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Mt. Batul Begam v. B. Hem Chandar Mukherji .
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit filed by Hem Chandra Mukerji, one of several co-sharers, against Mst. Batool Begum for recovery of arrears of rent under Section 148 of the U.P. Tenancy Act in respect of three plots. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was an exproprietary tenant who came into possession after the death of her husband, the original sir-holder. The defendant contended that she had acquired exproprietary rights over the entire area due to her predecessor's share and challenged the suit for non-joinder of all co-sharers as required by Section 240 of the Act.
At trial, it was agreed that the defendant was an exproprietary tenant only in Khata No. 1 (47 bighas 14 biswas), while for Khatas Nos. 2 and 3 she was a sir-holder and not liable to pay rent. The trial court dismissed the suit on grounds of non-joinder of necessary parties and causes of action. The plaintiff appealed, and the lower appellate court allowed the appeal, granting a decree for rent arrears and interest in respect of Khata No. 1. The defendant challenged this decree in a second appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a single co-sharer plaintiff can sue alone for recovery of rent arrears without joining other co-sharers, in light of Section 246 of the U.P. Tenancy Act.
- The interpretation and application of the phrase "special contract" under Section 246(2) and whether an implied contract suffices to override the requirement of joint action by co-sharers.
- The applicability of the doctrine of res judicata to bar the defendant from contesting the plaintiff's right to sue alone based on prior decrees.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The suit was barred due to non-joinder of all co-sharers as required under Section 240 and Section 246(1) of the U.P. Tenancy Act.
- An implied contract between co-sharers is insufficient to override the statutory requirement for joint action; only a "special contract," interpreted as a contract in writing, can do so.
- The bar under Section 246(1) was raised at the trial stage, and the plea of res judicata raised by the respondent in the second appeal was not pleaded earlier and lacked supporting material.
Respondent's Arguments
- There was an implied contract or an established practice allowing Hem Chandra Mukerji to sue alone for rent arrears.
- The question of whether the plaintiff could sue alone without other co-sharers being impleaded was res judicata due to previous decrees in favor of Hem Chandra Mukerji.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Council of Broken Hill, 1926 AC 94 | Limited scope of the rule of res judicata | Used to reject broad application of res judicata to plaintiff's right to sue alone for arrears not previously decreed. |
| L. Bishun Das v. L. Laxmi Narain, AIR 1949 All 596 | Res judicata applies when liability under contract is directly and substantially in issue and decided | Distinguished on facts; prior decisions did not decide the exact issue before the court. |
| Mohanlal v. Benoy Krishna, AIR 1953 SC 65 | Erroneous decision on question of law operates as res judicata | Not applicable as the present case concerned omission to decide a question, not an erroneous decision. |
| Surajmull Nagoremull v. Triton Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1925 PC 83 | Estoppel cannot override statutory provisions | Supported the principle that statutory bars cannot be defeated by estoppel or constructive res judicata. |
| Maritime Electric Co. Ltd. v. General Dairies Ltd., AIR 1937 PC 114 | Estoppel and res judicata principles relative to statutory bars | Reinforced that statutory provisions prevail over estoppel claims. |
| Mackintosh v. Gerrard, 1947 AC 461 | Rule of estoppel and res judicata | Used to underline that estoppel cannot be applied against statute. |
| Kalidas Dhanjibhai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 62 | Principles of res judicata and estoppel | Supported the court's view on statutory bars and limitations of res judicata. |
| Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 504 | Statutory bar overrides estoppel and res judicata | Confirmed that statutory provisions cannot be circumvented by res judicata or estoppel. |
| Jagadish Chandra Deo v. Gour Hari Mahato, AIR 1936 PC 258 | Procedural bar on raising new points in second appeal | Held that the plea of res judicata could not be raised for the first time in second appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the provisions of Section 246 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, focusing on the requirement that co-sharers must act jointly unless a special contract or local usage permits otherwise. It rejected the lower appellate court’s inference that an implied contract was sufficient to override the statutory bar requiring joinder of all co-sharers. The court interpreted "special contract" as a contract in writing, drawing on English law distinctions between contracts in specialty and simple contracts, and historical legislative changes that introduced the term "special" to the relevant section.
Regarding the plea of res judicata raised by the respondent, the court found that the earlier decrees in favor of the plaintiff did not conclusively decide the issue of whether the plaintiff could sue alone for the specific arrears and plots in question. The court emphasized that res judicata has a limited scope and cannot be extended to constructive res judicata against a statutory bar. It further held that estoppel cannot be applied against statutory provisions.
The court also noted procedural impropriety in raising the plea of res judicata for the first time in the second appeal and found insufficient material to sustain it. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower appellate court’s decision, and dismissed the plaintiff’s suit.
Holding and Implications
Appeal allowed. The court set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit for recovery of rent arrears.
The decision directly affects the parties by requiring proper joinder of all co-sharers in suits for rent arrears under the U.P. Tenancy Act. It clarifies that an implied contract does not suffice to override the statutory requirement for joint action, and that the bar under Section 246(1) must be strictly observed. The court did not establish new precedent beyond affirming the statutory interpretation and procedural requirements. The parties were directed to bear their own costs of the appeal.
1. This is a defendants' appeal arising out of a suit for arrears of rent under Section 148 of the U.P Tenancy Act. The suit was tiled by one of the co-sharers only, i.e Hem Chandra Mukerji, against Mst. Batool Begum for recovery of arrears of rent in respect of three plots detailed in the plaint. The plaintiff alleged that the plots were the exproprietary tenancy of the defendant, who had got possession over the plots after the death of her husband Fida Husain, who was the original sir-holder of the plots. The defendant contested the suit and one of her pleas in defence was that the suit could not be decreed, inasmuch as, an area of 83 bighas of Sir appertained to a -/5/2 share of the proprietary interest owned by her predecessor, and that as such she had acquired exproprietary rights in the village and the entire exproprietary tenancy had thereafter became her sir. She further pleaded that the suit was bad for non-joinder of all the cosharers as required by the provisions of Section 240 of the U.P Tenancy Act.
2. At a preliminary stage in the trial of the suit it was decided between the parties that the defendant was an exproprietary tenant in Khata No. 1 only, which comprised of 47 bighas 14 biswas, while in respect of Khatas Nos. 2 and 3 which comprised of 3 bighas 1 biswa and 5 bighas 5 biswas 12 dhurs respectively she had become a sir-holder and therefore vas not liable to pay any rent to the plaintiff. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on a finding that the suit was bad for non-joinder of not only causes of action but also of necessary parties.
3. An appeal was preferred by the plaintiff and the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal and granted the plaintiff a decree for the recovery of Rs. 355/5/- as rent in respect of khata No. 1. It also allowed Rs. 39/7/- on account of interest, the total decree granted in plaintiffs favour being Rs. 394/12/-. Future and pendente life interests were allowed at 3 per cent per annum. The parties were directed to bear their own costs throughout, in proportion to their success and failure.
4. In second appeal the decree passed by the lower appellate Court has been challenged on the ground that the decree was bad having been made in the teeth of the provisions contained in Section 246 of the U.P Tenancy Act. Sec. 246 is in these words:
“246. (1) Except as otherwise provided in sub-section (3) or in Sec. 245, where there are two or more co-sharers in any right, title or interest, all things required or permitted to be done by the possessor of the same shall be done by them conjointly, unless they have appointed an agent to act on behalf of all of them.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect any local usage or special contract by which a co-sharer in an undivided property is entitled to receive separately the whole or his share of the rent payable by a tenant.
(3) When one or two or more co-sharers is not entitled to sue alone and the remaining co-sharers refuse to join as plaintiffs in a suit for money recoverable by them jointly such co-sharer may sue separately for his share, joining the remaining co-sharers as defendants.
(4) Where the tenant of a holding or the illegal transferee of such tenant is also a co-sharer in the proprietary right in such holding, nothing in this section shall require him to be joined as plaintiff in any suit or application brought or made against him as such tenant or illegal transferee under the provisions of this Act.
5. The court below came to the conclusion-from the circumstance that the; plaintiff had on previous occasions obtained decrees for arrears of rent, that there must have been an implied contract between the co-sharers under which Hem Chandra Mukerji was entitled to sue for the recovery of arrears without the necessity of having to implead the other co-sharers. It may be here stated that it was admitted on all hands that there were other cc-sharers in this Khata and that Hem Chandra Mukerji was not the sole owner of the Khata. The contention put forward on behalf of the defendant appellant by Mr. Gopi Nath was that under sub-s. (2) of Section 246 of the U.P Tenancy Act an implied contract was not enough to override what was-provided for under sub-s. (1) of this section.
6. It was contended that in order to get the benefit of sub-sec. (2) a plaintiff had either to-establish local usage or a special contract. It was contended that a “special contract” was something very different from an “implied” contract. The words “special contract” had to be given soma meaning other than mere contract. It was pointed’ out that the words “special contract meant the same type of contract as was understood by the phrase ‘contracts in speciality’. In English Law “contracts in speciality” were formal contracts made under seal. Under the Indian Contract Act there was no such thing as a contact in speciality or contract under seal, but nevertheless the Indian Law did recognise that there were two types of contracts possible— one in writing & the other oral so that when Sec. 246(2) referred to special contract it must, in my opinion, refer to contracts in writing.
7. In English Law there were three well-recognised categories of contracts (1) contracts of record; (2) contracts under seal; and (3) simple contracts. As I have already observed contracts under, seal were also referred to as contracts in speciality and these could only be made by deed. Simple contracts, however, could be entered into orally. Since in India the Contract Act did not classify contracts in the manner in which contracts were classified under the English Law, the use of the word ‘special’ before a contract had to be given some meaning and some significance had to be attached to the qualifying word. Iyer's Law Lexicon has defined special contract “as a contract in writing” under seal.
8. In 1936 the Board of Revenue appear to have interpreted the phrase ‘special contracts’ to mean a contract in writing. It is interesting to note here that under the Agra Tenancy Act the word ‘special’ was not there in Sec. 265, which was the corresponding section to the present Sec. 246. The word ‘special’ was added when the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939 was enacted. Therefore, it was with some object that this change was made and the only obvious object appears to me to have been to require evidence of such contract in writing.
9. The court below in my opinion was not justified in holding that the bar of Sec. 246(1) could not arise against the plaintiff in this case. It was possible to infer an implied contract from the circumstances that, previously, some suits for arrears had been decreed in favour of Hem Chandra Mukerji suing alone but such a contract was not sufficient to save the suit.
10. Mr. Shambhu Prasad appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent contended that the question as to whether or not Hem Chandra Mukerji could sue alone without the necessity of the other co-sharers having teen impleaded was res judicata between the parties because of the earlier decisions in favour of Hem Chandra Mukerji. It may be pointed out that the question of res judicata was raised for the first time before me by Mr. Shambhu Prasad. It may also be pointed out that the point that Mr. Gopi Nath raised before me in Second Appeal, namely, the bar of Section 246(1) of the U.P Tenancy Act, had been raised in the court of first instance, on behalf of the plaintiff, and no attempt to defeat that plea was made on behalf of the defendant by pleading a bar of res judicata.
11. In order to establish a plea of res judicata lit is essential to place before the court all the mate-I rials on which the plea could be adequately founded. The mere reference to a decree in a suit was not enough to substantiate the plea. There was before me on the record no material, at any rate, learned counsel for the parties were unable to draw my attention to any materials on which it could legitimately be contended that the plea that was now being raised on behalf of the defendant, namely, the bar of Section 246(1) of the U.P Tenancy Act, could be raised in the earlier suits, for the plea of res judicata that has now been raised is that of constructive res judicata.
12. The mere fact that in respect of certain arrears, for certain years, for certain plots, Hem Chandra Mukerji obtained decrees, suing alone is not enough to show that he could sue for arrears alone in respect of the clots and for the years for which the suit out of which this appeal has arisen. The rule of res judicata has a limited scope. It is not a rule of such wide amplitude as Mr. Shambhu Prasad would want to make it. That the rule of res judicata is of limited scope was held in Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Council of Broken Hill, 1926 AC 94. Reliance was placed by Mr. Shambhu Prasad on the decision of L. Bishun Das…Applicant; v. L. Laxmi Narain…Opposite Party., 1949 All LJ 33 : (AIR 1949 All 596), where Seth J. held that a previous decision in regard to the liability of one of the parties to the suit under an agreement operated as res judicata in a subsequent suit.
13. The facts of Bishun Das's case were not quite the same as the facts of the case before me. In that case Mr. Justice Seth said “an issue in regard to the liability under the contract had been raised and decided, and therefore, there ought to be no difficulty in holding under such circumstances that the matter was directly and substantially in issue and had been decided.” It was further contended that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operated as res judicata and that was so decided in Mohanlal v. Benoy Krishna, AIR 1953 SC 65. We, however, are not concerned in the present case with any erroneous decision on a question of law. We are really concerned, if at all, with an omission to decide a question and it is on this omission that the rule of constructive res judicata was attempted to be applied to the case.
14. The rule of constructive res judicata was really a rule of estoppel. There could be no estoppel against statute. This proposition was well established and I need refer only to a few leading cases. Surajmull Nagoremull v. Triton Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1925 PC 83, Maritime Electric Co. Ltd. v. General Dairies Ltd., AIR 1937 PC 114 Mackintosh v. Gerrard, 1947 AC 461, Kalidas Dhanjibhai v. . State Of Bombay , (S) AIR 1955 SC 62 and Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, (S) AIR 1955 SC 504. There can be no doubt that the bar that was being raised against the plaintiff in this suit was a statutory bar.
15. There were yet other grounds for repelling the bar of res judicata. The question which Mr. Shambhu Prasad raised of res judicata was not open to him to be raised for the first time in Second Appeal in view of the decision in Jagadish Chandra Deo v. Gour Hari Mahato, AIR 1936 PC 258 and even if the point could be raised, then, as I have indicated above, there was not sufficient material on the record to come to the conclusion that the plea of res judicata was sustainable. For the reasons given above I allow this appeal, set aside the decision of the lower appellate Court, and dismiss the plaintiffs suit. Under the-circumstances of the case, however, I direct the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.
DD/K.S.B
16. Appeal allowed.
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