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United States v. DaQuan Lane
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4312
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, v.
DAQUAN MONTREAL LANE, a/k/a Da'Quan, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Elizabeth W. Hanes, District Judge. (4:23-cr-00050-EWH-RJK-1) Submitted: September 30, 2026 Decided: November 6, 2026
Before NIEMEYER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Salvatore M. Mancina, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Andrew W. Grindrod, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Peter Osyf, Assistant United States Attorney, Vetan Kapoor, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Daquan Lane pled guilty, pursuant to a conditional plea agreement in which he reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, to possession with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Lane to 78 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Lane challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the firearm and narcotics seized during a search of his vehicle. Specifically, he contends that (1) officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop; (2) even assuming the initial traffic stop was legal, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to open his car door, which, he contends, constituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment; and
(3) the officers arrested him without probable cause and acted unreasonably when they removed him from the car, pinned him to the ground, and handcuffed him. For the following reasons, we affirm.
"When the district court denies a motion to suppress, we review its legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government." United States v. Henderson, 136 F.4th 527, 531 (4th Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). "When reviewing factual findings for clear error, we particularly defer to a district court's credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to
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suppress." United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 653 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the clear error standard, factual findings by the district court may be reversed only if we are "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"A traffic stop constitutes a 'seizure' under the Fourth Amendment and is subject to review for reasonableness." United States v. Hill, 852 F.3d 377, 381 (4th Cir. 2017). To determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable, we apply the standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), asking "(1) if the stop was legitimate at its inception, and (2) if the officer's actions during the seizure were reasonably related in scope to the basis for the traffic stop." United States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d 200, 209 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). The Fourth Amendment authorizes an officer to stop a vehicle if the officer has probable cause to believe, see id., or "any objectively reasonable basis" to believe, Palmer, 820 F.3d at 650, that the driver has committed a traffic infraction. "Courts determine whether an officer correctly has assessed the existence of reasonable suspicion by considering the totality of the circumstances, giving due weight to common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their experience and training." United States v. Gist-Davis, 41 F.4th 259, 264 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Lane first argues that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he violated Va. Ann. Code § 46.2-1095, Virginia's child-restraint law, which was the reason for the traffic stop, and, as a result, the traffic stop was illegal from its inception. However, both officers testified that they observed a small child sitting low in the back seat of Lane's car when
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they drove past him and that they had either personal or professional experience with young children and booster seat requirements. Though Lane is correct that the officers could not surmise the child's age as they briefly viewed him when they drove past him, the reasonable suspicion standard does not require that level of certainty. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989) (holding concept of reasonable suspicion "does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the basis for the traffic stop was legitimate. See Bowman, 884 F.3d at 209. Further, the officer's actions during the stop—asking questions about the child's age—were reasonably related in scope to the basis for the traffic stop—specifically, the perceived child safety restraint violation. Id. Alternatively, Lane argues that the court clearly erred in crediting the officers' testimony that they believed the child was under the age requirement for § 46.2-1095 and was not sitting in a booster seat. He asserts that the body camera footage clearly contradicted the officers' testimony because a screenshot of the footage proved that the child did not look small and that his head was nearly two-thirds of the way up the headrest. The district court's decision to credit the officers' testimony regarding their belief as to the child's age and whether he was in a booster seat is subject to deference and is not clearly erroneous. Palmer, 820 F.3d at 653. Additionally, Lane's argument about the screenshot analyzes the question of reasonable suspicion at the wrong time. Here, what matters is how the officers perceived the child at the time they drove past Lane, not how the child appeared after they had initiated the traffic stop. Accordingly, given the totality of the circumstances,
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we conclude that the officers had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on the perceived child safety seat restraint violation. See Gist-Davis, 41 F.4th at 264. The gravamen of Lane's second argument is that, even if the initial traffic stop was valid, Officer Woods lacked reasonable suspicion that Lane was armed and dangerous, and Woods lacked probable cause to open Lane's car door to effectuate a Fourth Amendment search. Lane also argues that Woods trespassed on Lane's constitutionally protected interest in his vehicle and conducted a Fourth Amendment search when he opened Lane's car door to obtain information for his investigation.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless searches and seizures "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). One exception to the warrant requirement concerns automobiles because of their inherent mobility and the risk that contraband inside the vehicle could disappear while officers obtain a search warrant. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1985). Accordingly, "[p]olice officers do not need a warrant to search an automobile if they have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of criminal activity." United States v. Patiutka, 804 F.3d 684, 690 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (per curiam) ("If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits police to search the vehicle without more." (citation modified)). Generally, "probable cause to search a vehicle exists when reasonable officers can conclude that what they see, in light of their experience, supports
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an objective belief that contraband is in the vehicle." United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation modified).
Under the circumstances present here, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Officer Woods had probable cause to believe that Lane's vehicle contained contraband. Although Woods testified that he was initially unsure about what was in Lane's hoodie pocket, he explained that when Lane put his hands on his head, the product inside of the bags in Lane's pocket became visible, bolstering Woods's suspicions that Lane had narcotics on his person. See Baker, 719 F.3d 319. Further, the court credited Woods's testimony of what he observed in Lane's hoodie pocket, including Woods's experience with how narcotics are often packaged. See Palmer, 820 F.3d at 653; see also United States v. White, 549 F.3d 946, 951 (4th Cir. 2008) ("The district court is entitled to respect the inferences drawn by officers from their own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists." (citation modified)). Thus, the court did not clearly err in finding that Woods had probable cause to believe that contraband was inside Lane's car and a basis on which to search the car. See Patiutka, 804 F.3d at 690. This probable cause, coupled with officers' authority to order occupants to exit a vehicle during a routine traffic stop, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1977), made Woods's act of opening the car door permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
Lastly, Lane argues that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him and acted unreasonably when they removed him from the car, pinned him to the ground, and handcuffed him. As discussed above, we conclude that Officer Woods had probable cause
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to believe that Lane was in possession of controlled substances inside the vehicle, and thus to remove him from the vehicle and arrest him.
The officers saw knotted plastic baggies containing suspected narcotics on Lane's person, found a gun in the side pocket of the driver's side door, and asked him repeatedly to exit his car, to no avail. It was only when Lane became argumentative and refused to comply with their commands to exit the car that officers forcibly removed him. Moreover, when officers initially grabbed Lane to remove him from the vehicle, Lane pushed the ignition button to start the vehicle. And when officers took Lane to the ground, he continued to resist, and officers warned him he would be tased if he continued resisting. During the struggle, at least two bags of suspected narcotics fell from Lane's hoodie onto the ground. Accordingly, the officers' actions were reasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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