People v. Mears

People v Mears

2026 NY Slip Op 06237 October 27, 2026 Court of Appeals Halligan, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. The People & c., Respondent,

v

Stephen Mears, Appellant.

Decided on October 27, 2026

No. 80

Matthew Brissenden, for appellant.

Shiry Gaash, for respondent.

Halligan, J.

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Following a physical altercation with his girlfriend's fifteen-year-old son, the defendant was charged with two offenses, endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10) and strangulation in the second degree (id. § 121.12). The trial court gave a justification charge under Penal Law § 35.15 for the strangulation count, but denied the charge for the endangerment offense. A jury convicted the defendant of endangerment, but acquitted on strangulation. The Appellate Division affirmed, relying on prior cases holding the defense inapplicable to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child, and further found that no reasonable view of the evidence supported giving a justification instruction. We reverse. The relevant statutory text and our precedent confirm that a justification instruction pursuant to Penal Law § 35.15 may be available for a charge of endangering the welfare of a child that is premised on the use of force. We also conclude that there is a reasonable view of the evidence here in support of the defense, and the refusal to charge the justification defense was not harmless.

I.

In September 2022, the defendant shared a home with his girlfriend, J.L., and her fifteen-year-old son, R.T. During a night out, the defendant and J.L. argued and returned home. Each went back out to a bar, and they eventually returned home again, still quarreling. A physical altercation between the defendant and R.T. ensued, leaving R.T. on the floor, seemingly unconscious.

The defendant was charged with endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10)^FN1 and strangulation in the second degree (id. § 121.12)^FN2. At trial, the People relied on the same conductâ​​the defendant's use of force against R.T.â​​to prove both the endangering and the strangulation charges. J.L., R.T., and the defendant each recounted their versions of the altercation. The People also called a forensic nurse, who testified about the abrasions found on R.T.'s neck and a strangulation assessment she performed on R.T., and a forensic scientist, who testified about a DNA swab of R.T.'s neck that showed likely evidence of the defendant's DNA.

After the People rested, the defendant sought a trial order of dismissal on the ground that the People's evidence did not establish guilt of either charge. In response, the People pointed to the same evidence for both charges: that the defendant had placed his hands on R.T.'s neck, causing him to become unconscious. In their summation, the People again confirmed that they were relying on the same evidence for the endangerment and strangulation counts, stating that "[R.T.'s] testimony on that witness stand establishes every element of both crimes beyond a reasonable doubt."

Defense counsel requested a justification charge under section 35.15. The court denied the instruction with respect to the endangering count, but allowed it for the strangulation count. The jury proceeded to convict defendant on endangerment but acquitted him on the strangulation charge.

The Appellate Division affirmed (235 AD3d 779, 780 [2d Dept 2025]). Relying on People v Varela (164 AD2d 924 [2d Dept 1990]), People v Fields (134 AD2d 365 [2d Dept 1987]), and People v Williams (102 AD3d 566 [1st Dept 2013]), the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly declined to charge justification, since that defense "generally does not apply" to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child (235 AD3d at 780). It further held that, regardless, there was no reasonable view of the evidence that supported the defense (see id.).

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A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal (43 NY3d 1057 [2025]). We now reverse and remit for a new trial.

II.

Article 35 of the Penal Law sets forth various justification defenses that are available "[i]n any prosecution for an offense" (Penal Law § 35.00). The provision at issue here, section 35.15 (1), states that a person may "use physical force upon another when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such force to be necessary to defend himself . . . from what he or [*2]she . . . reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person." "[B]y recognizing the use of force to be privileged under certain circumstances, [this defense] renders such conduct entirely lawful" (People v McManus, 67 NY2d 541, 546 [1986]).

In denying this justification charge for the endangerment count, the Appellate Division relied on past precedent, including Fields (134 AD2d 365), Varela (164 AD2d 924), and Williams (102 AD3d 566). The starting point, Fields, held that a separate parental justification defense found in section 35.10 (1), which is not at issue here, was inapplicable to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child because a parent who knowingly acted in a manner injurious to a child's welfare could not have reasonably believed their actions necessary to promoting that child's welfare (134 AD2d at 365- 366)^FN3. Varela extended the rule from Fields to the self-defense justification defense under section 35.15 without any substantive explanation (164 AD2d at 924 ["The defense of justification is not applicable to the misdemeanor of endangering the welfare of a minor"]). The First Department reached a similar conclusion in Williams, albeit with the unexplained qualification that the defense "generally" does not apply to the crime of endangering the welfare of a child (102 AD3d at 567).

The statutory text, however, is clearly contrary. Article 35 instructs that, "[i]n any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 35.05 through 35.30, is a defense" (§ 35.00 [emphasis added]). And the self-defense justification defense, set forth in section 35.15, includes no limiting or qualifying language regarding the availability of the defense. We thus see no basis in Article 35's broad language for denying a section 35.15 justification defense in a prosecution involving a charge of endangering the welfare of a child.

We have consistently held that there is "no basis for limiting the application of the defense of justification to . . . any particular crime" (McManus, 67 NY2d at 547), and stressed that a justification charge is available "whenever the defendant claims that 'he engaged in forceful conduct in avoidance of a perceived attack' " (id., quoting People v Padgett, 60 NY2d 142, 146 [1983] [alterations omitted]). Contrary to the People's contentions, a self-defense justification defense is not limited to offenses that include the use of force as one of the statutory elements. Even if the prosecution could prove their case without establishing a defendant's use of force, the justification defense is available if the prosecution chooses to argue its case on a use-of-force theory, and a reasonable view of the evidence supports the defense (see e.g. id. [depraved indifference murder]; People v Goetz, 68 NY2d 96, 104 n 2 [1986] [reckless endangerment before a grand jury]). Although endangering the welfare of a child can be prosecuted based on a defendant's actions that do not involve the use of force, here, the prosecution premised their case on defendant's use of force.

When a prosecution for endangering the welfare of a child is based on the use of force, a charge of justification pursuant to Penal Law § 35.15 is available if there is a reasonable view of the [*3]evidence to support it. To the extent that Varela and Williams are inconsistent with that holding, they should not be followed.

III.

The Appellate Division found in the alternative that no reasonable view of the evidence could support the justification charge (235 AD3d at 780). Where "there is any reasonable view of the evidence that defendant was justified in his actions," an instruction must be given (People v Castillo, 42 NY3d 628, 631 [2024]). In making that assessment, a court must "examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant" (id.). Applying that standard here, we conclude that a reasonable view of the evidence supported a justification defense, and the Appellate Division erred in concluding otherwise.

The evidence relied on by the People to prove the endangerment charge was identical to that underlying the strangulation charge. Even though non-violent conduct may provide a basis for an endangerment charge, the People relied on defendant's use of force in support of both charges. The People did not differentiate between the endangerment and strangulation charges in their complaint, opening statement, or summation, and in their response to the trial order seeking dismissal, the People's evidence for both charges focused on the defendant placing his hands on R.T.'s neck.

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there is a reasonable view supporting a justification instruction. According to the defendant's testimony, the defendant was reacting to multiple unprovoked punches from R.T., with the apparent expectation that more punches would follow. The defendant testified that he might have ended up grabbing R.T.'s neck accidentally while protecting his glass contact lenses. While R.T. and J.L. provided accounts that sharply diverged from the defendant's, the "charge must be given if there is evidence reasonably supportive of the defense, even if there is other evidence which, if credited, would negate it" (People v. J.L., 36 NY3d 112, 119 [2020], quoting People v McKenzie, 19 NY3d 463, 466 [2012]).

Our conclusion is bolstered by the court's decision to give an instruction on justification for the strangulation charge without objection. The only discernible explanation the People offer for why the justification instruction would be available for one charge but not the other is that a jury could have construed the defendant's other actions that did not involve force as "injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare" of R.T. While the People might have been able to prove their case that way, that is not the path they pursued at trial. Instead, the People relied on the defendant's use of force in support of both charges.

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IV.

Because a reasonable view of the evidence supports the justification defense, the court was without discretion to deny the charge (see Padgett, 60 NY2d at 144-145). We reject the People's contention that the error was harmless. Accordingly, the Appellate Division order should be reversed and a new trial ordered. Singas, J. (concurring.)

I join the majority in full and write to provide additional observations regarding difficulties that will likely arise in cases where use of physical force is not an essential element of the crime, but the People seek to prove a defendant's guilt with evidence of the defendant's use of force that may have been justified.

First, when the People seek to establish a defendant's guilt usingâ​​among other evidenceâ​​proof of the defendant's use of physical force, and when there is a reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant's use of that force was justified, trial courts should specify the count to which justification defense applies (see CJI2d[NY] Penal Law § 35.15 [1], https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/Defenses/CJI2d.Justification.Person.Physical_Force.pdf [last accessed Oct. 21, 2026]) and should also identify the specific conduct to which that defense applies. This will permit the factfinder to evaluate the defense and, if the People fail to disprove it, to consider whether the People's other evidence nonetheless proves the defendant's guilt.

Second, when analyzing whether the trial court's failure to give a justification instruction to the jury was harmless error in such a case, appellate courts should similarly consider whether the evidence not subject to the justification defense overwhelmingly established the defendant's guilt and whether there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been different had the instruction been given (see People v Jones, 3 NY3d 491, 497 [2004]; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]; see also People v J.L., 36 NY3d 112, 124 [2020]).

I agree with the majority that the error was not harmless here (see majority op at 8). Although the People offered some non-use-of-force evidence at trial tending to establish defendant's guilt of endangering the welfare of a child, that evidence was not overwhelming. Moreover, given [*4]that the People focused almost exclusively throughout this prosecution on defendant's use of force to prove the endangerment charge (see majority op at 7), there was certainly a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it been properly instructed on justification as a defense to that conduct.

Order reversed and a new trial ordered. Opinion by Judge Halligan. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Garcia, Singas, Cannataro and Troutman concur, Judge Singas in a concurring opinion.

Decided October 27, 2026

Footnotes

Footnote 1 Penal Law § 260.10 (1) provides that an individual is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when "[h]e or she knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old or directs or authorizes such child to engage in an occupation involving a substantial risk of danger to his or her life or health."

Footnote 2

Penal Law § 121.12 provides that "[a] person is guilty of strangulation in the second degree when he or she commits the crime of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation . . . and thereby causes stupor, loss of consciousness for any period of time, or any other physical injury or impairment." The defendant was also charged with one count under Penal Law § 121.11 (a), but that count was dismissed before trial.

Footnote 3

Section 35.10 (1) provides that "[a] parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one . . . may use physical force, but not deadly physical force, upon such person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person." The defendant requested this instruction at trial, but he does not challenge its denial before this Court. Thus, we do not address the issue decided in Fields.

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