Moreland v. State

In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A1135

Lateef Jamil Moreland v.

The State

On Appeal from the Superior Court of Troup County No. 23R0614

Decided: October 27, 2026

LAGRUA, Justice.

Appellant Lateef Moreland challenges his 2024 convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Allan Dale Huguley, Jr. 1 Moreland contends

1 The crimes occurred on January 28, 2023. On October 12, 2023, a Troup County grand jury indicted Moreland on four counts of "Violation of Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act" (Counts 1, 2, 6, and 7); malice murder (Count 3); two counts of felony murder (Counts 4 and 8); aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 5); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 9); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 10). At a trial from May 13 to May 17, 2024, the jury found Moreland guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced Moreland to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder; four 20-year consecutive prison terms for the Gang Act counts; a ten-year consecutive prison term for the felon-in-possession count; and a five-year consecutive prison term for possession of firearm during the commission of a crime. The remaining counts were vacated by operation of law or merged. Moreland filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended with new counsel on April 14, 2025. After a hearing on April 22, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying the motion on October 17, 2025. Moreland filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court's reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the "Final Copy," will replace any prior version on the Court's website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.

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that the trial court committed several evidentiary errors. As explained below, his claims fail, and we affirm. The evidence at trial showed that at approximately 11:50 p.m. on January 28, 2023, Moreland, along with another man who was never identified, ambushed Huguley, a member of a rival gang, as Huguley sat in his car in the parking lot of a motel in LaGrange in Troup County. Moreland and the other man fired at least 20 shots at Huguley, striking him 12 times and killing him. The motel's night clerk saw the shooting, and it was captured on the motel's surveillance video cameras. The night clerk could not see the shooters' faces because they were wearing "full face coverings." One of the shooters wore a black hoodie with a white Nike emblem on the left chest, "ripped" blue jeans, and white Air Jordan athletic shoes with blue accents.

On the afternoon of January 28, several hours before the shooting, a clerk in a gas station convenience store, which was located about four miles from the shooting, observed several young men "coming in and out repeatedly." The clerk was

"nervous" and "did not feel safe" and informed the store owner about the situation. The store owner testified that, in his review of a video recording from the store's surveillance video cameras, the young men appeared to be "casing" the store, and so he saved the recording of the young men and "made … still shots" of them from the video recording. One of the still photos depicts one of the young men wearing a black hoodie with a white Nike emblem on the left chest, ripped blue jeans, and white Air Jordan athletic shoes with blue accents; his face was clearly visible in the still photo.

docketed in this Court to the April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.

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The day after the store owner saved the still photos of the young men who appeared to be "casing" the store, which was also the day after Huguley's murder, a LaGrange police officer happened to stop by the store, and the store owner, who knew the officer, gave the officer the still photos. A few days later, the officer who had received the photos realized that the clothing worn by one man in the still photos was virtually identical to the clothing worn by one of the shooters in Huguley's murder. Officers learned that the shooting suspect was "believed to be from Valdosta," so they communicated with police officers in Valdosta, sharing the still photo of the suspect from the convenience store with the Valdosta officers. The Valdosta officers identified the person wearing the black hoodie and ripped blue jeans as Moreland.

In June 2023, Moreland was arrested in Valdosta by police officers responding to a domestic disturbance 911 call from a woman named Taylor White who asked for help in removing a man from her home; White knew the man as "David Black." When officers arrived, the man identified himself as Lateef Moreland. Moreland was detained at the home until a detective arrived with the still photo from the LaGrange convenience store that Valdosta officers had received from the officers in LaGrange. The detective showed the photo to White, who said that the man in the photo was the man she knew as David Black. At trial, White also identified Moreland in the courtroom as the man depicted in the still photo.

After the LaGrange officers arrested Moreland for Huguley's murder, Moreland waived his Miranda 2 rights and spoke with officers. In his interview, which was audio - and video-

2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).

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recorded, Moreland at first said that the still photo was not him, asserting, "I don't wear s**t like that," referring to the Nike hoodie; however, the State presented evidence that Moreland's Facebook profile photo showed him wearing an identical Nike hoodie. The State also presented evidence showing that nine of the cartridge cases recovered from the scene of Huguley's shooting were fired from a distinctive gun that was recovered in another incident in Valdosta. 3 That gun had a teal frame and a black slide and was comprised of parts of two different Taurus 9mm handguns. Moreland's Facebook page contained multiple photos of an identical-looking gun, including one photo that Moreland sent to another person the day before Huguley's murder.

The State also presented a gang expert who gave expert testimony opining that, based on his investigation, Moreland was a member of one faction of the Gangster Disciples gang and Huguley was a member of a rival faction of that gang. The expert further testified that Huguley's "side" was suspected of being responsible for the killing of a member of Moreland's faction and that Huguley's death was consistent with a gang-related retaliatory shooting. Finally, the State offered into evidence a certified copy of Moreland's 2018 guilty plea to robbery by force.

1. Moreland contends that the trial court committed plain error in allowing White to provide lay opinion testimony identifying Moreland as the person in the still photo because

3 The gun was recovered in May 2023 in Valdosta, after officers saw two masked men standing beside a parked car with four occupants. As the officers approached, one officer saw the masked men "duck down" and then

"take off running"; the masked men were never captured. The gun was found underneath the parked car, and the occupants of the car, who had guns inside the car, denied any knowledge of the gun found outside.

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White did not have sufficient familiarity with him. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d) (authorizing court to review unpreserved claims related to admission or exclusion of evidence for "plain errors affecting substantial rights"). Moreland concedes that he did not object to White's testimony identifying him from the still photo at trial, so we review this claim only for plain error. To establish plain error, an appellant "must demonstrate that the trial court made an error that was not affirmatively waived, was clear or obvious, likely affected the outcome of trial, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." Minor v. State, S26A0840, slip op. at 5 (Ga. Aug. 13, 2026) (2026 WL 2349403, at *3). An error cannot be clear or obvious "where there is no controlling authority on point or if a defendant's theory requires the extension of precedent." Williams

v. State, 316 Ga. 304, 308 (2023) (quotation marks omitted). To show that an error affected substantial rights, an appellant must

"make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below." Id.

Our case law is clear that under OCGA § 24-7-701(a) 4 ("Rule 701(a)"), a lay witness may identify a defendant in surveillance photographs or video recordings where "there is some basis for concluding that a witness is more likely than the

4 OCGA § 24-7-701(a) provides:

(a) If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testimony in the form of opinions or inferences shall be limited to those opinions or inferences which are:

(1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness;

(2) Helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; and

(3) Not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Code Section 24-7-702.

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jury to correctly identify the defendant as the person in the photo or video." Minor, S26A0840, slip op. at 6 (quoting Mitchell v. State, 320 Ga. 673, 678-79 (2025)). See also Glenn v. State, 302 Ga. 276, 280 (2017). "Familiarity derived from a witness's close relationship to, or sustained contact with the defendant weighs heavily in favor of admitting the witness's identification testimony." Minor, S26A0840, slip op. at 6 (cleaned up). Moreland contends that White's identification was impermissible because White did not know him at the time the still photo was taken. We recently determined that there was no plain error in a detective identifying a defendant from a surveillance video recording "given the detective's familiarity with [the defendant's] appearance due to his investigation of the case." Jackson v. State, 324 Ga. 75, 77, 81-82 (2026) (cleaned up). Here, Moreland had been staying with White in Valdosta for two weeks, and when White was asked on direct examination about how she knew that the person in the photo was Moreland, she responded, "I recognized his face. … He's been at my house for the past two weeks. How would I not know what his face looked like?"

We conclude that White's testimony showed that she had a sufficient familiarity with Moreland derived from her sustained contact with him while he lived with her for two weeks, such that the requirements of Rule 701(a) were met. See Minor, S26A0840, slip op. at 8; Jackson, 324 Ga. at 82. Thus, there was no plain error in White's testimony identifying Moreland as the man in the still photo from the convenience store.

2. Moreland next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding a police "investigative report" that documented four anonymous tips identifying someone other than Moreland as the person in the still photo.

With respect to this claim, the record shows that after the

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jury had been excused on the second day of the trial, Moreland, through trial counsel, made a proffer, saying he wanted to question LaGrange Police Detective Krystal Crockett about "her portion of the [police investigative] report that was provided in discovery," which contained indications that "on four different occasions[,] there was anonymous information given that the tipster believed the person in the [still photo from the convenience store] … was someone other than Lateef Moreland." 5 Moreland stated that he would seek to elicit the proffered information from Detective Crockett, either by calling her as a witness or by questioning her on cross-examination, as she was on the State's witness list. Moreland stated that he anticipated that the State would argue that the testimony was hearsay and that his

"position would be" that the testimony "is not hearsay because it is not offered to prove the matter asserted"; that "the matter asserted … is that the person in the photograph is [a named individual other than Moreland]"; and that the purpose of introducing the testimony would be to "cast[] doubt on the State's assertion that it's simply obvious that anybody can look at the photograph from the gas station and see that it's Lateef Moreland." Moreland said he "may need to ask for leave to flesh this out with some research overnight," and explained that if the trial court were to sustain the objection, "then there's not [a] reason for me to attempt to get Detective Crockett under subpoena and here." After hearing argument from the State, as well, the trial court indicated that if there was an objection to asking Detective Crockett about the anonymous tips, it would

5 The tips were received in response to the police seeking information through Facebook and the "Crime Stoppers tip line" about the identity of the person shown in the convenience store still photo. Detective Crockett investigated the tips, and the tips did not lead to any incriminating evidence against Moreland or anyone else.

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sustain the objection but would "give [Moreland] time … to look at cases or any other kind of law on it" that would cause the trial court to reverse its ruling. Trial counsel indicated that if he found

"anything," he would "let everybody know." Moreland did not call Detective Crockett to testify or tender the investigative report into the record, and the issue was not otherwise raised again at trial.

On appeal, Moreland continues to claim that the anonymous tips in the investigative report were admissible because they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and also asserts a separate basis for the admission of the investigative report—that it was "an official record documenting the progress and results of the investigation" and thus was admissible under OCGA § 24-8-803(8)(A), (B) ("Rule 803(8)"). 6 We address these claims in turn[.]

(a) With regard to the contention that the anonymous tips in the investigative report were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, we review this claim for plain error because the trial court made a conditional ruling at trial and Moreland did not call Detective Crockett, attempt to offer the investigative report

6 OCGA § 24-8-803(8) provides, in relevant part:

The following shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

(8) Public records and reports. Except as otherwise provided by law, public records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices, setting forth:

(A) The activities of the public office;

(B) Matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, against the accused in criminal proceedings, matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel in connection with an investigation[.]

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into evidence, or address the issue further. See Wilson v. State,

301 Ga. 83, 87-88 (2017) (holding that where the trial court did not make a "definitive ruling" on the admissibility of the defendant's proffered evidence, and its ruling was "conditional upon any subsequent showing by [the defendant] and further discussion," the issue is reviewed on appeal for plain error). Under OCGA §§ 24-8-801(c) and 24-8-802, a witness's out-of-court statement that is offered for the truth of the matter asserted is hearsay and is not admissible, subject to certain statutory exceptions. See Glenn v. State, 324 Ga. 716, 720-21 (2026). But an out-of-court statement that is not offered for its truth is not hearsay. See Moss v. State, 323 Ga. 143, 149-50 (2025) (explaining that the murder victim's text message to his son— sent on the night he was killed and asking his son to come home— was not hearsay where it was offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted). See also Fed. R. Evid. 801(a), Advisory Committee Note (explaining that an out-of-court statement does not constitute hearsay if "offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter asserted" by the declarant).

In his appellant's brief, Moreland asserts that the anonymous tips in the investigative report were not hearsay because they were offered for a non-hearsay purpose. Specifically, Moreland claims that the evidence was offered "for the non - hearsay purpose of challenging the validity and reliability of the State's identification process and the assertion that 'it's simply obvious that anybody can look at the photograph ... and see that it's Lateef Moreland'" and that the exclusion of the investigative report "prevent[ed] the jury from hearing that the investigation had yielded multiple other suspects identified by name by the

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public." 7 But we need not delve into whether or how Moreland's asserted purposes render the anonymous tips within the investigative report not hearsay because Moreland has offered no on-point authority in support of his theories, and we have found none. Given the absence of citation to controlling authority as to his claimed non-hearsay purposes, we conclude that Moreland has not met his burden to show that excluding the tips as inadmissible hearsay was clear or obvious error. See Welsch v. State, 323 Ga. 504, 509-10 (2026) (declining to address the appellant's argument that the trial court erred in admitting a witness's recounting of the victim's statement where the appellant failed to identify any authority to support his claim that the statement should have been excluded because it was testimonial); Williams, 316 Ga. at 308. Thus, this claim fails. .

(b) With regard to the assertion that the anonymous tips in the investigative report were admissible under Rule 803(8) because they were contained in an official record, we review this claim under plain error because Moreland asserted a different basis for the introduction of the evidence below. See Peavy v. State, 324 Ga. 295, 302 (2026). We have not previously addressed the scope of Rule 803(8). 8 However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of

7 To the extent Moreland sought to admit the report to show that other suspects were identified by anonymous tipsters, we note that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in excluding hearsay testimony offered to show that another person is guilty. See Glenn, 324 Ga. at 721 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding an officer's hearsay testimony that he received information from another detective about a tip from a confidential informant that raised the possibility of an additional suspect other than the defendant).

8 Rule 803(8) is materially identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8),

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Appeals has said, "It is well established that entries in a police report which result from the officer's own observations and knowledge may be admitted but that statements made by third persons under no business duty to report may not." United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F3d 1260, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). See also Doe v. Carnival Corp., ___ F4th ___, ____ (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2026) (2026 WL 2491151, at *6) (agreeing that the federal district court properly determined that the portion of an FBI report containing a special agent's notes of an interview with a potential suspect was not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)). Additionally, Moreland has not cited any cases, and we have found none, holding that an anonymous tip documented only in a police report is admissible under Rule 803(8). Thus, we conclude that Moreland has failed to meet his burden to show that there was a clear or obvious error with regard to this claim. See Doe, 2026 WL 2491151, at *6; Mazer, 556 F3d at 1268-69.

Accordingly, Moreland's claims about the admissibility of the investigative report fail.

3. Finally, Moreland challenges the admission of evidence about one particular circumstance of his arrest. With regard to this claim, the record shows that before voir dire began, the State made a motion to admit evidence that in White's 911 call, she said that Moreland, whom she knew only as David Black at that point, had threatened to shoot her. After hearing the State's proffer about White's proposed testimony and argument from both sides, the trial court made a "conditional" ruling that the evidence would be admissible as intrinsic evidence based on the proffer and and we look to federal cases in interpreting and applying provisions of Georgia's current Evidence Code that are materially identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Ealey v. State, 322 Ga. 509, 519 n.8 (2025).

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that the issue could be revisited at trial. 9 At trial, the prosecutor did not ask White about her 911 call or what she told officers when they arrived in response to her call, and White did not reference the threat in any of her testimony. However, the Valdosta police officer who responded to White's 911 call testified, without objection, that "the initial call was a dispute with possible weapons involved where someone had threatened to shoot Ms. White." 10 The officer also testified on cross-examination that White did not "claim that she knew [Moreland] had had a gun with him" and that when the officer arrested Moreland on charges related to the domestic dispute, Moreland did not have any weapons on him and no weapons were discovered at the scene. Moreland contends that the evidence that he "threatened to shoot" White was improper character evidence and was not intrinsic to Huguley's murder and that, even if it was intrinsic, it should have been excluded under OCGA § 24-4-403 ("Rule 403"), which requires exclusion of evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."

Because the trial court made a conditional ruling based on a proffer about White's testimony and because trial counsel did not object when the officer testified that "someone had threatened to shoot Ms. White," we review this claim for plain error. See Minor, S26A0840, slip op. at 5.

9 Evidence that is "intrinsic" to the charged offense is admissible "even if it incidentally places the defendant's character at issue," so long as it satisfies OCGA § 24-4-403. See Dempsey v. State, 323 Ga. 576, 583-84 (2026) (quotation marks omitted).

10 The officer's testimony came just after the prosecutor had shown the officer the bodycam video of his arrival at White's house and the prosecutor asked the officer to "explain for the jury why at this point do you have your service weapon drawn."

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Pretermitting whether the evidence was intrinsic or whether there was a clear or obvious error in not excluding the officer's testimony under Rule 403, Moreland's claim fails because he has not met his burden to show that the evidence affected his substantial rights. As noted above, for an appellant to demonstrate that an error affected his substantial rights, he must

"make an affirmative showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below." Williams, 316 Ga. at 308 (quotation marks omitted). Here, the challenged testimony was very brief and the prosecutor made no mention of the officer's testimony about a threat in closing arguments. Moreover, Moreland established while cross-examining the officer that White did not tell the officer that Moreland had a gun and that, when Moreland was arrested, he did not have a gun in his possession and no guns were found at the scene. Additionally, there was compelling evidence of Moreland's guilt, including evidence showing that, before the shooting, Moreland was near the scene of the shooting wearing the same clothing as the shooter; that, the day before the shooting, Moreland posted on Facebook a photo of a gun that appeared identical to the gun that was identified as the murder weapon; and that Moreland falsely told officers that he didn't

"wear s**t like that," referring to the Nike hoodie. There was also expert testimony regarding the gang affiliations of Moreland and Huguley and opining that the shooting was consistent with a revenge shooting based on those gang affiliations. Thus, given that the only mention of the threat in the trial was the officer's very brief testimony, which was effectively countered on cross - examination, and the compelling evidence of Moreland's guilt, we conclude that Moreland has not met his burden to show that the officer's testimony affected his substantial rights. See Dennis v. State, 324 Ga. 440, 444 (2026) (concluding there was no plain error where, even assuming the detective's testimony was

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improperly admitted, there was strong evidence of the defendant's guilt unrelated to that testimony, and thus the defendant did not show that the detective's testimony likely affected the outcome of the trial); Watkins v. State, 320 Ga. 862, 869 (2025) (concluding that there was no plain error where the appellant did not show the alleged error affected the outcome of the trial in light of the "compelling evidence from which the jury could infer that [the appellant] murdered [the victim]"), overruled in part on other grounds by Gines v. State, 324 Ga. 46, 72 (2026). 11 Accordingly, this claim fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

11 Moreland summarily asserts that the cumulative effect of the errors he raises on appeal warrants a new trial. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (2020). But Moreland has failed to establish more than one error at trial, so there is nothing to assess cumulatively, and this claim is without merit. See Burke v. State, 320 Ga. 706, 713 (2025) (concluding that cumulative error claim under Lane failed where appellant "failed to establish more than one error at trial").