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Kisan Uchattar Madhyamik Vidyalaya Samiti v. Iiird Addl. District Judge
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petition under Article 226 challenges an order dated 12 April 1988 passed by the III Additional District Judge, Deoria, under Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code ("the Code"). The impugned order allowed a revision and directed the plaintiff (the present petitioner) to implead Mr. Mohd. Haneef (respondent No. 5) as a defendant.
The petitioners originally filed a suit for a permanent injunction against one Mainuddin Khan restraining him from interfering with the functions of Sri Arvind Pandey as officiating Principal. Petitioner No. 3 was acting Head Master; petitioner No. 2 (Dr. Nazaruddin Ahmad) was alleged Manager; and Ram Pravesh Prasad was Adhyaksh of the relevant management body. The alleged headmaster Mainuddin was not impleaded in the writ petition; he was said to be asserting himself on the basis of a forged order.
Respondent No. 5 (Dr. Mohd. Haneef) applied under O. 1, R. 10(2) of the Code seeking impleadment as a defendant on the ground that he claimed to be the duly elected Manager. The petitioners objected. The Trial Court rejected Dr. Haneef's application by an order dated 28-2-1987 (Annexure 4). Respondent No. 5 filed a revision, which was allowed by the revisional court in the impugned order; this led to the present writ petition under Article 226. The petitioners contend the revisional court lacked jurisdiction to implead Dr. Haneef because impleadment is a matter of the plaintiff's choice, and they relied on Mandir Mahadev Prithvi Nath v. Swami Prakashanand (1981 All LJ 567).
Legal Issues Presented
- What is the scope of Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code — i.e., whether the Court (including in revision) has discretion to add or implead a person as a party (suo motu or on application) in order to effectually and completely adjudicate all questions in the suit?
- Whether the revisional court had jurisdiction to direct impleadment of Dr. Mohd. Haneef as a defendant despite the plaintiff's opposition, and whether such direction amounted to an excess of jurisdiction or an error warranting issuance of certiorari under Article 226.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The revisional court had no jurisdiction to implead Dr. Mohd. Haneef as a defendant because impleadment is a matter of the plaintiff's choice (the plaintiff is dominus litis) and the plaintiff did not want to implead him.
- It was improper for a court to impose a party against the plaintiff's wishes; reliance was placed on Mandir Mahadev Prithvi Nath v. Swami Prakashanand (1981 All LJ 567).
Respondent's Arguments
- Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Code confers broad discretion on the Court to add or strike out parties "either upon or without the application of either party" and "on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just," including adding persons who ought to have been joined or whose presence is necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate the suit.
- Dr. Mohd. Haneef alleged he was duly elected Manager and his interests would be affected by the suit; he therefore ought to be impleaded. The impugned order also records that plaintiff No. 3 (Sri Arvind Pandey) accepted that Dr. Haneef was Manager and could be made a party.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bal Niketan Nursery School v. Kesari Prasad, (1987) 3 SCC 587 : AIR 1987 SC 1970 | The scope and effect of O. 1, R. 10 — if a bona fide mistake has occurred in filing suit in the name of the wrong person, the Court should set matters right under O.1 R.10 to promote justice. | The court relied on the Supreme Court's exposition that O.1 R.10 should be used to correct bona fide mistakes and to promote justice when adding or substituting parties. |
| Udit Narain Singh v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786 | It is within the Court's discretion to add or implead proper parties either suo motu or on the application of a party to completely settle all questions involved. | The court cited this authority to support the proposition that the Court has discretionary power to add necessary parties to settle all questions in controversy. |
| Munshi Ram v. Narsi Ram, (1983) 2 SCC 8 : AIR 1983 SC 271 | O.1 R.10(2) enables the Court to implead a person who appears to be a necessary party so as to effectually and completely adjudicate and settle all questions involved in the suit. | The court applied this principle directly to conclude that Dr. Mohd. Haneef could be impleaded if he appeared to be a necessary party for effective adjudication. |
| Mandir Mahadev Prithvi Nath v. Swami Prakashanand, 1981 All LJ 567 | The normal proposition that the Court should not add a person as defendant when the plaintiff is opposed, since the plaintiff is the dominus litis and best judge of his own interest. | The court considered this case but held the principle cannot be universally applied in every case given the wide language of O.1 R.10(2); the court distinguished it on the basis of the Code's broad discretionary language and the need to prevent collusive decrees and protect justice. |
| Harbans Lal v. Jag Mohan Saran, (1985) 4 SCC 333 : AIR 1986 SC 302 | The discretionary nature of writ of certiorari — it should not be issued as a matter of course; the High Court may refuse writ relief where granting it would secure an unjust advantage or perpetuate an unjust gain. | The court relied on this authority to hold that certiorari should not be granted when doing so would defeat the ends of justice; it refused to quash the impugned order for that reason. |
| M.P. Mittal v. State of Haryana, (1984) 4 SCC 371 : AIR 1984 SC 1888 | Supports the proposition that writ relief is discretionary and may be refused where it would defeat justice. | The court cited this case alongside Harbans Lal to justify refusal of certiorari, observing that granting relief would defeat the interests of justice. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the central point for determination as the scope of Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. It examined Supreme Court decisions interpreting O.1 R.10(2) and concluded that the provision grants wide discretionary power to the Court to add or strike out parties, including doing so suo motu, where necessary for effectual and complete adjudication of the questions in the suit.
Applying the statutory language and the cited precedents, the court found that Dr. Mohd. Haneef had applied for impleadment alleging he was elected Manager on 2-11-1986 and that his interests would be affected by the suit. The court noted that plaintiff No. 3 (Sri Arvind Pandey) had acknowledged Dr. Haneef's claim to be Manager and that there were allegations of collusion affecting the electoral or organizational positions. Given these facts, the court considered Dr. Haneef's presence necessary for the court to effectually and completely adjudicate the matters in controversy.
The court addressed the petitioner's reliance on Mandir Mahadev Prithvi Nath v. Swami Prakashanand and restated the principle that ordinarily the plaintiff — as dominus litis — chooses his opponents. However, the court held this cannot be an absolute rule in the face of the wide discretionary power conferred by O.1 R.10(2). The court reasoned that permitting plaintiffs always to exclude necessary parties could lead to collusive decrees or defeat the interests of justice; Parliament's language in O.1 R.10(2) was deliberate to avoid those outcomes.
On the question of writ relief, the court reviewed the limited and discretionary nature of certiorari under Article 226: it can be issued only where the lower court acted in excess of jurisdiction, violated principles of natural justice, or committed an apparent error on the face of the record. The court concluded the impugned impleadment order was within jurisdiction and did not involve an error apparent on the face of the record.
Finally, invoking the authorities on the discretionary nature of certiorari (Harbans Lal and M.P. Mittal), the court held that granting the relief sought would defeat the ends of justice; therefore, it refused to exercise writ jurisdiction to quash the impugned order.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition is dismissed. The impugned order directing impleadment of Dr. Mohd. Haneef as a defendant under O.1 R.10(2) of the Code stands. There shall be no order as to costs.
Implications:
- The revisional court's direction to implead Dr. Mohd. Haneef is upheld; Dr. Haneef is to be treated as a party whose presence is necessary for complete adjudication of the suit (as found by the court).
- The court concluded the impugned order was within jurisdiction and did not involve a breach of natural justice or an error apparent on the face of the record; therefore certiorari was not warranted.
- The opinion applies existing Supreme Court precedents interpreting O.1 R.10(2) to the facts rather than announcing a novel legal principle; no specific new precedent or sweeping change in law is declared in the text of the opinion.
1. By the present petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, impugned order dt. 12th Apr., 1988 passed by III Additional Distt. Judge Deoria under O. 1, Rule 10(2) of the Civil P.C, 1908 (for short the Code), allowing the revision and directing the plaintiff, the present petitioner to implead Mr. Mohd. Haneef, the respondent No. 5 as one of the defendants, is sought to be quashed by issuing a writ of certiorari.
2. It appears that the petitioners filed suit for permanent injunction against one Mainuddin Khan restraining him from interfering with the function of Sri Arvind Pandey as officiating Principal of the institution (vide para 4 of the petition). Petitioner No. 3 was acting Head Master whereas Dr. Nazaruddin Ahmad petitioner No. 2 was alleged Manager of Kisan Laghu Madhyamik Vidyalaya, and Ram Pravesh Prasad was Adhyaksh of Kisan Uchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya Samiti Banjaria Bazar. It is noticeable that Mainuddin the alleged head master has not been impleaded in the writ petition. As he was asserting himself to be headmaster on the basis of some forged order hence the suit has to be filed. Dr. Mohd. Haneef, the respondent No. 5 made an application under O. 1, R. 10(2) of Code claiming himself to be the Manager of the institution hence he may be impleaded as a defendant. Petitioners filed objection to that application. The Trial Court rejected the application by order dt. 28-2-1987 (Annexure 4 to the petition). Against that order a revision was filed by the respondent No. 5 which has been allowed by the impugned order, hence present petition has been filed. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that revisional Court has no jurisdiction to implead Dr. Mohd. Haneef, the respondent No. 5 as one of the defendants as the petitioners never wanted to implead him as defendant. It is the choice of the plaintiff to implead anybody as defendant and nobody can impose himself against the choice of the plaintiff to be impleaded as party to a suit. Reliance was placed on Sri Mandir Mahadev Prithvinath v. Swami Prakashanand, 1981 All LJ 567.
3. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that sub-r. 2 of R. 10 of O. 1 of the Code was quite comprehensive and it confers even discretion on the Court that the Court may at any stage of proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. Dr. Mohd. Haneef, the respondent No. 5 alleged himself to be duly elected Manager. His impleadment was even accepted by plaintiff No. 3 Sri Arvind Pandey (vide para 4 of the impugned order) that Dr. Mohd. Haneef was Manager and he may be made a party but aforesaid Arbind Pandey has not been made party to the petition as such Dr. Mohd. Haneef was necessary party to the suit in question.
4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties the point for determination is about the scope of O. 1, R. 10(2) of the Code.
5. The scope of O. 1, R. 10 of the Code has been pointed out in a number of decisions of Supreme Court. In Bal Niketan Nursery School v. Kesari Prasad., (1987) 3 SCC 587 : AIR 1987 SC 1970 : (1987 All LJ 1408), the matter was taken to the Supreme Court from this Court and the view of this Court was not approved. In para 13 at page 1975 it was observed by their Lordships of Supreme Court as follows:
“The scope and effect of O. 1, R. 10 has been considered in numerous cases and there is a plethora of decisions laying down the ratio that if the Court is satisfied that a bona fide mistake has occurred in the filing of the suit in the name of the wrong person then the Court should set right matters in exercise of its powers under O. 1, R. 10 and promote the cause of justice.”
6. In Udit Narain Singh v. Addl. Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 786, it was held that it is within the discretion of Court to add or implead proper parties for completely settling all the questions that may be involved in the controversy either suo motu or on the application of a party to the suit or on application filed at the instance of such proper party.
7. In Munshi Ram v. Narsi Ram, (1983) 2 SCC 8 : AIR 1983 SC 271, it was held that O. 1, R. 10(2) of the Code enables the Court to implead a person who appears to be necessary party so as to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit.
8. In the instant case the respondent No. 5 Dr. Mohd. Haneef made an application for impleadment under O. 1, R. 10(2) of the Code (Annexure 2 to the petition) and alleged that he was elected as Manager of the institution on 2-11-1986 in the meeting of the General Body. That apart plaintiff No. 2 and defendant No. 2 were in collusion and plaintiff No. 2 was never elected as Adhyaksh, hence respondent No. 5 may be impleaded as one of the defendants in the suit. As he alleged himself to be elected Manager, his interest would be affected in case the plaintiff obtains a decree in the suit by impleading some other persons as defendants. I am of the considered opinion that the language of O. 1, R. 10(2) of the Code has been employed by the Legislature to convey its object by giving a discretion to the Court in every case to implead, any person who appears to be necessary party so as to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. This power can be exercised by the Court even suo motu. There may be a person who may not be necessary party according to plaintiff, but he may be necessary party according to Court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon the questions involved in the suit. In the instant case respondent No. 5 appears to be a party whose presence was necessary as he alleged himself to have been elected as Manager.
9. As regards the case Mandir Mahadev Prithvi Nath v. Swami Prakashnand, 1981 All LJ 567, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in that case in para 5 at page 569 it was observed as follows:
“There is another aspect of the matter and it is that normally the Court should not add a person as defendant when the plaintiff is opposed to such addition. The reason is that the plaintiff is the dominus litis. He is the best judge of his own interest and it should be left to him to choose his opponent from whom he wants relief. If he seeks relief against a particular person, it is not the look-out of the Court to see whether the relief should be claimed against other persons, nor is it duty of the Court to investigate whether the necessary parties have been added or left out.”
10. With profound regards, I may say that it can never be a principle which may be made applicable in every case in view of the wide sweep of the language employed in O. 1, R. 10(2) of the Code. The provisions of O. 1, R. 10(2) of the Code clearly empower the Court to implead any person as party suo motu, who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. In case the plaintiff is permitted as a rule to choose, his own opponents and the Court does not interfere on the point, in that event it may be that a collusive decree is obtained against the real owner or interested person without impleading him as a party and when the decree will become final, then at a very late stage the person vitally affected or the real owner may come to know about it. This would lead to defeat the interest of justice which should not be permitted in a Court of law and to avoid these ugly situations the Parliament with considerable ingenuity enacted O. 1, R. 10(2) of the Code which has been couched in a language having very wide sweep.
11. The petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is well settled by plethora of decisions that a writ of certiorari being a discretionary remedy cannot be issued as a matter of course. It is to be issued only when Court below has acted in excess of jurisdiction, in passing the order or there is violation of principles of natural justice or there is error apparent on the face of the record. In the present case the order for impleadment having been passed under O. 1(one) Rule 10(ten)(2) of the Code, where the Court has very comprehensive powers to pass an order for impleadment of a person whose interests are either affected or likely to be affected by the decree or order to be passed on the suit or application of the plaintiff cannot be said to be without jurisdiction.
12. It is to be borne in mind that while granting the discretionary relief of the writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution, to a person who invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, the same may not lead to defeat the interest of justice. I am of the considered opinion that granting a relief to the petitioner in this case would certainly lead to defeat the ends of justice. This Court always has power to refuse relief where the petitioner seeks to invoke its writ jurisdiction in order to secure an unjust advantage or to perpetuate an unjust gain. See Harbans Lal v. Jag Mohan Saran, (1985) 4 SCC 333 : AIR 1986 SC 302 : (1986 All LJ 84), M.P Mittal v. State of Haryana, (1984) 4 SCC 371 : AIR 1984 SC 1888.
13. Applying a priori and a posteriori reasonings I am of the view that impugned order does not suffer from any error much less an error apparent on the face of the record. By impugned order substantial justice has been done.
14. This order cannot be said to be without jurisdiction, rather it is well within the power of Court under O. 1, R. 10(2) of the Code. In the premises aforesaid writ petition fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
15. Petition dismissed.
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