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Am. Future Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Nov 6, 2026

25-2781 Am. Future Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit

August Term 2025

Argued: March 19, 2026

Decided: November 6, 2026

No. 25-2781

AMERICAN FUTURE FUND, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, KATHLEEN C.

HOCHUL, in her official capacity as Governor of the State of New York, LETITIA JAMES, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New York, MICHAEL L. JOHNSON, in his official capacity as Chief Enforcement Counsel for the New York State Board of Elections Division of Election Law Enforcement, Defendants-Appellees.*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

No. 25-cv-8151, Jennifer H. Rearden, Judge. Before: W ESLEY, SULLIVAN, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges. * The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

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American Future Fund, Inc. (the "Fund") moved below for a preliminary injunction enjoining Appellees - the New York State Board of Elections, its chief enforcement counsel, the state's Governor, and its Attorney General (together, the

"State") - from enforcing New York's independent expenditure disclosure law with respect to political advertisements that the Fund planned to air before the 2025 New York City Mayoral Election. The district court (Rearden, J.) denied that motion; the Fund now appeals. Upon review, we conclude that - because the Fund's motion for a preliminary injunction sought relief for an injury related to an election that has since passed - the Fund's appeal is moot. And because the Fund's underlying action remains before the district court, it does not meet the mootness exception for controversies "capable of repetition, yet evading review." FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007). We therefore DISMISS the Fund's appeal of the denial of its request for a preliminary injunction as moot. Judge Menashi dissents in a separate opinion.

K ELLEN S. DWYER (Susan L. Greene, Joseph T.

Burns, Holtzman Vogel Baran Torchinsky &

Josefiak PLLC, Buffalo, NY; Jason B.

Torchinsky, Andreas N. Episkopos, Holtzman

Vogel Baran Torchinsky & Josefiak PLLC,

Washington, DC, on the brief), Holtzman Vogel

Baran Torchinsky & Josefiak PLLC,

Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

J UDITH N. VALE, Deputy Solicitor General

(Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General,

Daniel S. Magy, Assistant Solicitor General, on

the brief), for Letitia James, Attorney General for

the State of New York, New York, NY, for

Defendants-Appellees.

R ICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge:

American Future Fund, Inc. (the "Fund") moved below for a preliminary injunction enjoining Appellees - the New York State Board of Elections, its chief

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enforcement counsel, the state's Governor, and its Attorney General (together, the

"State") - from enforcing New York's independent expenditure disclosure law with respect to political advertisements that the Fund planned to air before the 2025 New York City Mayoral Election. The district court (Rearden, J.) denied that motion; the Fund now appeals. Upon review, we conclude that - because the Fund's motion for a preliminary injunction sought prospective relief tethered to an election that has since passed - the Fund's appeal is moot. And because the Fund's underlying action remains before the district court, it does not meet the mootness exception for controversies "capable of repetition, yet evading review."

FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007). We therefore DISMISS the appeal of the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction as moot.

I. B ACKGROUND

New York's independent expenditure disclosure law requires entities that spend money on political elections to register with the New York State Board of Elections and to regularly disclose certain information to the Board. See N.Y. Elec. Law § 14-107(3)-(4). The law only covers expenditures used to, among other things, advocate for or against a "clearly identified candidate," a phrase that the law defines as a "candidate" whose "identity . . . is apparent by unambiguous

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reference." Id. § 14-100(12); see id. § 14-107. New York issued a regulation specifying a holistic set of factors for "determining" whether "a communication is advocating for or against a candidate." 9 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. § 6200.10(b)(1)(ii)(c). Concerned that these factors would cover implicit references to a candidate, and thus sweep in generic issue advocacy, the Fund challenged the regulation's interpretation of the independent expenditure law. See App'x at 28. In particular, the Fund sought (i) a declaratory judgment holding the regulation unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to the content of five proposed advertisements, and (ii) an injunction "permanently enjoining" the State from enforcing that law against the Fund's proposed advertisements. Id. at 34. Those five advertisements - which the Fund had planned to run across New York City, id. at 11 - criticize socialism and the Democratic Socialists of America ("DSA"). Fund Br. at 8-10. The State threatened to enforce its independent expenditure law against those ads, claiming that they referenced a "clearly identified candidate" because the only citywide candidate affiliated with the DSA in the 2025 election was Zohran Mamdani, who ran in (and eventually won) the race for Mayor. Id. at 15; State Br. at 24-25.

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The day after filing its complaint, the Fund also moved for a preliminary injunction on an as-applied basis, arguing that the Fund should temporarily be allowed to run its proposed advertisements while it litigated the merits of its challenges to New York's law. App'x at 43-44; see also Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 8 at 1 ("Pl.'s Mot. Prelim. Inj."). In that motion, the Fund urged the district court to speedily enter a preliminary injunction because it planned "to speak on these political issues in the coming weeks." Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 9 at 3 (emphasis added) ("Pl.'s Mem. L. Supp. Pl.'s Mot. Prelim. Inj."); see also id. at 4 (similar). The Fund then emailed the district court, stating that a failure to rule before the election would constitute "a constructive denial of the motion." State's Addendum at 1. The district court denied the Fund's emergency motion, and the Fund then timely appealed the denial of that motion to our Court.

While we considered this appeal, the State moved to dismiss the Fund's complaint, prompting the Fund to file a motion to stay all proceedings related to its underlying complaint. The district court granted the Fund's motion.

II. D ISCUSSION

Before addressing the merits of an appeal, "we have an independent duty to consider . . . subject-matter jurisdiction, including mootness." Doe v. McDonald,

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128 F.4th 379, 384 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"[S]ubject[-]matter jurisdiction ceases when an event occurs during the course of the proceedings or on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party." County of Suffolk v. Sebelius, 605 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). When that happens, the appeal becomes moot and "we must dismiss [it], rather than issue an advisory opinion." Indep. Party of Richmond Cnty. v. Graham, 413 F.3d 252, 255 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A. The Fund's Appeal Is Moot.

This appeal is moot because the only harms the Fund alleged in its motion for a preliminary injunction concerned its ability to run the proposed advertisements in the lead up to the 2025 Mayoral Election, an event which has since transpired. As such, we are unable to grant effectual relief. The Fund urged the district court to speedily enter a preliminary injunction precisely because it planned "to speak on these political issues in the coming weeks." Pl.'s Mem. L. Supp. Pl.'s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 3; see also id. at 4 (similar). At no point in its preliminary injunction request did it express an intention to run these ads or materially similar ones after the election. In fact, understanding that it would soon suffer the harm

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for which it sought the preliminary injunction, the Fund went so far as to email the district court to state that a failure to rule before the election would constitute

"a constructive denial of the motion." State's Addendum at 1. The implication of this email is that the Fund (and the district court) understood that the injury asserted in the motion was tethered to an event, then imminent, which has now transpired: the 2025 Mayoral Election. Given the facts, we are left with no choice but to hold this appeal moot.

The dissent's arguments (echoing the Fund's) are unpersuasive. First, it asserts that because the Fund now tells us that it plans to run similar ads in the future, we "can grant effectual relief" to the Fund. Dissent at 8. But ours is not a court of first resort. The question is not whether we could grant the Fund any relief, but whether we can grant the Fund relief from the injury it asserted in its motion, the denial of which we are reviewing on a limited, interlocutory basis, see

28 U.S.C. § 1292. We cannot. "[T]he preliminary injunction aspect of the case— the springboard for and sole subject of this appeal—no longer presents a live controversy and is therefore moot." Knaust v. City of Kingston, 157 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1998). In the Fund's own words, its injury became complete upon the passage of the 2025 Mayoral Election. See State's Addendum at 1. If the Fund faces a

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different imminent harm, arising from a different election, see Dissent at 18-19, the required course is a new motion addressing that harm, not appellate resuscitation of an old one.

Perhaps recognizing the problems with these post-hoc representations, the dissent also asserts - relying on boilerplate language in the Fund's proposed order - that the controversy is live because the Fund initially "sought relief for the pendency of the lawsuit rather than only for the 2025 election." Dissent at 9 (emphasis added). But the scope of relief requested is irrelevant: just because a party requests a certain amount of relief does not mean their actual injury is commensurate with that relief. And to the extent the dissent is suggesting that we should construe the request for relief as evincing an intent to run the ads beyond the 2025 race, such a construction is belied by the plain language of the motion and by the Fund's email to the district court suggesting otherwise. See Pl.'s Mem. L. Supp. Pl.'s Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 3, 4; State's Addendum at 1. Having sought a preliminary injunction to remedy a threatened injury tied to its plan to run the proposed advertisements before the then-impending 2025 New York City Mayoral Election, which has now occurred, the Fund's appeal of the denial of that injunction is now moot.

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B. No Exception to Mootness Applies.

Because the underlying action remains pending in the district court, the mootness exception for disputes "capable of repetition, yet evading review," Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 462, is inapplicable here. That exception applies only when

"(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Where a claim "remains to be litigated in" an underlying suit, "in no sense does that claim 'evade' review." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983); accord Graham, 413 F.3d at 256. Rather, the evading-review exception exists to preserve a controversy when the alternative is that no court will reach the controversy. Here the district court will reach it, in the ordinary course, as it would have had we never heard this appeal. See Robins v. Rarback, 325 F.2d 929, 929-30 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding appeal of preliminary injunction moot while addressing merits of parallel, non-time-bound complaint).

We are bound by Graham, which held that the injuries asserted in a preliminary injunction request do not evade review when the "questions [that] remain pending before the district court" "raise the same underlying legal

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questions that are being argued [on] appeal." 413 F.3d at 256. The dissent argues that if our logic moots the preliminary-injunction motion it also moots the complaint, Dissent at 5, 11, and that Graham can only apply if we decide the complaint is not moot. Id. at 25-26. But the salient question in Graham is not whether the underlying complaint is live but whether there is "reason to believe that the issues raised by the [Fund's] request for permanent relief [can] be fully litigated" before the district court and, "following the entry of final judgment[,] . . . be reviewed on appeal in this court." Graham, 413 F.3d at 256. Here, there is "reason to believe" that the issues raised by the Fund will be

"fully litigated" before the district court. Id. Should the Fund move to lift the stay of the proceedings below, the district court is likely to do one of two things. It may conclude that the Fund's as-applied challenge remains live - and indeed, it seems clear that the Fund asserted broader injuries for its as-applied challenge in its complaint than it did in its preliminary-injunction motion, see, e.g., State's Addendum at 1. Or the district court may find the Fund's as-applied challenge moot, at which point the controversy would evade review; if the district court also finds the controversy capable-of-repetition (which it seems to be), it would have reason to then apply the exception to mootness and "fully litigate[]" the merits of

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the Fund's claims. Graham, 413 F.3d at 256. From the vantage point of this appeal, the controversy is under "review" either way.

The dissent likens the case before us to National Organization for Marriage v. Walsh and Wisconsin Right to Life, see Dissent at 16-17, but elides the differences between the procedural postures of those cases and this one. In National Organization for Marriage, the district court had "dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction." 714 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). A holding of mootness therefore would have left the plaintiff's election challenge extinguished and unreviewed in toto. In Wisconsin Right to Life, the plaintiff did not appeal the denial of its first preliminary injunction but rather litigated its as-applied substantive claim in the district court, which "subsequently dismissed [the plaintiff]'s complaint." 551 U.S. at 460. After securing a remand from the Supreme Court, the plaintiff prevailed on summary judgment, and the Court heard the case again on appeal. Id. at 460-61 (citing Wis. Right to Life v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 412 (2006)). Only then did the Court employ "the 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' doctrine." Id. at 463-64 (internal citation omitted). The course we describe

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today is no different from that undertaken by the plaintiff - and expressly countenanced by the Supreme Court - in Wisconsin Right to Life.1 The dissent next argues that emergency situations themselves can evade review, even if the underlying merits actions remain pending. Dissent at 26, 30. But the dissent's authorities, unlike the case before us, review grants of preliminary injunctions. Id. at 26, 27 & n.34 (citing, inter alia, Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457 n.4 (1973)). In that scenario, the defendants would suffer injuries that might evade review because the choice to pursue permanent relief in the underlying actions lies with the plaintiffs, who could voluntarily dismiss their complaints to avoid the risk of unfavorable appellate resolution.2Here, the Fund is the plaintiff and can move to lift the stay and continue pursuing its claims in the district court at any time. See Dist. Ct. Doc. Nos. 46-47.

1 The dissent's claim that we are creating a circuit split is even more far-fetched. See Dissent at 29-32. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Smith v. Helzer - which, it should be noted, came after our Court's decision in Graham - does not even identify the relevant issue, relying instead on a precedent that reviewed not a preliminary injunction but a grant of summary judgment. 95 F.4th

1 207, 1 21 3 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Alaska Right to Life Comm. v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 779-80 (9th Cir. 2006)).

2 The one case cited by the dissent involving review of a denial of a preliminary injunction makes clear the action was not actually moot in the first instance. See Stewart v. Taylor, 104 F.3d 965, 969- 70 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining it could order a new election as a remedy).

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Finally, the dissent expresses concern that the Fund will not have time to get a judgment from the district court and appellate review of these issues before the next election. Dissent at 28-29. But it bears noting that the Fund could have requested an injunction pending appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8 prior to the 2025 election and did not. It also had ample opportunity to file another preliminary-injunction motion in the district court with respect to the 2026 election and declined to do so. And the Fund was free at any time to lift the stay on the merits proceedings that it requested in the district court, but again did nothing. See Dist. Ct. Doc. Nos. 46-47. So the crisis of timing highlighted by the dissent was within the Fund's power to control. Since the 2025 election is now long over, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal at this time. See Knaust, 157 F.3d at 88-89.

C. Appeals of Future Preliminary Injunctions Will Return to This Panel.

Although we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal, we recognize the possibility that the Fund may seek a new preliminary injunction with respect to a future election. In the event that the Fund were to make such a motion, we would be free to review a decision on that motion on an expedited basis. See Doc. No. 21. Indeed, to ensure that such review will be conducted quickly and efficiently, we

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now direct that any appeal of a ruling on a preliminary-injunction motion - or request for emergency relief pending such appeal - be returned to this panel, which will have the benefit of the briefing submitted in connection with this appeal.

Panels of this Court may direct future proceedings to themselves only in narrow and compelling circumstances. See United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 21- 22 (2d Cir. 1994). Given the nature of this case, we believe that such a directive is warranted here. As in Jacobson, there is reason to believe that "expedition [will be] necessary" in the event the Fund seeks a new preliminary injunction. Id. at 22. And given the tight timeframes before elections, we fear that it would be "a waste of resources and perhaps unjust as well" to require a new panel to decide a subsequent preliminary-injunction appeal substantially similar to the one now before us. Id. Though review of a new preliminary-injunction decision would involve a new appeal - as opposed to the restoration of an existing one, as was the case in Jacobson - we have not limited the practice to existing appeals. "Sometimes the panel wants a subsequent appeal in the litigation to come before it, regardless of what prompted the remand." Jon O. Newman, Decretal Language, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 727, 734 (2005) (emphases added); see also United States v. Stillwell, 986 F.3d 196, 202

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(2d Cir. 2021) ("In the interest of judicial economy, any further appeal in these cases shall be directed to this panel.") (emphasis added); Rodriguez v. Gusman, 974 F.3d 108, 116-17 (2d Cir. 2020) (directing that a future appeal return to the panel); United States v. Bolin, 976 F.3d 202, 217 (2d Cir. 2020) (same). Indeed, the assignment of a subsequent appeal is even more warranted here than in these past cases, given the nature of the preliminary-injunction request in this matter. Additionally, we have not limited the procedure to instances where action must be taken by the district court in the first instance, as in Jacobson. See Time Warner Cable of N.Y.C. v. M.D. Elecs., 101 F.3d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1996) (Feinberg, J.) (directing a future appellate proceeding to return to the panel contingent on a party filing for specific relief below); Stillwell, 986 F.3d at 201 (same).

Finally, we stress the limited nature of the direction to assign future appeals to this panel. Unlike in Bolin and Stillwell, where the panels assigned themselves review of subsequent merits decisions, here the only appeals that will come back to us are those involving future preliminary-injunction motions, or related emergency motions pending such appeals. Any appeal of the district court's final judgment will be assigned to a new panel, as in the ordinary course. See Newman, Decretal Language, supra, at 735 ("In the Second Circuit, if . . . an appeal is taken that

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relates to a prior appeal, the clerk's office will assign the appeal to the next panel that includes one judge of the Second Circuit who was a member of the prior panel.").

III. C ONCLUSION

We recognize that the Fund raises important issues of First Amendment law, and we believe those arguments deserve full consideration on the merits. But a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy designed to address emergency situations that cannot wait until the full adjudication of the dispute. Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007). It is a scalpel to be used surgically, not a Swiss Army knife that can be switched up and altered to suit the shifting legal strategies of litigants. A cautious approach is warranted here, lest we "unnecessarily and inappropriately preempt the district court's resolution of the controversy before it." Graham, 413 F.3d at 257. Because the event giving rise to the emergency has passed but the Fund's underlying claims remain before the district court, the Fund's emergency motion presents neither a live controversy requiring immediate attention nor a moot one evading review. We therefore DISMISS the Fund's appeal of the district court's denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. Should either party appeal from

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a future decision by the district court on a motion to preliminarily enjoin New York's campaign-finance law as applied to the Fund's proposed advertisements (or substantially similar ones) - or should either party request interim relief pending such appeal - "we respectfully direct the Clerk of this Court to return the matter to this panel for further review and adjudication." Gusman, 974 F.3d, at 116-17.

25-2781 American Future Fund v. New York State Board of Elections MENASHI, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

American Future Fund, Inc. ("AFF") wants to broadcast several advertisements urging New Yorkers to oppose socialist policies. The proposed advertisements mention the Democratic Socialists of America, a political organization that regularly endorses candidates for political office. AFF has not aired its proposed advertisements, however, because it reasonably fears that the New York State Board of Elections will conclude that the advertisements reference a "clearly identified candidate," and the Board will deem the advertisements

"independent expenditures" under New York Election Law § 14-107. Such a determination by the Board would render AFF an

"independent expenditure committee" and require AFF to register with the Board and to make regular disclosures. AFF brought a pre-enforcement action challenging the disclosure requirements as unconstitutional both facially and as applied to the proposed advertisements, and it sought a preliminary injunction barring the Board from enforcing the disclosure requirements against AFF for broadcasting the proposed advertisements. AFF argued (1) that § 14-107 and its implementing regulations are unconstitutionally vague as applied to the proposed advertisements because those provisions do not provide fair notice of what constitutes a reference to a "clearly identified candidate" and

(2) that application of § 14-107 and its implementing regulations to the proposed advertisements violates the First Amendment because the advertisements reflect pure issue advocacy rather than electioneering or express advocacy. The district court denied AFF's motion for a preliminary injunction because it concluded that AFF had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its as-applied vagueness and First Amendment challenges. See Am.

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Future Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 809 F. Supp. 3d 146, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). AFF sought an expedited appeal.

In its appellate briefing, the state recognizes that "[t]his appeal concerns solely plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction based on its as-applied claims." Appellees' Br. 2. But the state argues that

"both the as-applied claims and the preliminary injunction motion sought an injunction to allow plaintiff to run advertisements before an election that has now passed," so this appeal is "moot." Id. The state contends that "any as-applied challenge to the applicability of the disclosure requirements to plaintiff's proposed advertisements in the future would be a different claim relating to a different election with different candidates," so to receive an adjudication of such a claim, AFF must "bring a new as-applied challenge." Id. at 3.1AFF responds that its as-applied claims and preliminary injunction motion sought relief extending beyond the 2025 election, so the appeal is "not moot." Reply Br. 3. And even if it were, according to AFF, it would involve a controversy "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. at 9 n.2.

1 See also Appellees' Br. 30 ("Plaintiff's preliminary injunction motion was based solely on its as-applied claims—which specifically sought to run the proposed advertisements before the 2025 election."); id. at 22 ("The text of the proposed advertisements further confirms that the purpose of plaintiffs as-applied claims, and its preliminary injunction motion based on those claims, was solely to obtain relief for the 2025 election."); id. at 25 ("Any as- applied challenge to the applicability of the disclosure requirements to the proposed advertisements in 2026 would therefore be a different claim relating to a different election with different candidates."); id. at 26 ("[I]f plaintiff wants to raise a new as-applied challenge to the enforcement of the disclosure requirements to the proposed advertisements for a different election in 2026, it has ample time to do so and fully litigate such a challenge.").

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The majority dismisses AFF's appeal as moot based on an argument that the state never made and to which AFF never had the opportunity to respond. According to the majority, AFF's "motion for a preliminary injunction concerned its ability to run the proposed advertisements in the lead up to the 2025 Mayoral Election, an event which has since transpired," rendering an appeal from the denial of that motion moot. Ante at 6. The majority agrees that if the underlying as-applied challenge is also moot, then this controversy "would evade review." Id. at 10. But the majority refuses to consider the parties' arguments about the mootness of the underlying as-applied challenge, insisting that those arguments must be directed to the district court. So the majority does not know whether AFF will be able to obtain review of its as-applied claims based on the complaint. Instead, the majority announces a new rule that the exception to mootness for a controversy capable of repetition yet evading review is "inapplicable" to an appeal involving a motion for a preliminary injunction because "the underlying action," moot or not, "remains pending in the district court." Id. at 9.

This new rule lacks a basis in the case law and conflicts with the law of other circuits that apply the exception to appeals involving preliminary injunctions. Those circuits have the better view. "[T]he preliminary injunction sought is usually of the same character as that of the final injunction."2In other words, a preliminary injunction is

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11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2947 (3d ed. 2026); see also Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) ("The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held."); De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945) ("A preliminary injunction is always appropriate to grant intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally."); Siskina (Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board) v. Distos Compania Naviera S.A. [1979]

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typically an interim version of the permanent injunction sought on the "ultimate legal claim." Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008). That is why "[t]he standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success." Id. (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987)). So it makes sense that when a controversy is capable of repetition yet evading review, the recurring controversy will generally involve the requests for both interim and permanent relief. Even if in some cases a request for interim relief might be based on a more particularized emergency situation, it is also possible for emergency situations to recur, making the request for interim relief itself capable of repetition yet evading review. In either scenario, there is no justification for the majority's novel rule that, whenever there is an underlying complaint, the exception is inapplicable. The understanding of the parties implicates the first scenario, and the approach of the majority implicates the second. But either way the exception applies. First, the motion for a preliminary injunction in this case sought the same relief, on an interim basis, as the complaint sought for the as-applied claims. So even if the as- applied claims were understood to relate only to the 2025 election— as the state contends—the same controversy, involving a need for both interim and permanent relief, will repeat for each election cycle and evade review if the exception does not apply. Second, given the AC 210 (HL) 256 (Lord Diplock) (appeal taken from Eng.) ("The right to obtain an interlocutory injunction is merely ancillary and incidental to the pre-existing cause of action. It is granted to preserve the status quo pending the ascertainment by the court of the rights of the parties and the grant to the plaintiff of the relief to which his cause of action entitles him, which may or may not include a final injunction.").

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frequency of primary and general elections, even if a court were to consider the request for interim relief to be independent of the underlying claims—as the majority apparently does—the controversy over interim relief will itself repeat and evade review. It is unsurprising that the parties have treated the motion for a preliminary injunction and the as-applied claims as seeking the same relief on interim and permanent bases. The majority emphasizes that in justifying the motion for a preliminary injunction, AFF said that it wanted "to speak on these political issues in the coming weeks."3But AFF said the same thing in the underlying complaint. 4

If the as- applied claims alleged in the complaint are not moot, 5

then the preliminary injunction motion—which was based on those claims— is not moot either. And if the preliminary injunction motion is moot, then so are the underlying claims, and the whole controversy is capable of repetition yet evading review.

In fact, this appeal is not moot. In its motion for a preliminary injunction, AFF did not limit its requested relief to the 2025 mayoral election. It sought a preliminary injunction barring the Board from

3 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 3, Am. Future Fund, Inc. v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., No. 25- CV-8151 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025), ECF No. 9 (emphasis added).

4 See App'x 11 (¶ 5) ("AFF would like to speak to New Yorkers on these important issues in the coming weeks."); id. at 22 (¶ 44) ("As soon as possible, AFF would like a determination of its legal obligations with respect to specific communications so that it is able to plan and implement its constitutionally protected political speech for the next month.").

5 The majority suggests that the underlying as-applied claims remain live. See ante at 10 ("[I]t seems clear that the Fund asserted broader injuries for its as-applied challenge in its complaint than it did in its preliminary- injunction motion.").

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subjecting AFF to § 14-107 and its implementing regulations if AFF broadcasts the proposed advertisements during the course of this litigation, which remains pending. The relief that AFF requested was not specific to any candidate or election. Indeed, AFF maintains that it wanted to run the proposed advertisements in 2026 and in future elections—and it could do so without modifying the advertisements because none of the advertisements mention a particular candidate or election. I would hold that there remains a live dispute between the parties, so the appeal is not moot. But even if it were moot, this appeal would fall within the exception to mootness for a controversy capable of repetition yet evading review. The exception would apply either based on the understanding of the parties that the preliminary injunction motion and the as-applied challenge involve the same controversy, and therefore stand or fall together, or based on the approach of the majority to consider the request for interim relief in isolation.

Because the case is not moot, I would reach the merits of AFF's appeal and hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court erred in holding that AFF was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its as- applied First Amendment claim. Section 14-107 and its implementing regulations cannot constitutionally be applied to the proposed advertisements because the advertisements do not explicitly and unambiguously reference a candidate and so reflect issue advocacy rather than electioneering communications. While the Supreme Court has upheld compelled disclosure requirements for advertisements that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, it has never embraced a disclosure regime applicable to communications designed to influence public opinion on a particular issue without reference to a specific candidate. And our court has held

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that such government regulation of issue advocacy violates the First Amendment. See Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell (VRLC II),

758 F.3d 118, 131 n.11 (2d Cir. 2014). I would hold that AFF is likely to succeed on its as-applied First Amendment challenge and that the district court abused its discretion in denying AFF's motion for a preliminary injunction. I dissent from the decision of the majority to dismiss this appeal as moot rather than provide that relief.

I

AFF's appeal is not moot. AFF still intends to broadcast its proposed advertisements, so this court can provide the relief that AFF seeks: a preliminary injunction barring the state from treating the proposed advertisements as "independent expenditures." There remains a live dispute between the parties. And even if the controversy over the proposed advertisements were no longer live, an exception to mootness would apply because the dispute between AFF and the state is capable of repetition yet evading review. The exception would apply either based on the understanding of the parties that the preliminary injunction motion and the as-applied claims sought parallel relief or based on the approach of the majority that the controversy over preliminary relief must be considered standing alone.

A

This case is not moot because AFF remains engaged in a live dispute with the state over the status of the proposed advertisements under New York law. Although the 2025 mayoral election has passed, AFF maintains that it "still wishes to run its Proposed Advertisements, which relate to an ideology and a set of policy proposals that are still very relevant in New York." Appellant's Br. 56. And AFF confirmed at oral argument that if it were to receive relief

8

from this court, it would have broadcasted the proposed advertisements during the then-current election cycle. 6

"A case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant 'any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.'" Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (quoting Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000)). This court can grant effectual relief to AFF by preliminarily enjoining the state from enforcing registration and disclosure requirements against AFF for airing the proposed advertisements. That relief would allow AFF to broadcast the advertisements without suffering those burdens. Given that possibility, the case is not moot.

The majority holds that this appeal is moot because AFF sought the preliminary injunction to allow it to run the proposed advertisements only in the period immediately preceding the 2025 mayoral election. But that is incorrect. AFF asked the district court to enjoin the state and the city "from enforcing New York's registration and disclosure requirements under N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 14-100, 14-106, 14-107, et seq[.] and 9 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. § 6200.10 against [AFF] for running the specific proposed advertisements listed in the Amended Complaint and such other and further relief as requested and as the Court deems just and proper." 7

The requested relief related to the proposed advertisements, but it was not limited to any particular election or time period.

AFF instead sought an injunction pending the resolution of the litigation—and the litigation remains ongoing. AFF told the district

6 See Oral Argument Audio Recording at 3:01, 5:15.

7 Notice of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 1-2, Am. Future Fund, Inc. v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., No. 25-CV-8151 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025), ECF No. 8.

9

court that it sought "to run advertisements in New York City in order to participate in the public debate that is currently raging on these foundational ideas" and that a preliminary injunction would "allow AFF to participate in the ongoing public discussion of socialist ideas that is currently taking place in New York City while the parties litigate the constitutionality of New York's disclosure and disclaimer requirements."8AFF proposed that the district court issue an order enjoining the defendants "from enforcing New York's registration and disclosure requirements … against [AFF] for running the advertisements listed in Exhibit A of this Order during the pendency of this action."9And AFF reiterated during the preliminary injunction hearing that "[a]ll we're seeking today is just to, in the pendency of the lawsuit, while that's being worked out, to be allowed to run these 11 ads." App'x 44 (emphasis added). AFF sought relief for the pendency of the lawsuit rather than only for the 2025 election. The state recognizes that AFF sought a preliminary injunction

"based on its as-applied claims." Appellees' Br. 2.10Accordingly, the state analyzes the viability of this appeal in terms of the viability of

8 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, supra note 3, at 2.

9 Id. at 41-42 (emphasis added).

10

See also Appellees' Br. 16 (noting that the "plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction … was based solely on its as-applied claims"); id. at 18 (identifying "the as-applied claims on which plaintiff based its preliminary injunction motion"); id. at 20 ("Plaintiff's preliminary injunction motion was based solely on its as-applied claims."); id. at 22 (describing "plaintiff's as-applied claims, and its preliminary injunction motion based on those claims"); id. at 30 ("[P]laintiff's preliminary injunction motion was based solely on its as-applied challenges.").

10

the as-applied claims.11AFF told the district court that it was making

"a narrow request for a preliminary injunction, related to 11 particular ads," while "the lawsuit itself is also bringing a facial challenge that … would invalidate the whole regulation." App'x 43-44 (emphasis added). AFF emphasized that it was seeking with its preliminary injunction motion "in the pendency of the lawsuit, while that's being worked out, to be allowed to run these 11 ads." Id. at 44. In this appeal, AFF continues to pursue the same relief for the five of

"the Proposed Advertisements that mention the DSA." Reply Br. 24.12 The majority identifies statements that accompanied the preliminary injunction motion indicating that AFF developed the proposed advertisements "to speak on these political issues in the coming weeks" and that AFF "would like to participate in the public discussion on socialism and socialist ideas that is happening in the

11 See, e.g., id. at 34 ("[T]he phrase 'advocates for or against' is irrelevant to plaintiff's as-applied claims, and to its preliminary injunction motion based on those claims, because plaintiff sought to run its advertisements in the sixty-day period preceding a general election."); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.

12

See Reply Br. 24 ("[T]he State already agreed—after facing probing questions at the preliminary injunction hearing—that AFF could run the Proposed Advertisements that only criticize 'socialism' and 'socialist' policies."); Appellees' Br. 12 ("[T]he State Defendants agreed that the six proposed advertisements that did not reference the DSA would not constitute independent expenditures if aired in the sixty days before the 2025 mayoral election."); Am. Future Fund, 809 F. Supp. 3d at 154 (noting that the parties "reached an agreement to narrow Plaintiff's pending motion for a preliminary injunction, and Plaintiff withdrew the PI Motion as to Proposed Advertisements 1, 3, 4, 6, 10, and 11").

11

coming weeks." 13

Similar statements appeared in the underlying complaint.14This language shows that AFF regarded the matter as urgent because AFF wanted to broadcast the advertisements in 2025—which is why AFF requested expedited briefing on its preliminary injunction motion—but it does not establish that AFF sought relief limited to the 2025 election. Had the requested relief been granted, AFF could have broadcasted the proposed advertisements unencumbered during the 2025 election cycle. But the preliminary injunction would have remained in place as long as the litigation remained pending, and AFF could have continued to broadcast the advertisements in 2026 and until the litigation concludes. 15

The majority mischaracterizes AFF's effort to secure preliminary relief allowing it to broadcast the advertisements in 2025 as evidence that AFF sought only to broadcast the advertisements in 2025. The record shows that AFF did not seek relief limited to the 2025 mayoral election. The proposed preliminary injunction sought relief pending the litigation, not pending the 2025 election cycle. AFF's complaint similarly sought relief that was not limited to 2025. In its complaint, AFF requested (1) a declaratory judgment that § 14-107(1)(a), as interpreted by 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 6200.10(b)(1)(ii)(c), "is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face and as applied to AFF's Proposed Advertisements" and (2) an injunction "enjoining Defendants from enforcing N.Y. Elec. Law § 14-107[(1)](a) against

13 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, supra note 3, at 3-4.

14 See supra note 4.

15 AFF's email to the district court similarly shows AFF's desire that the preliminary injunction motion be resolved in time to air its proposed advertisements before the 2025 election, but it does not change the scope of the relief that AFF requested in the preliminary injunction motion.

12

AFF's Proposed Advertisements." App'x 34. Neither the legal claim nor the requested relief was connected to the 2025 mayoral election. So the completion of the 2025 election does not make it "impossible for the court to grant 'any effectual relief whatever' to a prevailing party." Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).

Moreover, the content of the proposed advertisements is not specific to the 2025 election. The advertisements do not mention a particular election or candidate. There is no reason why AFF could not broadcast the advertisements without modification in advance of an upcoming election. AFF confirmed at oral argument that it would have run the proposed advertisements in the then-current election season if it receives the preliminary relief it seeks. And AFF sought expedited review from this court even though the 2025 election had already passed.16In that motion, AFF explained that while under threat of enforcement from the state, AFF will "not be able to contribute to the discourse as numerous other federal and statewide primary elections rapidly approach early next year."17 Our court can provide AFF with effectual relief by reversing the judgment of the district court and holding that AFF is entitled to a preliminary injunction. That relief would allow AFF to follow its plan to broadcast the proposed advertisements in an upcoming election season. The availability of that relief means that this case is not moot. See Knox, 567 U.S. at 307-08; see also Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 149 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a challenge to a

16 See Unopposed Emergency Motion to Expedite Briefing Schedule and Oral Argument, Am. Future Fund, Inc. v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., No. 25- 2781 (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 2025), ECF No. 14.

17 Id. at 8.

13

contribution limit was not moot because—even though the specific election prompting the suit had ended—the plaintiff intended to make above-limit contributions in future elections). The majority insists that "[t]he question is not whether we could grant the Fund any relief, but whether we can grant the Fund relief from the injury it asserted in its motion." Ante at 7. In its motion, AFF asserted that it faced "an imminent likelihood of grave, irreparable injury" because the regulatory burdens were "chilling its political speech."18It said that it would suffer "interim, continuing harm that the court cannot redress by final relief."19In other words, the imposition of those burdens during the pendency of this litigation

"impermissibly burdens AFF's speech, requiring it to comply with intrusive regulations to participate in a political and ideological debate that is currently raging in the nation's financial and cultural capital." 20

AFF said that "these ongoing constitutional violations constitute irreparable injury, as many of them are incapable of being redressed even if AFF ultimately prevails on the merits."21There is no question that AFF wanted to speak during the 2025 election cycle, but nowhere in its motion did AFF say that its injury was limited to that cycle. To the contrary, AFF was explicit that the injury to its First Amendment rights was a "continuing harm" and amounted to

18 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, supra note 3, at 25 (capitalization omitted).

19 Id.

20 Id. at 25-26.

21 Id. at 26.

14

"ongoing constitutional violations" throughout the pendency of the underlying litigation.22

That injury remains ongoing and can still be redressed by interim relief. The majority relies on cases holding that "an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction is mooted by the occurrence of the action sought to be enjoined," even though that is not the fact pattern of this case. Knaust v. City of Kingston, 157 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Bank of N.Y. Co. v. Ne. Bancorp, Inc., 9 F.3d 1065, 1067 (2d Cir. 1993)). It is not even analogous. AFF did not seek to enjoin a one-time action that has occurred, and it did not seek to prevent a one-time harm that has passed. It sought interim relief from a burden, the enforcement of the disclosure requirements, that was and remains ongoing. And it sought that relief for an interim period— the pendency of this litigation—that has not yet elapsed. Perhaps the majority is not persuaded that AFF will suffer an irreparable injury absent interim relief, but that would be a reason to deny relief on the merits rather than to dismiss the appeal as moot.23The appeal is not

22 Id. at 25-26.

23 The majority says that "the scope of relief requested is irrelevant" given that "just because a party requests a certain amount of relief does not mean their actual injury is commensurate with that relief." Ante at 8. But I do not understand the majority to claim that AFF would lack standing to seek injunctive relief to allow it to broadcast its advertisements in future elections. In fact, the majority says that AFF can file a "new motion" addressing "a different imminent harm, arising from a different election." Id. at 7-8. And it also says that it is "clear that the Fund asserted broader injuries for its as-applied challenge in its complaint than it did in its preliminary-injunction motion," suggesting that AFF has standing—based on allegations of actual injury—to seek future as-applied relief. Id. at 10. The majority's conclusion that this appeal is moot depends entirely on which "harms the Fund alleged in its motion for a preliminary injunction," id. at 6 (emphasis added), meaning the scope of its request for preliminary

15

moot because this court can provide AFF with effectual relief that it requested to redress the injury that it described. In concluding that this appeal is moot, the majority contorts AFF's preliminary injunction motion and the record. I would take AFF at its word that it sought and still seeks relief that would allow it to broadcast the proposed advertisements beyond the 2025 election. That position finds support in AFF's complaint, its preliminary injunction motion, the language of the proposed preliminary injunction, and the content of the proposed advertisements. I would hold that the appeal is not moot.

B

Even if this case were moot, an exception to mootness would apply because the controversy is capable of repetition yet evading review.24"The exception applies where '(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.'" FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007) (quoting Spencer injunctive relief. I do not understand AFF's motion to have limited its contentions about harm to the 2025 election. That AFF plainly sought relief extending beyond the 2025 election—far from "irrelevant"—is a strong indication that AFF sought redress for harm that continues throughout the pendency of this litigation.

24 I note that "[t]he Supreme Court has referred to the capable of repetition yet evading review doctrine as an 'exception,'" but "the term 'exception' is used only to explain that something which appears to be moot is in fact justiciable. To the extent that the mootness doctrine is grounded on constitutional limits on judicial power, it cannot admit of any true exception." Env't Def. Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 820 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

16

v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). "Election cases often fall within this exception, because the inherently brief duration of an election is almost invariably too short to enable full litigation on the merits."

Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh, 714 F.3d 682, 692 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 2003)).

1

Both the Supreme Court and our court have applied the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception when a plaintiff challenged the application of election laws but the relevant election had passed. In Wisconsin Right to Life, a nonprofit advocacy corporation sought an injunction preventing the FEC from enforcing a federal prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications within 30 or 60 days before a federal election; by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, however, the federal election had passed. See 551 U.S. at 455-62. The Court concluded that the case "fit comfortably within the established exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review," because (1) the nonprofit could not "have obtained complete judicial review of its claims in time for it to air its ads" within the 30- to-60-day window and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same controversy involving the same parties would recur given that the nonprofit "credibly claimed that it planned on running materially similar future targeted broadcast ads mentioning a candidate within the blackout period." Id. at 462-63 (internal quotation marks omitted). In National Organization for Marriage, our court similarly held that a nonprofit's challenge to state election laws regulating corporations engaged in express advocacy could continue—even though the relevant election had passed—because the nonprofit planned "to do materially similar advertising in materially similar

17

situations in the future, and consequently … New York law will apply to [the nonprofit] as it does now." 714 F.3d at 692 (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonprofit's "injury of self-censorship"

was "capable of repetition yet evading review." Id. (quoting Cal. Pro- Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003)). In this case, as in Wisconsin Right to Life and National Organization for Marriage, even if moot the dispute falls within the exception for cases capable of repetition yet evading review. Given the brevity of an election period, the duration of the challenged action—the enforcement of the registration and disclosure requirements in § 14-107 against AFF for airing the proposed advertisements—is "too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration." WRTL, 551 U.S. at 462 (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17). By the time the candidates in an election are known, triggering the requirements of § 14-107, there will not be enough time for a party challenging the application of § 14-107 to fully litigate its claim before the election occurs.

The state effectively concedes as much: While the state claimed in this appeal that AFF has "ample time to bring a new as-applied challenge" before the 2026 election, it simultaneously insisted that it was too early to tell whether § 14-107 applies to the proposed advertisements for the 2026 primary and general elections because

"the identities of the candidates … are not fully known." Appellees' Br. 17. The primary and general elections have already passed since the state made this representation, and this appeal has only now been resolved. So there has not been ample time. The state's insistence that § 14-107 depends on the identities of the candidates in a given election means that there will never be sufficient time. AFF could purchase airtime in advance to broadcast the advertisements in connection with a future election, and then the state could determine, within weeks of

18

the broadcast, that the introduction of a socialist or DSA-aligned candidate in the race renders the advertisements "independent expenditures" and triggers the disclosure and registration requirements. This case demonstrates that there would not be enough time to litigate that controversy fully before the election occurs. AFF also has "a reasonable expectation" that it "will be subject to the same action again." WRTL, 551 U.S. at 462 (quoting Spencer,

523 U.S. at 17). AFF affirmed in its briefs and at oral argument that it planned to run the proposed advertisements in the 2026 election period. The DSA endorsed candidates for election in New York for the primary and general elections in 2026. 25

So the proposed advertisements—or materially similar advertisements—would have been reasonably likely to be deemed independent expenditures if broadcast in the 60 days before the 2026 election, and the same goes for future elections. The state argues that AFF cannot show a reasonable expectation of future enforcement because "[d]etermining whether communications refer to a clearly identified candidate in an election is a context-dependent analysis that depends on who the candidates for office are in that election," which at the time of briefing was not yet known. Appellees' Br. 24. But that is why the controversy is capable of repetition yet evading review: it cannot be litigated except during a short period preceding the election.26

25

See New York City Democratic Socialists of America, Our Endorsed Candidates, https://perma.cc/4XG9-XSGA.

26 Cf. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 462 ("[G]roups like WRTL cannot predict what issues will be matters of public concern during a future blackout period. In these cases, WRTL had no way of knowing well in advance that it would want to run ads on judicial filibusters during the BCRA blackout period.").

19

For the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to apply, AFF does not need to establish to a certainty that the state will determine that the advertisements qualify as independent expenditures for a future election. A plaintiff faces a reasonable expectation that the same controversy will recur even if there will not necessarily be a "repetition of every 'legally relevant' characteristic of an as-applied challenge—down to the last detail." WRTL, 551 U.S. at

463. It is enough that the plaintiff plans to engage in "materially similar" future activities and the state continues to take the same legal position. Id. That is the case here.

2

Even if the preliminary injunction motion or the complaint were interpreted to express an intention to broadcast the advertisements only in 2025, the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading- review exception does not depend on a plaintiff's having alleged an intention to engage in the same conduct again. The point of the exception is that the controversy as alleged has become moot, but because a materially similar controversy is reasonably likely to arise without sufficient time to be fully litigated, the plaintiff may continue to litigate the original controversy. The future controversy is not part of the original controversy, so there is no reason for it to appear in the original allegations. In Davis v. FEC, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the original controversy was capable of repetition because, following the original election, the plaintiff "subsequently made a public statement expressing his intent" to "self-finance another [electoral] bid." 554 U.S. 724, 736 (2008) (citing Democrat Davis Confirms He'll Run Again for Congress, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, Mar. 27, 2008, at 5B).

20

The Supreme Court has explained that its "concern in these cases, as in all others involving potentially moot claims, was whether the controversy was capable of repetition and not … whether the claimant had demonstrated that a recurrence of the dispute was more probable than not." Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1988) (emphasis in original); see Int'l Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Brown,

498 U.S. 466, 473 (1991) (noting that the plaintiff "has run for office before and may well do so again," so "[t]he likelihood that the Union's rule would again present an obstacle to a preconvention mailing by respondent makes this controversy sufficiently capable of repetition to preserve our jurisdiction").27For that reason, the Sixth Circuit has expressly held that no statement of future intent is required:

Although [the candidate] has not specifically stated that he plans to run in a future election, he is certainly capable of doing so, and under the circumstances it is reasonable to expect that he will do so. Neither is an explicit statement from [the voter] necessary in order to

reasonably expect that in a future election she will wish to vote for an independent candidate who did not decide to run until after the early filing deadline passed. The law at issue is still valid and applicable to both [the candidate] and any independent candidate [the voter]

27 See also Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 27 9, 288 (1992) ("Even if the issue before us were limited to petitioners' eligibility to use the Party name on the 1990 ballot, that issue would be worthy of resolution as capable of repetition, yet evading review. There would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar, future controversy subject to identical time constraints if we should fail to resolve the constitutional issues that arose in 1990.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

21

might wish to vote for in future election years. Therefore, the controversy is capable of repetition. Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 371 (6th Cir. 2005). The Third Circuit has similarly rejected the "assumption that such an allegation"

of future intent "would be necessary." Merle v. United States, 351 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 2003). And it said that "[e]ven if we were to require some expression of intent," it was sufficient for the plaintiff to provide that expression "in his brief" on appeal. Id. 28

In this case, AFF expressed its intent to run the same advertisements beyond the 2025 election in its appellate brief, at oral argument, and in a subsequent letter to the court.29

28 See also Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 41 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Bork, J.) ("We also note in passing that this case is not moot, even though the 1984 town council election has long passed, since Branch seeks to preserve his right to run in a future election by preventing a recurrence of these events. Controversies that arise in election campaigns are unquestionably among those saved from mootness under the exception for matters 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'") (quoting Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969)).

29 See Letter at 1-2, Am. Future Fund, Inc. v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., No. 25- 2781 (2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2026), ECF No. 54 ("We write to reiterate our strong interest in running our proposed advertisements regarding the Democratic Socialists of America ('DSA'), which continues to be a highly relevant organization in New York politics and public policy. … [I]t cannot possibly be disputed that the DSA and its policy agenda are live issues in New York and will continue to be live issues through the November elections (when several DSA-endorsed candidates are on the ballot) and beyond. AFF regrets that, because of Defendants' overbroad interpretation of New York law and AFF's inability to obtain a court decision as to the constitutionality of that interpretation, AFF has been chilled from participating in the ongoing public debate concerning the DSA and its extreme policy agenda for almost a year now. To the extent it is necessary, AFF hereby reaffirms

22

Because AFF has maintained that it wants to broadcast the proposed advertisements during the pendency of the litigation, it has a "reasonable expectation that it … 'will be subject to the threat of prosecution' under the challenged law." WRTL, 551 U.S. at 463 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774-75 (1978)). The exception to mootness for a dispute capable of repetition yet evading review applies, so we have jurisdiction to decide this appeal.

3

Instead of applying the exception, the majority announces that under the law of the Second Circuit, the mootness exception for controversies capable of repetition yet evading review is

"inapplicable" to the appeal of an order addressing a motion for a preliminary injunction. Ante at 9. That is so, the majority explains, because "the district court will reach" the claims raised in such an appeal in the "underlying suit." Id. And it does not matter to the majority that the underlying claims may also be moot: Despite the parties addressing that question in this appeal, the majority refuses to consider whether the underlying claims here are moot.30So the rule its continued desire to run its proposed advertisements and inform citizens about the malign influence of the DSA.").

30 The majority does not explain why it refuses to consider the mootness of the underlying claims except to suggest that the district court must decide that issue in the first instance. That is wrong. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 691 (2008) ("Review of a preliminary injunction 'is not confined to the act of granting the injunction, but extends as well to determining whether there is any insuperable objection, in point of jurisdiction or merits, to the maintenance of the bill, and, if so, to directing a final decree dismissing it.'") (alterations omitted) (quoting City & Cnty. of Denver v. N.Y. Tr. Co., 229 U.S. 123, 136 (1913)); DiMartile v. Cuomo, 834 F. App'x 677, 679 (2d Cir. 2021) (concluding in an appeal of a preliminary injunction order that "this appeal

23

endorsed by the majority is that whenever underlying claims for permanent relief, moot or not, remain to be addressed—which will generally be true when the appeal involves a preliminary injunction order—the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception cannot apply. The majority later clarifies that its rule applies only when the motion for a preliminary injunction has been denied because in appeals of "grants of preliminary injunctions" it may be that "the defendants would suffer injuries that might evade review." Ante at 12. It is important to note that the majority's argument differs from what the state has argued in this appeal. The state, unlike the majority, argues that the underlying as-applied claims are moot. But the state and the underlying claims of [the plaintiffs-appellants] are moot" and providing that "[w]e dismiss the appeal as moot, vacate the preliminary injunction, and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the claims of [the plaintiffs-appellants] as moot") (capitalization omitted); Loc. 1374, Jefferson Par. Firefighters Ass'n v. Roberts, 182 F.4th 463, 466 (5th Cir. 2026) (concluding in an appeal of a preliminary injunction order that a

"factual development moots the appeal and the entire case" and providing that "[w]e vacate the injunction and remand to the district court to dismiss for want of jurisdiction"); Resurrection Sch. v. Hertel, 35 F.4th 524, 527, 530 (6th Cir. 2022) (concluding in an appeal of a preliminary injunction order that "both this interlocutory appeal and the claim itself are now moot" and providing that "[w]e dismiss this appeal and remand with instructions for the district court to dismiss this claim"); Mitchell v. Wall, 808 F.3d 1174, 1176 (7th Cir. 2015) (entering "the dismissal of the interlocutory appeal on grounds of mootness" but concluding that "the case remains alive in the district court"); Gjertsen v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 751 F.2d 199, 202 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that "the preliminary injunction under appeal" has

"become moot" but the underlying "case has not become moot"); 13C Wright & Miller, supra note 2, § 3533.10.3 (noting that in "appeals from injunction orders that have expired or become moot" courts consider "if the case remains alive in the district court" to decide whether "it is sufficient to dismiss the appeal without directing that the injunction order be vacated").

24

argues that AFF's "facial challenges to the disclosure requirements are still pending in the district court," and "[t]hose challenges raise largely the same issues as the as-applied challenges." Appellees' Br. 25-26 (emphasis added). That argument is wrong. A facial challenge will succeed only if the plaintiff establishes "that no set of circumstances exists under which the law would be valid," Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 615 (2021) (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)), or in the First Amendment context shows the law is "overbroad" because "a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep," id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010)). The challenged law here could very well be facially constitutional but still unconstitutional as applied to AFF's proposed advertisements. Cf. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 199 (2003) ("[O]ur rejection of plaintiffs' facial challenge to the requirement to disclose individual donors does not foreclose possible future challenges to particular applications of that requirement."). The legal issues in the facial and as-applied challenges are not the same.

The majority does not endorse the state's argument but relies instead on the degree to which AFF's "as-applied challenge in its complaint" remains to be litigated. Ante at 10 (emphasis added). The majority does not rely on the pending facial challenge. Our court has not previously endorsed an inflexible rule that the appeal of a preliminary injunction order can never implicate a controversy capable of repetition yet evading review. We have declined to apply the exception "to otherwise moot appeals of preliminary injunctions" only when "the legal questions underlying the interlocutory appeal remain before the district court in the still-pending action" and those questions will "be fully litigated

25

before that court." Indep. Party of Richmond Cnty. v. Graham, 413 F.3d 252, 256-57 (2d Cir. 2005). Other circuits have understood our decision in Independence Party to apply to "those situations in which the issues underlying the moot appeal are not moot in the case remaining before the district court." U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden, 72 F.4th 666, 675 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Marilyn T., Inc. v. Evans, 803 F.2d 1383, 1385 (5th Cir. 1986)) (citing Indep. Party, 413 F.3d at 256).31This is the first time our court has said that it does not matter whether the underlying claims are moot.32

The Supreme Court has recognized that a past act "which had been the subject of [a] preliminary injunction" might reasonably be expected to recur, and in such a case the appeal of the preliminary injunction order would involve a "situation capable of repetition yet evading review." Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 397 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Supreme Court itself has reviewed a preliminary injunction order related to a past election because the controversy was capable of repetition yet evading review. It said:

31 See also Fleming v. Gutierrez, 785 F.3d 442, 446 (10th Cir. 2015) ("Nor will the [defendants'] arguments evade review. The [plaintiffs'] complaint, which sought permanent injunctive relief regarding 'all future elections' and declaratory relief, remains pending in the district court."); Stevenson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 762 F.3d 765, 770 (8th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he issues implicated by the district court's denial of the motion for preliminary injunction do not evade review because appellants' request for declaratory relief and for a permanent injunction raise the same underlying legal questions that remain pending before the district court.") (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

32 We have also previously assumed that "the rule of Independence Party is not absolute" but applies only to cases that fit "within its logic." A.A.C. v. Starpoint Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 25-1316, 2026 WL 125401, at *5 (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 2026).

26

"Although the June 6 primary election has passed, the question raised is one 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' Consequently, the case is not moot." Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457 n.4 (1973).33 The Ninth Circuit has held that "[w]hen an appealed injunction expires by its own terms," the mootness of the appeal of the preliminary injunction order "is subject to an exception for disputes 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" Where Do We Go Berkeley

v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 32 F.4th 852, 857 (9th Cir. 2022). Other circuits have recognized that "an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction" may involve a controversy that "satisfies the 'capable of repetition yet evading review' exception to the mootness doctrine." Stewart v. Taylor, 104 F.3d 965, 969-70 (7th Cir. 1997).34The Eleventh Circuit has applied the exception to the appeal of a

33 An underlying complaint remained pending in that case. The Supreme Court said that "[n]othing precludes appellee from seeking a trial on the merits, if he chooses to proceed," and the Court remanded for further proceedings. Brown, 411 U.S. at 457.

34 See also Enyart v. Nat'l Conf. of Bar Exam'rs, Inc., 630 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the exception because "[t]here is a reasonable expectation that [the defendant] will be subject to another preliminary injunction in this case"); Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying the exception to the appeal of a preliminary injunction order because "there is a reasonable expectation that this dispute will recur"); Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri, 23 F.4th 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2022) (evaluating whether there is a "'reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability' that [the plaintiff] will seek or obtain another preliminary injunction to enforce those covenants") (quoting United States v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 778 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2015)); Grant v. Trial Ct., 183 F.4th 29, 38 (1st Cir. 2026) (in an appeal of a preliminary injunction order, evaluating whether "there's a 'reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again'") (quoting Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 170 (2016)).

27

temporary restraining order that had expired while the appeal was pending. The Eleventh Circuit explained that the plaintiff in that case

"has sought emergency injunctive relief in similar situations in the past, and we can expect [it] to do the same in the future." NBC v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 1022, 1024 (11th Cir. 1988). So the specific dispute over emergency injunctive relief was

"capable of repetition, yet evades review." Id.35 In this case, even accepting the majority's characterization of the preliminary injunction motion as focused on the "emergency situation[]" of the 2025 election, ante at 12, and even assuming that the underlying as-applied claims will continue to be litigated, this controversy is still capable of repetition yet evading review because the emergency situation is likely to recur before the underlying legal dispute is resolved. A new primary or general election cycle lasts a matter of months, and for that reason the legal controversy over AFF's request for interim relief will repeat and evade review if we dismiss this appeal as moot and require AFF to file a "new motion" seeking the same relief for a future election cycle. Id. at 8. Only today have we resolved the motion that AFF filed in advance of the 2025 election; the

35 The majority dismisses these authorities on the ground that a dispute over interim relief may be capable of repetition yet evading review when the relief was awarded against a defendant—rather than denied to a plaintiff—because plaintiffs "could voluntarily dismiss their complaints to avoid the risk of unfavorable appellate resolution." Ante at 12. But "[t]he 'capable of repetition' rule applies because of the nature of some controversies, not because of the parties' litigating decisions." FCC v. Consumers' Rsch., 606 U.S. 656, 671 n.1 (2025). And the rule "is concerned not with particular lawsuits, but with classes of cases that, absent an exception, would always evade judicial review." Wallingford v. Bonta, 82 F.4th 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Protectmarriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen, 752 F.3d 827, 836 (9th Cir. 2014)).

28

2026 primary and general elections have already passed. AFF has already suffered and is suffering the same harm to its ability to broadcast the proposed advertisements during a subsequent election cycle because of the same allegedly unconstitutional regulatory burden enforced by the same state agency. There is not only a reasonable expectation but also a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will arise between AFF and the state in forthcoming primary and general election seasons, and it will evade review until there is a final merits ruling in the underlying litigation. The question of interim relief will go unaddressed. In short, the compressed periodic election cycles mean that AFF's need for interim relief will repeat and yet evade review during the period in which the underlying litigation remains ongoing.

A court will apply the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading- review exception to an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction if issues specific to the request for interim relief will repeat and evade review. In Smith v. Helzer, for example, the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to Alaskan campaign-finance regulations in which the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the regulations during the 2022 election, "alleging that having to comply with these regulations in advance of the 2022 general election would irreparably harm their First Amendment rights." 95 F.4th 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 2024). The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and, while the appeal of that decision "was pending, the 2022 general election took place." Id. The Ninth Circuit ordered "supplemental briefing" to address "whether this preliminary-injunction appeal must be dismissed as moot for want of jurisdiction." Id.

In that briefing, unlike in this case, no party even argued that the underlying claims were moot. In fact, the state defendants urged

29

the Ninth Circuit to dismiss the preliminary injunction appeal so that the district court could more quickly resolve the merits of the underlying claims.36The state defendants properly recognized that the controversy over the request for interim relief would itself be capable of repetition yet evading review if the plaintiffs had

"demonstrated any immediate threatened injury that is likely to occur before a decision on the merits can be rendered," but the state defendants argued that the plaintiffs had not done so. 37

The intervenor-defendant similarly argued that the preliminary injunction appeal was moot and no issues would evade review because the underlying claims remained pending.38But the plaintiffs

36 See Supplemental Brief of State Appellees at 1-2, Smith v. Helzer, No. 22- 35612 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2023), ECF No. 43, 2023 WL 1074765 ("[N]ow that the 2022 election is over, little purpose is served by delaying the district court's adjudication of the merits … to decide an interlocutory appeal."); id. at 2 ("[I]t makes more sense for the district court to just decide if Smith actually succeeds on the merits rather than this Court deciding if the district court abused its discretion in assessing likelihood of success."); id. at 4 ("[T]he courts and the parties are better served if the district court is allowed to proceed to the merits.").

37 Id. at 6; see also id. at 1 ("[T]he completion of the 2022 election cycle means that Smith faces no imminent irreparable harm if they must wait for a decision on the merits."); id. at 5 ("[W]ith the 2022 election cycle in the rearview mirror, Smith is not likely to suffer any irreparable harm absent preliminary relief and can instead wait for the district court's decision on the merits.").

38 See Intervenor-Defendant Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 1-2, Smith v. Helzer, No. 22-35612 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2023), ECF No. 42, 2023 WL 1074445 ("Because the 2022 election has been completed, the stated justification for a preliminary injunction is gone, and thus any appeal based on the denial of a preliminary injunction is moot. Moreover, no exception to the mootness doctrine applies because this is a narrow appeal of a denial of a preliminary injunction for the 2022 election. Smith Appellants' recourse is to pursue the

30

argued that "granting the preliminary injunction [that the plaintiffs] seek 'will have some effect in the real world,' namely, it will protect the [plaintiffs'] advocacy in the 2023 and 2024 elections (and beyond) while this case is litigated on the merits."39

The Ninth Circuit rejected the view that the majority endorses today. The Ninth Circuit recognized that "an interlocutory appeal may be moot even though the underlying case still presents a live controversy." Smith, 95 F.4th at 1212 (internal quotation marks omitted). It agreed that the underlying merits case was not moot because it acknowledged that "once we have disposed of this appeal, the district court will render a final judgment on the merits, after which the losing party may appeal again." Id. at 1213. And it assumed that, but for the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception, the preliminary injunction appeal "would otherwise be moot," id., because "we cannot grant any relief that would address plaintiffs' concerns about irreparable harm around the 2022 election, which formed the basis of the preliminary injunction motion," id. at 1213 n.2. The Ninth Circuit nevertheless concluded that a dispute over merits of the underlying claims regarding Ballot Measure 2 in the District Court. And a decision on the merits would govern future elections, such that this issue would not evade review.").

39 Appellants' Supplemental Brief at 7-8, Smith v. Helzer, No. 22-35612 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2023), ECF No. 40, 2023 WL 1074191 (citation omitted) (quoting 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3533, at 270 (1975)). The plaintiffs argued that it must be that "either" the case "is not moot because the P.I. did not seek relief specific to the 2022 election" or "the appeal is moot but evading review because the same rules will be applied to the same parties in future cases," and "[e]ither way" the appellate court "should hear and decide this appeal." Id. at 14.

31

emergency interim relief is one to which "the capable-of-repetition- yet-evading-review exception applies." Id. at 1213. Like the plaintiffs in Smith, AFF would realize a real-world benefit from a decision that it was entitled to a preliminary injunction. That holding would establish that AFF is entitled to preliminary relief to protect its First Amendment rights during the elections that will occur while this litigation is pending. But the majority concludes, as a matter of law, that a dispute over the denial of a preliminary injunction cannot ever qualify as capable of repetition yet evading review because an underlying complaint will eventually be litigated. That conclusion is wrong and creates a split with those circuits that have applied the exception to preliminary injunction appeals. I would decide that this appeal is not moot because AFF sought a preliminary injunction to redress injuries that remain ongoing during the pendency of this litigation. And even if it had sought relief specific to the 2025 election, its as-applied claims and its request for interim relief would each qualify as disputes capable of repetition yet evading review. Under any of these arguments, we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

II

Because we have jurisdiction, I would address the merits and hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction. AFF is likely to succeed on its First Amendment challenge and will be irreparably harmed by its loss of First Amendment freedoms.

A

"A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer

32

irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.40

"We review a district court's decision to deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion." Libertarian Party of Conn. v. Lamont,

977 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 2020). "A district court abuses its discretion when it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or makes an error of law." Id. (quoting Almontaser v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 519 F.3d 505, 508 (2d Cir. 2008)). "We review de novo the district court's resolution of questions of law implicated in a request for a preliminary injunction." Havens v. James, 76 F.4th 103, 122-23 (2d Cir.

2023).

40 The district court applied a heightened standard rather than the ordinary preliminary injunction standard. We have said that a heightened standard is appropriate when "an injunction will provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits." Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1995). In this case, AFF sought a preliminary injunction that would allow it to broadcast the ads only during the pendency of the litigation, a temporal limitation that made the relief less than ultimately sought. And even though during that period AFF could broadcast the ads without providing disclosures, the state would be able to subject AFF to disclosure requirements if it ultimately prevails on the merits, which means that the relief was not irrevocable. We have previously held that a preliminary injunction that "prohibits … government action by enjoining the future enforcement of [a statute or regulation] against plaintiffs" pending the final resolution of the litigation did "not irreversibly affect the rights of the parties." Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 90 (2d Cir. 2006). A motion for such a preliminary injunction should be evaluated "under the test for prohibitory injunctions." Id. The district court should have applied that standard in this case.

33

B

AFF is likely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment challenge. AFF maintains that the proposed advertisements are pure issue advocacy because the advertisements do not explicitly and unambiguously identify a candidate for office. New York therefore does not have a sufficiently important interest in subjecting the proposed advertisements to the disclosure regime of § 14-107. The First Amendment prohibits the government from

"abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I. "[T]he expression of a political view implicates a First Amendment right." John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 195 (2010). A law that compels a political speaker to include a government-mandated message as part of his speech

"can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (citing cases). As a result, the Supreme Court has "closely scrutinized disclosure requirements, including requirements governing independent expenditures made to further individuals' political speech." Davis, 554 U.S. at 744. Because "[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements … burden the ability to speak," such requirements are subject to "'exacting scrutiny,' which requires a 'substantial relation' between the disclosure requirement and a 'sufficiently important' governmental interest." Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366-67 (2010) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66). Indeed, such "[a] substantial relation is necessary but not sufficient"

because "[w]here exacting scrutiny applies, the challenged requirement must be narrowly tailored to the interest it promotes."

Ams. for Prosperity Found., 594 U.S. at 609-10.

34

The Supreme Court has recognized three governmental interests that are sufficiently important to justify the imposition of disclosure requirements: "providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions." McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196. First, disclosure may be justified based on "a governmental interest in 'providing the electorate with information' about the sources of election-related spending." Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 367 (alteration omitted) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66). "Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. That is the interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 ("When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption."). Third,

"recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations"

of the campaign finance laws. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68. Even as it has determined that disclosure requirements are permissible for certain election communications, the Supreme Court has been careful to distinguish between "express advocacy," those communications which expressly "advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate," and "issue advocacy," those communications designed to influence public opinion on a particular issue without reference to a specific candidate. McConnell, 540 U.S. at

126. The line between the two categories is not always clear. See id. at 126-27; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42. But the Court has provided some guidance. In Buckley, the Court described express advocacy as

35

"communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject.'" 424 U.S. at 44 n.52. And in Wisconsin Right to Life, the principal opinion explained that "an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." 551 U.S. at 469-70 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). It concluded that the advertisements at issue in that case "lack[ed] indicia of express advocacy" because

"[t]he ads do not mention an election, candidacy, political party, or challenger; and they do not take a position on a candidate's character, qualifications, or fitness for office." Id. at 470. The Supreme Court has also upheld the application of disclosure requirements to communications that fall between issue advocacy and express advocacy. In Citizens United, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument that "disclosure requirements must be limited to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy." 558 U.S. at 369. It concluded that certain disclaimer and disclosure requirements were constitutional as applied to advertisements that referenced a candidate "by name shortly before a primary and contained pejorative references to her candidacy" because those advertisements qualified as "electioneering communication[s]." Id. at 368. An electioneering communication is defined by statute to include a communication that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office" and is made 30 days before a primary or 60 days before a general election. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A). Unlike a communication that constitutes express advocacy, an electioneering communication need not urge viewers to vote for or against a candidate. The Court upheld the disclaimer requirements as applied to electioneering communications because

36

the disclaimers "'provide the electorate with information,'" Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368 (alteration omitted) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196), "and 'insure that the voters are fully informed' about the person or group who is speaking," id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76). The proposed advertisements in this case are neither electioneering communications nor express advocacy. The proposed advertisements instead reflect issue advocacy. This is apparent from the face of the advertisements, which convey the following messages:

• The Democratic Socialists of America, an extremist political organization, seeks to control the future of NYC. They want to defund and ultimately eliminate the police and prisons, decriminalize all drugs, no matter how dangerous, and radically change our economic system. The only way to stop them is to vote.

• They call themselves the DSA—but behind the name is an agenda that would remake our city. Defunding the police. Legalizing sex work. Reshaping our economy with reckless policies. This isn't the future New Yorkers want. The only way to stop extremists is to vote.

• They pretend it would be progress. But what socialism really means is higher taxes on families, on small businesses, on the people who make New York run. The DSA's plan would drain paychecks, crush jobs, and drive even more families out of the city. New Yorkers already pay more than enough. We can't afford their so-called revolution. Protect your paycheck. Protect your future. Stand up for New York—vote.

• They say it's empowerment. But the truth is darker. The DSA wants to legalize prostitution—opening the

37

door to human trafficking, exploitation, and crime in our neighborhoods. Is this the future we want for our daughters, our streets, our city? New York should protect the vulnerable, not put them at greater risk. Don't let this reckless idea become law. Stand up for New York. Vote.

• The DSA isn't just another group. They're pushing an extremist vision: higher taxes, defunded police, legalized prostitution, reckless policies that put ideology before people. New Yorkers didn't ask for this—and we don't have to accept it. The future of our city is on the line. Stop the extremists. Protect New York. Vote.

App'x 23 (¶ 45).

The proposed advertisements do not contain the phrases that Buckley understood to demarcate a communication that constitutes express advocacy, "such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' [or] 'reject.'"

424 U.S. at 44 n.52. The ads urge the audience to vote but do not tell the audience for whom to vote. Nor are the proposed advertisements electioneering communications. The ads do not "refer[] to a clearly identified candidate." 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3)(A); see also N.Y. Elec. Law § 14-107(1)(a) (defining "independent expenditure" as including any communication conveyed to 500 or more members of the general public that "within sixty days before a general or special election for the office sought by the candidate or thirty days before a primary election, includes or references a clearly identified candidate"). The ads refer only to the DSA, which is not a political party but an organization that endorses candidates for many offices—as do other organizations such as unions—and refer to those who support its

38

agenda with the plural pronoun "they" rather than using a singular pronoun to refer to a candidate.

The proposed advertisements qualify as issue ads. The content of the ads "is consistent with that of a genuine issue ad." WRTL, 551 U.S. at 470 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). "The ads focus on a legislative issue, take a position on the issue, [and] exhort the public to adopt that position" by urging opposition to a purportedly socialist policy agenda. Id. Unlike express advocacy or electioneering communications, the proposed advertisements "do not mention an election, candidacy, political party, or challenger." Id. The proposed advertisements highlight a cause but do not tell voters to vote for or against a particular candidate. The ads do not even mention a candidate or an election.

The state lacks a sufficiently important governmental interest in subjecting the proposed advertisements to the disclosure requirements applicable to independent expenditures. Disclosure and disclaimer requirements have been tolerated in the election context based on the governmental interest in the integrity and transparency of elections. For a communication advocating for the election or defeat of a candidate—or referencing a clearly identified candidate—a disclaimer may be constitutionally permissible because it serves the sufficiently important governmental interest of

"'provid[ing] the electorate with information' and 'insur[ing] that the voters are fully informed' about the person or group who is speaking"

about a candidate shortly before an election. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368 (citation omitted) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196, and Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76). This governmental interest does not apply to issue advocacy for a straightforward reason: The governmental interest in transparency about who is speaking about a candidate or election cannot be implicated when the communication does not

39

reference a candidate or an election. The government does not have the same interest in providing the public with transparency regarding who is speaking about issues of public interest in general political and societal debates.

The Supreme Court has never approved a disclosure regime for genuine issue ads. See Citizens Union of City of N.Y. v. Att'y Gen. of N.Y.,

408 F. Supp. 3d 478, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (concluding that Supreme Court precedents "strongly suggest that compelled identity disclosure is impermissible for issue-advocacy communications").41 That regime would raise concerns under the First Amendment given the tradition of protecting anonymous political advocacy that the Supreme Court has recognized. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, for example, the Supreme Court held that an Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature violated the First Amendment. See 514 U.S. 334 (1995). The Court emphasized the "respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes," and it concluded that anonymity has long been "an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment"

in contexts extending from pseudonymous "[g]reat works of literature" to "the secret ballot." Id. at 341-43.

41

Our court has interpreted the decision in Buckley to prohibit, as a constitutional matter, the governmental regulation of issue advocacy. See Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell (VRLC I), 221 F.3d 376, 386 (2d Cir. 2000). In VRLC I, we held that a Vermont disclosure statute was "unconstitutional on its face" because it imposed reporting and disclosure requirements on communications "devoted to pure issue advocacy in violation of the clear command of Buckley." Id. at 389. We later said in dicta that "it is unclear whether VRLC I's holding that 'pure issue advocacy' cannot be the subject of a valid governmental regulation remains viable" in light of subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. VRLC II, 758 F.3d at 131 n.11. But we have not revisited that decision.

40

In Talley v. California, the Court held that a Los Angeles ordinance restricting the distribution of anonymous handbills violated the First Amendment because "[a]nonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). "Even the Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names." Id. at 65.

"[F]or over a century after the Founding, no state or federal law required supporters of political actors to publicly identify themselves" or "the government to publish a list of who gave money to which political causes." Ams. for Prosperity v. Meyer, No. 24-2933, 2026 WL 2934861, at *31 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2026) (Bumatay, J., dissenting). "Only in the 1970s did the Supreme Court first uphold disclosure requirements against a First Amendment challenge." Id. at *32.

When it did, the Court recognized that "compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66. A regime of government- compelled disclosure conflicts with the historical tradition and burdens the rights of speech and association. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366. While a sufficiently important governmental interest— such as the interest in the integrity of elections—may justify a disclosure requirement, the Court has not identified an interest that applies to issue advocacy.

In this case, the state does not contend that its disclosure regime would be constitutional as applied to the proposed advertisements if the advertisements were actually issue ads. Instead, the state argued before the district court and on appeal that the proposed

41

advertisements qualify as electioneering communications because the advertisements "reference a clearly identified candidate in the 2025 mayoral election, Mr. Mamdani." Appellees' Br. 42; see also App'x 53 (Transcript of Oral Argument on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction) ("And these proposed ads, these are electioneering communications. They can only be reasonably viewed in the lead-up to this mayoral election as advocating for voters to vote against candidate Mamdani."). Under New York Election Law, a communication references a clearly identified candidate if "the identity of the candidate is apparent by unambiguous reference."

N.Y. Elec. Law § 14-100(12). According to the state, the proposed advertisements unambiguously reference Mayor Mamdani. See Appellees' Br. 43.

If the state were correct that a communication that references an organization that endorses a slate of candidates contains an

"unambiguous reference" to each candidate on that slate and therefore may be regulated as an electioneering communication, then the authority of the state to regulate political speech would become unprecedentedly large. The Supreme Court has never endorsed so expansive an understanding of an "unambiguous reference." It has described an "unambiguous reference" as including "use of the candidate's initials (e.g., FDR), the candidate's nickname (e.g., Ike), his office (e.g., the President or the Governor of Iowa), or his status as a candidate (e.g., the Democratic Presidential nominee, the senatorial candidate of the Republican Party of Georgia)." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43 n.51. The proposed advertisements do not contain any reference that would qualify as an "unambiguous reference" as the Supreme Court has understood that term. The state's expansive understanding of what counts as an "unambiguous reference" would subject much

42

issue advocacy to the burdens of an election-related disclosure regime without any corresponding governmental interest.

In my view, AFF is likely to succeed on its First Amendment pre-enforcement challenge because it intends to "engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute." Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union,

442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). AFF seeks to run its proposed advertisements, which constitute issue advocacy. But if it does so, the state will likely subject it to the disclosure regime applicable to electioneering communications. Because the application of § 14-107 to the proposed advertisements would violate AFF's rights under the First Amendment, AFF has demonstrated a likelihood of success on its First Amendment challenge.

C

AFF has satisfied the remaining preliminary injunction factors. AFF has demonstrated that it will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. "The denial of plaintiffs' constitutional rights during the potentially protracted appellate process constitutes irreparable harm." Mirabelli v. Bonta, 607 U.S. 492, 497 (2026); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."); Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 17-21 (2020). And the balance of equities favors AFF. See SAM Party of N.Y.

v. Kosinski, 987 F.3d 267, 278 (2d Cir. 2021) ("In a suit against the government, balancing of the equities merges into our consideration of the public interest."). While the New York Election Law serves important regulatory interests, the state has not articulated how those

43

interests apply to issue advocacy such as the proposed advertisements. The state has failed to demonstrate that the public interest will be harmed if AFF is able to broadcast the proposed advertisements without the burden of the disclosure regime in § 14-107.

* * *

AFF seeks to engage in the quintessential activity protected by the First Amendment: expressing its views on a matter of political debate. AFF wanted to broadcast those ads in the lead-up to the 2025 mayoral election, and it still wants to broadcast those ads. But AFF reasonably fears that if it airs the ads, the state will deem AFF to be an independent expenditure committee that is required to register with and make regular disclosures to the Board. So AFF brought a pre-enforcement challenge and sought a preliminary injunction to allow it to run the ads during the pendency of the litigation. That litigation is ongoing, and the dispute between AFF and the state over the status of the proposed advertisements remains live. Our court can provide effectual relief to AFF by reversing the decision of the district court and holding that AFF is entitled to a preliminary injunction that would allow AFF to run the proposed advertisements without the burdens the state has threatened to impose. And even if the controversy were no longer live, it would be capable of repetition yet evading review.

I would reach the merits of AFF's claim and hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction. AFF is likely to succeed on the merits because § 14-107 and its implementing regulations cannot constitutionally be applied to the proposed advertisements, which contain issue advocacy. Anonymous political speech receives the protection of the

44

First Amendment, and the state has identified no sufficiently important governmental interest to justify imposing disclosure requirements on issue advocacy that does not reference a candidate or an election. I dissent from the decision of the court to dismiss the appeal as moot rather than provide relief.