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Jado Rai v. Onkar Prasad

Allahabad High Court
May 1, 1975
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns the second revision against the decisions of the trial court and the lower revisional court, both of which held that a suit was not liable to be stayed. The issue arose from two suits filed in different courts: the earlier suit in the court of the Munsif and the subsequent suit in the court of the District Judge. The courts below decided the question framed as “Whether the suit is liable to be stayed?” The revision challenges the courts’ interpretation of pleadings and their reliance on Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C), arguing also for the applicability of Section 151, C.P.C.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit is liable to be stayed under Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C).
  2. Whether the court has inherent power under Section 151, C.P.C to stay a suit when Section 10 is not applicable.
  3. The scope and interplay between Section 10 and Section 151 of the C.P.C in relation to staying suits pending in different courts.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The courts below erred in focusing exclusively on Section 10, C.P.C and failed to consider the applicability of Section 151, C.P.C.
  • Where Section 10 is not applicable, the court has inherent power under Section 151 to stay a suit pending before it.
  • Relied on cases such as J.T Republike v. Rungata and Sons, Bhagwati Prasad v. Sudheswar Singh, The Bharat Nidhi Ltd. v. Shri Shadi Lal, and Banshidhar v. Laxmidas to support this contention.

Opposite Party's Arguments

  • Section 10, C.P.C is exhaustive regarding the circumstances under which a court can stay a suit.
  • It is not open to a court to invoke inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C to stay proceedings if Section 10 applies.
  • Relied principally on Manohar Lal v. Seth Hira Lal (A.I.R 1962 S.C 527) and other Supreme Court decisions to argue that inherent powers cannot override express provisions of the Code.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Manohar Lal v. Seth Hira Lal, A.I.R 1962 S.C 527 Section 10, C.P.C is exhaustive for staying suits; inherent powers under Section 151 cannot override Section 10. Held that the court where the subsequent suit is instituted can stay the earlier suit; inherent power cannot be used to stay the earlier suit if Section 10 applies. However, if Section 10 is not applicable, inherent powers may be exercised.
Union of India v. Ram Charan, A.I.R 1964 S.C 215 Inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C cannot be invoked to implead legal representatives if statutory provisions cover the contingency. Supported the principle that inherent powers are not to be used where express provisions exist.
Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, A.I.R 1964 S.C 993 Express provisions of the Code exhaust the scope of court powers; inherent powers cannot override express provisions. Reinforced that inherent powers are limited when the Code provides express remedies.
Ramkaran Das v. Bhagwan Das, A.I.R 1965 S.C 1144 Inherent powers are to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances not covered by the Code. Clarified that express provisions like Rule 4 of Order 37 limit the use of inherent powers for setting aside decrees.
Khalli Panda v. Dharam Gouda, A.I.R 1967 Orissa 172 Suit cannot be stayed under Sections 10 and 151, C.P.C when the other proceeding is not a suit and involves different subject matter. Illustrated limits on staying proceedings when the matters are not identical or pending before different fora.
J.T Republike v. Rungata and Sons, A.I.R 1966 Cal. 382 Supports the inherent power of the court under Section 151 to stay suits where Section 10 is not applicable. Relied upon by the applicant to establish the discretionary power of courts to stay suits under Section 151.
Bhagwati Prasad v. Sudheswar Singh, A.I.R 1954 Pat. 11 Supports inherent power of courts to stay proceedings under exceptional circumstances. Used to support the contention for inherent power to stay suits.
The Bharat Nidhi Ltd. v. Shri Shadi Lal, A.I.R 1954 Punj. 114 Supports inherent jurisdiction of courts to stay proceedings. Referred to by the applicant in support of inherent powers under Section 151.
Banshidhar v. Laxmidas, A.I.R 1966 Orissa 53 Supports the exercise of inherent powers to stay suits where Section 10 is not applicable. Relied upon by the applicant to argue for inherent jurisdiction to stay suits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the applicability of Section 10 and Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code in the context of two suits pending in different courts. It agreed with the lower courts that the suit could not be stayed under Section 10 because a fundamental ingredient of that provision—the jurisdictional nexus between the courts where the suits were filed—was absent. The earlier suit was filed in the court of the Munsif, and the subsequent suit in the court of the District Judge, so the condition for a stay under Section 10 was not met.

However, the court acknowledged the applicant’s contention that the trial court could have stayed the suit under its inherent powers under Section 151. The court noted that Section 10 is not the only provision allowing a stay; inherent powers exist to prevent abuse or to manage proceedings effectively where no express provision applies.

The court analyzed the precedent in Manohar Lal v. Seth Hira Lal, clarifying that the Supreme Court’s observations there do not preclude a court from exercising its inherent jurisdiction to stay a suit if Section 10 does not apply. The court emphasized that every court where a suit is pending has the inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings before it, considering factors such as convenience of parties and the effect of the other suit’s judgment.

The court further reasoned that if Section 10 applies, the court where the earlier suit is pending cannot stay it under Section 151, as that would undermine Section 10’s purpose. But in absence of Section 10’s applicability, the inherent power under Section 151 is available and should be exercised with discretion.

The court concluded that the lower courts should have carefully examined the pleadings of both suits and exercised discretion regarding a stay under Section 151, which was not done. The matter is left to the trial court’s discretion without further interference.

Holding and Implications

The court allowed the revision, set aside the orders of the courts below, and directed the trial court to reconsider the issue of staying the suit in light of the observations made and in accordance with law.

Holding: The suit was not liable to be stayed under Section 10, C.P.C; however, the trial court has inherent jurisdiction under Section 151, C.P.C to stay the suit if it deems fit, after considering all relevant factors.

Implications: This decision clarifies that while Section 10 of the C.P.C governs stays of suits between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the inherent powers under Section 151 remain available to courts to stay proceedings in appropriate cases where Section 10 does not apply. The ruling emphasizes judicial discretion and careful examination of pleadings in deciding such stays. No new precedent is set beyond the application of established principles.

Show all summary ...

Mehrotra, J.:— This is the second revision. The courts below held, while deciding an issue framed thus in a pending suit ‘Whether the suit is liable to be stayed’? that the suit was not liable to be stayed. That was the finding of the trial court and the lower revisional court affirmed the said finding. In the second revision before me it is contended that the courts below have not properly construed the pleadings in the two suits in question and they were too much preoccupied with the ingredients of Section 10, C.P.C and they failed to consider the applicability of Section 151, C.P.C In my opinion, the courts below were right in holding that the suit in question could not be stayed under Section 10, C.P.C This conclusion can be arrived at on the simple and undisputed ground that the court where the earlier suit was filed did not have the jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit. The first suit was filed in the court of the Munsif and the second suit was filed in the court of the District Judge. It is obvious that one of basic ingredients of Section 10 has not been made out in the instant case, and, therefore, the suit could not be stayed under Section 10, C.P.C However. I agree with the learned counsel for the applicant that it was possible for the trial court to stay the suit under Section 151, C.P.C and the courts below have not properly considered the ingredients of Section 151, C.P.C Learned counsel for the opposite party, Shri H.S Joshi, has contended before me that Section 10 is exhaustive of the situations in which the court can stay a suit and apart from the said provision it is not open to a court to act under Section 151, C.P.C to stay the proceedings in a suit. Learned counsel has placed his principal reliance on Manohar Lal v. Seth Hira Lal . A.I.R 1962 S.C 527. where it was laid down.

“When there is a special provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing with the contingencies of two such suits being instituted, recourse to the inherent powers of Section 151 is not justified. The provisions of Section 10 do not become inapplicable on a court holding that the previously instituted suit is a vexatious suit or has been instituted in violation of the terms of the contract.”

2. Apart from the said case he has placed reliance on four other cases which are as follows:

(1) Union of India v. Ram Charan . A.I.R 1964 S.C 215.,

(2) Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar . A.I.R 1964 S.C 993.,

(3) Ramkaran Das v. Bhagwan Das . A.I.R 1965 S.C 1144.,

(4) Khalli Panda v. Dharam Gouda . A.I.R 1967 Orissa 172..

3. In Union of India v. Ram Charan it was laid down as under:

“The court is not to invoke its inherent powers under.

4. Section 151, C.P.C for the purposes of impleading the legal representatives of a deceased respondent, if the suit had abated on account of the appellant not taking appropriate steps within time to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party on the record and when its application for setting aside the abatement is not allowed on account of its failure to satisfy the court that there was sufficient cause for not impleading the legal representatives of the deceased in time and for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time.”

5. In Arjun Singh v. Mohinder Kumar (supra) the Court laid down:

“Thus every contingency which is likely to happen in the trial vis-a-vis the non-appearance of the defendant at the hearing of a suit has been provided for and Order 9, Rule 7 and Order 9, Rule 13 between them exhaust the whole gamut of situations that might arise during the course of the trial.”

and on the said finding the Court further observed:

“The inherent power of the court cannot override the express provisions of the law. In other words, if there are express provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the Court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter the inherent power of the Court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code. The prohibition contained in the Code need not be express but may be implied or be implicit from the very nature of the provisions that it makes for covering the contingencies to which it relates:

6. In Ram Karan Das v. Bhagwan Das (supra) it was laid down as under:

“The inherent powers are to be exercised by the Court in very exceptional circumstances for which the Code lays down no procedure. Rule 4 of Order 37 expressly gives power to a Court to set aside a decree passed under the provisions of that Order. Express provision is thus made for setting aside a decree passed under Order 37 and hence if a case does not come within the provisions of that rule, there is no scope of resort to Section 151 for setting aside such a decree.”

7. In Khalli Panda v. Dharma Gouda (supra) it was laid down as under:

“A money suit by a landlord against the tenant for arrears of rent for a certain period cannot be stayed under the provisions of Sections 10 and 151, Civil Procedure Code pending disposal of the tenant's application before the House Rent Controller under Secs. 5 and 8 of Orissa House Rent Control Act for fixation of fair rent. It is so far the reasons that the proceedings before the Rent Controller is not a ‘suit’ and the subject-matter of inquiry in the two proceedings is not the same.”

8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the following cases which undoubtedly support his contention that in the circumstances where Section 10 is not applicable the Court has an inherent power to stay the suit pending before him: 1. J.T Republike v. Rungata and Sons . A.I.R 1966 Cal. 382.; 2. Bhagwati Prasad v. Sudheswar Singh . A.I.R 1954 Pat. 11.; 3. The Bharat Nidhi Ltd., Delhi… v. Shri Shadi Lal…. . A.I.R 1954 Punj. 114.; 4. Banshidhar v. Laxmidas . A.I.R 1966 Orissa 53..

9. It is not necessary to refer to each and every one of the aforesaid cases. In my opinion Manohar Lal v. Seth Hira Lal (supra) is not capable of the interpretation which Shri Joshi has invited me to place upon it. Looking to the facts of the said case it is obvious that the observations relied upon by Shri Joshi were made to emphasise that it was the Indore Court where the subsequent suit had been instituted which could stay the suit under Section 10, C.P.C In that situation the Supreme Court laid down that it was wrong on the part of the Asansol Court where the earlier suit had been instituted to stay the suit pending before it under Section 151, C.P.C In the said background those observations were made. It is obvious that if the subsequent suit deserves to be stayed under Section 10, C.P.C then it would not be right for the court where the earlier suit is pending to stay the earlier suit purporting to exercise the inherent powers of the court. Such a stay will almost lead to a nullification of the provisions of Section 10, C.P.C But the Supreme Court's observation cannot be interpreted to lay down that where the ingredients of Section 10 are not made out then a court has no jurisdiction to stay a suit pending before it. It is important that even the observations relied upon did not lay down that the Asansol Court had no jurisdiction to stay the suit. The Court merely observed that it was not ………. justified for the Asansol court to stay the suit when the subsequent suit was liable to be stayed under Section 10. The question of justification is not a question of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in the said case clearly held that the Indore court where the subsequent suit had been filed had the jurisdiction to issue an interim injunction restraining the defendant in the said court from proceeding with his Asansol suit. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of Orders 39 were not exhaustive of the circumstances in which injunction could be issued and the Court had inherent power to issue injunction apart from the provisions of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2. On merits however, the Supreme Court held that it was very wrong of the Indore Court to have restrained the defendants in the said court from proceedings with their earlier suit filed in the Asansol Court. In my opinion, the Supreme Court has laid down that the court in which the subsequent suit has been instituted can bring about a stay of the earlier suit pending in another court by issuing an injunction to the party concerned. Then it is not possible to contend that the court itself where the earlier suit is pending has not the jurisdiction to stay the suit pending before it under Section 151. In my opinion, whether it be an earlier suit or whether it be the later suit, every court where a suit is pending, has an inherent jurisdiction to stay the proceedings pending before it. But it is obvious that where the ingredients of Section 10 are applicable and the subsequent suit is liable to be stayed under the said provision the court where the earlier suit is pending would not be justified in staying the earlier suit action under Section 151, C.P.C In my opinion, that is the ratio deductible from the aforesaid observations extracted from the said pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal v. Seth Hira Lal (supra). The other Supreme Court cases relied upon by Shri Joshi are not of much assistance inasmuch as the court in the said cases was not called upon to consider the provisions of Section 151 in conjunction with Section 10, C.P.C In my opinion, the Orissa case is also not of real assistance. I, therefore, hold that in a situation where Section 10 is not applicable the court in which a suit is pending has a jurisdiction to stay the proceedings and to await the decision in another suit pending in a different court. Of course, the court before staying the suit pending before it in the exercise of its powers under Section 151 would take into consideration various aspects of the matter, e.g, convenience of the parties, the implication and the effect of the judgment in the other suit upon the controversies involved in the suit pending before the court which chooses to stay its proceeding. It is not possible to exhaust those aspects and circumstances nor is it desirable to do so. In the instant case, I feel that the court below should have considered the pleadings of the parties in both the suits with great care and should have then decided whether it would be desirable for the subsequent suit to be stayed under Section 151, C.P.C This matter is entirely in the discretion of the trial court and it is not desirable that there should be any expression of views by this Court in the matter.

10. The revision is allowed and the orders of the courts below are set aside and the trial court is directed to decide the issue in the light of the observations made above and in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. I direct that the record of the court below be sent down immediately.