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Gadiraju Sanyasi Raju v. Kandula Kamappadu And Others

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Jul 15, 1959
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed a suit based on Ex. A-6 dated 30-5-1955, an agreement to lease certain properties permanently on specified terms. The defendants contended that the agreement was fraudulent and that it was inadmissible in evidence due to non-registration under Section 17(1)(d) of the Indian Registration Act. The trial court dismissed the suit on the grounds of fraud but overruled the objection regarding registration. The appellant appealed against this dismissal. The appellate bench, facing difficulty in interpreting the Privy Council decision in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co., referred the question of whether Ex. A-6 constitutes a lease within Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act to a Full Bench. The Full Bench then examined the nature of the document and the relevant statutory provisions to determine its status and admissibility.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ex. A-6 is a lease within the meaning of Section 17(1)(d) of the Indian Registration Act.
  2. Whether an unregistered document like Ex. A-6, falling under the definition of a lease, can be admitted as evidence in a suit for specific performance under the proviso to Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act.
  3. Whether the appellant can maintain a suit for specific performance based on Ex. A-6 under Section 12 or Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act, 1877.
  4. Whether the Full Bench ruling in Narayanan Chetty v. Muthiah Servai remains good law in light of the Privy Council decision in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co..

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Ex. A-6 is only an agreement to lease and not a lease requiring registration under Section 17(1)(d) because it does not create an immediate and present demise of the property.
  • The deposit of Rs. 12,000/- mentioned in the document is a condition precedent to the creation of a lease, implying that the lease would come into effect only upon fulfillment of certain conditions.
  • The Full Bench ruling in Narayanan Chetty v. Muthiah Servai is good law and supports that an agreement to execute and register a sub-lease at a future date is itself a lease requiring registration.
  • Ex. A-6 should be admissible as evidence for specific performance under Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, even though it is signed only by the lessors.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Ex. A-6 is a lease within the meaning of Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act and thus requires registration.
  • The document is hit by Section 49 of the Registration Act and is inadmissible as evidence due to non-registration.
  • The appellant has not been put in possession, nor signed the agreement, so Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act does not apply to enable suit for specific performance.
  • The alleged fraud and misrepresentation render the agreement unenforceable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. Definition and scope of "agreement to lease" under the Registration Act; lease must create a present and immediate demise to require registration. The Court relied on the Privy Council’s interpretation to hold that an agreement which does not create a present demise is not a lease requiring registration.
Narayanan Chetty v. Muthiah Servai Held that an agreement to execute and register a sub-lease at a future date is a lease requiring registration. The Court clarified that this precedent is no longer good law on the question of registration requirement but remains valid on other aspects.
Panchanan Bose v. Chandi Charan Misra Interpretation that an agreement to lease must operate as an immediate demise to require registration. The Court approved this interpretation as authoritative and consistent with the Privy Council ruling.
Valiya Kalyamani v. Krishna Nambiar An agreement for renewal of lease that does not create a present demise is not an agreement to lease requiring registration. Used to illustrate that contingent or future agreements do not amount to leases under the Act.
Suleman v. Patel (A.I.R. 1933 Bom. 381) An agreement to grant a lease in the future is not an agreement to lease under Section 2(7) of the Registration Act. Supported the principle that future leases do not require registration as leases.
Kanti Chandra v. Brojendra Mohan (A.I.R. 1929 Cal. 186) Agreement involving conditions precedent and no present right created is not a lease requiring registration. Confirmed that possession and immediate demise are key to the classification as a lease.
Purmannddas Jiwandas v. Dharsey Virje Document creating present interest in property requires registration even if a formal document is to be executed later. Supported the principle that the intention and effect of the document govern its classification.
Ramjoo Mahomed v. Haridas Mullic Letters containing terms amounting to present demise create immediate interest and constitute a lease. Used to illustrate that the substance and effect of the document, not form, determine its nature.
Maneklal Mansukhbhai v. J.J Ginwalla and Sons A contract in writing signed by one party can constitute a contract enforceable under Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act. Considered in determining whether Ex. A-6 could ground a suit for specific performance.
Venkateswarlu v. Kotilingam Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act is exhaustive for claims of specific performance based on written contracts to lease. Supported the Court's view that suit for specific performance must comply with Section 27-A conditions.
Balram v. Mahadeo (Nagpur High Court) Confirmed the exclusivity of Section 27-A for specific performance suits on written lease contracts. Reinforced the Court’s reasoning regarding the statutory framework governing specific performance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the nature of the document Ex. A-6 and the definition of "lease" under Section 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act, which includes agreements to lease. It analyzed the Privy Council decision in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co., which held that an agreement to lease must effect an actual and immediate demise to be considered a lease requiring registration. The Court rejected the Full Bench ruling in Narayanan Chetty v. Muthiah Servai to the extent it conflicted with this principle.

The Court scrutinized Ex. A-6’s terms and found that it contained all essential terms and the parties intended it to operate as a permanent lease. The deposit of Rs. 12,000/- was held to be a term of the agreement, not a condition precedent, and the lessor’s obligation to transfer kadapas to the lessee indicated an intention to create present possession rights. The appellant’s own admissions confirmed this interpretation.

Consequently, Ex. A-6 was held to be a lease requiring registration under Section 17(1)(d) and thus hit by Section 49 of the Registration Act, which bars unregistered documents from being received as evidence affecting immovable property.

The Court then considered whether the proviso to Section 49 allowed Ex. A-6 to be admitted in evidence as a contract for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act. It analyzed Sections 12 and 27-A of the Specific Relief Act, noting that Section 27-A allows suits for specific performance of written contracts to lease only if the lessee has taken possession or the lessor has delivered possession. Since Ex. A-6 was signed only by the lessors and the appellant was not in possession, Section 27-A did not apply.

The appellant’s argument that Section 12 could be invoked was rejected because Section 27-A was intended to be exhaustive for written contracts of lease, and Section 12 applies primarily to oral contracts. The Court emphasized the legislative intent behind Sections 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and 27-A of the Specific Relief Act, which protect possessory rights and regulate enforceability of lease contracts requiring registration.

Finally, the Court declined to entertain the appellant’s challenge to the fraud defense on merits, noting that the appeal failed on the legal grounds discussed.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that Ex. A-6 is a lease within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act and is therefore subject to compulsory registration under Section 17(1)(d). Being unregistered, it falls within the mischief of Section 49 and is inadmissible as evidence in a suit for specific performance unless it meets the conditions of Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act.

The Court further held that since the appellant was not in possession and did not sign the agreement, Section 27-A does not apply, and the suit for specific performance cannot be maintained on the basis of Ex. A-6.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This decision clarifies the scope of "agreement to lease" under the Indian Registration Act and the interplay with the Specific Relief Act, reinforcing that unregistered leases that create present interests require registration and cannot be enforced unless statutory conditions are met. No new precedent was set beyond affirming existing principles and legislative intent.

Show all summary ...

Bhimasankaram, J.:— One of the important questions to be decided in this appeal is whether the assent Ex. A-6 is a ‘lease’ falling within the ambit of Section 7(1)(d) and, fore, comes within the mischief of Section 49 of the Indian Registration. The Act defines a lease as including an agreement to lease.

2. The Privy Council decision in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamin Co.,1, dealt with the meaning of the phrase ‘agreement to lease’ and their hips made the following observations:

“…………, the Registration Act of 1908 provides that ‘lease’ includes an agreement to lease, and by Section 17 enacts that leases must be registered, and the penalty to non-registration being imposed by Section 49, which provides that if not registered to document shall affect immovable property which it comprises or be received as to evidence of any transaction affecting such property. It the document in question to be regarded as a lease within the meaning of this definition it could not be to in evidence. Their Lordships are of opinion that it cannot be so regarded. The ‘agreement for a lease’, which a lease is by the statute declared to include, much, their Lordships' opinion, be a document which effects an actual demise and operates a lease.”

3. Their Lordships were, in that case, dealing with an agreement which was enforceable on the date when it was entered into but which could become the only in case a certain event happened. Before that decision was to a Full Bench of the Madras High Court had in Narayana Chetty v. Sah Servai . I.L.R 35 Mad. 63 F.B ruled that an agreement to execute a sub-lease and to get it registered at a future date is a lease within section 3 of the Indian Registration Act III of 1887 and is compulsorily registrable under clause (d) of Section. Some time after the case in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. the was decided, a similar question came up for consideration before the Mad High Court in Swaminatha Mudaliar v. Ramaswami Mudaliar. Referring to the observations of the Privy Council in Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamdari Co., one of the learned Judges remarked as follows, after quoting the passage above-extracted from the decision:

“Turning to Panchanan Bose v. Chandi Charan Misra (I.L.R 37 Cal. 808, we see that the Chief Justice held that the document he was considering did not come within Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act and that consequently it was affected by rule contained in Clause 2(5). In fact, the conclusion was that unless an agreement to lease had the effect of operating as an immediate demise of the property it need not be registered. It may be urged that this view practically destroys the difference between a lease and an agreement to lease, but apparently the position created by the definition section has become very anomaious and Courts have been at pains to devise a way out of the difficulty; and as the solution has emanated from such a high authority as Sir Lawrence Jenkins and has the approval of the Judicial Committee, I feel that we should accept it unreservedly. I am not prepared to regard the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee as an obiter dictom which it is open to us to ignore, having regard to the Full Bench decision of this Court. The question was directly before the Board and they pointedly drew attention to the decision of the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court on the matter. I feel no compunction in respectfully accepting this view, and in holding that Narayanan Chetty v. Muthiah Servai (I.L.R 35 Mad. 63 F.B) should no longer be regarded as good law; otherwise it would result in perjured evidence being let in to prove a suppositious oral agreement in such cases.”

4. The other learned Judge, Wallis C.J, however, seemed to opine that the Court was still bound by the decision in Narayanan Chetty v. Muthiah Servai.

5. No subsequent decision binding upon us throwing light upon the meanie of the passage cited above from the privy Council decision has been brought to our notice. We find considerable difficulty in applying the observations their Lordships to the instrument before us. We, therefore, think it the that the following question should be decided by a Full Bench:

“Whether Ex. A-6 is a lease within the meaning of Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act?”

6. The papers will be placed before the learned Chief Justice for the constitution of a Full Bench to decide the question.

7. This Appeal coming up for hearing before the Full Bench consisting of the Hon'ble Mr. P. Chandra Reddy, Chief Justice, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kumarayya and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Muni Kanniah, in pursuance of the above Order of Reference, and having stood over for consideration till Thursday the 26th day of June, 1958 the Full Bench expressed the following

OPINION

(Judgment of the Court delivered by the Hon'ble The Chief Justice).

8. The question referred to the Full Bench is whether Ex. A-6 is a lease within the meaning of S. 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act. The facts necessary for an appreciation of the relative contentions of the parties may be briefly set out.—

9. The suit was laid by the appellant on the basis of Ex. A-6 dated 30-5-1955 an agreement to lease permanently properties mentioned therein on certain terms and conditions which would be referred to presently. The answer of the defendants was that the agreement in question was the result of fraud and misrepresentation and that the document relied on should not be received in evidence for want of registration as it fell within the scope of Sec. 17(1)(d) of the Indian Registration Act. The trial court overruled the objection based on the provisions of the Registration Act; but dismissed the suit accepting the plea of the defendants that the instrument was brought about by fraud and misrepresentation. The aggrieved plaintiff preferred the present appeal against that judgment complaining against the finding. When the appeal came up before Justice Bhimasankaram and Justice Krishnarao, the view of the trial court, that the document was unaffected by the provisions of Sec. 17(1)(d) read with Sec. 49 of the Indian Registration Act was canvassed before them by the respondent. As the learned Judges felt some difficulty in applying the observations of the Privy Council in Hemnta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co., they wanted a Full Bench to interpret the document.

10. The determination of the question as to whether Ex. A-6 is an agreement to lease or not depends upon the meaning to be attributed to the words “agreement to lease”. In other words, the exact scope of Section 2 clause 7 of the Registration Act has to be determined. “Lease” has been defined to include a counterpart, Kabuliyat, an undertaking to cultivate or occupy, and an agreement to lease. The construction of this clause was the subject of several judicial decisions.

11. The leading case on the subject is Hemanta Kumari Devi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co.. There, two actions were laid by the appellant to His Majesty in Council, one against Midnapur Zamindari and the other against the Government for recovery of possession of certain plots of land. The suit against the company was premised on terms that the company should recognise the title of the plaintiff but should be allowed to remain in possession of the property as lessee and that the properties forming the subject-matter of other suit should be granted a Jote settlement in the event of her succeeding in that suit. Eventually, when the suit was decreed, the appellant refused to fulfil the terms of the compromise. This led the company to file a suit for specific performance of the agreement embodied in the compromise petition. The main defence to the action was that the compromise was unenforceable for the reason that it was not registered as required by the relevant provisions of the Registration Act. This contention was repelled by the Lordships in the view that the document in question did not create any immediate and present demise in the company. The rule was stated by their Lordships in the following words:—

“…………, the Registration Act of 1908 provides that lease includes an agreement to lease and by section 17 enacts that leases must be registered, the penally for non-registration being imposed by Section 49, which provides that, if not registered, no document shall affect immoveable property which it comprises or be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. If the document in question can be regarded as a lease within the meaning of this definition it could not be received in evidence Their Lordships are of opinion that it cannot be so regarded. An ‘agreement for a lease which a lease is by the statute declared to include, must, in their Lordships’ opinion, be a document which effects an actual demise and operates as a lease. They think that Jenkins C.J, in the case of Panchanan Base v. Chandi Charan Misra (I.L.R 37 Cal. 808) correctly stated the interpretation of Section 17 in this respect. The present agreement is an agreement that, upon the happening of a contingent event at a date which was indeterminate and, having regard to the slow progress of Indian litigation: might be far distant, a lease would be granted Until the happening of that event it was impossible to determine whether there would be any lease or not. Such an agreement does not, in their Lordship's opinion, satisfy the meaning of the phrase “agreement for a lease,” which, in the context where it occurs and in the statute in which it is found, must in their opinion relate to some document that creates a present and immediate interest in the land.”

12. In this decision the dictum of Jenkins C.J in Panchanan Base v. Chandi Charan Misra, was approved. In the latter case the plaintiffs sought declaration of their right to a patta for a share in some lands and for possession thereof. The claim was based by the defendants on various grounds, but in the appeal the controversy was confined to the question whether the ‘solehnama’ which was foundation for the suit was admissible in evidence. Jenkins, G.J, who delivered the opinion of the Court upheld the pleas of the plaintiffs that the document did not amount to a lease for the reason that it only created a right to obtain another document which alone was contemplated to operate as an actual demise. The learned Judge thought that the document was merely an agreement to create a lease at a future date the terms of which were to be defined by a document to be executed in future.

13. Sri Ramamurthy, the learned counsel for the appellant seeks to bring the present case within the ambit of these rulings. His contention is that the document by itself did not form the transaction and as such it was only an agreement between the parties that some time later and on fulfilment of certain conditions a permanent lease was to be granted to the appellant. It was also urged by him that the Full Bench ruling in Narayanan Chetty v. Muthiah Servai which laid down the proposition that an agreement to execute a sub-lease and get it registered at a future date, whether possession was given to the lessee or not, was a lease within the meaning of Sec. 3 of the Indian Registration Act of 1877 corresponding to Sec. 2(7) of the present Act requiring registration under clause 1(d) of Sec. 17, is no longer good law in view of Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co..

14. Before examine the soundness of this contention with reference to the terms of the document we shall also deal with the cases referred to by the counsel for the appellant. In Valiya Kalyamani v. Krishna Nambiar, Ramesam J., ruled that an agreement between the parties for a renewal of ‘Kanom’ did not amount to an agreement to lease for the reason that the parties intended that the document should not operate as a present demise till the payment of a particular sum of money. The ratio of this ruling is that the demise was intended to come into existence only on the happening of some contingent event and the parties did not want that it should operate as a present demise. Suleman v. Patel . A.I.R 1933 Bom. 381. illustrates the same principle, namely, that if agreement is to grant a lease in future it would not constitute an agreement to lease within the scope of Sec. 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act. In that case, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff agreeing to take a flat for five years commencing from a certain day. Since on the relevant date the plaintiff had not decided which flat he would let to the defendant it was decided by Justice Wadia that the latter did not create a present demise of either the one or other flat and consequently it was not an agreement to lease requiring registration Trivenibai v. Leelabai,4 belongs to the same category. On a reading of the whole document, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the document was primarily meant to evidence payment that was made and was not meant to effect an actual demise in the property concerned.

15. Kanti Chandra v. Brojendra Mohan . A.I.R 1929 Cal. 186. does not carry the appellant any farther. There, an agreement was entered into for leasing certain properties after calculation of the area of the land, and for fixing the rent after measurement thereof. Pursuant to this agreement, the intending lessee was put in possession of the land not for its immediate use but for clearing the jungle so that the land could be measured. In a suit for rent, the question arose whether the agreement was inadmissible in evidence, not having been registered. It was answered in the negative as it was felt that the agreement was to lease the property on certain conditions such as clearing the jungle, for measuring the land, fixing the rent etc., and that there was no present right created in the land in favour of the proposed lessee.

16. It is seen that in all these cases, the instrument in question was found to be not a lease for the reason that the terms and the surrounding circumstances clearly indicated that the parties did not intend to effect a present demise in the immovable property by and under that document. If the intention of the parties as could be collected from the words of the instrument was that they should take effect as an actual demise, there could be little doubt that the instrument would constitute an agreement to lease, so as to attract Sec. 17(1)(d) read with S. 49 of the Registration Act.

17. In Purmannddas Jiwandas v. Dharsey Virje, the opinion expressed by Sargent, C.J, and Justice Bay ley is that if the document tends to create a present interest although the agreement contemplated the execution of a formal document at an early date it needs registration. It was observed that it was the paramount intention that could be gathered from the instrument itself that should prevail. The view taken in Sanjib Chandra Sanyal v. Santosh Kumar Lahiri is to the same effect.

18. There is an exhaustive discussion on the subject in Ramjoo Mahomed v. Haridas Mullic, Justice Page who decided the case had collected all the cases bearing on the subject. There, a suit was filed for specific performance of an alleged agreement embodied in two letters to lease a particular premises in Calcutta, that was in possession of the plaintiff and in the alternative for damages for breach thereof. The contents of the letters were as follows:

“I do hereby agree to take by our personal settlement your house and premises No. 7, Bowbazar street on a lease for 21 years under the following terms:—

19. The defendant replied:—

“I do confirm your letter dated 19th November, 1921. All terms will be settled on the agreement”.

20. These two letters were interpreted by the learned Judge as containing term amounting to a present demise of the said premises and creating an immediate interest therein. In his judgment reference is made to several English decisions touching the topic. In Maldon's case the words “you shall have a lease of my lands in D for twenty one years, paying therefor 10 shillings per annum, make a lease in writing and I will seal” were interpreted as making a good lease by parol and that the making of it in writing was but for further assurance. The proposition that a document would operate as a present demise though it has to take effect in future on either of the two dates mentioned therein whichever first happened after the lessor recovered the land in question from the person then in possession is contained in Barry v. Nugent. The observations of Lord Ellenborough in Doe v. Grooves . 1812 15 East 244., which are instructive have been extracted by the learned Judge:—

“If by the terms of this agreement it had been provided that there should be no entry until a lease was executed I should have had considerable doubts. But as the case stands it does appear to me that the instrument must be considered as a present lease from the 5th April 1798. From that period it has the operation of a demise, not depending upon the contingency of the party's granting a future lease, which was the stipulation only for the better security of the lessee. It falls, therefore, within the case of Poole v. Bentley,(1810) 12 East 168 and in Barry v. Nugent,(1782) 3 Dough. (K.B) 179 the Court thought, notwithstanding it was agreed that leases with the usual clauses were to be drawn, that such a stipulation did not affect the words of present demise. Here the lessee might never have the benefit on an executed lease; in the interim, therefore, this was an agreement to operate as a present demise, commencing immediately from the 5th of April, though a more formal lease was afterwards to be granted”.

21. It is unnecessary to multiply citation on either side since the cases referred to the lay down in clear terms the rule that should govern the interpretation of sec. 2(7) of the Registration Act. The principles that emerge from the various authorizes are these.

22. If the conditions of a contract to lease are fully ascertained and if it is attend that the right to possession should vest in the lessee either immediately on the term is to commence at once or in future, if it is to come into operation to the instrument has to be regarded as a lease. “Such a lease takes effect from the date fixed for the commencement of the lease without the on or actual entry”. If, on the other hand, it is only an agreement to one of the parties to the agreement to lease and the other to accept it, the is only an executory contract since the legal relationship of landlord and to would not be created by and under the instrument. Thus, the test is wether the agreement itself would confer a legal right or whether the execution on another instrument which would give a legal right was in the contemplation to the parties. It should be construed to be a lease if the present demise is to the be inferred from the language employed. The fact that it contains a stipulation for the execution of a formal document subsequently would not make any to if the covenants mentioned therein are to become binding at once, in on the other hand the terms are not fully ascertained and some at least of the essential conditions are to be settled at a later stage, even if the words used to a present demise, it would not be a lease as defined in Sec. 2(7). It is the dominant intention of the parties that should be gathered from the to in which the document is couched that should be the criterion in the whether a particular instrument is an agreement to lease or merely to agreement to grant a lease in future creating a right in a party to obtain a document under certain circumstances or on the happening of a certain contingency.

23. The rules stated by Readman in his book on “Landlord and Tenant” in paragraphs 50, 51 and 52 are in conformity with the principles indicated above.

24. We do not also accede to the proposition that Narayanan Chetty v. Muthiah Servai was overruled by Hemanta Kumari Deb v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. on the issue as to whether an agreement to lease would require registration even if possession of the property was not given to the proposed lessee. For one thing, no reference was made by the Privy Council to this ruling, nor could it be said that by necessary implication. Hemanta Kumari Devi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. has nullified the effect of Narayanan Chetti v. Muthiah Servai on this aspect of the matter. Further are not here concerned with the answer given by Narayana Chetty v. Muthiah Servai on the question as to whether a lease requiring registration but not registered is receivable in evidence in a suit for specif performance of a contract or for damages for breach of contract. It was the on this issue that the majority of the Full Bench of five Judges in Swaminatha Mudaliar v. Subba Reddiar expressed the opinion that Narayman Chetty v. Muthiah Servai should be overruled. On the other point, it was not overrule on the other hand, it is stated specifically by Justice Viswanatha Sastry that it is still good law on the question whether such an agreement required registration or not. However, that does not help the appellant in any way for the reason that the present problem has to be solved only with reference to the question whether the document has the effect of creating an actual demise not.

25. Bearing in mind these principles, we shall proceed to scrutinise the term of Ex. A-6 and consider their effect on the relevant provisions of the Registration Act. The contents of Ex. A-6 are as follows.—

“We have agreed to permanently lease out to you the following lands situated in Kondadadi village in Chipurupalli Sub-District belonging to us and which are in our enjoyment by virtue of purchase by individuals Nos. 1 and 2 from Kolanavada Suryanarayanaraju and others and from Gachamatta Peda Venkataraju and others viz., lands in Yeguvapoonu Istuva wet and dry lands in Sankarapuvani Istuva, wet and dry lands under Routuvani tank and Chintapoonu tank istuva, together with all the trees like palm, margosa, mango etc. thereon and inclusive of mango usufruct, water rights and fishery rights, with the stipulation that you should duly pay us a fixed cist of Rs. 1800/- annually, that you should evict the tenants from all those lands and take possession of the entire extents according to the sale-deeds and get them cultivated granting sub-leases to tenants of your choice bearing the expenses thereof yourself that you should yourself without any concern to us, look to the repairs and improvement of these lands, that you should pay the circar taxes deducting the same from out of the cist payable to us, that in regard to this permanent lease to you, you should deposit with us Rs. 12,000/- (Rupees Twelve thousands only, that interest thereon at Rs. 600 percent per mensem might be deducted from the cist payable to us and the balance alone need be paid. Should the annual cist for any year be not properly paid but default committed the stipulations as to the permanent lease are to be cancelled, and you should forfeit the deposit and surrender the lands to us. It is also agreed that you should look to the disputes and to the repairs etc., of these lands, yourself reaping the benefit by an act of State or Vis Major. The lease is to be got written (on a stamp paper) and registered within a month from this date. As regards the cist due to us from the ryots of these lands for this year Pardhiva we shall transfer Kadapas to you and on your responsibility you will recover the said cist from them yourself and debiting the public court expenses incurred in respect thereof against us, you will pay us the balance and this transaction is unalterable. This unalterable document letter is executed out of our free will”.

26. It is seen that this document contains the whole bargain and the parties had agreed on all the cardinal points of the contract and no essential particulars remained to be settled at a future date. The description of the document has in to be borne in mind although the label that is given to an instrument does not furnish conclusive test in determine the nature of the document. In the in it is described as a document letter and at the end of the document the description given is unalterable document letter. That it is given to the transaction appears from the recital and which expressions are meant to convey the impression that it was the document. Sri Ramamurthy invites us to hold that this document to conferred a right upon the proposed lessee to obtain a grant of the lease on fulfilment of certain conditions by him on the grounds that the deposit of the Rs. 12,000/- was a condition precedent to the creation of a lease, that no time in fixed for the coming into operation of the lease and that lastly it contained on stipulation that the lessor should transfer the kadapas executed in his favour of the previous tenants. We do not think we can give effect to his argument. The might be the force of the argument, if the condition regarding the is of Rs. 12,000/- is a pre-requisite to the grant of a lease, it is all force in it is regarded as one of the several terms and conditions of the agreement, to reading of the concerned recital leave no room for doubt in our minds that the was only one of the terms of the agreement and was not a condition precedent to contended for by the appellant. Neither the fact that a lease comes into the at a future date or on the termination of the existing lease nor the fact to a formal document shall be executed at a subsequent stage is conclusive the deciding the nature of the document. If it was intended that the transaction to be kept in abeyance till the execution of a formal document, it may be the that there was no concluded agreement to lease the properties. That is in the position here. It is plain from a reading of the document that the in intention of the parties was that it by itself should be regarded as the to. The circumstance that the lessor was required to transfer the kadaas executed by the previous tenants is on the other hand a clear indication that the effect should be given to the document and that the lessee should be to as much possession as the property was capable of, having regard to the in that a permanent lease was given under the agreement. That this is so the manifest from the admission of the appellant himself in his deposition in Exs. B-6 and B-6(a).

“We had a final discussion and the document was written on 30th. As Vizianagaram was far away, the defendants did not want the agreement to be written on stamp paper. Nothing remains to be done by the defendants after the execution of Ex. P-1. I have to pay them money and take possession of the lands”.

27. These admissions answer the contention of the counsel for the appellant to the deposit of Rs. 12,000/- was a condition precedent to the granting of a to and that the parties contemplated that nothing could be done till the on was made and that the execution of a formal document was essential to before the parties could fulfil the terms of the contract. In these circumstances, to we hold that Ex. A-6 is a lease within the definition of Sec. 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act requiring registration and is hit by Sec. 17(1)(d) and to Sec. 49 of the Indian Registration Act.

28. This Appeal coming on for final hearing on Friday the 3rd day of July 1959 after the expression of opinion by the Full Bench and the Appeal having to stood over for consideration till this day, the court delivered the following:

JUDGMENT

(judgment of the Court delivered by Bhimasankaram, J.).

29. The answer of the Full Bench to the question referred it by us is against to the appellant, Ex. A-6 the agreement on the basis of which he seeks in performance has been held to be an agreement of lease falling within the definition of Section 2(7) of the Indian Registration Act and so being to by Section 17(1)(d) of the acts as within the mischief of Section 49 thereof.

30. The question however remains as to whether it is saved by the provision to section 49 of the Indian Registration Act which is in these terms:—

“Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purpose of Sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument”.

31. Under this proviso, if the present suit is one for specific performance of a the tract of lease and is thus within the scope of Chapter II of the Specific the Act, then Ex. A-6 should he used as evidence of such a contract or not. Thus, in order to decide the question of the admissibility of Ex. A-6, in shall have to decide whether there can be founded on that document a claim in for specific performance. The relevant sections are sections 12 and 27-A Section 12 is a general provision dealing with the specific enforcement of an contract, “except as otherwise provided in this Chapter”. Section 27-A to provides for similar enforcement of contracts of lease of a special character to subject to certain specified limitations. In order to succeed, the appellant to must bring his case under one or the other of these sections.

32. Now Section 27-A of the Act runs thus:—

“27-A Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, where a contract to lease immoveable property is made in writing signed by the parties thereto on their behalf, either party may, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, sue the other for specific performance of the contract if—

(a) Where specific performance is claimed by the lessor, he has delivered possession of the property to the lessee, in part performance of the contract; and

(b) Where specific performance is claimed by the lessee, he has in part performance of the contract taken possession of the property or, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract, and has done some act in furtherance of the contract:

Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.

The section applies to contracts to lease executed after the first day of April, 1930”.

33. In the present case, Ex. A-6 is not signed by the appellant himself (the lessee) to has he been put in possession of property; so it is clear that this section does not avail him. But it is contended for the appellant that Ex. A-6 embodies to a contract that could be enforced under Section 12. Now, if has been held, to and in our opinion, rightly, that oral agreements to lease are enforceable under the Section 12. Vide Gokul Chandra Law v. Haji Mohammad Din. But it is not the in plaintiff's case that there was a separate oral contract preceding Ex. A-6 on the which a claim for specific performance could be rested. The position then to is this. Here is a written contract to lease immoveable property signed only to by the lessors. That there can be a contract in writing signed only by one of the parties cannot be disputed. See Maneklal Mansukhbhai v. J.J Ginwalla and Sons. Can a suit for specific performance be laid on the basis of this contract under section 12 of the Specific Relief Act. If Section 27-A of the Act is to be read as intended to cover all written contracts of lease, then section 12 must be held to be confined to the enforcement only of oral contracts of lease. If, on the other hand, Section 27-A is not exhaustive of all cases of written contracts, then, Section 12 may be held to extend to written contracts not covered by that section.

34. In order to answer the question so raised it seems to us necessary to bear in mind the circumstances in which Sec. 27-A was enacted. That Section was exacted by the legislature at the same time as it inserted Section 53-A in the Transfer of Property Act and the proviso to section 49 in the Registration Act. This spurt of simultaneous legislation in the three directions was inspired by the decision of the Privy Council in Skinner v. Skinner, which has ruled that an unregistered agreement to sell immoveable property which was made the foundation of a suit for specific performance could not be received in evidence as it fell within the purview of Sec. 17 and therefore within the prohibition of Section 49 of the Registration Act as it originally stood. The effect of that decision was that a vendee, under a written contract of sale although such a contract was never held to be compulsorily registrable until Skinner's case could not even defend the possession he had obtained thereunder and was liable to be ejected at the instance of the vendor. In the case of a written agreement to lease, which could be read as creating a present and immediate demise and therefore compulsorily registrable, the result was similar. A lessee with such a contract could neither maintain a suit for specific performance nor defend his possession. The legislature therefore introduced Sec. 53-A into the Transfer of Property Act whereby a person having the benefit of an agreement to sell or an agreement to lease is enabled to defend his possession. While Sec. 53-A gave only a shield, Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act placed a weapon of attack in the hands of lessee. He can not only defend his possession but also file a suit claiming specific performance and thus obtain a good title. This new section in the Specific Relief Act must be understood as making an exception in favour of possessory rights of persons having in their favour written contracts of lease which were hitherto inadmissible in evidence and therefore ineffective to sustain suits for specific performance. According to well-known cannons of construction, the legislature must be held to have intended that the new remedy is to be confined to cases falling within the four corners of the section.

35. We may point out, too, that if the appellant's contention is to be given effect to, the result would be that a person seeking enforcement of a contract signed by one of the parties would be in a better position than one suing on the basis of a contract signed by both the parties, because in the former case, he can seek specific performance even though he has not been put in possession. The substantial object of both Sec. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 27-A of the Specific Relief Act it seems to us is to protect rights acquired under written contracts which have been partly performed. It can hardly be said therefore that the intention of the legislature was to mike a written contract of lease of a compulsorily registrable character enforceable proprio vigore. In our opinion, it is clear that no suit for specific performance of a written contract to lease ‘immoveable property can be……………’ maintained unless it can be brought within the language of Section 27-A.

36. Our view that Section 27-A is exhaustive of all claims for specific performance based on written contracts is also supported by authority. Subba Rao, C.J, as he then was, dealt with a case exactly like the one before us and rejected a similar argument as that now urged on behalf of the appellant in Venkateswarlu v. Kotilingam. To the same effect is the ruling of the Nagpur High Court in Balram v. Mahadeo. The learned Judges in the latter case discussed the matter at considerable length and we find ourselves in complete agreement with their reasoning.

37. If this argument fails, it is not disputed that this appeal should be dismissed.

38. Mr. Ramamurthy however has asked us to go into the evidence in order to see whether the defence on the merits is sustainable, as the matter may be taken up to the Supreme Court. We may say that we are not impressed with the defendant's case that Ex. A-6 has been brought into existence under the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 6 of the written statement of the 1st defendant. Indeed, if we had been inclined to agree with the view of the lower court that the contract was unenforceable for the reasons mentioned therein, we might have spared the Full Bench the trouble for, deciding the question which we referred to it. Further, we would add that Mr. Somasundaram for the respondents was not keen in his endeavour to support the judgment of the lower court on the basis of that finding. We do not however propose to record a definitive finding on the matter as we are clearly of the opinion that this appeal should fail for the reasons stated as above.

39. This appeal is dismissed with costs.

Ch. R.

40. Appeal dismissed.