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Shitla Prasad And Others v. Bans Bahore And Others
Full Bench Opinion Summary — Applicability of Sec. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act under Sec. 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
Factual and Procedural Background
The opinion arises from a special appeal that was referred to a larger Bench of this Court because two conflicting single-Judge decisions had emerged: Raghubir Singh v. Board of Revenue (1966 A.L.J. 686) and Bans Bahore v. State of U.P. (1969 A.L.J. 513). The full Bench was asked to resolve the conflict by answering a reference question framed for the Bench's decision:
Referred question: “Whether under Sec. 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act, 1908 would be applicable to a suit under Sec. 209 in the absence of any express provision in Sec. 341 making Sec. 6 applicable?”
The Bench heard the matter, analysed statutory language and relevant authorities, resolved the conflict between the single-Judge decisions in favour of the view that Sec. 6 applies, and directed that the papers be placed before the Chief Justice so the matter may be returned to the appropriate Bench for decision of the Special Appeal on merits.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, by virtue of Sec. 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (which makes the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 "apply" to proceedings under that Act and expressly mentions "including Sec. 5 thereof"), Sec. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act is likewise applicable to a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P. Act, even in the absence of an express provision in Sec. 341 making Sec. 6 applicable.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants contended that Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act should not apply to suits under Sec. 209 because Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act (particularly clause (b)) restricts the applicability of the Limitation Act to local or special laws and provides that "the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply" where a special or local law prescribes a different period.
- They relied on the wording of Sec. 341 of the U.P. Act which expressly mentions "including Sec. 5 thereof", arguing that the specific mention of Sec. 5 indicates that the Legislature did not intend to make the whole of the Limitation Act (and in particular Sec. 6) applicable; the omission of an express reference to Sec. 6 was taken as consistent with non-applicability.
- The appellants relied on the reasoning in the single-Judge decision in Raghubir Singh, which held Sec. 6 inapplicable on the basis that the Limitation Act was to be applied subject to Sec. 29(2) and that the special/local law should prevail where inconsistent.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents maintained that Sec. 341 plainly applies the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act to proceedings under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and that this naturally includes Secs. 6 and 29; therefore Sec. 6 must be available under proceedings such as suits under Sec. 209.
- They relied on prior decisions (including the division bench/unreported decisions cited in the opinion such as Chhote-Petitioner v. Board of Revenue) and on the reasoning of Bans Bahore that Sec. 6 was applicable.
- The respondents argued that the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is a self-contained code (a special/local Act) with respect to procedure and limitation (Sec. 331 and Sec. 341 demonstrate self-containment). Where the special Act itself clearly applies the Indian Limitation Act (by using clear words including "including Sec. 5"), Sec. 29(2)(b) cannot be used to narrow or defeat that clear legislative intent.
- They also invoked a purposive consideration that Sec. 6 is a salutary provision that mitigates the rigour of limitation law in favour of persons under disability (minors, lunatics, idiots), and this policy supports extending Sec. 6 to proceedings under the U.P. Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raghubir Singh v. Board of Revenue (1966 A.L.J. 686) | Single-Judge held that Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to a suit under Sec. 209 because Sec. 341 merely extended the Limitation Act and, in view of Sec. 29(2), Sec. 6 became inapplicable. | The full Bench considered and disagreed with this conclusion and expressly stated it was unable to agree with Raghubir Singh (para 19). |
| Bans Bahore v. State of U.P. (1969 A.L.J. 513) | The single-Judge reached the contrary conclusion that Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act was applicable to proceedings under the U.P. Act, relying on an unreported division bench decision. | The full Bench accepted that Bans Bahore (and the unreported Chhote decision) laid down the correct law (paras 2–3, 19) and followed that view. |
| Chhote-Petitioner v. Board of Revenue, U.P. (C.M.W. No. 768 of 1961, unreported) | A division bench concluded that Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act was applicable to proceedings under the U.P. Act (extract of bench conclusion reproduced in the opinion). | The opinion records reliance on this unreported decision as supporting applicability of Sec. 6, and treats it as correctly decided (paras 2–3, 19). |
| State of U.P. v. Pt. B.M.N. Kaul (1958 A.L.J. 119) | Illustrates that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act might be thought not to apply but was held applicable in that case because the period under the Act did not differ from the Limitation Act and Sec. 39(2) was attracted. | The Court used this decision to explain why the Legislature added "including Sec. 5 thereof" to Sec. 341 (para 11) — to remove doubts that Sec. 5 applied. |
| Chandra Pal v. Board of Revenue (1957 A.L.J. 817) | Division Bench interpreted Sec. 29 and held that the exception in Sec. 6 could not be availed of under the U.P. Tenancy Act where Sec. 6 had been withheld (Tenancy Act applied only Sec. 5 by Sec. 253). | The Court distinguished Chandra Pal on the basis that the Tenancy Act did not have a provision analogous to Sec. 341 (para 13), so the decision was not controlling for the present issue. |
| Jagdeo Singh v. Babu Lal Sah (A.I.R. 1941 Patna 499) | Held that despite Sec. 29(2) the provisions of the Limitation Act (except Secs. 7, 8 and 9) applied to the Bihar Tenancy Act, indicating that general limitation provisions can apply to a special Act. | The full Bench cited this case to support the general principle that a special/local Act is subject to the Limitation Act except where inconsistency or exclusion is shown (para 11). |
| Raja Pande v. Sheopujan Pande (A.I.R. 1942 Alld. 429) | Full Bench decision bearing on interpretation where a special/local law is a complete code and limits applicability of general law. | The opinion cited the case to bolster the proposition that where a special Act is a complete code, Sec. 29(2)(b) cannot be used to import limitations that contradict the clear terms of the special Act (para 13). |
| Chheda Lal Jain v. The Officer Commanding the Station, Meerut (1941 A.L.J. 267) | Interpreted the amendment to Sec. 29 and held that the expression "the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply" means they do not apply unless expressly made applicable by the special or local Act. | The Bench endorsed this view as sound and relied on the legislative history explained in Chheda Lal Jain to interpret Sec. 29(2) (paras 14–16). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeds from a close textual reading of Sec. 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, which states that "the provisions of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1870, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 including Sec. 5 thereof, shall apply to proceedings under this Act." The Bench observed that a plain reading demonstrates that the Limitation Act was made applicable to the U.P. Act and that, on its face, this would naturally include Secs. 6 and 29 (paras 4–5).
The Court then addressed the apparent difficulty posed by Sec. 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act, which provides that where a special or local law prescribes a different period of limitation, "the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply." The appellants relied on this clause to argue that Sec. 6 should not be imported into proceedings under the U.P. Act (paras 9–11, 21).
The Bench rejected the appellants' textual argument that the specific mention of "including Sec. 5 thereof" in Sec. 341 implied exclusion of other provisions such as Sec. 6. The Court explained that Sec. 5 had been mentioned specifically to allay any misgivings about its applicability, not to exclude other provisions; the words "including Sec. 5" were additive, not restrictive. The Court invoked the accepted rule of statutory interpretation that the word "include" typically indicates extension and not limitation of meaning (paras 11–12).
The Court examined the legislative history and prior case law interpreting the amended Sec. 29. It accepted the reasoning in Chheda Lal Jain that the amended Sec. 29(2) should be read to mean that the "remaining provisions" of the Limitation Act do not apply provisorily simply by virtue of the Limitation Act itself, and that they apply to a special/local law only if the special or local Act itself makes them applicable. However, the Court stressed that Sec. 341 of the U.P. Act itself is an unequivocal provision that applies the Limitation Act (and, by its plain wording, includes Sec. 5). Where the special Act clearly and expressly applies the Limitation Act, Sec. 29(2)(b) cannot be used to curtail the clear terms of the special Act (paras 14–17, 36–37).
The Bench further relied on the proposition that the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is a self-contained or complete code for the purposes of procedure and limitation (paras 13, 26). Given that self-contained character and the clear language of Sec. 341, the court found no justification for artificially restricting the scope of Sec. 341 by resort to Sec. 29(2)(b).
Finally, the Court invoked policy considerations: Sec. 6 is a salutary, remedial provision that mitigates the rigour of limitation rules by protecting persons under legal disability (minors, lunatics, etc.). The Bench regarded an interpretation that promotes remedies and safeguards the rights of disabled persons as preferable, and thus aligned its construction with the protective purpose of Sec. 6 (paras 5, 17–18).
Taking these textual, historical and purposive considerations together, the Court concluded that Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act applies to suits under Sec. 209 by virtue of Sec. 341 of the U.P. Act, even in the absence of an express provision in Sec. 341 making Sec. 6 applicable (para 20).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench answered the reference question in the affirmative. In the Court's words, under Sec. 341 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, Sec. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 is applicable to a suit under Sec. 209 even in the absence of any express provision in Sec. 341 making Sec. 6 applicable (para 20).
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties and the pending litigation: the Bench resolved the conflict between single-Judge decisions by rejecting the view in Raghubir Singh and accepting the view in Bans Bahore and the Chhote bench decision; this means that parties to suits under Sec. 209 may claim the benefit of Sec. 6 where legal disability is present.
- The Court directed that the papers be placed before the Chief Justice so the Special Appeal may be sent back to the appropriate Bench for decision on merits (para 20). That is the procedural consequence flowing from the answer given.
- No broader change to statutory language was enacted — the Bench construed the existing statutory scheme to apply Sec. 6. The opinion does not purport to amend the statute; it resolves the judicial conflict and establishes the Bench's authoritative interpretation for the matters before the Court.
Note: The summary above is drawn solely from the text of the provided opinion. Interpretations, emphasis and citations are limited to what appears in that opinion.
M.N Shukla, J.:— Because of a conflict between two single Judge decisions of this Court in Raghubir Singh v. Board of Revenue 1966 A.L.J 686. and Bans Bahore v. State of U.P 1969 A.L.J 513. this special appeal was referred to a larger Bench and eventually came before us for hearing. The following question was referred to the full Bench for decision:
“Whether under Sec. 341 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act, 1908 would be applicable to a suit under Sec. 209 in the absence of any express provision in Sec. 341 making Sec. 6 applicable?”
2. In the case of Raghubir Singh it was held by S. Singh, J. that the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act were not applicable to a suit under Sec. 209 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) because Sec. 341 of the Act merely extended the Limitation Act to proceedings under a the Act but in as much as the whole of the Limitation Act was made to apply, the provisions of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act also became applicable with the result that Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act could not apply to proceedings under the Act. On the other hand, a contrary view was taken by K.N Srivastava, J. in Bans Bahore's case. He relied on an unreported division Bench decision of this Court in Chhote-Petitioner v. Board of Revenue, U.P, Allahabad-Opposite Party C.M.W No. 768 of 1961 decided on 28-8-1961.. In the unreported decision the Bench after summing up the entire argument stated its conclusion in the following words:
“We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners who has urged that two points arise in this petition. One point according to him is that Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act has been wrongly applied by the Board of Revenue to the suit of which the proceedings went up before the Board. Sec. 341 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act clearly applies all the provisions of the Limitation Act to proceedings under that Act. From the circumstance that under the Rules framed under the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act the period of Limitation for various kinds of suits and the time from which period of limitation starts running are prescribed no inference follows that the provisions of exceptional nature contained in Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act have become inapplicable. Since Sec. 341 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in clear terms applied the whole of the Limitation Act to proceedings under the former Act the decision of the Board of Revenue that Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act was applicable is perfectly correct.”
3. Sec. 341 of the Act reads as follows:
“Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1870, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 including Sec. 5 thereof, shall apply to proceedings under this Act.”
4. A plain reading of the above section shows that the entire Limitation Act was made applicable to the Act. This would naturally include Secs. 6 and 29 of the Indian Limitation Act around which the controversy in the present case hovers. Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act is in the following terms:
“6. Legal disability.— (1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned, a minor, or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time prescribed therefor in third column of the first schedule.
(2) Where such person is, at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period, after both disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so prescribed.
(3) Where the disability continues up to the death of such person, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so prescribed.
(4) Where such representative is at the date of the death affected by any such disability, the rules contained in Sub-secs. (1) and (2) shall apply.”
5. Sec. 6 is a very salutary provision in the Limitation Act which mitigates the rigour of that statute. The scheme of the Limitation Act is that as a general rule suits and other proceedings instituted after the lapse of the period prescribed by the first schedule should be barred but this general rule enacted in Sec. 3 is subject to the exception that in certain special circumstances, which have been defined in different provisions of the Act, a suit or other proceeding, though instituted after the lapse of the period so prescribed, should not be time-barred. Sec. 6 is one of the provisions which extend the period of limitation laid down by the first schedule. The ground on which the extension is given is the disability of the person entitled to sue or apply. The clear effect of Sec. 341 of the Act is to press into service the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act. The difficulty, however, is presented on account of another provision in the Limitation Act, namely, Sec. 29 which requires a careful scrutiny and seems to apparently restrict the applicability of the Limitation Act to local or special law to the extent of the sections enumerated in Sec. 29. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that even in the language of Sec. 341 of the Act there was some indication that the intendment of the Legislature was not to apply the Limitation Act in its entirety to proceedings under the Act. The foundation of this argument was the use of the expression “including Sec. 5 thereof” in Sec. 341 of the Act. It was argued that if the Legislature had intended to apply the whole of the Limitation Act to proceedings under the Act there would have been no need to refer expressly to Sec. 5 in Sec. 341. On the other hand, the omission of Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act in the aforesaid provision was consistent with the intention not to make Sec. 6 applicable to proceedings under the Act. This argument is untenable. Sec. 5 appears to have been specifically mentioned in Sec. 341 of the Act only for the sake of emphasis and it cannot even remotely be construed as having the effect of excluding the applicability of the other provisions of the Limitation Act. In facts, it seems to have been added merely with a view to allaying the possible misgivings which might arise with regard to the applicability of Sec. 5. It appears that judicial interpretation of Sec. 341, without containing any reference to Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, could parhaps sometimes arrive at the conclusion that Sec. 5 was not applicable to proceedings under the Act; by specific mention of this section, therefore, the possibility of that construction has been ruled out. The words “including Sec. 5 thereof” were not to be found in Sec. 341 of the Act as it stood in 1952. The possibility of that interpretation is clearly reflected in the observations of R. Singh, J. in State of U.P v. Pt. B.M.N Kaul 1958 A.L.J 119.. In the case the argument that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act was inapplicable to a proceeding under the Act was repelled by the learned Judge only on the ground that the period of limitation provided under that Act for filing second appeals did not differ from that provided under the Limitation Act and hence it was held that the provisions of Sec. 39(2) of the Limitation Act were attracted. That decision illustrates the possibility of taking a view that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable in case the period of limitation prescribed under the Act differred from the one prescribed under the Limitation Act. That judgment was tendered on 13-11-1957. The words “including Sec. 5 thereof” were added to Sec. 341 of the Act by Sec. 82 of the Uttar Pradesh Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1958 (U.P Act No. XXXVII of 1958) with effect from 7-11-1958. The addition of these words, therefore, should not raise any doubt about the applicability of Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act to proceedings under the Act.
6. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of judicial interpretation that the words “and include” and “or include” are expressions of extension and not restrictive; they import addition. As pointed out by Sri Jugdish Swarup in his book “Legislation and Interpretation” at page 170 (first edition). The word “include” or “shall be deemed to include” is very generally used in interpretation clause in order to change the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute, or where it is intended that while the term defined shall retain its ordinary meaning its scope should be widened by specific enumeration of certain matters which its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise so as to make the definition enumerative and not exhaustive, and when it is so used, the words or phrases must be considered as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. Therefore, when the word “including Sec. 5 thereof” are introduced in Sec. 341 of the Act they do not connote that the section would not retain its ordinary meaning which it would have borne, bereft of those words.
7. The learned counsel for the appellants sought support from a division Bench ruling of this Court in Chandra Pal v. Board of Revenue 1957 A.L.J 817. where after interpreting Sec. 29 of the Limitation Act it was held that the benefit of the exception contained in Sec. 6 thereof could not be availed of in a suit under the U.P Tenancy Act as Sec. 6 had been expressly withheld by the Legislature from persons proceeding under local and Special Acts. It may, however, be observed that in the U.P Tenancy Act there was no provision analogous to Sec. 341 of the Act. In the earlier Tenancy Law the Limitation Act was not applied to it, except so far as mentioned by it. In the U.P Tenancy Act only Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act was made applicable to proceedings under the former Act vide Sec. 253 thereof. It was, therefore, held in the case of Chandra Pal that Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act did not apply to a suit under the U.P Tenancy Act.
8. The U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act radically reoriented the attitude of the Government with regard to the status of agricultural tenants. Thus, for instance, heritable and transferable rights were conferred on one class of tenants such as bhumidhars. They were, therefore, no longer mere birds of passage, they acquired stability. Their rights, being of a more abiding and substantial character, merited meticulous legislative attention. Such rights acquired added importance on account of the fact that under the Act it became possible for other tenants also to acquire bhumidhari rights by depositing ten times land revenue. All this naturally called for greater protection of such tenancy rights by the Legislature. It seems, therefore, legitimate to infer that perhaps it was in pursuance of that underlying policy that the whole of the limitation Act was made applicable to the Act and as soon as some courts expressed the view that Sec. 5 did not apply to proceedings under the Act the Legislature lost no time in suitably amending the provisions of Sec. 341 of the Act so as to put it beyond doubt that even Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act applied to proceedings under the Act.
9. The only difficulty which still remains to be overcome is the one created by Sec. 29 of the Limitation Act, the relevant portion of which reads as under:
“Section 29—
(1) ……………………
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of Sec. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law—
(a) the provisions contained in Sec. 4, Secs. 9 to 18, and Sec. 22 shall apply in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.”
10. The learned counsel for the appellants placed his main reliance on clause (b) of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act which says:
“the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.”
11. It was contended that in the teeth of such prohibition there could be no justification for importing the other provisions of the Limitation Act, including Sec. 6, (save those enumerated in Sec. 29 of the Limitation Act) into the proceedings under the Act. This was the view expressed in Raghubir Singh's case but the learned single Judge did not take into consideration the fundamental rule of construction that a special Act prevails against a general Act where the two are inconsistent. That argument does not seem to have been advanced before him. It is a well known principle of interpretation of statutes that the general provisions such as those contained in the Limitation Act do not derogate from special provisions. On the other hand, the provisions of the special Act do derogate from the former. Thus, in Jagdeo Singh v. Babu Lal Sah A.I.R 1941 Patna 499. it was held that irrespective of the provisions of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 the provisions of all the sections of Limitation Act except Secs. 7, 8 and 9 of the same would apply to the Bihar Tenancy Act. It cannot be gainsaid that the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is a local or special Act. The preamble says:
“Whereas is expedient to vide for the abolition of the Zamindari system which involves intermediaries between the tiller of the soil and the State in the Uttar Pradesh and for the acquisition of their rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating to land tenure consequent on such abolition and acquisition and to make provision for other matters connected therewith.”
12. It is hereby enacted as follows:
It has been held in numerous decisions of this Court that the said Act is a local Act.
13. Another rule of interpretation which can be successfully invoked by the respondents is that if a special or local law is a complete code in the matter of limitation or if the phraseology used in the relevant provision such as 341 of the local or special Act is quite clear, the application of Sec. 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act to the special or local law must be deemed to have been excluded by the Legislature. There would be no justification for circumscribing the applicability of the Limitation Act in such circumstances. When the intention of the Legislature is clearly disclosed it would be verging on absurdity to attempt to apply Sec. 29(2)(b) to the special or local law. We are fortified in our opinion by the view expressed by a Full Bench of this Court in Raja Pande v. Sheopujan Pande A.I.R 1942 Alld. 429.. The U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is a self-contained Act, or, in other words, “a complete code”. That the Act is self-contained so far as the procedure to be followed in the proceedings under the Act is concerned admits of no doubt. Sec. 331 of the Act, lays down the complete procedure under the Act. Similarly Sec. 341 demonstrates that the Act is self-contained in the matter of limitation also with respect to proceedings contemplated by the Act. Therefore, Sec. 341 of the Act must be given its full play and its ambit should not be artificially restricted by reference to Sec. 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act. The clear words “the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, including Sec. 5, thereof, shall apply to proceedings under this Act used in Sec. 341 in our opinion are proof positive of the intention of the Legislature to forbid recourse to Sec. 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether the benefit of Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act should be extended to proceedings under that special or local law. The intention of the Legislature to apply the entire Limitation Act to proceedings under the Act is unambiguous. Hence, we cannot look to anything outside Sec. 341 of the Act itself for finding out the exceptions to or restrictions on its scope.
14. We also find force in the respondents' submission that clause (b) of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act should be construed to mean that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply unless they are expressly applied by a special or local law. That was the view adopted by this Court in Chheda Lal Jain v. The Officer Commanding the Station, Meerut 1941 A.L.J 267. and that is the view which commends itself to us. The correctness of this inference is demonstrated by a reference to the Legislative history of Sec. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act. The section as it stood before its amendment in 1922 was as follows:
“(2) Nothing in this Act shall.
(a) affect the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Sec. 26.
(b) affect or alter any period of limitation specially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law now or hereafter in force in British India.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall apply to suits under the Indian Divorce Act.
(3) Secs. 26 and 27 and the definition ‘easement’ in Sec. 2 shall not apply to cases arising in territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882, may for the time being extend.”
15. The effect of the amendment of the said section by the Act of 1922 came up for consideration in Chheda Lal Jain's case and the following observations made in that connection may be reproduced:
“In view of the amendment effected in Sec. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, by the Act of 1922 the situation stands slightly altered, because as the section originally stood it laid down that the provisions of the Act did not affect or alter any rule of Limitation prescribed in any special or local Act. The second sub-section to Sec. 29 now says that the periods of limitation prescribed by special or local laws shall be regarded as prescribed by that Act for the purpose of Sec. 3 and that section and other sections, namely, Sec. 4, Secs. 9 to 18 and Sec. 22 shall apply unless they are expressly excluded by the special or local Act and that the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply. The last phrase can only mean that the remaining provisions of the Act shall not apply unless they are expressly made applicable by the special or local Act. Under the old Sec. 29 none of the provisions of the Limitation Act were applicable unless they were expressly included by the special or local Act. The amendment to Sec. 29 of the Limitation Act in 1922 has extended and not restricted the scope. Under the new Sec. 29 some of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act are made applicable without being expressly included unless they are expressly excluded by the special or local Act. The rest of the provisions remain as before applicable only when they are expressly included.” Bajpai, J. with whose opinion we respectfully find ourselves in agreement, stated his conclusion thus:
“The expression “the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply” in the amended Sec. 29 simply means that they are not to apply propriovigore, that is, merely by virtue of the Limitation Act itself, and that if they are to apply, the grounds for applying them must be found in the special or local Act itself.”
16. Hence, where the language of Sec. 341 of the Act is unmistakably clear Sec. 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act cannot surb or whittle down its amplitude.
17. We are also inclined to lean in favour of an interpretation which has the effect of promoting a remedy and advancing the cause of justice. All systems of jurisprudence throw a mantle of protection round the interests of minors and persons of unsound mind and those similarly situate and provide longer periods or loss or their rights. The ancient Roman Law recognised a number of exceptions to the general rule of limitation. Under the Civil Laws of Rome the rule was “nullum tempus occurrit regi” (lapse of time does not bar the right of the crown). Even the ancient Hindu jurisprudence admitted several exceptions to the rule of loss of ownership of property by long possession. Thus the Smriti of Katyayana stated the following exceptions to the rule of loss by long possession:
“…… a mortgaged or pledged property, boundary, minor's property, an open deposit, a sealed deposit, women (female slaves), the property of the king i.e (of the State) and tile property of a Brahman learned in Veda…….” Yajnavalkyasmriti adds to the above the properties of idiots and of women. Narda-smriti emphatically states that women's property and state property are not lost even after hundreds of years, when they are enjoyed without title. The Mitaksara on the Yajnavalkya-smriti gives reasons why the several exceptions are made and says:
“Idiots and minors are ignorant or incapable of understanding their rights, the king being engrossed in numerous state affairs may not be able in time to look into the question about possession of state properties, women on account of their ignorance and timidity may not assert their rights and a learned Brahman being devoted to learning, teaching and performance of rites and duties may have no time to go to law.”
18. Nothing in modern times has transpired to warrant a deviation from that time-honoured principle of law.
19. Thus, with due difference we are unable to agree with the view ex-pressed in Raghubir Singh v. Board of Revenue and we are respectfully of the view that the cases of Bans Bahore v. State of U.P and Chhote v. Board of Revenue (supra) lay down the correct law.
20. Therefore, our answer to the question referred to us is that under Sec. 341 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act Sec. 6 of the Limitation Act, 1908 would be applicable to a suit under Sec. 209 even the absence of any express provision in Sec. 541 making Sec. 6 applicable. With the above answer we direct that the papers of this case may be laid before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for being sent back to the appropriate Bench for decision of the Special Appeal on merits.
21. K.B Asthana, J.:— I agree and have nothing to add.
22. R.B Misra, J.:— So do I.
23. Question answered.
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