1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 4-12-2000 passed by the respondent No. 1 in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 513 of 1997. The facts arising out of the present writ petition are that the petitioner was a Mobile Booking Clerk with effect from 15-1-1981 and continued to the said post till 31-3-1987. The services were terminated from 1-4-1987. The petitioner moved an original application before the Central Administrative Tribunal and vide its judgment and order dated 22-2-1989 allowed the petition and quashed the order of termination. On the basis of the judgment of the Tribunal the petitioner was reinstated and join his duties on 22-11-1989 but he was not being paid regular pay scale according to the payscale, which becomes entitled as regular employee. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the respondent No. 2 the petitioner filed a reference application under section 15 Sub-clause 2 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. A case was registered as case No. 114 of 1990. The written statement on behalf of the respondent No. 2 was filed and ultimately the reference was allowed by its order dated 30-3-1995. A restoration application was filed by the respondent No. 2 on 24-8-1995 instead of filing an appeal under section 17 of the Act. But on interim order was granted. The respondent No. 2 approached the Central Administrative Tribunal for obtaining the interim order but ultimately on 8-11-1996 the said application was dismissed and the said order was vacated then respondent No. 2 filed a writ petition before this Court which was numbered as Writ Petition No. 11077 of 1997 seeking a direction to the authority under the Payment of Wages Act to decide the restoration application dated 24-8-1995. This Court on 1-4-1997 had passed an order directing the authority to decide the application within a period of three months. It was further directed that the amount deposited in pursuance of the order-dated 30-3-1995 shall not be paid to the respondent No. 2.

2. The respondent No. 2 without making any effort to decide the said restoration application or to file an appeal move an application before the Administrative Tribunal and the High Court only to get the interim order. Thereafter the respondent filed an appeal under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act supported by an application under section 5 on 1-7-1997. It is submitted that the restoration application filed by the respondent was dismissed on 5-7-1997. The appellate authority exercising the jurisdiction under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 has considered the application of the respondent No. 2. Without application of mind and without considering the evidence on record illegally allowed the application for condonation of delay vide its order dated 4-12-2000.

3. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 the limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, if order under section 15 has been passed within thirty days from the order, the limitation for filing the appeal has been provided under the said statute, therefore, the respondent No. 1 has got no jurisdiction under the law to apply provisions of Limitation Act and to condone the delay There is on power conferred upon the respondent No. 1 in view of the provisions of Section 17(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. It has further been stated that as from the plain reading of Section 15 of the Payment Act, the period of limitation is provided twelve months from the date of which deduction is made from the wages and a provision to this effect has also been given that application may be admitted after the said period of twelve months when the applicant satisfied the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. Meaning thereby the statute itself has given a power that in case a person is not able to approach the authority within time prescribed under section 15 he can move an application explaining the delay and reasons but from the perusal of the section 17 which is the provision of appeal against the order passed under section 15 of the act, it has been provided that the appeal may be preferred within thirty days from the date on which the order or direction was made. There is no proviso under the aforesaid section that the Court has any jurisdiction to condone the delay if the appeal under section 17 has not been filed within thirty days from the date of order. Sections 15 and 17 of the Payment of Wages Act being reproduced below:—

15. Claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims-(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a presiding officer of any Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or under any corresponding law relating to the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in the State or any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages, (of persons employed or paid in that area, including all matters, incidental of such claims:

Provided that where the State Government considers it necessary so to do, it may appoint more than one authority for any specified area and may, by general or special order, provided for the distribution or allocation of work to be performed by them under this Act.)

2) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person him self, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorized in writ ing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector un der this Act, or any other person acting with the permission of the authority appointed un der sub-section (1), may apply to such author ity for a direction under sub-section (3):

Provided that every such application shall be presented within (twelve months) from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be:

Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of (twelve months) when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.

3) When any application under sub-sec tion (2) is entertained, the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or other per son responsible for the payment of wages under section 3, or give them an opportunity of being heard, and, after such further inquiry (if any) as may be necessary, may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which such employer or other person is liable under this Act, direct the refund to the employed person of the amount deducted, or the payment of the delayed wages, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the former case and (not exceed ing twenty-five rupees in the latter, and even if the amount deducted or the delayed wages are paid before the disposal of the application, direct the payment of such compensation, as the authority may think fit, not exceeding twenty-five rupees)

Provided that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in the case of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to-

a) a bona fide error or bonafide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person, or

b) the occurrence of an emergency, or the existence of exceptional circumstances, such that the person responsible for the payment of the wages was unable, though exercising reasonable diligence, to make prompt payment, or

c) the failure of the employed person to apply for or accept payment.

4. If the authority hearing an application under this section is satisfied,-

a) that the application was either malicious or vexatious, the authority may direct that a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees be paid to the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages by person presenting the application; or

b) that in any case in which compensation is directed to be paid under sub-section (3), the applicant ought not to have been compelled to seek redress under this section, the authority may direct that a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees be paid to the State Government by the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages.

(4-A) Where there is any dispute as to the person or persons being the legal representative or representatives of the employer of the employed person, the decisions of the authority on such dispute shall be final.

(4-B) Any inquiry under this section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

5. Any amount directed to be paid under this section may be recovered-

a) if the authority is a Magistrate, by the authority as if it were a fine imposed by him as Magistrate, and

b) if the authority is not a Magistrate, by any Magistrate to whom the authority makes application in this behalf, as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate.

17. Appeal-(1) (An appeal against an order dismissing either wholly or in part an application made under sub-section (2) of section 15, or against a direction made under subsection (3) or sub-section (4) of that section) may be preferred, within thirty days of the date on which (the order or direction) was made, in a presidency-town before the Court of Small Causes and elsewhere before the District Court-

a) by the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under section 3, if the total sum directed to be paid by way of wages and compensation exceeds three hundred rupees 9 or such direction has the effect of imposing on the employer or the other person a financial liability exceeding one thousand rupees) or

b) by an employed person or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorized in writing to act on his behalf or any Inspector under this Act, or any other person permitted by the authority to make an application under sub-section (2) of section 15, if the total amount of wages claimed to have been withheld from the employed person exceeds twenty rupees or from unpaid group to which the employed person belongs or belonged exceeds fifty rupees, or)

c) by any person directed to pay a penalty under (Sub-section (4)) of section 15.

(1 - A) No appeal under clause (a) of subsection (1) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited the amount payable under the direction appealed against.

2) Save as provided in sub-section (1), any order dismissing either wholly or in part an application made under sub-section (2) of section 15, or a direction made under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) of that section shall be final.

3) where an employer prefers an appeal under this section, the authority against whose decision the appeal has been preferred may, and if so directed by the Court referred to in sub-section (1) shall, pending the decision of the appeal, withhold payment of any sum in deposit with it.

4) The Court referred to in sub-section (1) may, if it thinks fit, submit any question of law for the decision of the High Court and if it so does, shall decide the question in con-formity with such decision.”

4. It has been further contended that the law has been decided in Sri Anwari Basavarai Patil v. Sri Siddaramaiah reported in Judgment Today 1993 (1) Supreme Court 328 : AIR 1994 SC 572) wherein question of applicability of provisions of Limitation Act in respect of proceeding un der Representation of People Act 1951 was being considered. It has been held that pe riod of notice under proviso 2 Sub-section 1 of Section 47 of the said act does not permit condonation of delay under the Limitation Act Considering the provisions of the said Act has also the effect of section 29(2) of the Limita tion Act, and also law explained under the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra reported in (1974) 2 SCC 133 : AIR 1974 Supreme Court Page 480. It has been held that if on an ex amination of the relevant provisions of spe cial act, it is clear that the provisions of Limi tation Act are necessarily excluded, then ben efits conferred by Limitation Act cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of special act.

5. It has further been contended on behalf of the petitioner the specific provisions for condonation of delay has been made in the second proviso of Sub section 2 of Section 15 of the said Act. Although no such provi sion is there in Section 17, therefore afore said interpretation of law becomes applicable. The counsel for the petitioner has vehemently placed reliance upon the judgment of Hukumdev Narain Yadav (AIR 1974 480) (Supra) and has placed reliance upon para 17, 23, 24 and 25 of the said judgment. The same is being reproduced below:—

17. Though Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act has been made applicable to appeals both under the Act as well as under the Code of Criminal Procedure, no case has been brought to our notice where Section 29 (2) has been made applicable to an election petition filed under Section 81 of the Act by virtue of which either Section 4, 5 or 12 of the Limitation Act has been attracted. Even assuming that where a period of limitation has not been fixed for election petitions in the Schedule to the Limitation Act which is different from the Fixed under Section 81 of the Act, Sec. 29 (2) would be attracted, and what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this section are expressly excluded in the case of an election petition, it is contended before us that the words “expressly excluded” would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. As usual the meaning given in the Dictionary has been relied upon, but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is, in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. The provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act that a suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed are provided for in Section 86 of the Act which gives a peremptory command that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Sub Section 81, 82 or 117. It will be seen that Section 81 is not the only section mentioned in Section 86, and if the Limitation Act were to apply to an election petition under Section 81 it should equally apply to SS. 82 and 117 because under S. 86 the High Court cannot say that by an application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, S. 81 is complied with while no such benefit is available in dismissing an application for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 82 and 117 of the Act alternatively if the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to Section 82 and Section 117of the Act, it cannot be said that they apply to S. 81. Again S. 6 of the Limitation Act which provides for the extension of the period of limitation till after the disability in the case of a person who is either a minor or insane or an idiot is inapplicable to an election petition. Similarly, SS. 7 to 24 are in terms inapplicable to the proceedings under the Act, particularly in respect of the filing of election petitions and their trial,

23. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Nandkishore Bhatt, (1973) 2 SCC 530 (AIR 1973 SC 2464) it was held that there is no question of any common law right to challenge an election as such an discretion to condone the delay in pre sentation of the petition or to absolve the pe titioner from payment of security for costs can only be provided under the statute governing election disputes. It was observed that if no discretion was conferred in respect of any of these matters, none can be exercised under any general law or on any principles of eq uity. If for non-compliance with the provisions of Ss. 82 and 117 which are mandatory, the election petition has be dismissed under S. 86 (1) the presentation of election petition within the period prescribed in S. 81 would be equally mandatory, the non-compliance with which visits the penalty of the petition being dismissed. The answer to the plea that if the petition were to be dismissed, allega tions of serious corrupt practices cannot be enquired into and the purity of the elections cannot be maintained is that given by Mitter, J., in Venkateswara Rao's case, (1969) 1 SCR 679 : (AIR 1969 SC 872) where he said at P. 689

“That is however matter which can be set right only by the Legislature. It is worthy of note that although the Act has been amended on several occasions, a provision like S. 86 (1) as it now stands has always been on the statute book but whereas in the Act of 1951 the discretion was given to the Election Commission to entertain a petition beyond the period fixed if it was satisfied as to the cause for delay no such saving clause is to be found now. The legislature in its wisdom has made the observance of certain formalities and provisions and failure in that respect can only be visited with a dismissal of the petition.”

24. Since the above decision in Venkateswara Rao's case, (1969) 1 SCR 679 : (AIR 1969 SC 872) in August 1968, though Parliament has made certain amendments in S. 8 of the Act in 1969, it has not considered it necessary till now to amend the Act to con fer, on persons challenging an election, ben efits similar to those available to them under the proviso to the repealed S. 85 of the Act, for, as we venture to think, it did not want delays to occur in the disposal of election petitions as in the past.

25. For all these reasons we have come to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not govern the filing of election petitions or their trial and, in this view, it is unnecessary to consider whether there are any merits in the application for condonation of delay.”

6. The further reliance has been placed upon judgment of the Apex Court reported in 1970 (20) FLR Page 153 : (1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR 1970 SC 209) Nityanand M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and has submitted that the scheme of Indian Limitation Act is that only to deal with the application to Courts and as the Labour Court is not a Court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, application under section 33-C (2) were not barred by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Further reliance has been placed upon a judgment of this Court reported in 1998 (3) A.W.C 2216 : 1999 All LJ 805 (Lucknow Bench) Vijai Kumar Bhalla v. District Judge, Bahraich. Reliance has been placed upon Paras 13, 14 and 15 of the said Judgment. The same is being reproduced below-

13.I am definitely of the view that Payment of Wages Act, 1936 provides a complete code in itself, which does not admit of the application of any of the provisions of the Limitation Act mentioned in Section 29 (2) of that Act. Section 17 is very clear that the appeal may be preferred within 30 days of the day on which the order or direction was made. It does not provide that the appeal may be preferred within 30 days of the date, on which any party derived the knowledge of the order or direction made by the Prescribed Authority. Certainly in those cases where the Indian Limitation Act is applicable, the limitation shall run from the date of the knowledge of the order but where a special Act specifically contains a provision that an appeal can be filed within a specific time from the date of the order or direction, the appeal must be filed within the aforesaid period an the provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act cannot be made applicable.

As far as the another thrust of Dr. L.P Misra, the counsel for the petitioner regarding the non-deposit of the whole amount payable under the directions of the appeal against is concerned a provided under Section 17(1-A), it has been clearly stated in para 10 of the writ petition that the certificate filed along with the appeal in regard to the deposit of the amount payable with the authority only related to Rs. 6,472.76: whereas the total amount to be deposited before filing the appeal was Rs. 12,787.02 paise that being so, the finding recorded by the District Judge to the effect that the total amount payable under the direction was deposited under the certificate was erroneous and against the record. There is no denial of the said claim in para 8 of the counter affidavit which deals with the contents of paras 9 and 10 of the writ petition. Only this much has been stated in para 8 of the counter affidavit that it needed no comment and that was a matter of record. The wordings of Section 17 (1 A) puts a complete bar to the effect that no appeal under clause Section 17 (1A) puts a complete bar to the effect that no appeal under clause (a) of subsection (1) would lie unless the memorandum of appeal was accompanied by a certificate by the authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited the amount payable under the direction appealed against. The amount payable under the direction appealed against was Rs. 12,787.02, but it seems that only a sum of Rs. 6,472.76 was deposited.

14. While dealing with the question of limitation, the learned District Judge was of the view that the petitioner did not raise any objection against the application of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. The attention to this Court was drawn towards the averments made in para 6 of the writ petition wherein it has been stated that the petitioner filed an objection to the affidavit to the allegations made in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and in the affidavit filed in support of the same. The objection filed by the petitioner against the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was marked as GA-30 and the counter affidavit filed by the petitioner was marked as GA-27. The certified copy of the objection filed by the petitioner against the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the certified copy of the counter affidavit as well as the certified copy of the order-sheet dated 15-1-1983 and the certified copy of the order-sheet dated 29-11-1982 was annexed by the petitioner in the writ petition as Annexure 3, 4, 5 and 6 to the writ petition, in which specifically it was averred that the appeal was barred by time. It seems that the learned District Judge totally ignored this aspect of the matter.

15.I am of the view that the appeal preferred by the appellant was time barred and the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were not applicable. Besides the above, the appeal was not accompanied by a certificate by the authority to the effect that the appellant had deposited the amount payable under the direction appealed against. The learned District Judge committed a manifest error of law in entertaining the appeal, which was barred by the time and was not accompanied by a certificate issued by the authority to the effect that the appellant had deposited the amount payable under the direction appealed against.

Hence, this writ petition deserves to be allowed. A writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 26 March, 1983 passed by the learned District Judge, Bahraich, contained irt Annexure No. 7 is issued. A writ in the nature of mandamus is issued to the learned District Judge to dismiss the appeal of opposite party No. 2 preferred against the directions dated 30-6-1982 issued by the prescribed Authority under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936”.

7. The another judgment relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner reported in 1999 (1) A.W.C 126 : (1999 ALL LJ 585) Hind Majdoor Sabha, U.P v. State of U.P it has been submitted that the Single Judge relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court has held that Limitation Act will not be applicable under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act.

8. On the other hand the counsel for the respondents has submitted that in view of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, it is a saving clause provides that where any special or local law prescribed the period of limitation different from period prescribed in the schedule that is Limitation Act unless and until they are expressly excluded by special or local law, limitation Act will be applicable. The Section 29 is being reproduced below:—

“29. Savings-(1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 29 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law.

4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of “easement” in Section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882, may for the time being extend.”

9. Reliance has been placed by the counsel for the respondents in Justiniano Augusto De Piedade Barreto, Appellant v. Antonio Vicente Da Fonseca, Respondents And Narain Ramchandra Poi (dead) by L.R's. Appellants v. Vassudeva Pundolica Salcar reported in (1979) 3 SCC 47 : 1979 Supreme Court Page 984 and has placed reliance upon paras 13, 14 and 15 of the said judgment. The further reliance upon two judgments of the Apex Court in (2004) 4 SCC 252 : (AIR 2004 SC 3668) Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar. and has submitted that the Apex Court has taken an analogy that if the further period of limitation is also specifically provided to make an application and that for preferring an appeal and references under the provisions of the Act as section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 1955 prescribes the period of limitation for applying to enforce presumption rights, it does not speak of application of Section 5, Limitation Act or its principles. Therefore, it unnecessarily follows that the legislature did not intend to give benefit of Section 5. Meaning thereby an express exclusion in necessary. Reliance placed upon para 9 of the said judgment. The same is being reproduced below:—

“9. An important departure is made in Section 29 sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act of 1963. Under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 Section 29 (2) (b) provided that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act was specifically and in clear terras excluded, but under Section 29(2) of the present Limitation Act, Section 5 shall apply in case of special or local law to the extent to which it is not expressly excluded by such special or local law. In other words, application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded only when it is expressly excluded by the special or local law. The emphasis of the argument by the learned counsel, who argued for the proposition that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an application made for enforcement of rights of pre-emption under Section 8 of the Act was on the ground that the Act has not expressly excluded the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”

10. Further reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (1976) 1 SCC 392 : AIR 1976 Supreme Court 105 Mangu Ram (in S.L.P No. 918 of 1975) and Ram Prasad Gondamal through Ram Pershad and Jaidayal (In S.L.P No. 919 of 1975) v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi. The Apex Court has held that there is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 in so far as the provisions contained in Section 29 Sub-Section 2 are concerned. Since under the Limitation Act, Section 5 is specifically made applicable by Section 29 Sub-Section 2 it can be believed of for the purposes of expending the period of limitation prescribed by special or local laws if the application can show that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation. It is only if the special or local law expressly excluded an applicability of Section 5 that it would stand displaced. The reliance has been placed upon para 7 of the said judgment. The same is being reproduced below:—

“7. There is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 in so far as the provision contained in Section 29, Sub-section (2) is concerned. Whereas under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 Section 29, Sub Section (2), el. (b) provided that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, other than those contained in Sections 49, to 18 and 22, shall not apply and, therefore, the applicability of Section 5 was in clear and specific terms excluded. Section 29, sub-section 92 of the Limitation Act, 1963 enacts in so many terms that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, which would include Section 5, shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law S. 29, Sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in clear and unambiguous terms provides for the applicability of Section 5 and the ratio of the decision in Kaushalya Rani's case can, therefore, have no application in case governed by the Limitation Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis that the applicability of Section 5 was excluded by reason of Section 29 (2) (b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 190?. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5 is specifically made applicable by Section 29. sub-section (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation. It is only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5, that it would stand displaced. Here, as pointed out by this Court in Kaushalya Rani's case AIR 1964 SC 260 (1964 (1) Cri LJ 152) the time limit of sixty days laid down in sub-section (4) of Section 417 is a special law of limitation and we do not find anything in this special law which expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5. It is true that the language of sub-section (4) of Section 417 is mandatory and compulsive, in that it provides in no uncertain terms that no application from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal. But that would be the language of every provision prescribing a period of limitation. It is because a bar against entertainment of an application beyond the period of limitation is created by a special or local law that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of Section 5 in order that the application may be entertained despite such bar. Mere provision of a period of limitation is howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that in a case where an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 would be available to the applicant and if he can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time limit of sixty days prescribed in sub-section (4) of Section 417, the application would not be barred and despite the expiration of the time limit of sixty days, the High Court would have the power to entertain it. The High Court, in the present case, did not, therefore, act without jurisdiction in holding that the application preferred by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was not barred by the time limit of sixty days laid down in sub section (4) of the Section 417 since the Municipal Corporation of Delhi had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within such time limit. The order granting special leave was in the circumstances not an order outside the power of the High Court.”

11. Another Judgment relied jupon by the counsel for the respondents in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker. reported in (1995) 5 SCC 5 : AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2272 and the reliance has been placed upon Paras 10, 11, 15, 21 and 22. The same is being reproduced below:—

“10. In the light of the aforesaid analysis of the relevant clauses of S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, let us see whether S. 18 of the Rent Act providing for a statutory appeal to the appellate authority satisfies the aforesaid twin conditions for attracting the applicability of S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. It cannot be disputed that Kerala Rent Act is a special Act or a local law. It also cannot be disputed that it prescribes for appeal under S. 18 a period of limitation which is different from the period prescribed by the schedule as the schedule to the Limitation Act does not contemplate any period of limitation for filing appeal before the appellate authority under S. 18 of the Rent Act or in other words it prescribes nil period of limitation for such an appeal. It is now well settled that a situation wherein a period of imitation is prescribed by a special or local law for an appeal or application and for which there is no provision made in the schedule to the Act, the second condition for attracting S. 29 (2) would get satisfied. As laid down by a majority decision of the Constitution Bench of this court in the case of Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel, AIR 1964 SC 1099. When the first schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time limit for it, it can be said that under the first schedule of the Limitation Act all appeals can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period. While the former permits the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to be filed within the prescribed period, it is, therefore, different from that prescribed in the former and thus S. 29 (2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act.

11. It is also obvious that once the aforesaid two conditions are satisfied S. 29 (2) on it its own force will get attracted to appeals field before appellate authority, under S. 18 of the Rent Act. When Section 29 (2) applies to appeals U./S 18 of the Rent Act, for computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeals under that Section, all the provisions of Ss. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Section 5 being one of them would therefore get attracted. It is also obvious that there is no express exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act taking out the applicability of S. 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed before appellate authority under S. 18 of the Act. Consequently, all the legal requirements for applicability of S. 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals in the light of s. 29 (2) of Limitation Act can be said to have been satisfied. There was the view taken by the minority decision of the learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma (AIR 1974 Kerala 162) (Supra). The majority did not agree on account of its wrong supposition that appellate authority function-ing under S. 18 of the Rent Act is a personadesignata. Once the presumption is found to be erroneous as discussed by us earlier, it becomes at once clear that minority view in the said decision was the correct view and the majority view was an erroneous view.

15. After repealing of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and its replacement by the present Limitation Act of 1963 a fundamental change was made in S. 29(2). The present S. 29 (2) as already extracted earlier clearly indicates that once the requisite conditions for its applicability to given proceedings under special or local law are attracted the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 24 both inclusive would get attracted which obviously would bring in S. 5 which also shall apply to such proceedings unless applicability of any of the aforesaid Sections of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded by such special or local law. By this charge it is not necessary to expressly state in a special law that the provisions contained din S. 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the determination of the periods under it. By the general provision contained in S. 29 (2) this provision is made applicable to the periods prescribed under the special laws. An express mention in the special law is necessary only for any exclusion. It is on this basis that when the new Rent Act was passed in 1965 the provision contained in old S. 31 was omitted. It becomes therefore, apparent that on a conjoint reading of S. 29.(2) of Limitation Act of 1963 and S. 18 of the Rent Act of 1965, provisions of S. 5 would automatically get attracted to those proceedings, as there is nothing in the Rent Act of 1965 expressly excluding the applicability of S. 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals under S. 18 of the Rent Act.

21. Before parting with the discussion we may also note that a Division bench of Madras High Court in the case of Rethinaswamy v. Komalavalli, AIR 1983 Mad 45, took the view that the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was a special and local enactment and as Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act were not excluded in their application to the appeals filed under Section 23 of the Rent Control Act. Section 29 (2) enabled the application of Sections 4 to 24 to Rent Control Courts. Consequently, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an appeal preferred before the appellate authority, constituted under Section 23 (1) (b) of the Rent Control Act. We entirely agree with the aforesaid view. In the said decision the majority view of the Full Bench of Kerala High Court in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Ummar (AIR 1974 Ker 162) (Supra) was dissented from and the minority view as found therein was accepted. The said decision of the Madras high Court lays down the correct law and has rightly dissented from the majority view of the Full Bench of the Kerala high Court and has rightly accepted the minority view as discussed by us earlier. Our attention was also invited by learned Counsel for the appellant to the decision of a learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of G. Bulliswamy v. Smt. Annapumamma, AIR 1976 Andhara Pradesh 270. In that decision the learned Judge held relying on Section 3 as found in Evidence Act, 1872 that Rent Controller acting under the A.P Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act who is authorized to record evidence of the parties before him by virtue of Rule 8(2) of the Rules framed under the Act is a court within the meaning of Section 3 and therefore revision application against order of Rent Controller was maintainable under Section 18 before the High Court. In the case of Smt. Vidya Devi v. Firm Madan Lai Prem Kumar, AIR 1971 Punjab & Haryana, 150, a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court was concerned with the question whether Rent Controller and appellate authority under Punjab Rent Restriction Act are courts or civil Courts for purposes of Sections 195 (1) (b), 476 and 479-A of Criminal procedure Code. Tuli, J. Speaking for the Full Bench held that they were such courts and could issue show cause notice why complaint under Section 193 should not be filed against persons committing perjury before Rent Controller and to file complaint under Section 195 (1) (b) of Criminal Procedure Code if it is found expedient in the interest of justice.

22. As a result of the aforesaid discussion it must be held that appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Rent Act, 1965 functions as a court and the period of imitation prescribed therein under Section 18 governing appeals by aggrieved parties will be computed keeping in view the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 such proceedings will attract Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act and consequently Section 5 of the Limitation Act would also be applicable to such proceedings. Appellate Authority will have ample jurisdiction to consider the question whether delay in filing such appeals could be condoned on sufficient cause being made out by the concerned applicant for the delay in filing such appeals. The decision rendered by the High Court in the present case as well as by the appellate authority taking contrary view are quashed and set aside. The proceedings are remanded to the court of the appellate authority, that is, District Judge, Thalassery, Rent Control Appeal No. 9.94 filed before the said authority by the appellant is restored to its file with a direction that the appellate authority shall consider I.A 56/94 filed by the applicant for condonation of delay on its own meaning and they proceed further accordance with law. Appeal is allowed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.”

12. The further reliance has been placed upon a judgment of this Court in U.P State Electricity Board v. District Judge, Gorakhpur reported in 2002 (5) AWC 3795 : (2002 All LJ 2522)

13. In such a way the counsel for the respondents submitted that in Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act as there is no express provision, therefore, in view of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, Section 5 of the Limitation is fully applicable under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act and the Court below has rightly applied the provisions of Limitation Act and has allowed the application.

14. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Govind Saran who appeared for the respondents.

15. The question for determination before this Court is “whether the Payment of Wages Act is a complete code in itself in the matter of limitation or it is a mere adjunct to supplement Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act for the purposes of Limitation; whether Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act can be called in aid to apply to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act by virtue of Section 29 of the Limitation Act 1963?

16. I have considered the submission made on behalf of the parties.

17. Section 29 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act contemplates in no uncertain terms that if a special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of Section 3 would apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 4 to 24 shall apply only in so far as and to extent which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. From a bare perusal of Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, it is crystallises that there is no specific exclusion as to applicability of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act by virtue of Payment of Wages Act, 1936, being a special law. The judgements, which have been relied by the counsel for the petitioner, the case of Sri Anwar Basavaraj Patil v. Sri Siddaramaiah : ((1993) 1 SCC 636 : AIR 1994 SC 512) and Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, ((1974) 2 SCC 133 : AIR 1974 SC 480), were the case relating to the consideration of the provisions of Representation of Peoples Act. Under the representation of Peoples Act there is an express exclusion for entertaining an application. But under the present case, under section 17 of the Pay merit of Wages Act, the express exclusion is not there, therefore, the cases cited by the petitioner will not be of any help.

18. Likewise the judgment relied upon in 1993 (1) Supreme Court 328 was a case relating to re-recrimination petition in the election petition arising out of Section 97 of the Representation of Peoples Act. Under this case provisions relating to appeal under Payment of Wages Act or any similar matter relating to appeal were not reckoned into consideration.

19. So far as Section 17 is concerned the present employee are “may be preferred within 30 days”. In the light of observations made above it unnecessarily false that function of the legislature while indicating Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act was not to exclude the Indian Limitation Act from the applicability expressly to the proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act. In view what has been discussed above, the question is answered in affirmative as the Payment of Wages Act is not complete code in itself. So far as Limitation Act is concerned and it unnecessarily to be supplemented by Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act. Regarding the second question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, can be called in 8 to supply to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act by virtue of Section 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. It is the period that that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is fully applicable in the matter of appeal to be preferred under the Payment of Wages Act.

20. Recently the Apex Court has also considered the applicability of Section 29(2) and Section 5 of the Limitation Act where the same will be applicable in special court though trial of offences relating to person in Securities Act 1992. The Apex Court in Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. v. Custodian. reported in (2004) 11 SCC 472 : (2003 AIR SCW 3076) has taken a similar view that special law or local act provides a limitation period different from that period under Limitation Act. It does not expressly exclude an application of Limitation Act the Limitation Act will be applicable. The Apex Court has held that-

“The provision prescribing a time-limit for failing a petition for objection under Section 4(2) of the Act is mandatory in the sense that the period prescribed cannot be extended by the Court under any inherent jurisdiction of the Special Court. Prescribed periods for initiating or taking steps in legal proceedings are intended to be abided by, subject to any power expressly conferred on the court to condone any delay. If the periods prescribed were not mandatory, it would not have been necessary in the Limitation Act to provide for exclusion or extension of time jn certain circumstances nor would the method of computation of time have any meaning. Section 4(2) of the Act plainly read simply requires a person objecting to a notification issued under Section 3(2) to file a petition raising such objections within 30 days of the issuance of such notification. The words are unequivocal and unqualified and there is no scope for reading in the power of court to dispense with the time-limit on the basis of any principle of interpretation of statutory provisions.”

9. We are of the view that the provision prescribing a time-limit for filing a petition for objection under Section 4(2) of the Act is mandatory in the sense that the period prescribed cannot be extended by the court under any inherent jurisdiction of the Special Court. Prescribed periods for initiating or taking steps in legal proceedings are intended to be abided by, subject to any power expressly conferred on the court to condone any delay. Thus the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for different periods of limitation within which suits, appeals and applications may be instituted or filed or made as the case may be. It also provides for exclusion of time from the prescribed periods in certain case, lays down bases for computing the period of limitation prescribed and expressly provides for extension of time under Section 5 in respect of certain proceedings. If the periods prescribed were not mandatory, it was not necessary to provide for exclusion or extension of time in certain circumstances nor would the method of computation of time have any meaning.

10. Section 4 (2) of the Act plainly read simply requires a person objecting to a notification issued under sub-section (2) of Section 3 to file petition raising such objections within 30 days of the issuance of such notification. The words are unequivocal and unqualified and there is no scope for reading in a power of court to dispense with the time-limit on the basis of any principle of interpretation of statutory provisions. In R. Rudraiah v. State of Karnataka it was contended on behalf of the appellants that Section 48-A of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 which provided for the making of an application within a particular period should be construed liberally in favour of tenants so that the period was to be read as extendable. The submission was rejected on the ground that the language of Section 48-A was unambiguous and could not be interpreted differently only the ground of hardship to the tenants.”

21. In view of the aforesaid fact, it is held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable under section 17 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act. As the appeal filed by the respondents has been entertained and delay has been condoned.

22. I see no infirmity in the order passed by the Court. The writ petition is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim order dated 11-1-2001 is hereby discharged. Petition dismissed.