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United States v. Yomere Busbee

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Nov 6, 2026

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4227

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee, v.

YOMERE JUAN BUSBEE, a/k/a Ram, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (5:20-cr-00393-M-1) Submitted: May 21, 2025 Decided: November 6, 2026

Before RUSHING and BERNER, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: James W. Kilbourne, Jr., ALLEN STAHL & KILBOURNE, P.L.L.C., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Daniel P. Bubar, Acting United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

In 2020, Yomere Juan Busbee was charged with several offenses, including conspiracy to kidnap four individuals, one of whom was a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c); kidnapping a minor and aiding and abetting such conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1), (g), 2; conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl and a quantity of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) ("Count 4"); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime as alleged in Count 4, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924. In July 2022, Busbee pled guilty to Count 4 of the indictment without the benefit of a plea agreement, and he pled not guilty to the remaining counts. A jury ultimately found Busbee guilty of all five remaining counts, including finding that one of the kidnapping victims was under 18 years of age and that Busbee was not a family member—and did not have legal custody—of the minor. Busbee was sentenced to an aggregate term of 390 months in prison. The district court also imposed the special assessment of $600 and ordered that Busbee pay $500 in restitution to each of his four victims. The court did not impose a fine.

On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal but raising for the court's consideration: (1) Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the kidnapping and § 924(c) convictions; (2) Whether evidence of prior bad acts should have been admitted at trial; (3) Whether Busbee had a constitutional right to possess a firearm in light of New

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York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)1; and (4) Whether the total weight of controlled substances for which Busbee was found responsible and the sentencing enhancements for sexual exploitation and leadership role were supported by the evidence. Busbee was notified of his right to file a brief, but did not do so, and the Government did not file a response brief. We identified a potentially meritorious issue and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on whether the district court plainly erred in ordering restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A or 18 U.S.C. § 3663 based on Busbee's kidnapping conviction. We affirm the criminal judgment.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Busbee's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his kidnapping and § 924(c) convictions, we will uphold the jury's verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. United States v. Burfoot, 899 F.3d 326, 334 (4th Cir. 2018). In reviewing the evidence, we ask whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Robinson,

855 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, we may not "assess witness credibility" and must "assume that the jury resolved any conflicting

1 Busbee's arguments based on Bruen are foreclosed by this court's precedent. See United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 703 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2756 (2025); United States v. Canada, 123 F.4th 159, 161 (4th Cir. 2024); cf. United States v. Askew, 98 F.4th 116, 123 (4th Cir. 2024) (observing that while defendant "may have had a right to possess firearms, he had no right to possess them in furtherance of his drug dealings").

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evidence in the prosecution's favor." United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A defendant who brings a sufficiency challenge bears a heavy burden, as appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence is confined to cases where the prosecution's failure is clear." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Kidnapping is the unlawful seizure, confinement, abduction, or carrying away of any person if done within the jurisdiction of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1201. And a minimum 20-year sentence is mandated if the victim is a minor under the age of 18 and the offender is 18 years or older and is not a family member or a person having legal custody over the minor. § 1201(g). A conspiracy is the agreement to commit the unlawful act and may be proven by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Tillmon, 954 F.3d 628, 640 (4th Cir. 2019).

To sustain a conviction under § 924(c), the Government was required to prove that Busbee "(1) committed a drug trafficking offense and (2) possessed a firearm (3) in furtherance of that drug offense." United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180, 192 (4th Cir. 2021). Whether Busbee possessed the firearms to further a drug trafficking offense is a question of fact, and "the fact finder is free to consider the numerous ways in which a firearm might further or advance drug trafficking." United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002). Some factors this court considers when determining whether a connection exists between a defendant's firearm possession and his drug trafficking activity include: "the type of drug offense, the type of firearm, its proximity to drugs and drug profits, its accessibility, whether the firearm is illegally possessed, whether the firearm is stolen, whether the firearm is loaded, and the general circumstances surrounding the possession."

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Moody, 2 F.4th at 192. Generally, "[f]inding drugs and firearms in a residence used to sell drugs supports a finding that the firearms were being used in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime." United States v. Hardy, 999 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2021). We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict. Regarding the kidnapping counts, the Government introduced evidence establishing that Busbee held his victims in a hotel room against their will and would not allow them leave for hours. Evidence was also presented establishing the elements required for the § 924(c) count, including evidence that firearms were found in proximity to controlled substances and that Busbee was armed when he sold narcotics. We therefore conclude that Busbee failed to meet his "heavy burden" of establishing that his convictions should be vacated. Savage,

885 F.3d at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. Prior Bad Acts Evidence Next, we discern no error in the district court's decision to admit evidence of Busbee's prior bad acts. In this regard, a district court may admit "[r]elevant evidence"

except as otherwise provided by law. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence is evidence which has "any tendency to make a fact more or less probable" when the fact "is of consequence in determining the action." Fed. R. Evid. 401. Although Rule 404(b) provides that "[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character," Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), such evidence is admissible for other purposes, "such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident," Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).

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This "list is illustrative rather than exclusionary." United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 831 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "[w]hile Rule 404(b) regulates prior-acts evidence extrinsic to the acts charged in the indictment, it does not regulate acts intrinsic to the conduct charged." United States v. Underwood, 95 F.4th 877, 891 (4th Cir. 2024). This court has held that intrinsic acts include, among other things, those that are involved in "the same series of transactions as the charged offense," or that are "necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial." United States v. Webb, 965 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). In conspiracy cases, for instance, "the government is permitted to present evidence of acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy even though they are not all specifically described in the indictment."

United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2004).

"To be admissible under Rule 404(b), prior bad acts evidence: (i) must be relevant to an issue other than character, such as identity or motive; (ii) must be necessary to prove an element of the crime charged; (iii) must be reliable; and (iv) its probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature." United States v. Blauvelt, 638 F.3d 281, 292 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations and emphasis omitted). Under Rule 404(b), "all evidence of other crimes or acts" may be admitted, "except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the district court's decision to admit prior bad act evidence for abuse of discretion. Id. In this case, the district court allowed testimony on two uncharged, illicit acts committed by Busbee; namely, his prior physical violence and his role in the prostitution trade. Since evidence of both tended to establish the control Busbee had over the other

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individuals involved, the evidence was properly admitted to explain why the individuals cooperated with Busbee's orders on the day in question. We therefore discern no abuse of the court's discretion to admit the challenged evidence.

III. Sentencing Challenges We review a sentence for "reasonableness" by applying the "deferential abuse-of- discretion standard." United States v. McCain, 974 F.3d 506, 515 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, "[o]ur inquiry proceeds in two steps." United States

v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2021). First, we must "ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

"Only if we determine that the sentence is procedurally reasonable do we then proceed to substantive reasonableness." Id. In considering the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, this court "takes into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a)." United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A]ny sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable." United States v. Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934, 945 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, a defendant can only rebut that presumption "by showing that the sentence is unreasonable

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when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors." United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"In assessing whether a district court properly calculated the Guidelines range, including its application of any sentencing enhancements, [we] review[] the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error." United States v. Pena,

952 F.3d 503, 512 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[C]lear error exists only when the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Slager, 912 F.3d 224, 233 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). "In other words, if the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, [we] may not reverse it." United States v. Barnett, 48 F.4th 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

A. Guidelines Range Calculation

Before a sentencing court can impose a Guidelines enhancement, "the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the enhancement applies." United States v. Kobito, 994 F.3d 696, 701 (4th Cir. 2021). "This burden simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence." United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 435 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court here enhanced Busbee's offense level on the kidnapping convictions by six levels based on Busbee's sexual exploitation of his victims, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 2A4.1(b)(5) (2021). The application notes to this Guideline define "[s]exually exploited" to include "offenses set forth in 18 U.S.C.

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§§ 2241-2244, 2251, and 2421-2423." USSG § 2A4.1 app. n.3. These statutes criminalize sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact, sexual exploitation of children, and transportation in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution.

As is relevant here, § 2241 sanctions behavior that "causes another person to engage in a sexual act" by "using force against that other person" or "by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping." 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a). In addition, § 2242 prohibits engaging "in a sexual act with another person . . . without that other person's consent," and "include[s] doing so through coercion." 18 U.S.C. § 2242(3). A sexual act is defined in relevant part as "the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2).

We find that the district court did not clearly err when it concluded that such conduct occurred here. But even if the court erroneously applied the enhancement, the error would have no effect on Busbee's offense level since the offense level for the grouped kidnapping offenses would not have been reduced. Moreover, the district court expressly indicated that it would impose the same sentence even if it erroneously calculated Busbee's Guidelines range. See United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th Cir. 2014), as corrected (Apr. 29, 2014) ("A Guidelines error is considered harmless if we determine that (1) the district court would have reached the same result even if it had decided the guidelines issue the other way, and (2) the sentence would be reasonable even if the

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guidelines issue had been decided in the defendant's favor." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The record also supports the district court's Guidelines enhancement based on Busbee's aggravated role in the narcotics and kidnapping offenses, pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1. In particular, we find that the record amply establishes that Busbee was in charge of the kidnapping for which he was convicted. See USSG § 3B1.1(c). And for the drug trafficking offenses, Busbee was in charge of the group that included five individuals. See USSG § 3B1.1(a). We also reject Busbee's assertion that he should have only been held responsible for the controlled substances seized during law enforcement's search of his hotel room, rather than the additional drug weights that were not introduced at trial. See United States v. Peters, 843 F.3d 572, 581 (4th Cir. 2016) ("For drug conspiracies, a defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and all quantities of contraband that were involved in transactions carried out by other participants, if those transactions were within the scope of, and in furtherance of, the jointly undertaken criminal activity and were reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity." (cleaned up)). Accordingly, we reject Busbee's challenges to his Guidelines range calculation.

B. Restitution

After considering the parties' supplemental briefs, we find that the district court did not reversibly err when it ordered Busbee to pay restitution for his kidnapping crime. In this regard, this court has recognized that "[f]ederal courts do not have the inherent authority to order restitution, but must rely on a statutory source to do so." United States

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v. Ritchie, 858 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). "As such, discretion in ordering restitution is circumscribed by the procedural and substantive protections of the statute authorizing restitution." Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

In particular, it is well-established that under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, "when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the court shall order . . . that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1). As is relevant here, the offenses described in subsection (c) include "a crime of violence as defined in [18 U.S.C.] section 16," and an "identifiable victim" of the crime must have "suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss." 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c); see United States v. Diaz, 865 F.3d 168, 174 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that § 3663A(c)(1)(A) and § 3663A(c)(1)(B) are read in the conjunctive).

Here, the purported crime of violence underlying the restitution order was kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). However, in United States v. Walker,

934 F.3d 375, 378-79 (4th Cir. 2019), the court determined that federal kidnapping is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). And in United States v. Petties, 42 F.4th 388, 391 (4th Cir. 2022), the court noted that the Government conceded that federal kidnapping was not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16. Accordingly, the parties rightly agree that Busbee's kidnapping conviction could not support the restitution order under § 3663A.

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But under the Victim and Witness Protection Act ("VWPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3663, a district court "may" order the defendant to make restitution to any victim for certain offenses, including offenses under the Controlled Substances Act such as 21 U.S.C. § 841, but not for "offense[s] described in section 3663A(c)." Contrary to a restitution order under § 3663A, such an order under the VWPA is discretionary. United States v. Blake, 81 F.3d 498, 505 (4th Cir. 1996) ("The decision to order restitution pursuant to the . . . VWPA . . . is within the discretion of the district court.").

Moreover, because Busbee did not object to the order to pay restitution of $2,000 (without interest)—$500 to each of his four kidnapping victims for estimated treatment costs—our review is for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Under that standard, Busbee must show that the error "affect[ed] substantial rights, which generally means that there must be a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different." Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 507-08 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, even assuming the district court committed a plain error in relying on § 3663A, that error did not affect Busbee's substantial rights because the district court entered restitution under "Title 18, United States Code, Section 3663 and 3663[A], or any other statute authorizing a sentence of restitution." (J.A. 1071-72 (emphasis added)).2

Indeed, restitution awards under § 3663 may be granted in the district court's discretion after it considers "the amount of the loss sustained by each victim as a result of

2 "J.A." refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties.

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the offense," as well as "the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate." 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i). A district court may make findings of fact to support its restitution order by "adopt[ing] a defendant's presentence . . . report (PSR) that contains adequate factual findings to allow effective appellate review of the . . . restitution." United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1277 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Blake, 81 F.3d at 505.

The district court here considered the § 3663 factors and, by adopting the findings in the PSR, made specific findings of fact which are sufficient to support its discretionary award. As to the amount of loss sustained by the victims, the district court found that each had suffered $500 in estimated treatment costs. As to Busbee's earning ability and ability to pay, the district court considered his education and skills, his assets and liabilities, and his "ability to pay" (J.A. 1074). As to the financial needs of dependents, the district court found that Busbee provides voluntary financial support to his teenage children who live with others. The court specifically found that Busbee is able to "be gainfully employed on a full-time basis, earning at least minimum wage," and is therefore able to make "a minimum monthly payment of $50," but does "not have the ability to pay a fine [or interest] in addition to court-imposed restitution," and so the court did not order a fine or interest on the restitution. (J.A. 1073-74, 1181). The court further directed the probation officer to assess Busbee's ability to pay upon his release in case any adjustment to the payment plan becomes necessary.

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Although the district court suggested in some places that restitution was mandatory in this case, in the plain error posture, the burden is on Busbee to show that the error affects his substantial rights. The district court also imposed restitution under § 3663, which is discretionary, and Busbee has identified nothing in the record that suggests the district court would have reached a different result if it had not considered § 3663A as well. And even assuming the district court should have said more than it did about its factual findings supporting discretionary restitution, Busbee has not shown that additional explanation or factfinding would have a reasonable probability of changing the restitution award. Cf. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 580 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2010) (assuming that district court's "very brief explanation" was plain error, the defendant was required to demonstrate that the explanation "had a prejudicial effect on the sentence imposed"). Beyond showing that any error affected his substantial rights, Busbee must also demonstrate why we should exercise our discretion to correct an unpreserved error by showing "that the error had a serious effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Greer, 593 U.S. at 508 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court imposed only a modest restitution requirement for the estimated treatment costs of the four victims (including a 2-year-old) that Busbee and his coconspirators kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and terrorized for hours. The restitution award is supported by the record and is far from a completely unexplained condition imposed on a defendant for the rest of his life. Cf. United States v. McMiller, 954 F.3d 670, 677 (4th Cir. 2020) (finding plain error when district court provided no individualized explanation for why, for the rest of his life, defendant would not be allowed to own or use any electronic device

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capable of accessing the internet or maintaining any social networking account without prior approval). Without interest, Busbee could pay off the entire restitution obligation before his term of supervised release ends by making the minimum monthly payment. Requiring Busbee to provide this minimal compensation to his victims, after the district court considered factors relevant to imposing this payment obligation, would not have a serious negative effect on the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, giving us no strong reason to exercise our discretion to reach any unpreserved restitution error.

Having reviewed the record in this case in accordance with our obligations under Anders and finding no meritorious issues for review, we affirm the criminal judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Busbee in writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Busbee requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may motion this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Busbee. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED