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Chandradeo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Rai

Allahabad High Court
May 19, 1972
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (R.B. Misra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These matters arise from Civil Revision No. 1777 of 1968. The Single Judge of the High Court referred two civil miscellaneous applications to a larger Bench because of an apparent conflict between two Division Bench decisions on whether an application in revision abates if no substitution application is made within ninety days of the death of a party.

The underlying dispute began when the applicants filed a suit in the Court of the Munsif, Ghazipur seeking a permanent injunction restraining interference with their possession of agricultural land. The defendants challenged jurisdiction; the Munsif framed a preliminary issue and held the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction, ordering return of the plaint. The applicants' miscellaneous appeal failed, and they filed Revision No. 1777 of 1968 before this Court.

During the pendency of the revision, opposite party No. 10, Ram Nandan Upadhya, died. On 10 July 1970 the applicants filed Miscellaneous Application No. 4130 of 1970 to bring his heirs on record, supported by an affidavit alleging death on 13 April 1970. The opposite parties filed a counter-affidavit alleging the death occurred on 31 December 1969. The Court below was asked to determine the correct date and found that Ram Nandan Upadhya died on 31 December 1969. The applicants were permitted to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, and they filed Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 14638 of 1970 under Section 5.

The legal controversy centered on whether the Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation for substitution applications in revision proceedings and, relatedly, whether the residuary article of the Limitation Act (Article 137 of the new Act, corresponding to Article 181 of the old Act) applies to such applications.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application in revision abates if no substitution application is made within ninety days of the date of death of a deceased party (i.e., whether the 90-day period in the Limitation Schedule for suits/appeals applies to revisions).
  2. Whether any period of limitation is prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act for applications to bring the legal representatives of a deceased party on record in a revision application.
  3. Whether the residuary article of the Limitation Act (Article 137 of the new Act; Article 181 of the old Act) applies to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore whether a three-year period applies to substitution applications in revision proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Seth Shanti Swaroop, A.I.R. 1966 Alld. 530 Division Bench view that because no period of limitation is prescribed for substitution in revision, substitution can be made at any time while the revision is pending. Identified as one side of the conflicting decisions that prompted reference to a larger Bench; the Court recorded this view but proceeded to analyze the residuary article of the Limitation Act and the Supreme Court authority.
Khuda Bux v. Maha Nand Tewari, A.I.R. 1948 Oudh 84 Division Bench view that if substitution application is not presented within a reasonable time (equated with the period in Order XXII, C.P.C.), the revision will abate unless good cause is shown. Recorded as the contrary view creating the conflict; used to explain why the reference to a larger Bench was necessary.
Bhajju Lal v. Bechay Singh, A.I.R. 1950 Alld. 665 Held Order XXII, C.P.C. does not apply to revision applications and no specific period of limitation for substitution in revision was prescribed, but substitution should be moved within a reasonable time. Noted by the Court as part of earlier High Court authorities holding Order XXII does not apply to revisions; described as not decisive in view of later Supreme Court authority.
Ram Datt Singh v. Ajodhya Singh, A.I.R. 1952 Alld. 446 Similar principle: Order XXII not applicable to revisions; substitution to be made within reasonable time. Noted among earlier High Court decisions addressing the applicability of Order XXII to revisions; acknowledged but not followed as conclusive.
Syed Ali Athar v. Syed Kalbe Haider, 1955 A.L.J. 54 Expressed the view that Order XXII does not apply to revision applications and substitution should be within reasonable time. Referenced as part of the body of High Court authority that had earlier addressed the topic; treated as not determinative given Supreme Court precedents.
Khuda Bux Khan v. Mahanand Tewari, A.I.R. 1948 (Oudh) Same or similar holding as Khuda Bux v. Maha Nand Tewari: absence of Order XXII applicability to revisions; reasonable time required. Mentioned among contrary Division Bench decisions; recorded historically as part of the conflicting views.
Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 752 Supreme Court held Article 181 (old Act) prescribes a three-year period of limitation for applications under the Code of Civil Procedure for which no period is provided elsewhere. Treated as the decisive Supreme Court authority that supports applying the residuary three-year period to substitution applications that are applications under the Code of Civil Procedure.
Sha Mulchand & Co. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd., A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 98 Supreme Court observation that Article 181 (old Act) has been held in many decisions to govern only applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. Quoted to support the conclusion that the residuary article governs applications under the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore is applicable to substitution applications in revision (which are applications under the CPC).
1971 A.W.R. 560 (Single Judge decision) Held that the residuary Article (Art.137 of the new Act) covers applications and objections under special laws or any other law and should not be confined narrowly. Relied on as persuasive local authority supporting a broad interpretation of Article 137 of the new Limitation Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal steps, applying only the principles and authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. The Court first clarified the scope of Order XXII, C.P.C. Rules 3 and 4 (and Rule 11) — those provisions prescribe substitution procedures and penalties where heirs are not brought on record in suits and appeals; by their terms they relate to suits and appeals and do not apply to revisions.
  2. The Court identified that Articles in the Limitation Schedule (Article 176 of the old Act; Article 120 of the new Act) prescribe ninety days for bringing the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or appellant (and similarly for defendants/respondents) in a suit or an appeal. The issue was whether any period of limitation in the Limitation Act applies to substitution in revision proceedings.
  3. The Court examined prior High Court decisions that had held (a) Order XXII does not apply to revisions and (b) substitution applications in revision should nonetheless be made within a reasonable time. It found these authorities not decisive in light of subsequent Supreme Court authority on the residuary article.
  4. The Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva, which held that Article 181 of the old Limitation Act prescribed a three-year period for applications under the Code of Civil Procedure for which no period was provided elsewhere. The Court noted that Article 137 of the new Limitation Act is substantially pari materia with Article 181 of the old Act and prescribes three years for "any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere."
  5. The Court considered the Supreme Court's observation in Sha Mulchand that the residuary article has been held in a long series of decisions to govern only applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, reinforcing that residuary articles apply to CPC applications.
  6. The Court concluded that substitution applications in revision proceedings are applications under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., they are applications under the CPC). Therefore, the residuary Article 137 of the new Limitation Act (three years) applies to such substitution applications.
  7. Applying that conclusion to the facts, the Court found that the applicants' Miscellaneous Application No. 4130 of 1970 to substitute heirs was filed within three years of the date of death of opposite party No. 10 as found by the Court below (31 December 1969). Consequently, there was no abatement of the revision and no need for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
  8. The Court therefore allowed Miscellaneous Application No. 4130, ordered substitution of Jaddu Upadhya in place of Ram Nandan Upadhya, and held Miscellaneous Application No. 14638 of 1970 (the Section 5 application) to be infructuous and dismissed it.
  9. Finally, the Court observed it would be desirable for the Rules of Court on the administrative side to be amended to prescribe a uniform period (ninety days) for bringing heirs on record even in revision applications, but this was framed as a recommendation rather than a holding altering existing law.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Miscellaneous Application No. 4130 of 1970 is allowed; Miscellaneous Application No. 14638 of 1970 (under Section 5 of the Limitation Act) is dismissed as infructuous.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The name of the deceased opposite party, Ram Nandan Upadhya, is to be removed from the array of opposite parties in Revision No. 1777 of 1968 and the name of Jaddu Upadhya is to be brought on record as his representative.
  • Because the substitution application was held to be within the three-year residuary period of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, the revision did not abate and there was no requirement to condone delay under Section 5 for that purpose; hence the Section 5 application became infructuous.
  • The revision will proceed and be placed before the Bench concerned for disposal on merits.

Broader implications and precedent: The Court applied the Supreme Court authority (Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva) and concluded that the residuary period (three years under Article 137 of the new Act) applies to substitution applications in revisions because these are applications under the Code of Civil Procedure (Sec. 151 CPC). The opinion recommended administrative amendment of the Rules of Court to prescribe a uniform ninety-day period for bringing heirs on record in revisions, but this was an observation of desirability rather than a statutory amendment or binding rule change.

Show all summary ...

R.B Misra, J.:— These two civil miscellaneous applications arise out of Civil Revision No. 1777 of 1968. They came up for disposal before a learned Single Judge of this Court. He has referred these applications to a larger Bench because he felt that there was a conflict of opinion between two Division Bench decisions on the question whether an application in revision would abate if no substitution application was made within ninety days of the date of death of a deceased party. In the Union of India v. Seth Shanti Swaroop A.I.R 1966 Alld. 530. a Division Bench took the view that since there is no period of limitation prescribed for an application for substitution in revision, it can be made at any time so long as the application in revision is pending. A contrary view was taken by another Division Bench of Oudh Chief Court in Khuda Bux v. Maha Nand Tewari A.I.R 1948 Oudh 84.. It was held that if after the admission of a revision application one of the parties dies and an application to bring his legal representatives on record is not presented within a reasonable time (which in the case of such an application is the time mentioned, in Order XXII, C.P.C), the revision application will abate in the sense that the proceeding shall cease unless good cause is shown for the delay. This is how these two applications have come up before this Bench.

2. The material facts to bring out the controversy involved in these two applications lie in a narrow compass. The applicants filed a suit in the Court of the Munsif, Ghazipur for the issue of a permanent injunction restraining the opposite parties from interfering with their possession over an agricultural plot. The claim was resisted by the opposite parties on grounds inter alia that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The Munsif framed a preliminary issue on the question of jurisdiction and held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. He accordingly ordered the return of the plaint to the applicants for presentation to the proper Court. The applicants sought to challenge that order by filing a Miscellaneous Appeal, but the appeal failed. The petitioners thereupon filed a revision before this Court which was numbered as Revision No. 1777 of 1968.

3. It appears that during the pendency of the Revision, Ram Nandan Upadhya (opposite party No. 10) died, and Miscellaneous Application No. 4130 of 1970 to bring his heirs on the record was filed by the applicants on 10th July, 1970. In this application, supported by an affidavit, it was alleged that Ram Nandan Upadhya died on 13th April, 1970. The opposite parties resisted the application and alleged in the counter-affidavit that Ram Nandan Upadhya had died on 31st December, 1969. In view of this allegation and counter-allegation with regard to the date of the death of Ram Nandan Upadhya, an issue was remitted to the Court below to find out whether Ram Nandan Upadhya died on 13th April, 1970 or on 31st December 1969. The Court below returned the finding that he died on 31st December, 1969. The applicants were permitted to file an application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of delay, whereupon they filed Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 14638 of 1970 under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act.

4. In order to appreciate the point involved in the case it would be convenient at this stage to refer to relevant provisions of Order XXII, C.P.C and the relevant Articles of Limitation Act.

5. Order XXII, Rule 3(1) provides for bringing the legal representatives of deceased plaintiff on the record when the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, and sub-rule (2) thereof provides the penalty for not bringing the heirs of the deceased plaintiff on record within the period of limitation prescribed. Order XXII, Rule 4, C.P.C provides for substitution of a deceased defendant where the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, and sub-rule (3) thereof provides penalty for not bringing the heirs of the deceased defendant on record within the time prescribed by law. Obviously Rules 3 and 4 of Order XXII, C.P.C relate to substitution of plaintiffs and defendants in a suit. But by virtue of Rule 11 of Order XXII, Rules 3 and 4 are made applicable to the appellants and respondents in appeal as well. Rule 11 reads thus:—

“In the application of this Order to appeals so far as may be, the word ‘plaintiff’ shall be held to include an appellant the word ‘defendant’ a respondent, and the word ‘suit’ an appeal.”

6. These rules, however, do not apply to revisions. Now, the question arises whether any period of limitation has been prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure for an application to bring the heirs of a deceased party on record in a revision application.

7. Article 176 of the Schedule of the old Limitation Act (IX of 1908) read thus:

Description of suit. Period of Limitation. Time from which period begins to run. 176. Under the same Code to have the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or a deceased appellant made a party. Ninety days The date of the death of the deceased plaintiff or appellant.

8. Article 120 of the Schedule attached to the new Limitation Act (XXXVI of 1963) reads thus:—

120. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to have the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or appellant or of a deceased defendant or respondent made a party. Ninety days The date of death of the plaintiff, appellant, defendant for respondent, as the case may be.

9. Thus limitation has been prescribed for bringing on record the heirs of deceased plaintiff or defendant in a suit, and the deceased appellant or respondent in an appeal, and if no application is made within the said period, the penalty contemplated by Order XXII, Rules 3 and 4 would ensue. If a similar period of Limitation has been prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, for bringing the heirs of a deceased party on record even in revision applications, the penalty analogous to that contemplated by Order XXII, Rules 3 and 4, C.P.C would be attracted to revisions as well. The crucial question for determination, therefore, is whether any period of limitation has been prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act with regard to revisions also.

10. In Bhajju Lal v. Bechay Singh A.I.R 1950 Alld. 665., in Ram Datt Singh v. Ajodhya Singh A.I.R 1952 Alld. 446., in Syed Ali Athar v. Syed Kalbe Haider 1955 A.L.J 54., and in Khuda Bux Khan v. Mahanand Tewari, it was held that order XXII, C.P.C does not apply to revision applications, nor was there any period of limitation prescribed for an application for substitution of names of legal representatives in place of a deceased party in a revision application, yet it was that the application for bringing the heirs should be moved within a reasonable time.

11. The above cases are not of much help: the point in question has now been concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva A.I.R 1964 S.C 752., wherein it was held that Art. 181 prescribed three years' period of limitation in respect of applications under the Code of Civil Procedure for which no period of limitation was provided elsewhere.

12. It may be pertinent to read Art. 181 of the old limitation Act of 1908 and Art. 137 of the new Act (XXXVI of 1963):

Description of application. Period of Limitation. Time from which period begins to run. 181. Applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule or by Sec. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Three years. When the right to apply accrues. 137. Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided else where in this Division. There years. When the right to apply accrues.

13. In Sha Mulchand and Co. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd. A.I.R 1953 S.C 98., the Supreme Court, while dealing with Article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908, observed:—

“That Article has, in a long series of decisions of most, if not all, of the High Court, been held to govern only applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. It may be that there may be divergence of opinion even within the same High Court, but the preponderating view undoubtedly is that article applies only to applications under the Code.”

14. Now, the next question that requires consideration is whether Art. 137 of the new Limitation Act also covers an application under the Code of Civil Procedure. Substantially the language of Art. 181 of the old limitation Act is pari materia with the language of Art. 137 of the new Limitation Act. If Art. 181 applies to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, we see no reason why Art. 137 of the new Limitation Act should not apply to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. It may or may not apply to applications under other Acts, but there can be no manner of doubt about its applicability to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. In “1971 A.W.R 560” a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the residuary Art. 137 covers in its ambit applications and objections under special laws or any other law. The Article should not be interpreted narrowly so as to keep it confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure.

15. Even if there be some doubt about the applicability of Art. 137 to applications under other Acts, about which we express no concluded opinion, there is not the slightest doubt that Art. 137 would cover applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. The consensus opinion of the various High Courts has been that Art. 181 of the old limitation Act applied to the applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 137 of the new Limitation Act should also be given a similar meaning. Article 137, being a residuary Article, must be construed ejus dem generis with the other Articles dealing with applications. As most of the other Articles deal with applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 137 should also be held to apply to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. In Union of India v. Seth Shanti Swamp the Division Bench distinguished the supreme Court decision in Bambay Gas Company v. Gopal Bhiva on the ground that the application in that case was not an application under the Code of Civil Procedure but it was an application under Article 133 of the Constitution.

16. That the application for substitution of heirs in revision is an application under Sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure can admit of no doubt. Therefore, the period of limitation for bringing the heirs of the deceased opposite party No. 10 would be three years under Article 137 of the new Limitation Act. The application for substitution was filed within three years of the death of opposite party no. 10, so there is no question of abatement or of condonation of delay.

17. Miscellaneous Application. No. 4130 of 1970 for bringing the heirs of Ram Nandan Upadhya (opposite party No. 10) on record is accordingly allowed and the name of Ram Nandan Upadhya will be removed from the array of opposite parties and in his place the name of Jaddu Upadhya will be brought on record.

18. In the view that we have taken, the other Miscellaneous (Application No. 14638 of 1971) under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act has become in-fructuous and is dismissed.

19. Before parting with the case we would like to observe the desirability of the amendment of the Rules of Court on the Administrative side so as to prescribe a uniform period of limitation of ninety days for bringing heirs of a deceased party even in revision applications. The Rules of the Court have already been amended so as to prescribe a period of ninety days for bringing the heirs of a deceased party in a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, to special appeals and Tax Act references falling under Chapters IX, XXII and XXVII of the Rules of the Court, by the introduction of Rule No. 38-A Chapter VIII, Rules of Court, 1952, Part I.

20. The revision application will now be placed before the Bench concerned for disposal on merits.