Cardenas-Gamez v. Blanche

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factual findings and otherwise fails to show error in the BIA's weighing of the relevant facts, we dismiss the petition in part for lack of jurisdiction and deny the remainder.

Background

In 1994, Cardenas-Gamez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without being admitted or paroled. After the government initiated removal proceedings against him in 2009, Cardenas-Gamez later conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal in 2011. To qualify for that relief, Cardenas-Gamez had to establish, among other things, "that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or" a lawful permanent resident.¹8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D); see also id. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i) (providing that noncitizen bears burden of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal). Cardenas-Gamez contended that his removal would impose exceptional and extremely unusual hardship on two qualifying relatives: his daughter, Jessica Cardenas Enriquez, a United States citizen who was nine at the time of the application; and his father, Santiago Cardenas Estrada, a lawful permanent resident who was then 66. An IJ conducted a hearing on Cardenas-Gamez's application in November 2019. There, Cardenas-Gamez testified about the hardships that Jessica and Santiago

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would face upon his removal and provided documentary evidence to support his testimony. Cardenas-Gamez testified that he was Jessica's sole provider. His domestic partner, who is Jessica's mother, had previously worked but was currently unemployed. Jessica's mother, Cardenas-Gamez, and Jessica all lived together, and Jessica's mother stayed at home with Jessica while Cardenas-Gamez was away for work. Cardenas-Gamez added that he wouldn't allow Jessica to accompany him to Mexico if he were removed. Cardenas-Gamez further testified that, although he was frequently away for work, he helped Jessica with her schoolwork. Jessica, then 17 and in 12th grade, had a learning disability but was on track to graduate high school in six months and had started applying to colleges. A letter from Jessica stated that she had a strong bond with her father and that she needed his support to continue her education. That said, however, one of Jessica's teachers testified that Jessica's mother participated in meetings and conversations with the school, not Cardenas-Gamez.²

Next, Cardenas-Gamez testified that Santiago, then 74, was in good health but expressed concern about Santiago's care. Santiago spent nine months of the year with Cardenas-Gamez and his family. He spent the other three months with Cardenas-Gamez's sister, a lawful permanent resident who lived in the same state as Cardenas-Gamez and who frequently saw Cardenas-Gamez's family.

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Cardenas-Gamez and his sister both financially supported Santiago, but Cardenas-Gamez provided most of that support, and he did not believe that his sister could independently care for Santiago. Cardenas-Gamez also had a brother who lived in the same state and who was a United States citizen.

Following the hearing, the IJ denied the application because, as relevant here, Cardenas-Gamez failed to establish that his removal would impose exceptional and extremely unusual hardship on Jessica or Santiago. The BIA affirmed in a single-member decision.

Cardenas-Gamez then filed a petition for review.

Analysis

"When, as here, a single BIA member 'issues a reasoned decision addressing a petitioner's arguments on appeal,' we confine our review to 'the BIA's decision and will not address the IJ's decision except where the BIA has explicitly incorporated [the IJ's] reasoning.'" Miguel-Peña v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145, 1153 (10th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up) (quoting Luevano v. Holder, 660 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2011)). But we may "consult[] the IJ's more complete explanation of those same grounds" on which the BIA based its decision. Aguayo v. Garland, 78 F.4th 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting Neri-Garcia v. Holder, 696 F.3d 1003, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 2012)). Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship is "substantially different from, or beyond, [the hardship that] would normally be expected from the deportation of an alien with close family members here." Martinez v. Garland, 98 F.4th 1018, 1021 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (B.I.A. Appellate Case: 24-9563 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 4

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2001)). When evaluating the existence of such hardship, the BIA must "consider the ages, health, and circumstances of qualifying . . . relatives" in a cumulative analysis. Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63; see also In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23

I. & N. Dec. 467, 472 (B.I.A. 2002). The hardship determination is a "mixed question" of law and fact that "is primarily factual" and that we review under a "deferential" standard.³Martinez, 98 F.4th at 1021 (quoting Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024)). Under this standard, we lack jurisdiction to review the "facts underlying any determination on cancellation of removal." Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225. "For instance, an IJ's factfinding on credibility, the seriousness of a family member's medical condition, or the level of financial support a noncitizen currently provides remain unreviewable."

Id. "Only the question whether th[e] established facts satisfy the statutory eligibility standard is subject to judicial review." Id.

Before this court, Cardenas-Gamez makes several arguments about how the BIA erred, but none succeed. At the outset, some of Cardenas-Gamez's arguments

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present unreviewable challenges to the BIA's and IJ's factfinding. According to Cardenas-Gamez, the BIA "fail[ed] to consider" or "impermissibly . . . speculat[ed]"

about certain factual issues, Aplt. Br. 19, 20, 24, including whether Jessica would accompany him to Mexico and whether Santiago "would be taken care of in [Cardenas-Gamez's] absence," id. at 24. These are factual findings, even though Cardenas-Gamez "dresses [them] . . . in the language of legal review." Acosta Cruz v. Bondi, No. 23-9601, 2026 WL 368113, at *2-3 (10th Cir. Feb. 10, 2026) (unpublished).⁴Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review them. See Wilkinson, 601 U.S. at 225 (explaining that factual findings are unreviewable). Next, Cardenas-Gamez argues that the IJ erred by disregarding his

"country[-]conditions evidence" and his lack of "alternat[iv]e means of immigrating to the United States." Aplt. Br. 15, 22. But as the government argues, Cardenas-Gamez didn't raise these arguments before the BIA, so he can't make them now. "[A]n alien must present the same specific legal theory to the BIA before he or she may advance it in court." Miguel-Peña, 94 F.4th at 1154-55 (quoting Garcia-Carbajal v. Holder, 625 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2010)). This requirement, known as "issue exhaustion," is "mandatory" when raised by the government, as it is here. Id. at 1155. We therefore decline to consider these arguments. See Zubia Escarcega v. Garland, No. 22-9550, 2024 WL 3688734, at *5 (10th Cir. Aug. 7,

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2024) (unpublished) (declining to consider unexhausted issue in connection with ruling on exceptional and extremely unusual hardship).

Cardenas-Gamez does raise two properly exhausted and reviewable arguments:

that the BIA failed to "fully explain[]" the reasons for its decision, Aplt. Br. 15, and improperly "departed from established caselaw," id. at 13, by "not applying all the hardship factors of" controlling BIA cases, id. at 23. Neither argument is persuasive.⁵ To begin, Cardenas-Gamez is incorrect that the BIA failed to fully explain its reasoning. Generally, "the BIA is not required to 'write an exegesis on every contention. What is required is that it consider the issues raised[] and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.'" Maatougui v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1230, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up) (quoting Becerra-Jimenez v. INS, 829 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1987)). The BIA's decision considered the issues raised and explained the reasons for its conclusion. That is adequate to enable our review. Further, we disagree that the BIA erred by not expressly considering each and every fact discussed in three "seminal" BIA cases. Aplt. Br. 23. The BIA's decision recognizes that the IJ "considered the aggregate effect of the relevant factors, including the age, health, language skills, family ties, and the financial impact of the

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respondent's removal." App. vol. 1, 4. These are the factors BIA precedent recognizes as important. See Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63. So the record doesn't show that the BIA or IJ disregarded any relevant factors.⁶See Acosta Cruz, 2026 WL 368113, at *4 (holding that "there is no indication that the [BIA] and the IJ did not consider all the [relevant] factors" when the BIA's decision "summariz[ed] [the] salient evidence" and stated that "the [IJ's] decision reflects a consideration of the entirety of [the] hardship evidence").

Moving to the specific factors that the BIA purportedly ignored, we likewise discern no error. Cardenas-Gamez argues that the BIA never considered three facts about financial hardship: his status as the sole provider for his family; his lack of assets; and the inferior employment opportunities in Mexico. On this point, the BIA and IJ found that Cardenas-Gamez "ha[d] skills that would translate to jobs in Mexico" and that Jessica's mother "[h]ad worked in the past." App. vol. 1, 48, 51. So, notwithstanding the issues Cardenas-Gamez raised, the family could still generate income. See Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 808, 813-14 (B.I.A. 2020) (finding absence of requisite hardship when respondent had not "meaningfully challenge[d] the [IJ's] finding that, in the event his children and partner remain[ed] in the United States, his partner could return to work and help support the children");

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Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 64 ("[T]he respondent . . . is apparently in good health and able to work. There is nothing to show that he would be unable to work and support his United States citizen children in Mexico."). We thus see no error, under our deferential standard of review, in the BIA's conclusion that any financial hardship was not exceptional and extremely unusual—whether considered separately or along with other factors. See Martinez, 98 F.4th at 1021 (holding that

"economic detriment" generally cannot establish the requisite hardship). Next, Cardenas-Gamez argues that Jessica's "educational difficulties" were not afforded sufficient weight. Aplt. Br. 20. The BIA acknowledged Jessica's

"academic struggles" but also considered that her "academic needs were being addressed by her school and teachers" and that she "was six months away from graduating high school and was on track to graduate." App. vol. 1, 4. Furthermore, Cardenas-Gamez testified that Jessica had begun applying to colleges. These facts undercut Cardenas-Gamez's contention that Jessica could not successfully pursue her education after his removal. Thus, the BIA did not err in concluding that Jessica's educational challenges fell below the level of exceptional and extremely unusual. See Martinez, 98 F.4th at 1021 (finding that similar educational difficulties did not "rise to the level of extremely unusual hardship").

Finally, Cardenas-Gamez ties Jessica's educational needs to his family's financial hardships, contending that the financial strain resulting from his removal would cause Jessica to lose her "support network," which in turn would exacerbate her educational difficulties. Rep. Br. 9. That argument runs headlong into the IJ's Appellate Case: 24-9563 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 9

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factual findings. It is conceivable that, upon Cardenas-Gamez's removal, Jessica's mother would reenter the workforce, which would limit the at-home support she could provide for Jessica. But the evidence, as found by the IJ, showed that Jessica received educational support primarily through her teachers, rather than her mother. Thus, even if Jessica's mother could not provide as much at-home support, that change was unlikely to substantially diminish Jessica's educational support. And without substantial detriment, there cannot be exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. See Martinez, 98 F.4th at 1021.

Conclusion

We are sympathetic to the hardships that Cardenas-Gamez and his family will face upon his removal. But we lack jurisdiction to review Cardenas-Gamez's challenges to the BIA's and IJ's factfinding, and Cardenas-Gamez has failed to show error in the BIA's weighing of the relevant facts. Under our deferential standard of review, we cannot conclude that the BIA erred. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition in part and deny the remainder.

Entered for the Court

Nancy L. Moritz

Circuit Judge

Appellate Case: 24-9563 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 10/27/2026 Page: 10