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United States v. Anthony Lynch
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4343
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, v.
ANTHONY LYNCH,
Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Elizabeth W. Hanes, District Judge. (2:23-cr-00008-EWH-RJK-1) Submitted: April 30, 2026 Decided: November 10, 2026
Before KING, HARRIS, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Dallas F. Kratzer III, Columbus, Ohio, Margaret Ann Lohman, STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Bridgeport, West Virginia, for Appellant. Todd W. Blanche, Attorney General, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Anthony Comer Mozzi, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, Theophani K. Stamos, First Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Anthony Lynch pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to attempted enticement of a minor to engage in criminal sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and commission of a felony offense involving a minor while being required to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A. The district court sentenced Lynch to 300 months' imprisonment. On appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Lynch's motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) whether Lynch's sentence is reasonable. The Government moved to dismiss the appeal pursuant to the appellate waiver in Lynch's plea agreement. After reviewing the record pursuant to Anders, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing the district court's failure to advise Lynch that he had the right to appointed counsel "at every other stage of the proceeding." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(D). We now affirm in part and dismiss in part.
"We review an appellate waiver de novo to determine its enforceability" and "will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls within its scope."
United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 223-24 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A]n appellate waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it." Id. at 224. To determine whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary, "we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's experience, conduct, educational background and knowledge of his plea agreement and its terms." Id. "When a district court questions a defendant during a [Federal] Rule [of Criminal Procedure] 11
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hearing regarding an appeal waiver and the record shows that the defendant understood the import of his concessions, we generally will hold that the waiver is valid." United States
v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 2021). Our review of the record confirms that Lynch knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his convictions and sentence, with limited exceptions not applicable here. We therefore conclude that the waiver is valid and enforceable and that the sentencing issues counsel raises fall squarely within the scope of the waiver. Although Lynch's appellate waiver is valid and enforceable, "the existence of such a waiver does not bar our review of the validity of the guilty plea." United States v. Taylor- Sanders, 88 F.4th 516, 522 (4th Cir. 2023). "Rule 11 requires that, before accepting a guilty plea, a district court must ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty, and the various rights the defendant is relinquishing by pleading guilty."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The "court must also determine that the plea is voluntary and that there is a factual basis for the plea." Taylor- Sanders, 88 F.4th at 522 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2)-
(3).
Here, the district court substantially complied with Rule 11 in accepting Lynch's plea. The court, however, did not advise Lynch that he had the right to appointed counsel
"at every other stage of the proceeding." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(D).
"Generally, we review the acceptance of a guilty plea under the harmless error standard." United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). Under that
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standard, "any deviation from the requirements of Rule 11 is reversible unless the government demonstrates that it was harmless." Taylor-Sanders, 88 F.4th at 522 (citation modified). "The [g]overnment bears the burden to prove an error was harmless." United States v. Golestan, 151 F.4th 634, 643 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1499 (2026).
"But when . . . a defendant fails to move in the district court to withdraw his or her guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is reviewed only for plain error." Williams,
811 F.3d at 622. Importantly, to avoid plain-error review of a Rule 11 misstep, the defendant must have moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the Rule 11 colloquy was inadequate. United States v. Smith, 157 F.4th 366, 372-73 (4th Cir. 2025). For example, in Smith, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of plea counsel, "not the adequacy of the colloquy." Id. at 372. Accordingly, even though the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, he had
"forfeited his challenge to the plea colloquy," and we reviewed his claim "only for plain error." Id. at 372-73. Under those circumstances, "the burden of proof shifts from the government to [the defendant]." Id. at 373.
Here, Lynch moved to withdraw his guilty plea, but he never complained about the adequacy of the Rule 11 colloquy. Accordingly, we conclude that Lynch bears the burden of demonstrating reversible plain error from the Rule 11 omission. Under both standards, however, the question is whether the Rule 11 error affected the defendant's substantial rights. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h) ("A variance from the requirements of this rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights."); United States v. Cabrera-Rivas, 142 F.4th 199, 213 (4th Cir. 2025) (explaining that plain error
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may be reversible if it "affects substantial rights"). "[T]he overarching inquiry" in determining whether a Rule 11 error affected a defendant's substantial rights "is whether there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty had there been no Rule 11 error." Smith, 157 F.4th at 372 (citation modified). We conclude that Lynch has not established that the Rule 11 omission affected his substantial rights. First, although the district court did not advise Lynch that he had the right to counsel "at every other stage of the proceeding" during the Rule 11 colloquy, Lynch was made aware of this right through his plea agreement, which he signed, initialed, and reviewed with counsel. See id. at 373 (finding omission did not affect substantial rights when, among other reasons, defendant was advised of omitted information in plea agreement). Second, considering the amount of "incriminating evidence" against Lynch, we conclude that "any rational defendant would have opted for the favorable guilty plea that [Lynch] received. It was a bargain." Id. at 373-74.
An appellate waiver also will "not bar appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw the underlying guilty plea when the plea-withdrawal motion incorporates a colorable claim that the plea agreement itself—and hence the waiver of appeal rights that it contains—is tainted by constitutional error," such as involuntariness or ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 733 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994); accord Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1702, 1713 (2026) ("[A]n appeal waiver is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice."). Here, Lynch alleged that his plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary due to his emotional and mental state. Accordingly, we conclude that
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Lynch's challenge to the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea falls outside the scope of the waiver.
We review a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. Smith, 157 F.4th at 374. "A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. Rather, it may be withdrawn if the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal." Id. (citation modified). And "[w]e have long articulated six non-exhaustive 'Moore[*] factors' to guide district courts in determining whether a reason is 'fair and just.'" Id. These factors are: (1) "whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea was not knowing or not voluntary"; (2) "whether the defendant has credibly asserted his legal innocence"; (3) "whether there has been a delay between the entering of the plea and the filing of the motion"; (4) "whether defendant has had close assistance of competent counsel"; (5) "whether withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government"; and (6) "whether withdrawal will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources." Id. at 374-75 (citation modified). The district court warned Lynch during the Rule 11 hearing that he would not be able to withdraw his plea without a fair and just reason. And we conclude that the district court, after carefully weighing the relevant Moore factors, did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lynch had not presented such a reason. Notably, Lynch's claims that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that he is innocent of the offenses are belied by his sworn statements during the Rule 11 hearing. See United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, * United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1991).
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221-22 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining that, "in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the truth of sworn statements made during a Rule 11 colloquy is conclusively established"). Moreover, as the district court found, it is apparent that Lynch had the close assistance of competent counsel during plea negotiations. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Lynch's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore grant the Government's motion in part and dismiss the appeal as to the issues within the scope of the waiver. We otherwise affirm. This court requires that counsel inform Lynch, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Lynch requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Lynch.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
DISMISSED IN PART
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