Howard v. State

In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A1087

Sequoyah Howard

v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County No. 21SC180115

Decided: October 27, 2026

LAND, Justice.

Sequoyah Howard admitted to shooting and killing Mario Peterson but claims she did so in self-defense. The jury rejected that argument and found her guilty of malice murder and related charges. She now appeals. 1 Howard argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions, the trial court erred in ex - cluding evidence she contends supported her defense, the trial

1 The crimes occurred on June 24, 2021. On December 17, 2021, a Ful - ton County grand jury indicted Howard for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 3), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). Following a trial from January 30 to February 6, 2023, the jury found Howard guilty on all counts of the indictment. Howard was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole for Count 1 and 5 years in prison, suspended, for Count 4, to be served consecutive to Count 1. Count 2 was vacated by operation of law and Count 3 merged with Count 1 for sentencing purposes. Howard filed a timely motion for new trial on February 14, 2023, and amended that motion through new counsel on March 20, 2025. The trial court denied the amended motion for new trial on December 16, 2025, and Howard filed a timely notice of appeal. Howard's appeal was docketed to this Court's April 2026 term.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court's reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the "Final Copy," will replace any prior version on the Court's website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

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court erred by giving a "general and vague" corrective jury in - struction after defense counsel misstated the evidence during closing argument, the trial court committed plain error in failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, and she was de - nied effective assistance of trial counsel. For the reasons that fol - low, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at trial shows as follows. Howard and Peterson had a history of disagreements, and Howard, on multiple occasions, discussed wanting to shoot and kill Peterson. Corri Page testified that "[Howard] kept saying she was going to shoot [Peterson] if he came over" and that she said, "if she shot him … she would get away with it." Laronda Anthony testified that "[i]t was like every other day [Howard] was talking about if [Peterson] just comes around her and just touch[es] her one time or do anything to her, she was going to shoot him."

Another resident of Howard's apartment complex testified that Howard was angry with Peterson and that Howard had stated multiple times that if "[Peterson] came on the property or if he came around, she was going to kill him." Another neighbor testified that she overheard Howard say that "she wanted to kill [Peterson]" and that "she always talked about it." The property manager of Howard's apartment complex testified that Howard had complained about Peterson's behavior. On March 31, 2021, Howard came into the property manager's office with a gun, ap - peared "angry and agitated," but not "afraid," and said that she was "going to shoot [Peterson] if he d[id]n't leave her alone."

Approximately three months before the shooting, police re - sponded to a 911 call at Howard's apartment complex about a

"black male with a gun knocking on the door threatening to shoot up the location." When police arrived, Howard told them: "[Peter-

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son's] messing with me because I live alone." Police bodycam foot - age of the incident was played for the jury, during which police informed Howard that Peterson was "criminally trespassing," and Howard said she wanted to be able to "protect herself." An officer told Howard that she could protect herself and told her to look up OCGA § 16-3-21.²Howard looked up the code section on her cell phone and stated, "according to this, I can shoot [Peterson]." The officer told Howard to "hold on," that he was not "going to tell [her] that [she] could shoot somebody," and that he could only "direct [her] what the law says."

On the night of June 24, 2021, Howard, Page, Destyne Hol - loway, and Anthony were outside of Anthony's apartment when they encountered Peterson. The group was discussing where they could purchase alcohol because the liquor stores were closed for the evening. The group saw Peterson "come around the corner"

and Anthony "asked him to come over real quick" so she could ask him where they could purchase alcohol.

Holloway, who was sitting in a stairwell with Howard, be - gan to argue with Peterson. When Holloway became "louder and a little belligerent," and started calling Peterson names, Peterson

"started getting mad" and "dropped [his] bike and started to ap - proach" Holloway. Howard then stood up, told Peterson that

"[y]ou know you're not supposed to be over here," and "pushed"

Peterson. Peterson "slapped her hand," Howard pushed Peterson

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again, and he pushed her back. Howard then shot Peterson. Sur - veillance footage of the shooting was played for the jury. Anthony testified that after Howard shot Peterson, Howard said that she

"done messed up." The medical examiner who conducted Peter - son's autopsy concluded that Peterson died from a single gunshot wound to his chest.

Howard testified in her own defense at trial. She testified that, after she told Peterson he was not "supposed to be over here," he "thr[e]w [his] bike down and charg[ed]" at her and she stood up, reached in her purse to retrieve her gun and "[stuck her] arm out." Howard testified that she drew her gun to "intimidate"

Peterson, but when he saw her gun, he said that he didn't "give a f**k about any of that." She testified that she saw that Peterson had a gun "on the right side … in his hip or something," that she

"got scared," panicked, and shot Peterson because she "didn't know what he was going to do [to her], and [she] wasn't going to give him the opportunity to find out." Neither Howard nor any other witness testified that Peterson pulled a gun on Howard or her acquaintances, and Page testified that he did not see a gun on Peterson until after he was shot and fell over when "the back of his shirt lifted up and [he] saw a gun tucked into the back of [Pe - terson's] pants."

2. Citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307 (1979), Howard summarily asserts, without any meaningful argument, that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 3 We disagree.

3 To the extent Howard challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to Count Two (felony murder) and Count Three (aggravated assault), because

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When considering whether the evidence was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support a defendant's convictions, we ask "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 US at 319 (emphasis in original). In assessing this claim, "this Court does not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicting testimony." Mosby v. State, 300 Ga. 450, 452 (2017). In particular, in self-defense cases, "it is the role of the jury to evaluate the evidence and decide whether the defendant was justified in using deadly force in self-defense." Huff v. State,

315 Ga. 558, 562 (2023). The jury may "reject any evidence in sup - port of a justification defense and accept evidence that a shooting was not done in self-defense." Gibbs v. State, 309 Ga. 562, 564 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Here, Howard admitted that she shot Peterson, and the shooting was caught on camera. Multiple witnesses testified that Howard repeatedly talked about wanting to shoot and kill Peter - son, and Page specifically testified that Howard said she would

"get away with it." Although Howard testified that Peterson had a gun, none of the witnesses to the shooting saw Peterson pull a gun on Howard or her acquaintances, and Page testified that he did not know Peterson had a gun until he saw it in the back of Peterson's waistband as he fell over. Viewed in the light most fa - vorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support Howard's convictions. See those counts were vacated or merged for sentencing purposes, her challenges to those counts are moot. See Ellington v. State, 314 Ga. 335, 340 (2022) ("To the extent [the defendant] challenges the sufficiency of the evidence related to counts that were merged for sentencing purposes or vacated by operation of law … such challenges are moot by virtue of those convictions being merged or vacated for purposes of sentencing.").

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Maynor v. State, 317 Ga. 492, 497 (2023) (jury was free to reject defendant's "self-serving testimony" that he shot the victim in self-defense).

Citing Neely v. State, 302 Ga. 121 (2017), Howard also sum - marily asserts in one sentence that the evidence was not suffi - cient "to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt."

To the extent Howard seeks to invoke OCGA § 24-14-6 as the ba - sis for this assertion, that claim also fails. "Under [OCGA § 24 - 14-6], to support a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that the defendant was guilty of the charged offense." Montgomery v. State, 323 Ga. 188, 190-91 (2025) (punctuation omitted). But "if there is any direct evidence presented by the State, the circum - stantial evidence statute does not apply in a sufficiency analysis."

Brown v. State, 314 Ga. 193, 196 (2022). Here, the State presented direct evidence in the form of eyewitness testimony and Howard's own admission that she shot Peterson. Accordingly, OCGA § 24 - 14-6 does not apply, and Howard's claim fails. See Maynor, 317 Ga. at 497-98.

3. Howard argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that she contends supports her defense of self-defense. Specifically, Howard points to the following evidence that was ex - cluded: (a) Peterson's prior felony convictions, (b) Peterson's rep - utation for dealing drugs, and (c) an incident where Howard told Peterson to stop dealing drugs around her house. "A trial court's decision whether to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed on ap - peal for an abuse of discretion," and "we will reverse a conviction based on a trial court's abuse of discretion in excluding evidence only if the exclusion was harmful." Mbungu v. State, 322 Ga. 564, 567 (2025). Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

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excluding this evidence, these claims fail.

(a) At the hearing on the State's motion in limine to exclude evidence of Peterson's criminal history, Howard's trial counsel represented that Peterson had six certified convictions—two for burglary, two for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, one for possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer, and one for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon—and that he had another conviction for armed robbery, but that counsel did not have a certified copy of that conviction. 4 Howard argues that this evidence was improperly excluded because it supports her self-defense claim. In her appellate brief, Howard's only citation of authority in support of this contention is OCGA § 24-4-404(b) ("Rule 404(b)"), which prohibits the admission of evidence of other crimes to "show action in conformity therewith" but provides that such evidence may "be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara - tion, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."

Howard makes no argument concerning why this evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) .. Without the benefit of any mean - ingful argument in this regard, Howard has failed to carry her burden of showing error on this appeal. See Williams v. State, 324 Ga. 15, 21 (2026) ("It is the appellant's burden to show error by identifying in the record the thing that he challenges on appeal

4 The State noted that Peterson may not have been convicted for armed robbery because it "just show[ed] on his GCIC, but it doesn't have a disposition on it." Whether Peterson had six or seven prior convictions does not affect our analysis.

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and citing authority to show why that thing represents an er- ror."). 5

(b) Howard argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that Peterson was the "neighborhood drug dealer." In support of her argument, Howard cites only one case, Smith v. State, 267 Ga. 372 (1996), which was decided well before the adop - tion of Georgia's current evidence code that is applicable to this case. Because Howard has failed to cite any authority that sup - ports this assertion of error, she has failed to carry her burden of showing error on appeal. Williams, 324 Ga. at 21. Even if we were to overlook Howard's failure in this regard, it is clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded this evidence. Howard fails to provide any meaningful argument as to how Pe - terson's status as the "neighborhood drug dealer" supports her self-defense claim. The bare assertion that a victim was involved in dealing drugs, without more, does not support the admission of the evidence. See Wilson v. State, 302 Ga. 106, 109 (2017) ("We have previously rejected the contention that a victim's alleged in - volvement in the drug trade, without more, would tend to show that the victim was armed so as to support a defendant's claim of self-defense."). This enumeration is therefore without merit.

(c) Finally, Howard asserts that the trial court erred in ex - cluding evidence of a prior interaction she claims she had with Peterson in which she told him to "stop deal[ing] drugs around her house." She makes no meaningful argument in support of this

5 While we recognize that a victim's prior acts of violence may be ad - missible for the purposes of a self-defense claim where the defendant is aware of those prior acts, see Ryals v. State, 321 Ga. 151, 160 (2025), there was no evidence here that Howard was aware of Peterson's alleged prior acts or knew about his specific felony convictions. Thus, the mere existence of prior convic - tions does not make them admissible even if the defendant claims self-defense.

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assertion, leaving us to speculate as to why she contends the trial court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. To the extent Howard contends this evidence should have been admitted because it showed Peterson's status as the "neigh - borhood drug dealer," this contention fails for the same reason given in Division 3(b). As discussed in that division, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of Peterson's status as the alleged "neighborhood drug dealer."

To the extent Howard contends the evidence of her prior interaction with Peterson should have been admitted simply be - cause it revealed a prior interaction between the two individuals, this contention fails because she has failed to show how this evi - dence supports her claim of self-defense. Aside from showing that she previously asked Peterson to "stop deal[ing] drugs around her house," Howard has failed to cite anything in the record showing any of the specifics of this alleged encounter with Peterson. We are thus left to speculate as to exactly what occurred between the two, when this interaction occurred (whether it was days, weeks, months, or even years before the shooting), where the interaction occurred, what was said and by whom, and how Peterson re - sponded to Howard's request. Howard has cited nothing in the record showing how the two interacted with one another, if at all, following the encounter. Without this information, we simply can - not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it ex - cluded the evidence. It is not our job to cull the record in search of error, and absent some meaningful attempt to show the specif - ics of what was excluded and how such evidence would have sup - ported her claim of self-defense, Howard has failed to carry her burden of showing error on appeal. See, e.g., Henderson v. State,

304 Ga. 733, 739 (2018) ("It is not this Court's job to cull the record on behalf of Appellant to find alleged errors[,] as appellate judges

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are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs." (cleaned up)).

4. Howard next argues that the trial court erred by giving a "general and vague" corrective jury instruction after Howard's trial counsel improperly suggested in her closing argument that Peterson had a prior conviction for carrying a firearm when there was no evidence admitted at trial supporting that assertion. This claim fails under plain error review.

During her closing argument, Howard's trial counsel ar - gued as follows:

[Howard's] in the stairwell, in a narrow stairwell in a shoving match with someone who has a gun on his hip, who according to [Page] has a reputation for car - rying a gun, and [Page] was aware that [Peterson] had a prior conviction for carrying a gun. And the State would have you to believe it's not a one-as - sault, two-push minimum before you can use self-de - fense. Again, [Peterson] could have knocked [How - ard] out.

The State objected, the jury was removed from the courtroom, and the trial court observed that Page did not testify about Peterson's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The State requested a curative instruction, and the trial court agreed to give one but indicated it did not want to specify which state - ment the jury should ignore because "by stating what it is that [the jury] should ignore, it would further emphasize it." The in - struction that was ultimately given was as follows:

Ladies and gentlemen, during the defense's closing argument, an argument was made that is not based

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on any evidence presented in this case. The argu - ment, that portion of it was inappropriate and inad - missible. It is not for your consideration. You, the jury, should disregard it.

Howard's trial counsel stated that her "only objection" to the in - struction was that she did not "like the word 'inappropriate' be - cause it was not necessarily intentional" and that she "was under the impression" she had asked Page about the firearm conviction. This claim that the curative instruction was too "general and vague" is subject to plain error review because Howard's trial counsel only objected to the use of the word "inappropriate" in the curative instruction and expressly indicated she had no other ob - jection. Thus, Howard's trial counsel did not make the objection she now asserts on appeal. See Grullon v. State, 313 Ga. 40, 44- 45 (2021) (defendant's argument about a jury instruction was sub - ject to plain error review because "the ground for his objection at trial was different than the ground he asserted on appeal"). Under plain error review, a defendant

must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived, the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable dispute, the error must have affected his substantial rights, and the error must have seri - ously affected the fairness, integrity or public repu - tation of judicial proceedings.

Henderson v. State, 322 Ga. 304, 312 (2025) (cleaned up). "If one prong of the plain error test is not satisfied, we need not address the other prongs of the test." Id. (citation omitted). Assuming without deciding that the alleged error was not affirmatively waived by trial counsel's statement that the trial court's use of the word "inappropriate" was her only objection,

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Howard's claim fails because she is unable to demonstrate that the trial court clearly and obviously erred. "To establish the req - uisite error under the plain-error analysis, an appellant must demonstrate more than actual legal error by the trial court in charging the jury; rather, the jury instruction in question must have an obvious defect rather than a merely arguable defect." Fox

v. State, 321 Ga. 411, 417 (2025) (citation and punctuation omit - ted). "Therefore, to show clear and obvious error, an appellant must cite to on-point controlling authority or to the unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule that plainly establish that the trial court erred." Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). Howard cites no controlling statutory authority or case law here, instead rely - ing on nonbinding, inapplicable decisions from New Jersey in sup - port of her argument. Howard has therefore failed to demonstrate that the trial court clearly and obviously erred in giving this in - struction. See id.

5. Finally, in related enumerations of error, Howard ar - gues that the trial court plainly erred by failing to give a jury in - struction on voluntary manslaughter in accordance with Pattern Instruction 2.10.40 and Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (1992), and that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to re - quest this pattern jury instruction and for failing to object when the trial court failed to give it. These claims fail.

(a) First, Howard argues that the trial court plainly erred by failing to give the pattern jury instruction on voluntary man - slaughter. This argument is meritless because the trial court did

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in fact give that instruction.⁶Suggested Pattern Jury Instruc ^- tions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases § 2.10.40 (4th ed. 2007, 2023 up - date).

(b) Next, Howard argues that her trial counsel rendered in - effective assistance by failing to request the pattern jury instruc - tion on voluntary manslaughter and failing to object when the trial court failed to give that instruction. As noted above, How - ard's trial counsel requested this instruction and the trial court gave it. Thus, the entire basis of this enumeration of error is de - void of evidentiary support in the record and is meritless.

(c) Finally, with respect to both enumerations concerning the pattern jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter, Howard argues that the instruction violates this Court's holding in Edge. A review of that instruction reveals no such violation. 7 In Edge,

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we held that a "sequential charge requiring the jury to consider voluntary manslaughter only if it has considered and found the defendant not guilty of malice murder and felony murder is not appropriate where there is evidence that would authorize a charge on voluntary manslaughter." Edge, 261 Ga. at 867. But we later explained that, even if there were an Edge violation, there is no prejudice where the defendant is convicted of malice murder. See Speziali v. State, 301 Ga. 290, 294 (2017) ("Where, as here, the defendant is convicted of malice murder, the problem which Edge seeks to address is not present." (citation and punctuation omitted)). Because the trial court here did not instruct the jury in a manner inconsistent with Edge, there is no violation of Edge, and even if there were a violation of Edge, that violation was not harmful because Howard was convicted of malice murder. Thus, Howard's contention fails. 8

8 As discussed in this opinion, there are several instances where we are limited in our ability to review Howard's enumerations of error due to poor briefing by her counsel, J.M. Raffauf. These instances include Mr. Raffauf's failure to make any meaningful argument in support of certain enumerations of error, failure to cite controlling authority, failure to cite the record in a mean - ingful and helpful way, and misrepresentation concerning jury instructions that were given by the trial court. In addition, the briefs filed by Mr. Raffauf in this case are riddled with typographical and grammatical errors, and ap - pear, in at least one instance, to contain argument concerning matters that did not occur at Howard's trial. This briefing is, of course, unacceptable and dis - tressing on its own. When considered in conjunction with the other similar in - stances where we have previously reprimanded Mr. Raffauf, they have crossed the line into territory where we must act. Accordingly, on today's date, we have issued an order in another case requiring Mr. Raffauf to show cause as to why his privilege to practice in this Court should not be revoked. This case is but one example of many giving rise to our order in that case. See Sanders v. State, No. S26A1415 (reciting Mr. Raffauf's troubling history of briefing in multiple cases in this Court and ordering that he show cause as to why his privilege to practice in this Court should not be revoked).

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Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.