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Gokul Prasad Mishra v. The Upper Mukhya Adhikari, Zila Parishad, Lalitpur And Others

Allahabad High Court
Apr 11, 2002
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was appointed as "Pond Keeper" on 11-12-1975 on a temporary basis by the Chairman, Zila Parishad, Lalitpur and was subsequently confirmed (the opinion records confirmation dates of 1-8-1977 and, in the counter affidavit, 23-11-1990). By order dated 1-9-1992 the petitioner was placed under suspension. A charge sheet dated 14-10-1992 alleged that the petitioner had entered the accountant's room, used unparliamentary language and misbehaved with the accountant. The petitioner denied the allegations, replied to the charge sheet and alleged that although he had sought documents they were supplied only partially, he was not given a personal hearing, witnesses were not examined in his presence, he was not allowed to cross-examine the department's witnesses and the inquiry record was not maintained.

The writ petition challenged the dismissal/termination order dated 16-3-1993 (also referred to as 16/18-3-1993 in the opinion). A counter affidavit was filed in which the respondents maintained that the charges were serious, the petitioner’s reply was considered, relevant documents were supplied, full opportunity of hearing was given and the inquiry officer (Upper Mukhya Adhikari) had examined witnesses; the termination followed an inquiry report dated 23-2-1993.

The court noted that the respondents did not appear when the matter was called twice; after hearing the petitioner’s counsel and considering the averments in the counter affidavit, the matter was decided finally at that stage.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order dated 16-3-1993 terminating the petitioner’s services should be quashed on the ground that the departmental inquiry did not comply with the procedural requirements of Rules 36 and 37 of the Zila Parishad Service Rules, 1970 and Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.
  2. Whether the petitioner was denied a reasonable opportunity of defence (including the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses and to receive a copy of inquiry proceedings) making the inquiry and the resulting dismissal invalid.
  3. If the dismissal is quashed, whether the petitioner should be reinstated and what quantum of back wages should be awarded.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner denied the allegations in the charge sheet and asserted he had demanded documents which were (according to him) supplied but he was not afforded a personal hearing.
  • He alleged no witnesses were examined in his presence and he was not permitted to cross-examine the persons whose statements formed the basis of findings of guilt; the inquiry record was not maintained.
  • He relied on Rule 36 and Rule 37(2) of the Zila Parishad Service Rules, 1970, which require clear charges, an opportunity to defend, maintenance of records of evidence and that any order of dismissal must specify charges, evidence and reasons; he contended the impugned order did not comply with these requirements and was therefore unsustainable.
  • He also relied on case-law (as cited in the opinion) supporting principles such as the obligation to provide subsistence allowance, the requirement of a proper inquiry, the right to cross-examination and, where bias or apprehension of bias is raised, the need to consider changing the inquiry officer.

Respondents' Arguments

  • By counter affidavit the respondents asserted that the petitioner’s services were confirmed and that the charges were serious; the petitioner’s reply was considered and his services were terminated after assessment by the concerned officer.
  • The respondents maintained that the inquiry officer examined witnesses and that the petitioner had been given full opportunity of hearing; they relied on the inquiry report dated 23-2-1993.
  • The respondents argued relevant documents were furnished to the petitioner and there was no necessity to change the inquiry officer; they contended there was no specific pleading by the petitioner pointing to any particular relevant document that was withheld or to any specific prejudice caused thereby.
  • The respondents cited authorities (for example Chandrama Tewari; State of Tamil Nadu v. K.V. Perumal; Secretary to Government v. A.C.J. Britto) for the proposition that it is not necessary to supply every document asked for but only material and relevant documents, and that non-supply of irrelevant documents does not vitiate enquiry proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India (1987 Supp SCC 518 : AIR 1988 SC 117) It was cited for the proposition that it is not necessary to supply every document asked for; obligation is to supply material and relevant documents. The respondents relied on this authority to contend that non-supply of irrelevant documents does not vitiate the inquiry.
State of Tamil Nadu v. Thiru K.V. Perumal ((1996) 5 SCC 474 : AIR 1996 SC 2474) Reiterated the principle that only material and relevant documents need be supplied in disciplinary proceedings. Relied upon by respondents to support the contention that provision of relevant documents suffices and enquiry was not vitiated.
Secretary to Government v. A.C.J. Britto ((1997) 3 SCC 387 : AIR 1997 SC 1393) Also cited for the proposition that supplying material and relevant documents is sufficient; not every document need be supplied. Invoked by respondents in support of the contention that the departmental enquiry was not vitiated by non‑supply of irrelevant documents.
Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh ((1973) 1 SCC 656 : AIR 1973 SC 1183) Held that where a delinquent could not attend enquiry due to nonpayment of subsistence allowance, the enquiry proceedings (and dismissal) were vitiated for violation of Article 311(2). The court cited this decision to underscore that denial of a reasonable opportunity due to nonpayment of subsistence allowance vitiates the enquiry and consequent dismissal.
State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale ((1983) 3 SCC 387 : AIR 1983 SC 803) Struck down a rule reducing subsistence allowance to Rs.1 as violative of Article 311(2); held normal subsistence allowance must be paid pending proceedings/appeal. Used to support the principle that nonpayment of subsistence allowance can render departmental proceedings violative of Article 311(2) and natural justice.
Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki v. Presiding Officer ((1986) 3 SCC 131 : AIR 1986 SC 1168) Held that denial of payment of at least a small subsistence allowance amounts to gross unfairness and violates principles of natural justice. Cited to emphasize the importance of subsistence allowance in enabling an employee to effectively defend himself in departmental proceedings.
Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. ((1999) 3 SCC 679 : AIR 1999 SC 1416) Discussed the inhumanity of suspension without subsistence allowance and the object and necessity of subsistence allowance; referenced prior authorities including O.P. Gupta and Khem Chand. Cited for the proposition that nonpayment of subsistence allowance frustrates the object of suspension and may vitiate proceedings where the employee cannot defend himself.
Jagdamba Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P ((2000) 7 SCC 90) Held that payment of subsistence allowance under the rules is a right and not a bounty; nonpayment can lead to breach of natural justice. Relied upon by the petitioner and cited in the opinion as supporting the right to subsistence allowance and consequent vitiation if not paid.
K.P. Giri v. State of U.P (2000) 1 UPLBEC 908 (High Court) Held that even if no reply to charge-sheet is submitted, the enquiry officer must fix a date for inquiry and intimate the petitioner; evidence must be produced in petitioner’s presence and he must be given opportunity to cross-examine. Invoked by the petitioner to show that failure to fix enquiry dates and confront evidence violates natural justice.
Bajrang Prasad Srivastava v. U.P. Pariyojana Prabandha U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd ((2000) 2 UPLBEC 1321) High Court authority cited alongside K.P. Giri for procedural requirements of enquiry—intimation of date and opportunity to cross-examine. Relied on by the petitioner to support the argument that no proper enquiry was held.
Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Madras v. F.X. Fernando ((1994) 2 SCC 746) Where a delinquent officer entertains doubt about impartiality of enquiry officer and timely requests change, authorities should appoint another enquiry officer to remove apprehension of bias. Petitioner relied on this authority to argue that a change of inquiry officer should have been considered to allay apprehensions of bias.
Indrani Bai (Smt.) v. Union of India (1994 Supp 2 SCC 256) Held that when a delinquent officer requests change of inquiry officer early on because of doubts about impartiality, authorities should accede and appoint another officer. Used by petitioner to support the contention that doubt regarding the inquiry officer’s impartiality should have been remedied.
Subhash Chandra Sharma v. M.D.U.P. Co-op. Spg. Mills Fed. Ltd ((1999) 4 All WC 3227) Held that after reply to charge-sheet a date must be fixed for enquiry and the petitioner must be intimated; oral and documentary evidence must be led in his presence and he must be allowed to cross-examine; if he fails to appear, ex parte enquiry is permissible, but inquiry must first have been fixed and conducted. Invoked to show that the impugned order was passed without a proper enquiry and thus violated natural justice.
Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen (AIR 1963 SC 1719) Stated the elementary principle that an accused must know the accusation and the testimony in support; must be given opportunity to hear evidence, cross-examine and rebut. Quoted to reinforce the basic requirement of opportunity to confront evidence and cross-examine in disciplinary proceedings.
S.C. Girotra v. United Commercial Bank (1995 Supp 3 SCC 212) Supreme Court set aside dismissal passed without giving the employee an opportunity of cross-examination. Used to support that denial of cross-examination vitiates dismissal orders.
Punjab National Bank AIPNBE Federation (AIR 1960 SC 160) Held that in such enquiries evidence must be recorded in the presence of the charged employee and he must be given an opportunity to rebut the evidence. Cited to support the proposition that evidence must be recorded in presence of the charged employee and he must have an opportunity to rebut.
ACC Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1963) 2 Lab LJ 396 (SC) Principle supporting right to confront and rebut evidence in disciplinary enquiries. Referred to for the same principle of fair opportunity to confront evidence.
Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1963) Lab LJ 78 (SC) Reinforced requirement of evidence recording in presence of the charged employee and opportunity to rebut. Used to corroborate the principle of natural justice in disciplinary enquiries.
Radhey Shyam Pandey v. The Chief Secretary, State of U.P (2001) 2 UPLBEC 1676 : (2001 All LJ 1859) Held that where no regular and proper inquiry was held and subsistence allowance was not paid, ex parte inquiry is illegal and the order of dismissal is quashed. Cited to show that absence of proper inquiry and failure to pay subsistence allowance justify quashing of dismissal.
Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (1980) 4 SCC 443 : AIR 1981 SC 422 Established the common principle that ordinarily reinstatement with full back wages follows quashing of termination, but allowed courts discretion to mould relief in exceptional circumstances. Referred to when considering reinstatement and the quantum of back wages to be awarded.
A.L. Kalra v. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. ((1984) 3 SCC 316 : AIR 1984 SC 1361) In case of a highly placed officer reinstated after dismissal, back wages were mitigated (50%) in view of all aspects of the case and intervening employment. Cited as an example where courts have adjusted back wages upon reinstatement considering the facts.
Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. S.N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences (1999) 3 SCC 60 : AIR 1999 SC 983 Probationer's termination set aside; reinstatement with back wages and continuity ordered in view of facts. Referred to as an authority supporting reinstatement with back wages where justified by the facts.
State Bank of India v. T.J. Paul ((1999) 4 SCC 759 : AIR 1999 SC 1994) Where removal was set aside and remitted for fresh consideration, High Court directions for back wages, promotions, increments etc. were sustained in appropriate circumstances. Cited to demonstrate circumstances in which courts have directed monetary benefits upon setting aside disciplinary orders.
Hardwari Lal v. State of U.P ((1999) 8 SCC 582 : 2000 All LJ 1) Where inquiry was vitiated by failure to examine material witnesses, findings were set aside and reinstatement ordered with adjusted back wages (50%). Used as precedent for setting aside findings and granting reinstatement with partial back wages where long delay or other facts warrant reduction.
Prabhudayal Bihari v. M.P. Rajya Nagrik Aapurti Nigam Ltd ((2000) 7 SCC 502 : AIR 2000 SC 3058) Termination contrary to appointment conditions set aside and reinstatement with back wages ordered. Cited to support reinstatement where termination violates contractual or appointment conditions.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Prem Chand Gupta ((2000) 10 SCC 115 : AIR 2000 SC 454) Where termination was invalid (contravention of S.25-F ID Act) and long delay occurred, the court awarded 50% back wages taking into account public employer's funds and delay. Referred to when considering quantum of back wages in light of delay and public employer's position.
Vinod Bhanti v. State of Bihar ((2000) 10 SCC 146) Withdrew resignation scenario: where resignation withdrawn, person may be deemed not relieved from service but not entitled to back wages for periods not actually worked. Cited for principle that back wages need not be awarded for periods during which the employee did not actually work.
Ex Constable Chhote Lal v. Union of India ((2000) 10 SCC 196) Held that the opinion of the departmental authority that it is not reasonably practical to hold an inquiry must be justified; dispensing with inquiry unjustified in that instance. Referred to for the principle that dispensing with inquiry requires justification and is not to be lightly done.
Director of Collegiate Education v. Jagadguru Pancha-charya Vishwa Dharma Vidya Peetha ((2000) 10 SCC 200) Court set aside directions to pay back wages where the issue of liability for back wages was not before the Tribunal or High Court. Cited to show limited circumstances where courts may decline to order back wages if not part of original proceedings.
Assistant General Manager, SBI v. Thomsa Jose ((2000) 10 SCC 280) Bank employee dismissed for misconduct; Tribunal modified punishment; reinstatement allowed with back wages but with conditions (e.g., no increment for specified period) depending on nature of misconduct. Used to illustrate that courts/tribunals may tailor relief (reinstatement, back wages, conditions) depending on misconduct and public interest.
Scooters India Ltd. v. Labour Court (1989 Supp 1 SCC 31 : AIR 1989 SC 149) Authority relied upon in the context of Tribunal awards related to reinstatement and back wages. Referenced by the court when discussing the scope for tribunal modification of punishment and awarding of monetary benefits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by observing the statutory and rule framework applicable to the petitioner—the Uttar Pradesh Chhetra Samiti and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam, 1961 and the Zila Parishad Service Rules, 1970 (notably Rules 36 and 37). The court extracted and emphasised the procedural protections contained in those rules: (i) clear and definite charges; (ii) written statement of defence and option to be heard; (iii) if oral inquiry is held, oral evidence to be recorded and the charged person to be allowed to cross‑examine witnesses; (iv) maintenance of a sufficient record of evidence and findings; and (v) requirement that orders of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank be in writing specifying charges, defense and reasons (Rule 37(2)).

On the facts presented, the petitioner asserted that no proper inquiry was conducted—no witnesses were examined in his presence, he was not permitted to cross-examine, and records of proceedings were not maintained. The respondents asserted the contrary, stating that the inquiry officer had examined witnesses and that full opportunity had been given; they also relied on authorities to contend that only material and relevant documents needed to be supplied.

The court analysed these contentions against Article 311(2) of the Constitution and an extensive line of authorities emphasizing the fundamental requirements of natural justice in disciplinary proceedings—particularly that the employee must know the charges and the evidence against him and must be given a fair opportunity to meet that evidence, including cross‑examination and production of witnesses. The opinion reviewed precedents establishing that (a) enquiry proceedings conducted without affording reasonable opportunity (including on account of nonpayment of subsistence allowance preventing attendance) are vitiated; (b) nonpayment of subsistence allowance can amount to denial of a practical opportunity to defend oneself; and (c) when procedural infirmities have occurred (for example, failure to fix inquiry dates, conduct ex parte proceedings without proper notice, failure to allow cross‑examination, or not maintaining records), the inquiry and punishment can be set aside.

Applying these principles to the present record, the court concluded that a major punishment had been imposed without observance of the procedure prescribed under Rules 36 and 37. The court found that the inquiry had not been conducted in consonance with the normal procedure required by those rules. On that basis and in light of the authorities cited concerning procedural fairness and consequences of defective enquiries, the court held the inquiry report, its findings and the order of dismissal dated 16/18-3-1993 to be unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed. The inquiry report, its findings and the dismissal order dated 16/18-3-1993 are set aside; the petitioner is directed to be reinstated with consequential benefits. However, the court directed that only 50% of back wages shall be paid to the petitioner for the period since 18-3-1993 (the petitioner had not rendered any service since that date).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner will be reinstated in service and will receive 50% of back wages for the period since termination; the dismissal and its underlying inquiry report are quashed.
  • The court’s decision is grounded on established principles of natural justice (Article 311(2) and Rules 36–37) and existing precedent regarding the necessity of a fair inquiry, cross-examination and the consequences of procedural failures. The opinion applies these precedents to the facts and does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond those authorities.
Show all summary ...

1. The matter called twice none appeared on behalf of the respondents. Counter affidavit has been filed. Therefore, after hearing learned counsel for the petitioner and on the basis of the averment made in the counter affidavit this matter is decided finally at this stage.

2. In this writ petition, a prayer has been made to quash the order dated 16-3-1993 terminating the services of the petitioner.

(1) Heard Sri Jai Krishna Tiwari holding the brief of Sri Shashi Nandan, learned counsel for the petitioner.

3. The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the case are that the petitioner was appointed on 11-12-1975 as ‘Pond Keeper’ by the Chairman, Zila Parishad, Lalitpur on temporary basis and subsequently he was confirmed on 1-8-1977. The services of the petitioner was governed by Uttar Pradesh Chhetra Samiti and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam, 1961 and Zila Parishad Service Rules, 1970. By order dated 1-9-1992 the petitioner was placed under suspension. A charge sheet was issued to him on 14-10-1992 alleging that the petitioner had entered in the room of accountant and under provocation has used un-parliamentary language and had misbehaved with the accountant. The petitioner has replied to the charge sheet and denied the allegations. According to the petitioner, he has demanded certain documents which were supplied but no personal hearing was given to him and no opportunity was given to examine any of his witnesses or to cross-examine the witnesses produced on behalf of the department. The relevant extract from Zila Parishad Service Rules 1970 is applicable to the case of the petitioner is given as under:

“36. Procedure for disciplinary proceedings.— (1) No order (other than an order based on facts which have led to his conviction on a criminal charge) of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank (which includes reduction to a lower post or time-scale or to a lower stage in a time scale but excludes reversion to a lower post of a person who is officiating in a higher post), shall be passed against any servant of the Zila Parishad unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of a definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged and which shall be so clear land precise as to give sufficient indication to the person charged of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires or if the authority concerned so directs an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegations as are not admitted. At the inquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the enquiring officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be admitted to cross-examine as he may wish provided that the officer conducting the enquiry may for called as he may wish, provided that the officer conducting the enquiry may for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. Neither the Zila Parishad nor the person charged shall be entitled to be represented by a counsel. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. The officer conducting the enquiry may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the person charged.

(2) Sub-rule (1) shall not apply—

(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has held to his conviction on a criminal charge; or

(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be considered by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to observe the prescribed procedure; or

(c) where the State Government is satisfied and directs accordingly that the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to observe the prescribed procedure.

(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to observe wholly or partly the procedure prescribed in sub-rule (1), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove or reduce in rank the person concerned shall be final.

37. Procedure to be followed after enquiry under rule 36 — (1) After an enquiry against a person has been completed and after the punishing authority has arrived at provisional conclusions in regard to the penalty to be imposed, the person charged shall, if the penalty proposed is dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, be supplied with a copy of the proceedings prepared under Rule 36, excluding the recommendations, if any, in regard to the punishment made by the officer conducting the enquiry and given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence during the enquiry:

Provided that if for sufficient reasons the punishing authority disagrees with any part of whole of the proceedings prepared under Rule 36 the point or points of such disagreement, together with a brief statement of the grounds thereof, shall also be communicated to the person charged along with the copy of the proceedings under Rule 36.

(2) Every order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, shall be in writing and shall specify the charge or charges brought, the grounds of defence, if any, and the reasons for the order.”

4. From perusal of the aforesaid rules it appears that full departmental enquiry is to be held against delinquent official and the enquiry office is bound to maintain the record of evidence and statements of finance and accounts thereof apart from affording an opportunity to the delinquent employee of alleged oral evidence and to cross-examine witnesses and copy of the proceedings prepared under Rule 36 is to be served upon the delinquent employee in order to enable him to make a proper reply to the proposed penalty.

5. According to para 11 of the writ petition the inquiry officer has not held any enquiry in as much as neither witnesses have been examined nor has the petitioner been afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the persons on the basis of whose statements the findings of guilt has been recorded without maintaining records of the proceedings.

6. According to the petitioner Rule 37(2) further provides that every order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank shall be in writing and shall specify the charge or charges, accounts of facts, evidence, if any, and the reason for order but however, the perusal of the impugned order indicates that note of the conditions imposed therein have been followed. Therefore, the dismissal order is not legally sustainable. According to para 18, the person involved in the alleged incident was also issued only warning and only show cause notice was issued to him. In view of reply submitted by him only warning was issued to him by the Chairman, Zila Parishad.

7. Counter affidavit has been filed, according to which the petitioner's services was confirmed on 23-11-1990 to the post of Pond Keeper. According to para 5 of the counter affidavit, the charges against the petitioner were serious in nature, therefore, seeing the gravity of offences his services were terminated. According to para 6 of the counter affidavit, the reply of the petitioner was considered to assess the conduct of the petitioner by his concerned officer.

8. According to para 11 of the counter affidavit, the inquiry officer, the Upper Mukhya Adhikari has examined the witnesses and full opportunity of hearing have already been given to the petitioner. On the basis of inquiry report dated 23-2-1993 the service of the petitioner has been terminated.

9. On the other hand, it has been argued by learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner was given sufficient opportunities and the relevant documents were furnished to him and there was no necessity to change the inquiry officer therefore, dismissal has been correctly made. Learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the respondents contended that there was no specific pleading pointing out which particular relevant document was not supplied to the petitioner due to which he was prejudiced. It was also submitted in reference to (a) Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India, 1987 Supp SCC 518 : AIR 1988 SC 117; (b) State of Tamil Nadu v. Thiru K.V Perumal, (1996) 5 SCC 474 : AIR 1996 SC 2474 and (c) Secretary to Government v. A.C.J Britto, (1997) 3 SCC 387 : AIR 1997 SC 1393 where Supreme Court found that it was not necessary to supply every document asked for rather the obligation was only to supply material and relevant documents only, thus, the enquiry proceedings had not vitiated for non-supply of irrelevant documents.

10. The relevant part of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India read as follows:

“(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:

Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed.……”

11. In Ghanshyam Das Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1973) 1 SCC 656 : AIR 1973 SC 1183. when the delinquent Forest Ranger failed to attend the departmental enquiry due to paucity of funds resulting from nonpayment of subsistence allowance, the 5 Judges Constitution Bench quashed the order of the Government dismissing him from service though giving liberty to the Government to start a fresh enquiry in accordance with law against him, observing as follows:

“5……………As he did not receive subsistence allowance till March 20, 1965, he could not, in our opinion, attend the enquiry. The first payment of subsistence allowance was made to him on March 20, 1965, after a part of the evidence had already been recorded on February 9, 10 and 11, 1965. The enquiry proceedings during those days are vitiated accordingly. The report of the Inquiry Officer based on that evidence is infected with the same defect. Accordingly, the order of the Government dismissing him from service cannot stand. It was passed in violation of the provisions of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution for appellant did not receive a reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the enquiry proceedings.”

12. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale, (1983) 3 SCC 387 : (AIR 1983 SC 803). the Supreme Court has held the second proviso to Rule 151(1)(ii)(b) as unreasonable and void being violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India providing payment of allowance of only Rupee 1/- per month to a suspended Government servant holding that normal subsistence allowance must be paid during the pendency of the trial of the criminal proceedings, appeal and even appeal before the Supreme Court, which is evident from Paragraph 23 of the judgment which reads as follows:

“Any departmental enquiry made without payment of subsistence allowance contrary to the provision for its payment, is violative of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution as has been held by this Court in the above decision. Similarly, any criminal trial of a civil servant under suspension without payment of the normal subsistence allowance payable to him under the rule would be violative of that Article. Payment of subsistence allowance at the normal rate pending the appeal filed against the conviction of a civil servant under suspension is a step that makes the right of appeal fruitful and it is therefore, obligatory. Reduction of the normal subsistence allowance to the nominal sum of Rs. 1 per month on conviction of a civil servant under suspension in a criminal case pending his appeal filed against that conviction, whether the civil servant is on bail or has been lodged in prison on conviction pending consideration of his appeal, is an action which stultifies the right of appeal and is consequently unfair and unconstitutional just as it would be impossible for a civil servant under suspension who has no other means of subsistence to defend himself effectively in the trial Court without the normal subsistence allowance — there is nothing on record in these cases to show that the civil servants concerned in these cases have any other means of subsistence — it would be impossible for such civil servant suspended to prosecute his appeal against his conviction fruitfully without payment of the normal subsistence allowance pending his appeal. Therefore, Baban's contention in the writ petition that the subsistence allowance is required to support the civil servant and his family not only during the trial of the criminal case started against him but also during the pendency of the appeal filed in the High Court or this Court against his conviction is correct. If any provision in any rule framed under Article 309 of the Constitution is illusory or unreasonable, it is certainly open to the civil servant concerned to seek the aid of the Court for declaring that provision to be void. In these circumstances, I hold that the second proviso is unreasonable and void and that a civil servant under suspension is entitled to the normal subsistence allowance even after his conviction by the trial Court pending consideration of his appeal filed against his conviction until the appeal is disposed of finally one way or the other, whether he is on bail or lodged in prison on conviction by the trial Court.”

(Emphasis supplied)

13. In Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki v. Presiding Officer, (1986) 3 SCC 131 : AIR 1986 SC 1168 it was held as follows:

“Denial of payment of at least a small amount by way of subsistence allowance would amount to gross unfairness and violative of principles of natural justice.” (Paragraphs 8 and 9)

14. In Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 2 UPLBEC 1280 : (1999) 3 SCC 679 : AIR 1999 SC 1416 the Supreme Court had held as follows (paras 29, 31, 33):

“………………Suspension notwithstanding non-payment of subsistence allowance is an inhuman act which has an unpropitious effect on the life of an employee. When the employee is placed under suspension, he is demobilised and the salary is also paid to him at a reduced rate under the nick name of ‘subsistence allowance’, so that the employee may sustain himself. This Court in O.P Gupta v. Union of India, (1987) 3 JT SC 532 : ((1987) 4 SCC 328 : AIR 1987 SC 2257) made the following observations with regard to subsistence allowance;

“An order of suspension of a Government servant does not put an end to his service under does not put an end to his service under the Government. He continues to be a member of the service in spite of the order of suspension. The real effect of suspension as explained by this Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India, (AIR 1958 SC 300) is that he continues to be a member of the Government service but is not permitted to work and further during the period of suspension he is paid only some allowance — generally called subsistence allowance — which is normally less than the salary instead of the pay and allowances he would have been entitled to if he had not been suspended. There is no doubt that an order to suspension, unless the departmental inquiry is concluded within a reasonable time, affects a Government servant injuriously. The very expression ‘subsistence allowance’ has an undeniable penal significance. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘subsist’ as given in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. (II) at p. 2171 is “to remain alive as on food; to continue to exist”. “Subsistence” means — means of supporting life, especially a minimum livelihood.”

15. If therefore, even that amount is not paid, then the very object of paying the reduced salary to the employee during the period of suspension would be frustrated. The act of non-payment of subsistence allowance, would gradually starve himself to death.

16. On joining Government service, a person does not mortgage or barter away his basic rights as a human being, including his fundamental rights, in favour of the Government. The Government, only because it has the power to appoint, does not become the master of the body and soul of the employee. The Government by providing job opportunities to its citizens only fulfils its obligations under the Constitution, including the Directive Principles of the State Policy. The employee, on taking up an employment only agrees to subject himself to the regulatory measures concerning his service. His association with the Government or any other employer, like Instrumentalities of the Government or Statutory or Autonomous Corporations etc., is regulated by the terms of contract of service or Service Rules made by the Central or the State Government. Under the proviso to Article 390 of the Constitution or other Statutory Rules including Certified Standing Orders. The fundamental rights, including the Right to Life under Article 21 of the Constitution or the basic human rights are not surrendered by the employee. The provision for payment of subsistence allowance made in the Service Rules only ensures non-violation of the right to life of the employee. That was the reason why this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Chanderbhan, (1983) 3 SCR 337 : (1983) 3 SCC 387 : AIR 1983 SC 803, struck down a Service Rule which provided for payment of a nominal amount of rupee one as subsistence allowance to an employee placed under suspension. This decision was followed in Fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki v. Presiding Officer, 1986 JT 394 : ((1986) 3 SCC 131 : AIR 1986 SC 1168) and it was held in that case that if an employee could not attend the departmental proceedings on account of financial stringencies caused by non-payment of subsistence allowance, and thereby could not undertake a journey away from his home to attend the departmental proceedings, the order of punishment, including the whole proceedings would stand vitiated. For this purpose, reliance was also placed on an earlier decision in Ghanshyam Das Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1973) 1 SCC 656 : AIR 1973 SC 1183.

17. Since in the instant case the appellant was not provided any subsistence allowance during the period of suspension and the adjournment prayed for by him on account of his illness, duly supported by medical certificates, was refused resulting an ex part proceedings against him. We are of the opinion that the appellant has been punished in total violation of the principles of natural justice and he was liberally not afforded any opportunity of hearing. Moreover, as pleaded by the appellant before the High Court as also before us that on account of his penury occasioned by non-payment of Subsistence Allowance, he could not undertake a journey to attend the disciplinary proceedings, the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer at such proceedings, which were held exparte, stand vitiated.”

(Emphasis supplied)

18. In view of the discussions aforesaid, we hold that due to non-payment of subsistence allowance, the inquiry, the punishment of dismissal of the petitioner and dismissal of his appeal, all are void and liable to be quashed by this Court by grant of a writ of certiorari.

19. The petitioner has placed reliance on the decision Jagdamba Prasad Shukla v. State of U.P, (2000) 7 SCC 90 : (2000 All LJ 2444) (para 8)

“where the Supreme Court has held that the payment of subsistence allowance in accordance with the Rules, to an employee under suspension is not a bounty. It is a right. An employee is entitled to be paid the subsistence allowance. No justifiable ground has been made out for non-payment of the subsistence allowance all through the period of suspension i.e from suspension till removal. One of the reasons for not appearing in inquiry as intimated to the authorities was the financial crunch on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance and the other was the illness of the appellant. The appellant in reply to the show cause notice stated that even if he was to appear in inquiry against medical advice, he was unable to appear for want of funds on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance. It is a clear case of breach of principles of natural justice on account of the denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant to defend himself in the departmental enquiry. Thus, the departmental enquiry and the consequent order of removal from service are quashed.

20. The petitioner also placed reliance on the judgments of this High Court (2000) 1 UPLBEC 908, K.P Giri v. State of U.P Paras 7 and 8 as well as on (2000) 2 UPLBEC 1321, Bajrang Prasad Srivastava v. U.P Pariyojana Prabandha U.P State Bridge Corporation Ltd. It was held in the case of K.P Giri (supra).

“Even in the absence of any reply submitted by the petitioner to the charge-sheet, it was incumbent upon the enquiry officer to fix the date in the enquiry and to intimate the petitioner about the same which has not been done in the present case. Moreover, from a perusal of the order of dismissal dated 20-3-98 it will be seen that the management had produced the evidence in support of the charges levelled against the petitioner making had been accepted by the enquiry officer without making any effort to confront the same to the petitioner. Thus, the entire proceedings have been conducted in gross violation of equity, fair play and is in breach of the principles of natural justice.”

21. In respect of change of inquiry officer the petitioner has further placed reliance on (1994) 2 SCC 746 page 12 (Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Madras v. F.X Farnando) where it was held that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done, therefore, the Supreme Court has directed that an another enquiry officer be appointed in order to remove any apprehension of bias on the part of the respondent. In 1994 Supp (2) SCC 256 Para 5 Indrani Bai (Smt.) v. Union of India. The Supreme Court has held that:

“it is seen that right, through, the delinquent officer had entertained a doubt about the impartiality of the enquiry to be conducted by the enquiry officer. When he made a representation at the earliest, requesting to change the enquiry officer, the authorities should have acceded to the request and appointed another enquiry officer, other than the one whose objectivity was doubted.”

22. The petitioner has placed reliance on (1999) 4 All WC 3227 Para 5, Subhash Chandra Sharma v. M.D.U.P Co-op. Spg. Mills Fed. Ltd. In this judgment of this Court it was held that:

“In our opinion, after the petitioner replied to the charge-sheet a date should have been fixed for the enquiry and the petitioner should have been intimated the date, time and place of the enquiry and on that date the oral and documentary evidence against the petitioner should have been led in his presence and he should have been given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses against him and also he should have been given an opportunity to produce his own witnesses and evidence. If the petitioner in response to this intimation had failed to appear for the enquiry, then an ex-parte enquiry should have been held but the petitioner's service should have not been terminated without holding an enquiry. In the present case, it appears that no regular enquiry was held at all. All that was done that after receipt of the petitioner's reply to the charge-sheet. He was given a show cause notice and thereafter the dismissal order was passed. In our opinion, this was not the correct legal procedure and there was violation of the rules of natural justice. Since no date for enquiry was fixed nor any enquiry held in which evidence was led in our opinion, the impugned order is clearly violative of natural justice.

23. In Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719, the Supreme Court observed (para 4):

“It is an elementary principle that a person who is required to answer a charge must know not only the accusation but also the testimony by which the accusation is supported. He must be given a fair chance to hear the evidence in support of the charge and to put such relevant questions byway of cross examination as he desires. Then he must be given a chance to rebut the evidence led against him. This is the barest requirement of an enquiry of this character and the requirement must be substantially fulfilled before the result of the enquiry can be accepted.”

24. In S.C Girotra v. United Commercial Bank, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 212 the Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order which was passed without giving the employee an opportunity of cross examination. In Punjab National Bank AIPNBE Federation. AIR 1960 SC 160 (vide para 66) the Supreme Court held that in such enquiries evidence must be recorded in the presence of the charge sheeted employee and he must be given an opportunity to rebut the said evidence. The same view was taken in ACC Ltd. v. Their Work Man, (1963) 2 Lab LJ 396 (SC) and in Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1963) Lab LJ 78 (SC).

25. In view of the judgment of this Court ((2001) 2 UPLBEC 1676) : (2001 All LJ 1859). Radhey Shyam Pandey v. The Chief Secretary, State of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, the order the dismissal of writ petitioner was held not justifiable by this Court (DB) (at p. 1866 of All LJ):

‘The respondents have not conducted the inquiry according to the proper procedure prescribed under Rule 99. No specific date, time and place of inquiry was fixed oral and documentary evidence against the petitioner should have been adduced in his presence and he should have been given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses against him and also he should have been given an opportunity to produce his own witnesses and evidence. A dismissal order is a major punishment having serious consequences and hence should be passed only after complying with the rules of natural justice. Since in the present case no regular and proper inquiry was held nor was subsistence allowance paid, hence in these circumstances, it is clear cause that the petitioner had not been afforded a fair opportunity much less a reasonable opportunity to defend himself that has resulted in violation of principal of natural justice and fair play. The ex-parte inquiry is illegal and the order of dismissal dated 27-3-2001 is quashed.”

26. Now the question arises whether the petitioner after the dismissal/removal has been set aside, has been allowed to reinstate in service and what should be the amount of back wages is to be paid to him. Withdrawal of resignation of the appellant was considered and appellant was entitled to remain in continuity in service was not allowed any back wages if the employee did not actually worked.

27. In (1980) 4 SCC 443 : (AIR 1981 SC 422), Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi, the Supreme Court has held that reinstatement with full back wages is common principle, however, the Court has power to mould the relief in exceptional cases. In para 6 of Surendra Kumar Verma (supra) it was held:

“Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of workmen. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the Court to make appropriate consequential orders. The Court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. The Court may deny the relief of award of full back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases the Court may mould the relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted.”

28. In (1984) 3 SCC 316 : AIR 1984 SC 1361, (A.L Kalra v. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Limited) it was held that when the delinquent highly placed officer in public sector though not guilty of misconduct found to have committed lapses in not returning House Building Advance and Vehicle Purchase Advance was reinstated after dismissal from service then having regard to all the aspect of the case, the appellant was paid 50% of the back wages for the period since his removal from service up to his reinstatement excluding the period for which he had procured an alternative employment.

29. In (1999) 3 SCC 60 : (AIR 1999 SC 983) (Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta it was held that the employee was entitled to back wages when the termination of probationer was set aside and the facts and circumstances of the case the reinstatement was allowed with back wages and continuity in service.

30. In (1999) 4 SCC 759 : (AIR 1999 SC 1994), State Bank of India v. T.J Paul when the respondent, employee, in doing act prejudicial to the interests of the bank, or gross negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss even if the actual loss was not necessary to attract his clause ahead enough to hold such employee, respondent, guilty when such bank officer charges to have sanctioned loans without adequate security and without prior approval/ratification from superior authorities. This was contrary to the departmental instructions but in the departmental proceedings the penalty of removal imposed on respondent employee was found ultra vires and case remitted to the appellant for fresh consideration of penalty in accordance with rules then the order of High Court direction payment of back wages, promotions, increments etc. was allowed to sustain.

31. In (1999) 8 SCC 582 : (2000 All LJ 1) (Hardwari Lal v. State of U.P) wherein the appellant, a police constable, charged of having abused his colleague while he (appellant) was under the influence of liquor and neither complainant nor the other employee who accompanied the appellant to hospital for medical examination, examined as witnesses, inquiry was held to be vitiated being in violation of principle of natural justice and plea rejected that there was other material sufficient to come to conclusion one way or the other on the failure to the respondents to examine material witnesses. The finding of departmental enquiry was set aside and the appellant was reinstated, however considering that long time had elapsed between dismissal and reinstatement for which no blame could be made on respondent, 50% of back wages was allowed.

32. In (2000) 7 SCC 502 : (AIR 2000 SC 3058) (Prabhudayal Bihari v. M.P Rajya Nagrik Aapurti Nigam Ltd.) The Supreme Court observed that termination being in contravention of the specific conditions mentioned in the appointment order, the appellant was reinstated in service with back wages.

33. In (2000) 10 SCC 115 : (AIR 2000 SC 454), (Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) v. Prem Chand Gupta) the Supreme Court has held that where termination of respondent's services declared invalid being violation of S. 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and keeping in view that the case dragged on for 33 years but neither of the contesting parties were at fault. The delay was due to pendency of the case in Courts and the employer was a Municipal Corporation whose funds were primarily meant for public benefit. In the facts and circumstances of the case, only 50% back wages was allowed with all other consequential benefits.

34. In (2000) 10 SCC 146, (Vinod Bhanti v. State of Bihar) the Supreme Court has held that the appellant a confirmed employee of Artificial Limb Centre, absented from duty, submitted his resignation but before acceptance of the resignation letter, he withdrawn the same. It was held after that having withdrawn the resignation the appellant could not be deemed to have been relieved from service. The Centre remaining non functional for said period and the appellant was allowed to resume work at later stage when centre became non-functional. It was found that the appellant was not in service, therefore, he would be deemed to have been relieved from service. He was entitled to continue in service after the resignation having been withdrawn but he was not entitled for back wages for the period the appellant did not actually worked.

35. In (2000) 10 SCC 196, (Ex Constable Chhote Lal v. Union of India) the Supreme Court has held that such on opinion of departmental authority that it was not reasonably practical to hold inquiry, was not justified and argument advanced by the respondents that the appellant being a police constable could have influenced witnesses and therefore, dispensing of inquiry was done, such argument rejected. Dispensing of inquiry was not found according to law, therefore, the liberty was given to, respondents to proceed against appellant by holding inquiry. It was observed while setting aside the order of dismissal that in view of the nature of the charges against the appellant.

36. In (2000) 10 SCC 200, (Director of Collegiate Education v. Jagadguru Pancha-charya Vishwa Dharma Vidya Peetha) where the direction of the High Court to the Government to pay the back wages and other monetary benefits to respondent No. 3 was set aside as the question of liability of Government to pay the back wages and other benefits was not in issue either before the Tribunal or before the High Court and therefore, the High Court was justified to pass such a direction.

37. In (2000) 10 SCC 280, (Assistant General Manager, SBI v. Thomsa Jose) In that case Bank employee was dismissed from service on account of his admitting of misconduct of withdrawing money unauthorisedly from customer's account. The Industrial Tribunal has power to modify punishment of discharged/dismissal imposed by employer. The Industrial Tribunal ordered reinstatement without back wages and the writ petition filed by the Bank against the award of the Tribunal was dis missed by High Court relying upon Scooters India Ltd. v. Labour Court, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 31 : (AIR 1989 SC 149). It was held that the Bank employee deals with public money and therefore cannot be treated leniently as has been done by the Tribunal in the case in question and the award of the Tribunal, therefore, modified by inserting an additional condition that the employee would not get any increment for ten years with cumulative effect. However, the reinstatement of the appellant was allowed with back wages without any increment for period of ten years.

38. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and have perused the contents of the writ petition. I find that the major punishment have been given to the petitioner for which the proper procedure as prescribed under Rules 36 to 37 has not been observed. The enquiry has not been made in consonance to the normal procedure. Therefore, the enquiry report and its findings as well as the decision of dismissal by order dated 16/18-3-1993 is set aside and the petitioner is directed to be reinstated with consequential benefit. However, since 18-3-1993 the petitioner had not rendered any service, therefore, only 50%, of back wages shall be paid to him. With these above observations the writ petition is allowed.

39. Petition allowed.