Matter of Red Hook Boat Club, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Town of Red Hook

creating a waterfront park is not a basis for relief under EDPL 207 (see Matter of One Point St., Inc. v City of Yonkers Indus. Dev. Agency, 170 AD3d 851, 853; Matter of Peekskill Hgts., Inc. v City of Peekskill Common Council, 110 AD3d 1079, 1080). The Board has broad discretion to decide which land is necessary to fulfill its stated purpose (see Matter of Citibank, N.A. v Village of Tarrytown, 149 AD3d 931, 932). In its determination and findings, the Board also addressed the general effect of the proposed action on the Town's environment and residents as required by EDPL 204(B)(3), indicating that there would be no new construction, that a negative declaration had been issued, and that the Board had determined that the proposed action was consistent with the LWRP. The petitioner's contention that a restrictive covenant on adjoining property is an impediment to the proposed action is without merit. EDPL 204(B) does not require the Board to address every specific concern or objection raised at the public hearing in its determination and findings (see Matter of Arbern Sutphin Props., LLC v City of New York, 85 AD3d 1158). An adequate basis for the determination has been shown and the petitioner cannot show that the determination was without foundation (see Matter of Waldo's, Inc. v Village of Johnson City, 74 NY2d 718, 720). Accordingly, the Board's determination that the proposed action was necessary to achieve the desired public purpose was rational and should not be disturbed (see Matter of Peekskill Hgts., Inc. v City of Peekskill Common Council, 110 AD3d at 1081). While strict compliance with SEQRA procedure is required under EDPL 207(C)(3), SEQRA does not require an agency to reach a particular result on any issue or to permit the court to second-guess the agency's choice, which can be annulled only if arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d at 417; Matter of Kirquel Dev., Ltd. v Planning Bd. of Town of Cortlandt, 96 AD3d 754, 755). Here, the petitioner's contention that the Board's environmental review of the proposed action was improperly segmented (see 6 NYCRR 617.2[aj]; 617.3[g][1]) is without merit (see Matter of Save Open Space v Planning Bd. of the Town of Newburgh, 74 AD3d 1350). Furthermore, the Board properly classified the proposed action as "Unlisted" under SEQRA rules (see 6 NYCRR 617.4[b]) such that the Board was not required to prepare an environmental impact statement (see id. § 617.4[a]). Notably, even though the Board classified the proposed action as Unlisted, the Board conducted the equivalent of a Type I review notwithstanding the purported misclassification (see Matter of Williamsville Residents Opposed to Blocher Redevelopment, LLC v Village of Williamsville Planning & Architectural Review Bd., 208 AD3d 1609, 1610).

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the Board did not complete its environmental review prior to obtaining the record evidence. At the time that the negative declaration was completed, finding that no significant adverse impact on the environment would result from the proposed action and that an environmental impact statement need not be prepared, the Board had before it all the information that is found in the record (see Matter of King v Saratoga County Bd. of Supervisors, 89 NY2d 341).

Not every conceivable environmental impact, mitigating measure, or alternative must be identified and addressed to satisfy the substantive requirements of SEQRA (see Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d at

417). Furthermore, SEQRA requires that "a suitable balance of social, economic, and environmental factors be incorporated into the planning and decision-making processes" (see 6 NYCRR 617.1[d]). Here, the record demonstrates that the Board complied with its SEQRA obligations to identify the relevant areas of environmental concern, take a hard look at them, and make a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its determination to issue a negative declaration (see Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d at 417; [*3]Matter of River St. Realty Corp. v City of New Rochelle, 181 AD3d 676). As the Board complied with the procedural and substantive requirements of SEQRA, it is not for a reviewing court to duplicate these efforts (see Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd. of Town of Southeast, 9 NY3d 219, 232).

The Code of the Town of Red Hook § 68-12(A) provides that prior to approval of a proposed action, the agency shall make a determination that it is consistent with LWRP policy standards and conditions. The Board did not improperly override the inconsistency determination of the Waterfront Advisory Committee (hereinafter WAC) without making written findings (see id. § 68-12). The Board specifically considered each policy of the LWRP and provided written findings as to the reason its proposed action was consistent with those policies, including those policies with which WAC found inconsistency. A court may not evaluate the data de novo and substitute its judgment for that of the Board (see Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 570). Accordingly, the petitioner identified no ground for annulling the Board's determination to proceed with acquiring the property by eminent domain, and the determination must be confirmed. GENOVESI, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, WAN and LOVE, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph Clerk of the Court

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