- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
State Bank Of India, Zonal Office, Gorakhpur v. Ram Chandra Dubey And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Twenty-six workmen (including respondents 1 to 23) employed by the petitioner-bank between 4 May 1961 and November 1962 had their services terminated on 16 August 1969. An industrial dispute was referred by the Central Government (by notification dated 21 June 1985) to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kanpur, registered as Industrial Dispute No. 255 of 1985, asking whether the terminations were justified and, if not, what relief the workmen were entitled to.
The Tribunal issued an award dated 4 February 1987 holding that the terminations were not justified and directing reinstatement of all the workmen with effect from 16 August 1969. The petitioner-bank challenged that award by filing Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 9901 of 1987 before this Court; an interim order stayed operation of the award subject to the condition that all the workmen be reinstated. The workmen were reinstated on 4 February 1987. The writ petition was later dismissed by this Court by order dated 9 January 1997, which found no error of law in the award.
The award was silent on the question of back-wages. Respondents 1 to 23 (out of the 26 reinstated workmen) filed three separate applications under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (L.C.As. Nos. 335, 336 and 340 of 1997) seeking computation of back-wages on the basis of the award. Those applications were decided by an impugned order (referred to in the writ petition as dated 11 September 1988 in the body of the opinion and elsewhere referenced to an order dated 19 November 1998), which computed back-wages from 16 August 1969 as per annexures to that order.
The petitioner-bank challenged the impugned order in the present writ petition, principally contending that (a) because the award was silent on back-wages, the workmen had no right to back-wages that could be executed under S. 33-C(2); (b) reinstatement without an express order for back-wages does not automatically entitle workmen to past wages; and (c) the Tribunal's computation was wrong and excessive, having disregarded or misapplied management evidence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether reinstatement of workmen without a specific direction for payment of back-wages necessarily means rejection of their claim for back-wages (i.e., whether reinstatement simpliciter implies entitlement to back-wages).
- Whether applications under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are maintainable to obtain computation of back-wages where the underlying award is silent on the question of back-wages (i.e., whether S. 33-C(2) proceedings can be used to compute a right that the award did not explicitly grant).
- Whether the mathematical computation of back-wages made by the Tribunal (respondent 24) suffers from inaccuracies that justify interference by this Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner-Bank's Arguments
- Because the award of 4 February 1987 is silent as to back-wages, the workmen have no accrued right to back-wages that can be executed under S. 33-C(2); therefore, the S. 33-C(2) applications were not maintainable.
- Reinstatement simpliciter does not automatically mean reinstatement with back-wages; in the absence of a specific direction for payment of back-wages, those wages cannot be awarded.
- Reliance was placed on Maneck Gopal Divekar v. Phoenix Mills Ltd. (1988 L. & I.C. 629) (Bombay High Court) for the proposition that an order of reinstatement must specifically mention back-wages to grant them, and that when statutory alternatives exist an order of reinstatement simpliciter should not be read as including back-wages.
- Reference was made to a decision of a Single Judge of this Court in Gorakhpur Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Ram Kripal Nag Banshi (Second Appeal No. 40 of 1995) to contend that arrears of salary cannot be granted where the suit was merely for reinstatement unless a finding of non-gainful employment is recorded; the petitioner-bank also complained of errors in the Tribunal’s mathematical calculation and the Tribunal's dismissal of management evidence.
Respondent-Workmen's Position
- The respondents indicated that the challenge to the impugned order was purely a question of law and the respondents did not file a counter-affidavit; counsel for respondents stated he would not file a counter-affidavit and invited final disposal on the legal matrix.
- The Tribunal had found reinstatement to be the appropriate relief and implicitly embraced the claim for full back-wages even though the award was silent; the applications under S. 33-C(2) were for computation of back-wages on the basis of the award and did not create any new substantive right.
- Respondent counsel did not object to a recalculation of the back-wages if the petitioner produced materials showing computational errors.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Maneck Gopal Divekar v. Phoenix Mills Ltd., [1988 L. & I.C. 629] (Bombay High Court) | Held that an order of reinstatement cannot automatically be read as an order of reinstatement with back-wages; when statute provides alternatives, an order of reinstatement simpliciter does not include back-wages unless specified. | The Court confined the observations in Maneck Gopal to the facts and statutory scheme (Maharashtra Act s.30(1)(b)) and refused to apply it as a universal principle; the opinion states those observations are to be limited to that case's facts and statute. |
| Gorakhpur Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Ram Kripal Nag Banshi (Second Appeal No. 40 of 1995) | Where suit was merely for reinstatement and not recovery of arrears, arrears of salary could not be granted without recording a finding on gainful employment; led to modification allowing subsistence allowance only. | The Court held this decision not helpful in the present case because the respondent-workmen were immediately before termination working and getting salary of the post they were holding. |
| State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atal Behari Shastri, [1993 (66) F.L.R 855] | Referenced in support of the principle that reinstatement does not automatically carry full back-wages in certain contexts (as cited in the Gorakhpur Kshetriya decision). | Referenced only indirectly via other authority; the Court did not rely on it as determinative in the present matter. |
| Depot Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C. v. Venkateswarulu, [1994 (1) L.L.N 863] | Referenced for the proposition that reinstatement following suspension pending enquiry does not automatically entitle full salary without findings on gainful employment. | Referred to as part of background jurisprudence but not applied to alter the outcome in the present case. |
| S.V. Mitto v. L.C., [(1973) 2 A.P.L.J 374] | Held that on reinstatement a worker is not automatically entitled to wages for the entire interregnum in every case. | Noted by the Court as one of several decisions showing variability in outcomes; Court balanced this against other authorities favoring entitlement to back-wages. |
| Andhra Scientific Company v. Labour Court, [1971 L. & I.C. 513] | Holds that award of reinstatement restores status and implies entitlement to full back-wages reduced by income earned elsewhere. | Used by the Court to support the proposition that reinstatement ordinarily carries entitlement to back-wages (subject to reduction for gainful employment). |
| Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd., [1979 (1) L.L.N 6] (Apex Court) | Established that reinstatement with continuity normally entitles a workman to full back-wages except to the extent of gainful employment; emphasized hardship to workmen due to protracted litigation and referred to Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution. | The Court treated this decision as of "far reaching consequence" and as central authority supporting the normal rule that reinstatement implies entitlement to back-wages unless employer proves gainful employment or other relevant circumstances. |
| S.M. Saiyad v. Baroda Municipal Corporation, [1985 (50) F.L.R 81] | Workmen held entitled to full back-wages unless there are relevant grounds to deny them. | Relied upon as reinforcing the ordinary rule that reinstatement carries entitlement to back-wages unless rebutted by employer evidence. |
| Union of India v. Babu Ram Lalla, [1987 Supp SCC 71 : A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 344] | Where termination was a nullity, the workman was entitled to be paid salary on the footing that he had always continued in service. | Relied upon to support the proposition that a void termination means the employee is to be treated as having remained in service for salary entitlement purposes. |
| Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Dass, [1984 (1) L.L.N 90] | Where illegally terminated workmen reached superannuation and physical reinstatement was not possible, they are deemed to have continued in service and entitled to all back-wages and terminal benefits; back-wages calculated as if service had been uninterrupted. | Used to illustrate that reinstatement (or a finding that termination was void) carries broad monetary consequences, including benefits accruing in the period of interruption. |
| Vasantika R. Dalia v. Baroda Municipal Corporation (Special Civil Application No. 10005 of 1996) (decided 5 May 1997) | Held that once reinstatement is granted, continuity of service is a direct consequence unless continuity was specifically denied; back-wages depend on gainful employment factors. | Relied upon to support the proposition that reinstatement normally carries continuity and that back-wages depend on whether the employee was gainfully employed during the interruption. |
| Deshbandhu Cinema v. I.T., [1969 — I L.L.J 138] and Vihar Talkies v. I.T., [1969 — I L.L.J 145] | Considered the meaning of "reinstatement" and its implications (restoration to prior position). | Cited to support the lexical and legal meaning of "reinstatement" as restoration to status quo ante, underpinning the Court's analysis that reinstatement normally implies continuity and back-wages. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by observing that the award of 4 February 1987 unequivocally directed reinstatement of the workmen with effect from 16 August 1969 but was silent on back-wages. The central question for analysis was whether reinstatement simpliciter — an order that restores an employee to the position held before dismissal/termination — carries with it an implied entitlement to back-wages.
The Court analysed the meaning of “reinstatement” (including dictionary and legal authorities) and identified two distinct consequences of reinstatement: (1) restoration of the worker and the contract of service; and (2) entitlement, from the reinstatement date, to the wages the worker would have been entitled to had he continued in service. The Court cited and examined a series of authorities, giving particular weight to the Apex Court's decision in Hindustan Tin Works (1979), which emphasises that reinstatement with continuity of service ordinarily carries entitlement to full back-wages except to the extent that the employee was gainfully employed during the period of enforced idleness.
The Court reviewed conflicting or qualifying authorities (for example S.V. Mitto and the Bombay High Court's Maneck Gopal decision) and explained that certain observations (notably those grounded in the specific statutory alternatives under the Maharashtra statute) are fact- and statute-specific and cannot be elevated to a universal rule denying implied back-wages on reinstatement. In particular, the Court confined Maneck Gopal to its statutory context (Maharashtra Act s.30(1)(b)) and did not accept it as a general principle applicable in all cases.
Synthesising the precedents and the policy concerns (hardship to workmen due to protracted litigation, and constitutional/social welfare considerations referenced in Articles 41 and 43), the Court concluded that the normal rule in labour jurisprudence is that reinstatement is ordinarily coupled with a direction for back-wages, and that departure from this rule can be made only on proof of relevant circumstances (e.g., that the workman was gainfully employed during the period, or other circumstances warranting denial).
Applying this legal framework to the present facts, the Court found no attempt by the petitioner-bank to show gainful employment or any other ground that would justify denying back-wages. The Tribunal's finding that the award of reinstatement embraced the claim for full back-wages (even though the award was silent on the point) was accepted as correct. The Court further addressed the procedural question whether S. 33-C(2) proceedings could be used to compute back-wages when the award was silent: it held that the S. 33-C(2) applications were for computation only and did not create a new substantive right; respondent 24 merely computed back-wages on the basis of the award (which, interpreted in light of settled jurisprudence, conferred the right).
On the contention that the Tribunal's arithmetical calculation might be inaccurate, the Court noted the petitioner’s specific complaints and the respondents' willingness to permit recalculation. The Court declined to undertake the recalculation in writ jurisdiction but directed respondent 24 to reconsider and recalculate the back-wages in light of any material the parties wish to place before it.
Holding and Implications
Holding: On the legal matrix the writ petition failed and was dismissed. The Court held that reinstatement in the present circumstances carries an entitlement to back-wages; respondents 1 to 23 are entitled to back-wages for the period 16 August 1969 to 3 February 1987. The applications under S. 33-C(2) were maintainable for computation of back-wages because the award of reinstatement, read in light of authoritative precedents, conferred the right to claim back-wages even though the award was silent on the point.
Direct Consequences and Directions:
- Respondents 1 to 23 are entitled to back-wages for the period 16 August 1969 to 3 February 1987 as a consequence of the reinstatement ordered by the Tribunal and affirmed by this Court.
- The Court directed respondent 24 to revisit the mathematical computation of back-wages and to recalculate them in the light of any material placed before it by either party. This recalculation was to be completed within one month from the date a certified copy of the judgment is produced to respondent 24.
- If mistakes are found in the calculations they shall be rectified and the parties intimated. The parties were to bear their own costs, and a certified copy of the judgment was to be provided to counsel on payment of usual charges within 72 hours.
Broader implication: The Court applied and reaffirmed the established principle in labour jurisprudence — particularly as expounded in Hindustan Tin Works and related authorities — that reinstatement normally carries entitlement to back-wages unless the employer proves gainful employment or other cogent reasons to deny that relief. The Court confined contrary observations in other authorities (e.g., Maneck Gopal) to their facts and statutory contexts rather than adopting them as universal rules.
1. An interesting and important question of law, that has been canvassed in the present writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, is whether the reinstatement of workmen without a specific order for the payment of back-wages would necessarily mean rejection of the claim for such wages. To understand the background in which the controversy has come to be raised, it is necessary to narrate certain facts.
2. Twenty-six workmen, including respondents 1 to 23 were employed by the petitioner-bank between 4 May, 1961 and November 1962. The services of all the 26 employees were terminated on 16 August, 1969. An industrial dispute was raised and the Central Government by its notification, dated 21 June, 1985, referred the following dispute for adjudication to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kanpur:
“Whether the action of State Bank of India in relation to their Gorakhpur Branch in terminating the services or Sri Ram Chandra Dubey and 25 other employees of the bank (as mentioned in annexure) is justified? If not, to what relief are the workmen concerned entitled?”
A reference came to be registered as Industrial Dispute No. 255 of 1985. Both the parties canvassed their points of view before the Tribunal. An award, dated 4 February, 1987, a copy of which is Annexure 1 to the writ petition, was made. After elaborate discussion of the facts and the rival contentions of the parties, it was concluded:
“19. That in any view of the matter the services of the workmen could not have been terminated. Consequently I hold that the action of the management of State Bank of India in relation to their Gorakhpur Branch in terminating the services of Sri Ram Chandra Dubey and 25 other employees of the bank as mentioned in the annexure is not justified.
20. The result is that all the workmen mentioned in the annexure to the reference order are entitled to be reinstated in service with effect from 16 August, 1969”.
The petitioner challenged the validity of the award before this Court by filing a writ petition, being Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 9901 or 1987. An interim order staying the operation of the award was passed subject to the condition that all the workmen are reinstated. The workmen in whose favour the award was made were reinstated on 4 February, 1987. By order, dated 9 January, 1997, a copy of which is Annexure 2 to the writ petition, Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 9901 of 1987 was dismissed by this Court as it was found that the award in question does not suffer from any error of law. A passing reference was made to the question, which is the subject-matter of challenge in the present petition that the workmen who have been reinstated in service, are not entitled to past wages as the award on the point is absolutely silent. This question was not gone into in the said writ petition primarily on the ground that there was no challenge against the award on the said ground Out of 26 workmen, who were reinstated, respondents 1 to 23 moved three separate applications under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), for computation of the amount of back-wages on the basis of the award. All these three applications (L.C.As Nos. 335, 336 and 340 of 1997 have been decided by the impugned order, dated 11 September, 1988, a copy of which is Annexure 7 to the writ petition. Back-wages for the period 16 August, 1969, as per details given in the annexure appended to the order, were computed.
3. The petitioner-bank has challenged the impugned order, dated 19 November, 1998, mainly on the ground that in the absence of any direction in the award regarding payment of back-wages, the question of that claim being entertained under S. 33-C(2) of the Act did not arise and, therefore, the applications moved by the respondent-workmen were not maintainable in law; that though the workmen have been reinstated with effect from 16 August, 1969 impliedly granting continuity in service, workmen do not, as a matter of right, become automatically entitled to back-wages in full or in part; that in the absence of the specific order, back-wages could not be awarded to the respondent-workmen and in any case, the amount as calculated by the respondent 24-Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kanpur Nagar (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), without taking into consideration the evidence of the petitioner-bank is wrong and excessive. On the above grounds, it is prayed that the impugned order, dated 19 November, 1998. Annexure 7 to the writ petition be quashed.
4. Sri H.N Singh, appearing on behalf of respondents 1 to 23, stated that since the impugned order is challenged purely on legal matrix, he would not file any counter-affidavit and the writ petition be decided finally at this stage.
5. Heard Sri S.N Varma, learned senior advocate, assisted by Sri Navin Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner-bank and Sri H.N Singh, on behalf of the respondent-workmen.
6. It is an indubitable fact that that the award, dated 4 February, 1987, is totally silent with regard to the payment or nonpayment of the back-wages though the respondent-workmen have been directed to be reinstated with effect from 16 August, 1969, on which date, their services were terminated. When a workman is reinstated, then on some occasions, some difference of opinion arises regarding the past facilities, wages, leave, bonus, etc., which are not specifically decreed or awarded by the order by which the workman is reinstated. In the absence of a specific direction, one way or the other, a vex question to make payment of the back-wages arises. Whether a workman is entitled to such wages would depend on the meaning and consequence of the order of reinstatement. In the case of wrongful dismissal/termination, reinstatement is the normal relief, which should be granted to the aggrieved workman and this can only be departed from in extraordinary case because the establishment is closed, or the post is abolished or (here is bitterness or lack of confidence between the parties or the worker is on the verge of retirement or is old or infirm so as to incapable of discharging his duties. Taking into consideration the material on record the Tribunal came to the conclusion that reinstatement of the respondent-workmen was the appropriate relief which could be allowed to them Accordingly, an award for reinstatement was made and the order of reinstatement has further been affirmed by this Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ petition No. 9901 of 1987. The order of reinstatement passed in favour of the respondent-workmen, therefore, is beyond the pale of challenge.
7. Sri S.N Varma, learned senior advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner-bank, urged that in the absence of specific direction for the payment of back-wages, the respondent-workmen were not at all entitled to claim such wages. In support of his contention that a mere order of reinstatement would not necessarily mean reinstatement with back-wages, reliance was placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Maneck Gopal Divekar v. Phoenis Mills, Ltd., [1988 L. & I.C 629], in which it was observed that an order of reinstatement cannot be construed as an order of reinstatement with back-wages. The term “reinstatement” has to be read with the necessary limitations by which it is governed, such as the reinstatement with or without back-wages or reasonable compensation in lieu thereof. It was further observed in the said case that normally when a relief of reinstatement is granted, it is coupled with the order of back-wages whether full, half or otherwise, unless there are compelling circumstances in the case for not granting back-wages. But the order has to specifically mention granting of back-wages when reinstatement is granted otherwise it would necessarily means reinstatement without back-wages. In the opinion of learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court, it would not be correct to say that an order of reinstatement without back-wages does not exist If an order of reinstatement is to be construed as an order of reinstatement with full back-wages there was no necessity for the Legislature to make provisions or four alternatives in granting the relief to a dismissed or discharged workman. With reference to the provisions of S. 30(1)(b) of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, which provided for four alternative reliefs, namely:
“(i) payment of reasonable compensation; or
(ii) reinstatement;
(iii) reinstatement with or without back-wages; or
(iv) payment of reasonable compensation in lieu of back-wages.
In the case of dismissal, discharge or termination of services, it was observed that when the relief of ‘reinstatement simpliciter’ is granted it means relief of reinstatement and nothing more and certainly not the back-wages along with it. The view taken in the aforesaid case proceeded on the reasoning that if there are four alternatives available to the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court in granting the relief to the complainant and when anyone of them is granted, it would necessarily mean rejection of the other three. In view of the specific four alternatives provided in the Maharashtra Act, the various observations made in Maneck Gopal case (vide supra), are to be confined to the facts of that case only. The observations made therein are not of universal application so that they may be transplanted in all the given situations which may arise beyond the purview of the provisions of Maharashtra Act”.
8. On behalf of the petitioner, reference was also made to a decision, dated 13 November, 1995, of learned Single Judge of this Court in Gorakhpur Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Mohaddipur, Gorakhpur v. Ram Kripal Nag Banshi, Second Appeal No. 40 of 1995. In that case, the order granting the full back-wages by the civil Court was challenged. It was urged that where the suit was merely for reinstatement and not for recovery of arrears of salary, the arrears of salary could not be granted without recording a finding that the employee was not gainfully employed. Relying upon the decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atal Behari Shastri, [1993 (66) F.L.R 855] and Depot Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Hanumkonda v. Venkateswarulu, [1994 (1) L.L.N 863], it was observed that where an employee who was suspended pending departmental enquiry for a criminal charge and an order of reinstatement is passed, he is not automatically entitled to full salary. The order passed by the first appellate Court was modified in the second appeal with the clarification that the plaintiff-employee shall stand restored to his position as it existed immediately before the order of removal from service was passed, meaning thereby, he was entitled to the subsistence allowance which he was getting during the period of suspension prior to the order of removal. The decision in the second appeal, referred to above, which has been heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner-bank is of no help and assistance in the present case for one simple reason that the respondent-workmen 1 to 23 were immediately before then termination on 16 August, 1969, working and getting the salary of the post which they were manning.
9. It is true that the payment of back-wages depends on various imponderables and variable factors. Back-wages may not be granted depending upon the finding on the question of gainful employment or otherwise during the period of enforced idealness. It has been held in a catena of decisions that it is for the employer to establish that the workman was gainfully employed during the period he remained out of job or that mere existed certain circumstances which debarred the workman from claiming payment of back-wages. Nothing of the kind has been shown in the case of present 23 respondent-workmen.
10. Law is clear on the point that normally reinstatement should carry a direction for payment of back-wages. Ordinarily reinstatement contemplates back-wages. In a case where reinstatement simpliciter has been ordered without a specific order for the payment of back-wages, the question is as to whether such an order of reinstatement implies direction for payment of back-wages also. To answer this question, one has to consider the meaning of the expression “reinstatement”. Reinstatement results in emplacing a person in a position from which he resigned or was dismissed; it means restoration of the status qua ante the resignation or dismissal, as the case may be. The word “re” when used as a prefix normally means “again” or “back”. Reinstatement ordinarily means restoration of ex-employee to his original post and putting him into the position he would have been if he would have continued in service all along and he is, therefore, entitled to all back pay, allowances and other privileges. The word “reinstatement” means that the employee is put back in the same position as if he has not been dismissed. The above meaning of the word “reinstatement” has been explained by Venkatramaiya in “Law Lexicon and Legal Maxim” as well as in Words and Phrases Vol. IV, pages 524-525 (Rowland Borrows). This expression was also considered and given the same meaning in Deshbandhu Cinema v. I.T, [1969 — I L.LJ 138] and Vihar Talkies v. I.T, [1969 — I L.L.J 145]. The effect of reinstatement therefore, that it effaces the order of dismissal or termination for all practical purposes and if the order of dismissal/termination is set aside, the employee is restored back to the position and status which he was occupying an enjoying just before the order of dismissal or termination was passed. The order of reinstatement wipes off the stigmatic order of dismissal or termination. Reinstatement implies as if the order of dismissal/termination was never passed. When an order of reinstatement is made, two distinct consequences follow:
(1) the worker is reinstated and the contract of service is restored; and
(2) from the date he is entitle to wages as he was entitled to prior to the date of dismissal/termination and the employee continues to be in service uninterrupted by the offending order.
Though in the case of S.V Mitto v. L.C, [(1973) 2 A.P.L.J 374], it was held that on reinstatement a worker is not automatically entitled to get wages for the entire period, in another case of Andhra Scientific Company v. Labour Court, [1971 L. & I.C 513], it was observed that the effect of an award of reinstatement is to restore the employee to his former position and status. It implies that on reinstatement, he should get his full back-wages reduced to the extent of the income earned by him elsewhere. Even though the workman has not been in actual service from the date of his termination till the order of termination was set aside, he must be deemed to have remained in service once the order of termination is set aside. This point came to be considered with all specificity by the Apex Court in Hindustan Tin Works (Private), Ltd. v. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works (Private), Ltd., [1979 (1) L.L.N 6]. The relevant observations which are of far reaching consequence and have a direct bearing on the controversy in hand, may be extracted as below:
“The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to work of the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract and simultaneously deprived the workman of his earnings. If thus the employer is found to be in the wrong as a result of which the workman is directed to be reinstated, the employer could not shirk his responsibility of paying the wages which the workman has been deprived of by the illegal or invalid action or the employer. Speaking realistically, where termination of service is questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our system where the law's proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after such a protracted time and energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is to be told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back-wages which would be due to him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved. Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back-wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. This is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated as in this case, viz., to resist the workman's demand for revision of wages, the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances, reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed with full back-wages. Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution would insist us in reaching a just conclusion in this respect”.
11. In S.M Saiyad v. Baroda Municipal Corporation Baroda., [1985 (50) F.L.R 81], the workmen were held entitled to the full back-wages unless the same could be denied on some relevant grounds. In Union of India v. Babu Ram Lalla, [1987 Supp SCC 71 : A.I.R 1988 S.C 344], the Apex Court took the view that since the order of termination of the workman was rightly held to be a nullity, he was entitled to be paid salary on the footing that he had always continued in service and the void order was never in existence in the eye of law. Not only this, in the case of Gammon India Limited v. Niranjan Dass, [1984 (1) L.L.N 90], where the illegally terminated workmen had reached the age of superannuation and, therefore, physical reinstatement in service was not possible, the Apex Court declared that the workmen shall be deemed to have continued to be in service uninterruptedly from the date of attempted termination of service till the date of superannuation and that he would be entitled to all back-wages including the benefit of revised wages or salary, if during the period there is revision of pay-scales with yearly increments, revised dearness allowance or variable dearness allowance and all terminal benefits if he has reached the age of superannuation such as, provident fund, gratuity, etc. It was directed that back-wages should be calculated as if the workman continued in service uninterrupted. He was also held entitled to leave encashment and bonus, if other workmen in the same category were paid the same. It would not be out of place to make a reference to a decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Vasantika R. Dalia v. Baroda Municipal Corporation [Special Civil Application No. 10005 of 1996, decided on 5 May, 1997] (vide infra). In that case, by an award, the relief or reinstatement was granted but the relief of back-wages had been denied specifically and the relief of continuity of service had not been denied in any terms except that along with the relief of reinstatement, the word, “continuity” had not been mentioned. It was held that once the relief of reinstatement is granted, the continuity of service is the direct consequence rather inherent in the relief of this nature. When the relief of reinstatement is granted and the continuity of service is not specifically denied the party has to be relegated to the same position as was held by it at the time of termination. It was further observed that when the order of termination has been found to be void, the workman holds the relief of reinstatement with no mention of specific denial of continuity of service, the concerned workman has to be relegated to the position which was obtained at the time of termination of his/her services and there is no question of denying the continuity of service for the period for which the services have been interrupted on account of an unlawful and void order. As regards the question of back-wages, it was observed that it is dependent on variable factor of gainful employment during the period of idleness and, therefore, in a given case the relief of back-wages cannot be granted depending upon the question of gainful employment or otherwise during the period the party remained out of employment.
12. From the analysis of various decisions, particularly the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Hindustan Tin Works (Private), Ltd., [1979 (1) L.L.N 6] (vide supra), it can easily be spelt out that the claim for back-wages is implicit, integral part, and necessary inseparable concomitant of the order of reinstatement. The thrust of all the decisions is that ordinarily a workman, whose services have been illegally terminated, would be entitled to full back-wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idealness. It is the normal rule in labour jurisprudence. If the order of termination is void being contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of India or mandatory provisions of law, in such a case, the employee must be deemed to have continued in service without break and is entitled to salary throughout. It would not make any difference if an order for the payment of back-wages has not specifically been passed. On the reinstatement, even though simpliciter, the normal rule of payment of back-wages has to be applied unless it is proved that the workman has engaged himself in some gainful employment or there existed any other circumstance to deprive him of the said benefit. The normal rule can be departed from only when the employer objecting to the payment of back-wages establishes the circumstances necessitating the departure from the well embedded normal rule, which has, in course of time, ripened into law. In the instant case, there is no attempt, or even a faint suggestion on the part of the petitioner-bank to reflect the circumstances to neutralize the normal rule. Undoubtedly the continuity of service of respondents 1 to 23 has been maintained by making the order of reinstatement with effect from 16 August, 1969. In the absence of any circumstance to neutralize the normal rule that reinstatement is coupled with the relief of back-wages, respondents 1 to 23 are entitled to back-wages, i.e, for the period of 16 August, 1969 to 3 February, 1987. The impugned order, dated 19 November, 1998, therefore, does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity in so far as it reaches the conclusion that the respondent workmen are entitled to back-wages.
13. Now it is time to consider the legal question whether an order for the payment of back-wages in the circumstances could be passed by respondent 24 on applications under S. 33-C(2) of the Act. Sri S.N Varma, learned senior advocate and counsel for the petitioner-bank urged that it is settled law that the proceeding under S. 33-C(2) of the Act is in the nature of execution proceedings by which an existing right in favour of an employee under a settlement or award or under the statute can be executed and since no such right of full back-wages had accrued in favour of the respondent workmen in terms of the award, which is silent on the question of payment of back-wages, the applications under S. 33-C(2) of the Act were not maintainable. This submission is nothing but a subterfuge and an attempt to hairsplit the controversy. A firm finding has been recorded by respondent 4, which has also found approval of this Court that the award cannot be interpreted to mean that the back-wages were not implied in the relief of reinstatement. It has been held that the award, dated 4 February, 1987, by which the reinstatement was ordered, embraced within its ambit the claim for full back-wages even though it was silent on the point. Applications under S. 33-C(2) of the Act moved by the workmen before respondent 24 were essentially for the purpose of computation of back-wages. Respondent 24 has not determined any new right in favour of the workmen. It has simply computed the back-wages on the basis or the award of reinstatement which conferred a right for claim of back-wages on the respondent-workmen.
14. Sri Varma, learned counsel for the petitioner-bank, also urged that the mathematical calculation of the back-wages arrived at by respondent 24 has suffered certain inaccuracies and on a proper calculation and proof of certain facts, there would arise a wide gap in the amount, which is actually payable to the respondent-workmen and which has been awarded by the respondent 24. A pointed reference was made to the observation of respondent 24 in the impugned order that the evidence of Vinod Kumar Agarwal, Deputy Manager, MW. 1, was not taken into consideration and the version of the management was not found to be worth consideration as the claim of the respondent-workmen was not specifically denied in the written statement. Sri H.N Singh, learned counsel for the respondent workmen has no objection if in view of the alleged yawning discrepancy recalculation of the back-wages is made. It is not possible for this Court to undertake this exercise in the writ jurisdiction.
15. On legal matrix, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Respondent 24, however, is directed to give a fresh look to the calculation of the back-wages payable to respondents 1 to 23 and recalculate them in the light of the material, which may be placed before it by the petitioner-bank as well as the respondent workmen. This exercise shall be concluded by respondent 24 within a period of one month from the date a certified copy of this judgment and order is produced by either of the parties. If there are any mistakes in the calculations, they shall be rectified and intimated to the parties. The parties shall bear their own costs. Let certified copy of this judgment and order be supplied to the learned counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges within 72 hours.
Alert