United States v. Daniel Mathis

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special condition 3 of Mathis' supervised release terms present in the amended judgment was inconsistent with this condition as orally announced at resentencing; this court thus vacated Mathis' sentence and again remanded for resentencing. Mathis, 103 F.4th at 198-200. In 2025, the district court resentenced Mathis to three concurrent terms of life imprisonment, a consecutive term of 48 years' imprisonment, and concurrent supervised release terms of three and five years.

Mathis timely appealed the second amended criminal judgment. On appeal, he argues that the two mandatory life sentences the district court imposed for his convictions on counts 28 and 30 violate the Eighth Amendment. He also argues that the discretionary life sentence the district court imposed for his conviction on count 26 is substantively unreasonable. Before filing its response brief, the Government moved for summary affirmance. This court denied the Government's motion to suspend briefing pending resolution of the motion for summary affirmance, and the Government filed its response brief. Mathis filed a reply brief and a response to the motion for summary affirmance. Because we conclude that Mathis' appeal is not "manifestly unsubstantial," 4th Cir. R. 27(f)(1), we deny the Government's motion for summary affirmance. We nevertheless affirm the second amended criminal judgment.

Mathis challenges the district court's imposition of the two life sentences statutorily required for his convictions on counts 28 and 30. He contends that, because he had only recently turned 18 at the time of these offenses, the life terms violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

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The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend.

VIII. A punishment is cruel and unusual not only when it is "inherently barbaric," but also when it is "disproportionate to the crime." Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010). We review de novo whether a sentence contravenes the Eighth Amendment. United States v. Contreras, 149 F.4th 349, 372 (4th Cir. 2025).

Binding Circuit precedent forecloses Mathis' constitutional challenge to these sentences. See id. at 373 ("Our governing precedents draw a bright line at the age of [18] in the imposition of [mandatory life sentences for murder in aid of racketeering activity]. [T]he district court did not err in imposing mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole on [appellant] who had reached the legal age of majority." (citation modified)); United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 609 (4th Cir. 2018) ("The Supreme Court has held that mandatory life sentences are unconstitutional as to defendants who committed their crimes as juveniles. But this is no help to the defendants, both of whom were adults at the time they committed murder in aid of racketeering." (internal citation omitted)). Mathis was convicted of murder in aid of racketeering activity and aiding and abetting (count 28) and witness tampering by murder (count 30), both of which require imposition of a life sentence for each count. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1512(a)(1)(C), (3)(A), 1959(a)(1). By Mathis' own admission, he was over 18 years old when he committed these offenses. Mathis argues that Contreras and Chavez were wrongly decided, that evolving standards of decency have shifted such that Chavez is no longer binding, and that en banc reconsideration of this issue is warranted. We reject these contentions. Contreras and

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Chavez bind this panel, see Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 661 (4th Cir. 2016), and, "even if we agreed [that these decisions were wrongly decided], we 'cannot overrule a decision issued by another panel,'" United States v. Green, 67 F.4th 657, 670 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). This court has rejected in binding authority the constitutional challenge Mathis brings, and, insofar as his briefing advances new theories in support of that challenge, we are still bound by Contreras and Chavez. See Gibbons v. Gibbs, 99 F.4th 211, 215 (4th Cir. 2024). We cannot provide Mathis with en banc review or reconsideration on this issue. This court's "governing precedents draw a bright line at the age of eighteen in the imposition of the[] serious penalties" Mathis received, Contreras, 149 F.4th at 373, and he falls on the constitutionally permissible side of that line. Accordingly, his life sentences for these counts do not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Mathis also challenges the reasonableness of the life sentence the district court imposed on count 26. "Reasonableness review has procedural and substantive components [, and w]e review both for an abuse of discretion." United States v. Elboghdady, 117 F.4th 224, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). "Even when an appellant only challenges the substantive reasonableness of a criminal sentence, as [Mathis] does here, the Supreme Court instructs us to first review [the sentence for] procedural reasonableness." Id. at 234.

"A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court committed a serious procedural error, such as improperly calculating the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the

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chosen sentence." United States v. McKinnie, 21 F.4th 283, 289 (4th Cir. 2021).

"A sentence is substantively unreasonable only where under the totality of the circumstances, the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a)." United States v. Devine, 40 F.4th 139, 153 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A]ny sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] defendant can only rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors." United States v. Everett, 91 F.4th 698, 714 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors." United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 215 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that Mathis' life sentence imposed for his conviction on count 26 is not unreasonable. The district court did not err in calculating Mathis' advisory prison sentence under the Guidelines at life. The district court also afforded counsel an adequate opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence and properly afforded Mathis an opportunity to allocute that he declined. After considering argument, the Guidelines' sentence as advisory, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court explained that a life sentence was warranted for count 26 based on the violent and deliberative nature and circumstances of Mathis' offense conduct, his history and characteristics, and the needs for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of his offense, to provide just punishment for that offense, and to protect the public, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A), (C). We

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conclude that the district court's explanation for the within-Guidelines prison term it imposed was sufficient, and Mathis has not overcome the presumption of substantive reasonableness afforded to this term. We thus discern no abuse of discretion in the district court's imposition of the life term on count 26.

Accordingly, we affirm the second amended criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED