the village of East Takkellapadu was not an estate within the meaning of either the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 or the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, Bhimasankaram and Ranganatham Chetty, J. held that the suit fell directly within the mischief of Section 9 (4) of the Estates Abolition Act and was, therefore, barred. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Desikacharyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh. Section 9 of the Act, we may mention here, confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal to determine whether any Inam village is an Inam Estate or not. The decision of the Tribunal is also given finality under the Act. The case is of no practical assistance to us.
14. We now come to the case on which Sri Veerabhadrayya placed principle reliance in Someswaraswami Varu v. Srirajitam (1971-1 Andh WR 14) the plaintiffs were the deities of Sri Somaswaraswami Varu and Sri Venugopalaswami Varu, Vella Village, Vella village was an estate which was taken over under the provisions of Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the suit lands were granted to the deities in the year 1738 and that in the year 1900 the defendants were put in possession of the suit lands towards remuneration for the services required to be performed by them by way of giving dance recitals in the temples on festival occasions. The Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Devadasis Prevention of Dedication Act prevented the rendering of such services and the contract, therefore, became void. The plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to recover possession of the lands from the defendants. The defendants contended that the plaintiffs had no title to the lands and that the defendants had acquired occupancy rights in the lands Venkatesam and A.D.V. Reddy, JJ, noticed the decision of Chandra Reddy, J, (as he then was) in Chigasrupati Venkatasubbaiah v. Ravi Punnayya (1957-2 Andh WR 204) and thought that in Appanna v. Sriramamurthy (1958-1 Andh WR 420) Subba Rao C.J. and Ranganatham Chetty J, had dissented from the view of Chandra Reddy J. We have already pointed out that Subba Rao C.J. and Ranganatham Chetty J, did not dissent from the view of Chandra Reddy J, that Civil Courts could take cognizance of suits where the reliefs sought could not be granted by the Special Tribunals. It is true that Subba Rao C.J. observed that if Chandra Reddy J, meant to lay down that the Civil Court was not barred even in respect of disputes between the two persons claiming to be lawful ryots they could not agree with the view. As explained earlier by us and also by Ramachandra Iyer J, in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan (1959-1 Mad LJ 195) the remarks of Subba Rao, C.J. must naturally be confined to rights created by the Act in respect of which there is a dispute between persons claiming to be lawful ryots. After observing that Subba Rao C.J. and Ranganatham Chetty, J had dissented from the view of Chandra Reddy J, Venkatesam and A.D.V. Reddy JJ., went on to say that tough the reliefs of possession and mesne profits could not be granted by the Settlement Officer, the reliefs were intimately connected with the question as to who was entitled to the issue of patta under the Act. As the defendants were admittedly in possession of the land on the date of the coming into force of the Act they were entitled not to be disturbed from their possession by virtue of the proviso to Sec. 3 (d) of the Act, until the question of g rant of patta was determined either under Section 11 or Section 12 of the Act. The learned Judges said that until the question of issue of patta was determined the plaintiff has no right to recover possession from the defendants. The suit was premature. The learned Judges further said that by a trick of pleading or by camouflage of the reliefs asked for they could not make the civil Court inquire into questions which were within the exclusive competence of the tribunals created by the Act. The enquiry into the question of grant of patta could not be considered to be ancillary or incidental to the relief of possession in the civil court since the relief of possession depended entirely on the right of the plaintiffs to the issue of a patta. If the learned Judges were of the view that in substance the plaintiffs were really asking for a declaration of their rights to the grant of a patta cleverly camouflaging the rest relief by asking for possession and mesne profits there can be no quarrel with the conclusion of the learned Judges. If, however, the learned Judges, meant to lay down that no erstwhile landholder or ryot could seek the relief of possession in a Civil Court without first obtaining a ryotwari patta under the provisions of the Estates Abolition Act we must, with great respect overrule the view of the learned Judges. In our view, a suit for a relief which the Settlement Officer cannot grant is not barred merely because it incidentally involves the adjudication of questions within the competence of the Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal. If, however, the relief claimed in the suit is a mere camouflage for obtaining a determination of the rights which are required to be decided by the Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal the suit must be held to be barred. As we said earlier, the plaint must determine the forum. But the defendant may show that the plaint is a mere camouflage to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal. If the Court is satisfied that the allegations in the plaint and the reliefs sought do not bring the action within the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal and if the defendant is unable to show that the action is a mere camouflage, there is no reason why the jurisdiction of the Civil Court should be excluded merely because the defence raised involves the adjudication of the Special Tribunal.
15. In Cherukuru Muthayya v. G. Gopalakrishnayya (FB) a Full Bench of this court expressed its dissent with the reasoning of the learned Judges tough they left open the question whether an erstwhile landholder could institute a suit for possession without first obtaining ryotwari patta.
16. We are also of the view that in the present case the plaintiffs should not be permitted to urge in second appeal that their suit should have been dismissed as premature. In the lower Courts their contention was, the suit was maintainable and it was only when the decision went against them on merits that they have chosen to turn and urge this ground.
17. In the result, we dismiss the second appeal with costs.
18. Appeal dismissed.
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