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Bhawani Prasad v. Ram Deo

Allahabad High Court
May 17, 1974
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns a zamindari grove originally owned by Data Din, which after his death was inherited by his two sons, Gokul Prasad (defendant No. 2) and Ram Prasad. Ram Prasad died without issue, and his half share passed to Gokul Prasad. Gokul Prasad had two sons: Bhawani Prasad (plaintiff-appellant) and Ram Baran (defendant No. 3), who died without issue, with his property reverting to Gokul Prasad. At the time of zamindari abolition, the grove was held partly as Gokul Prasad's individual property (inherited from Ram Prasad) and partly as joint Hindu family property with his sons. If partition had occurred before abolition, the plaintiff would have had a one-sixth share in the grove.

Post-abolition, Gokul Prasad and his sons acquired Bhumidhari rights under Section 18 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. While living as a joint Hindu family, Gokul Prasad sold the entire grove to Ram Deo (defendant No. 1). Bhawani Prasad challenged this sale, asserting it was not made for legal necessity. The trial court held the sale deed was not binding on the plaintiff to the extent of his one-sixth share, decreeing the suit accordingly. The defendants appealed, and the Lower Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court on legal necessity but remanded the case for further consideration on other points. Subsequent proceedings involved admissions by the defendant's counsel that legal necessity was not proved, but the Civil Judge later reopened this issue and found legal necessity established, prompting this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale of the Bhumidhari holding by Gokul Prasad was made for legal necessity, thereby binding the plaintiff's share.
  2. Whether Bhumidhari holdings held by joint Hindu family members are governed by ordinary Hindu Law or exclusively by the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.
  3. Whether a Karta can transfer the entire Bhumidhari holding, including shares of other family members, under the principle of legal necessity or otherwise.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Appellant's Arguments

  • The sale deed executed by Gokul Prasad was not for legal necessity and thus not binding on the plaintiff's one-sixth share.
  • The question of legal necessity is immaterial because Bhumidhari rights are governed solely by statutory provisions, not by personal Hindu law restrictions.

Defendant-Respondent's Arguments

  • Initially conceded that legal necessity was not proved.
  • Later argued that legal necessity was established based on a reappraisal of the evidence, asserting it as a mixed question of law and fact.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigu Nath, 1964 RD 80 (AIR 1965 All 1) (FB) Transfer of Bhumidhari holdings governed solely by the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, not by Hindu Law. Confirmed that Bhumidhari rights are distinct from personal Hindu law property rights, allowing absolute transfer without legal necessity restrictions.
Ramji Dixit v. Bhirgunath, 1968 RD 293 (AIR 1968 SC 1058) Supreme Court affirmation of the Full Bench decision that Bhumidhari rights transfer is governed by statute, not Hindu Law. Reinforced the principle that statutory provisions override Hindu Law regarding Bhumidhari transfers.
Chhotey Lal v. Jhande Lal, 1972 All LJ 468 (AIR 1972 All 424) (FB) Statutory provisions (U.P Tenancy Act) override Hindu Law in devolution of ancestral holdings among coparceners. Supported the view that personal law is overridden by statute in matters of tenancy and inheritance of land rights.
Mahendra Kumar v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1968 RD 365 Joint Hindu family is not a juristic person; members individually hold Bhumidhari rights; Karta's powers do not extend to alienating others' shares. Applied to hold that Karta cannot alienate Bhumidhari holdings of other family members even for legal necessity.
Mahendra Singh v. Atar Singh, 1967 RD 191 (AIR 1967 All 488) Supports the principle that Bhumidhari rights vest individually, not in the family as a legal entity. Used to reinforce the limitation on Karta's powers over Bhumidhari land.
Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar, AIR 1969 All 526 (FB) Transfer rights of joint Hindu family members in Bhumidhari land controlled only by Section 152 of the Act; Hindu Law restrictions like legal necessity do not apply. Confirmed that statutory law exclusively governs transfer of Bhumidhari interests, excluding Hindu Law restrictions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court held that the question of legal necessity in this case is a pure question of fact. The Civil Judge erred by reopening this issue after the defendant's counsel had twice admitted that the evidence did not establish legal necessity. Such an admission was binding and precluded reappraisal of the evidence on this point. Furthermore, the court analyzed relevant precedents establishing that Bhumidhari rights are governed exclusively by the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, which overrides the ordinary rules of Hindu Law, including restrictions like legal necessity on transfers. The joint Hindu family is not recognized as a separate juristic person under the Act; thus, the Karta cannot alienate the shares of other members. Consequently, Gokul Prasad could not validly transfer the plaintiff's one-sixth share in the grove. The sale deed was therefore void to that extent and not binding on the plaintiff.

Holding and Implications

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court, and restored the trial court’s decree which held the sale deed not binding on the plaintiff’s one-sixth share. The parties were directed to bear their own costs. The direct effect is that the sale by Gokul Prasad does not affect the plaintiff’s share in the grove. No new precedent was established as the decision principally reaffirmed existing legal principles regarding the governance of Bhumidhari rights by statutory law rather than Hindu Law.

Show all summary ...

1. The dispute in this case relates to a zamindari grove which formerly belonged to one Data Din. After his death it was inherited by his two sons Gokul Prasad defendant No. 2, and Ram Prasad. It appears that both these brothers were separated Hindus, Ram Prasad died issueless and his ½ share in the grove was inherited by his brother Gokul Prasad. Gokul Prasad had two sons named Bhawani Prasad, who is the plaintiff-appellant before us, and Ram Baran who was impleaded as defendant No. 3 in the suit but who died subsequently without leaving any widow or issue and whose property was inherited by his father Gokul Prasad. At the time of the abolition of zamindari this grove was held by Gokul Prasad and his sons. Gokul Prasad held ½ share in this grove as his individual property which he had inherited from his brother Ram Prasad, while the other half was held by him as co-parcenary property belonging to the joint Hindu family consisting of himself and his two sons. If the partition were to be effective on the date preceding the abolition of zamindari, Gokul Prasad and his two sons would have got equal share in the ancestral half share of this grove. In other words, the plaintiff would get 1/6th share in this entire grove.

2. After the abolition of zamindari, Gokul Prasad and his sons acquired Bhumidhari rights in this grove under Section 18 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. While Gokul Prasad and his two sons were living as members of the joint Hindu family. Gokul Prasad sold this entire grove to Ram Deo defendant No. 1. Thereupon Bhawani Prasad plaintiff filed a suit challenging the sale deed on various grounds. The trial Court found that the sale deed executed by Gokul Prasad was not for legal necessity and so it was not binding on the plaintiff to the extent of his 1/6th share. The suit was decreed accordingly to the extent of 1/6th share. The contesting defendant filed an appeal against that decision. The Lower Appellate Court disagreed with the trial Court on the finding of legal necessity. At this place it may be stated that the suit had been dismissed earlier by the Munsif and on that occasion also he had recorded a finding on an examination of the evidence that no legal necessity had been proved. On other points he decided against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. When the plaintiff went in appeal on that occasion it was conceded by the counsel for the contesting defendant-respondent before the Lower Appellate Court that the evidence on record did not establish any legal necessity. So the learned Civil Judge in that appeal did not upset the finding of the trial Court on the question of legal necessity. He, however, differed from the trial court on other points and remanded the case.

3. After remand when the case was reheard by the same Munsif the defendant' counsel again conceded that legal necessity had not been proved and he did not press the issue on that point. So the learned Munsif went into other disputed question in the light of the directions given by the appellate court in its order of remand and thereafter he partly decreed the suit and partly dismissed it. This time the defendant went in appeal and on his behalf the finding on the question of legal necessity was also assailed. The appeal was heard by the same Civil Judge who had previously remanded the case and before whom it was admitted by the defendant' Counsel that legal necessity had not been proved from the evidence on record. But the Civil Judge was of the opinion that this question was a mixed question of law and fact and so the admission made by the defendant' Counsel was not binding on him. After that he reappraised the evidence and held that legal necessity had been proved.

4. In my opinion, the question whether the sale was made for legal necessity or not is a pure question of fact, at least in the present case. The learned Civil Judge also did not refer to any rule of law in this connection, but simply reappraised the evidence and then recorded a finding in favour of the contesting defendant. This was not permissible as this question of fact was no more open for decision after being admitted twice on behalf of the contesting defendant that the evidence adduced by the parties did not make out any case of legal necessity. The learned Civil Judge committed a manifest error by allowing this issue of fact to be reopened when it had been concluded by the admission made on behalf of the defendant.

5. In the second place it has been argued by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that the question of legal necessity is immaterial in this case because the disputed property consists of Bhumidhari rights which are not governed by the personal law of the Bhumidhar but only by the provisions of the statute under which these rights were conferred on the holders of the land.

6. So the question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether a Bhumidhari holding belonging to several persons who are members of a joint Hindu family would be governed in the matter of devolution, or transfer, by the ordinary rules of Hindu Law or only by the provisions contained in the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and those provisions would to that extent override the provisions of Hindu Law. This matter came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Ramji Dixit v. Bhrigu Nath, 1964 RD 80 : (AIR 1965 All 1) (FB) in which it was held that the transfer of Bhumidhari holding would be governed only by the provisions of the Act and not by ordinary rules of Hindu Law. In that case a widow had inherited some Sir and Khudkasht from her husband and on the abolition of zamindari she acquired Bhumidhari rights in that land. Under the Hindu Law a widow could not transfer any property inherited from her husband except for legal necessity but in this case it was held that the Bhumidhari rights acquired by her were quite a different property and its transfer would be governed only by the provisions of the Act. There being no provision in the Act that a female Bhumidhar could not make an absolute transfer of the properly held by her, it was held that she was at liberty to make an absolute gift of such property un-inhibited by the ordinary rules of Hindu Law. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ramji Dixit v. Bhirgunath, 1968 RD 293 : (AIR 1968 SC 1058).

7. Another Full Bench of this Court in Chhotey Lal v. Jhande Lal, 1972 All LJ 468 : (AIR 1972 All 424) (FB) took the same view though in a different context. In that case an ancestral holding had been inherited by several brothers; who lived as coparceners, from their father under the provisions of the U.P Tenancy Act. The question arose whether on the death of one of the brothers its devolution would be governed by the principle of survivorship as known to Hindu Law, or by the rule of succession as provided in the U.P Tenancy Act. It was held that the U.P Tenancy Act would govern the devolution and to that extent the personal law shall be overridden by the statutory enactment.

8. The decision of this Court in Mahendra Kumar v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1968 RD 365 is directly applicable to this case. It was held by Satish Chandra, J. following the Division Bench decision in Mahendra Singh v. Atar Singh, 1967 RD 191 : (AIR 1967 All 488) that the joint Hindu family has not been recognised by law as a juristic personality and it would be the members of the family who would acquire Bhumidhari rights under the provisions of the Act and not the family itself as a distinct entity. The powers of Karta under the Hindu Law would not be available qua Bhumidhari rights. A Karta cannot alienate a Bhumidhari holding either for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate etc. He has unfettered right to transfer his own share, but he cannot alienate the share of other members of the family.

9. Lastly, reference may be made to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar, AIR 1969 All 526 (FB) in which it was held that the right of transfer of each member of the joint Hindu family of his interest in Bhumidhari land is controlled only by Section 152 of the Act and by no other restriction. The provisions of Hindu Law relating to restriction on transfer of coparcenary land e.g, existence of legal necessity, do not apply.

10. From these decisions it appears that the ordinary rule of Hindu law that the Karta of the family can transfer not only his own share but the share of other members of the joint Hindu family also, if the sale is made for legal necessity does not hold good so far as Bhumidhari land is concerned. There is no provision in the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act that one of the co-Bhumidhars can transfer more than his own share.

11. In that view of the matter, the father Gokul Prasad, defendant-respondent No. 2 could not validly transfer the share of the plaintiff in this grove which, as stated above, was 1/6th. To that extent the sale deed executed by him was void and not binding on the plaintiff.

12. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court is set aside and that passed by the trial Court is restored. But considering the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.

13. Appeal allowed.