Keith Hapana Crow v. State of Minnesota

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A24-0902

Redwood County Keith Hapana Crow, Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota, Respondent.

Procaccini, J. Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Gaïtas, C.J., Hennesy, J.

Took no part, Aligada, Jr., J. Filed: October 21, 2026

Office of Appellate Courts

________________________

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Zuri Balmakund, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Shannon Ness, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota, for respondent. ________________________

S Y L L A B U S

1. The district court abused its discretion when it summarily denied appellant's preliminary application for relief from a first-degree felony murder conviction under the Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864-68 (the Act), on the grounds that the issues raised in appellant's preliminary application had

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"previously been decided" by this court because our previous decision did not resolve whether appellant caused, or aided with the intent to cause, the victim's death.

2. The summary denial of a preliminary application under subdivision 5(e)-(f) of the Act is distinct from a denial for lack of reasonable probability under subdivision 5(h). Because the district court did not conduct a reasonable probability analysis and the parties have not briefed or argued the question of reasonable probability, we remand to the district court for it to conduct a reasonable probability analysis pursuant to our decision in State v. Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d 847 (Minn. 2026).

3. Appellant's constitutional and other claims raised in his pro se supplemental briefs do not merit relief.

Reversed and remanded.

O P I N I O N

PROCACCINI, Justice. Appellant Keith Hapana Crow appeals the district court's summary denial of his preliminary application for relief from his felony murder conviction pursuant to legislation establishing a procedure for challenging felony murder convictions that are based on an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability. See Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864-68 (the Act). The district court summarily denied Crow's preliminary application under subdivision 5(e)(4) of the Act, which permits a district court to do so when "the issues raised in the application … have previously been decided by the court of appeals or the supreme court in the same case." Specifically, the district court determined that the issues raised in Crow's preliminary application—

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whether Crow (1) caused the death of the victim or (2) aided with the intent to cause the victim's death—had "previously been decided" by this court in State v. Crow (Crow I),

730 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 2007). We hold that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying Crow's preliminary application under subdivision 5(e)(4) because we did not decide whether Crow caused, or aided with the intent to cause, the death of the victim in Crow I. But our determination that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying Crow's preliminary application under subdivision 5(e)(4) does not constitute a determination of reasonable probability that Crow is entitled to relief (a prerequisite for Crow to file a petition to vacate his conviction). This is because a summary denial under subdivision 5(e)-(f) is distinct from a denial for lack of reasonable probability under subdivision 5(h). Accordingly, we remand to the district court for it to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that Crow is entitled to relief under the Act pursuant to the standard we set forth in State v. Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d 847, 858-59 (Minn. 2026). Finally, we reject the constitutional and other arguments raised in Crow's pro se supplemental briefs.

FACTS

In 2005, in connection with the death of Robert Berry, Jr., a Redwood County grand jury indicted Crow on three counts: (1) first-degree premeditated murder in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.185(a)(1); (2) first-degree felony murder (while committing a kidnapping) in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.185(a)(3); and (3) first-degree felony murder (while committing an

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aggravated robbery) in violation of Minnesota Statues section 609.185(a)(3). Crow pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.

Trial

As relevant to Crow's preliminary application, the State presented the following evidence at trial. Crow, his girlfriend Alicia Connor, Morris Pendleton, Jr., Vernon Jones, W.S., and J.P. were at a house party in Morton.¹The victim, Robert Berry, Jr., arrived at the party and got into a fight. Berry was beaten by several guests at the party, including Crow. Berry was then left in the home—unconscious and alone—for some period while Crow, Connor, and the four others drove away in a truck. Connor testified that Crow talked about killing Berry during that initial ride, making a comment about "going down by the river and throwing [Berry] in the river," and that the other men agreed. Connor also testified that Pendleton said that they should "stab [Berry] and then cut his head off,"

to which Crow laughed and said, "that would be crazy." Connor claimed she understood Crow to mean that it "would be cool if he did that." At some point, Crow, Connor, and the four others returned to the house, wrapped Berry in a blanket, and put him in the back of the truck. They then drove to a river embankment. Connor testified that during this second ride, Pendleton stated that J.P. should stab Berry and that Crow agreed. Connor heard Berry moaning. While Connor waited at the truck, Crow, Pendleton, Jones, W.S., and J.P. took Berry to the riverbank, where Berry was stabbed 15 times. It is unclear who

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stabbed Berry. The State's expert testified that it was more likely that multiple people stabbed Berry but that it was "[a]bsolutely" possible that there was just one assailant. The jury instructions referred to both principal and aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability. The jury found Crow guilty of first-degree felony murder (kidnapping) in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.185(a)(3), and the lesser-included charge of second-degree intentional murder in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 1(1).²The jury acquitted him of all other charges. The district court entered a judgment of conviction on the first-degree felony murder conviction and imposed a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of release.

Direct and Postconviction Appeals

On direct appeal, Crow raised several issues, one of which is relevant here. Specifically, Crow argued that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish aiding-and-abetting liability. See Crow I, 730 N.W.2d at 280-82. Based on our analysis of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue, as well as the other issues raised on appeal, we affirmed Crow's conviction. Id. at 282. Between 2008 and 2017, Crow filed four postconviction petitions, which were summarily denied. See Crow v. State (Crow II),

923 N.W.2d 2, 7-9 (Minn. 2019) (discussing Crow's postconviction petitions).

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Passage of the Act

In 2023, the Legislature made two changes related to criminal liability for aiding- and-abetting³first-degree felony murder.⁴

First, the Legislature created an exception to the expansive liability provision in Minnesota Statutes section 609.05, subdivision 2, as applied to first-degree felony murder under section 609.185(a)(3).⁵Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 3, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 850. Prior to the change, a jury could find a defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder without finding that the defendant intended to cause death. Under the prior accomplice liability provision, Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2022), a defendant could be held liable for a crime committed by another if they intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured the other to commit a crime. And under the expansive liability provision, Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2 (2022), the defendant could also be held liable for a felony murder committed by another if the felony murder was reasonably foreseeable as a probable consequence of the crime for

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which the person was liable under the accomplice liability provision. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2 (2022). Now, under the amended statute, a defendant may not be held criminally liable for a first-degree felony murder committed by another unless the defendant "intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured the other with the intent to cause the death of a human being." Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2a(a).

Second, the Legislature created a relief procedure for individuals, like Crow, who were convicted of first-degree felony murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability before the revision to section 609.05 went into effect. See the Act, § 24. The relief procedure has three steps: (1) the preliminary application; (2) the petition to vacate the conviction; and (3) the evidentiary hearing. See id.

In the first step (the step relevant here), a person seeking relief must submit a preliminary application to the district court. Id., subd. 4(a); In re The Filing of Requests for Relief in Aid and Abet Felony Murder Cases, No. ADM09-8010 (Minn. filed Aug. 18, 2023). The preliminary application must contain certain information about the applicant, the applicant's case, and "a brief statement … explaining why the applicant is entitled to relief under this section." The Act, subd. 4(a).

When reviewing a preliminary application, the district court has three options. It may (1) summarily deny the preliminary application, id., subd. 5(e)-(f); (2) deny the preliminary application because "there is not a reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief," id., subd. 5(h); or (3) move the process forward to the petition stage because there is a "reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief," id.,

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subd. 5(g). We have explained that a "summary denial" and a "denial" of a preliminary application are distinct and based on different subparts of subdivision 5. See Zielinski,

32 N.W.3d at 856 (explaining that "[a] reviewing judge can deny a preliminary application without summarily denying it"); State v. Griffin (Griffin V), 24 N.W.3d 247, 251 n.4, 255 (Minn. 2025) (noting that the district court denied, but "did not summarily deny," appellant's preliminary application based on a finding that "there is no reasonable probability that [appellant's] application is entitled to relief under [the Act]"). The district court "may summarily deny an application" on several bases outlined in subdivision 5(e) and (f), including—as relevant here—when "the issues raised in the application … have previously been decided by the court of appeals or the supreme court in the same case." Id., subd. 5(e)(4); Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d at 856-57.⁶ If the district court does not summarily deny the preliminary application, it "shall determine whether … there is a reasonable probability that the application is entitled to relief." The Act, subd. 5(c); id., subd. 5(g)-(h). The "reasonable probability standard"

requires that a preliminary application "allege facts that would cause a rational person to believe that at an evidentiary hearing, the applicant might be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they neither caused nor intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured another with the intent to cause the death of a human being." Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d at 858. But when the alleged facts present a question of credibility, district courts cannot make credibility determinations at

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the preliminary application stage "because they have not yet conducted an evidentiary hearing." Id. at 860. To evaluate reasonable probability, the district court "shall consider the preliminary application and any materials submitted with the preliminary application and may consider relevant records in the possession of the judicial branch." The Act, subd. 5(d).

If the district court determines that " 'there is not a reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief,' " then the preliminary application is denied. See Zielinski,

32 N.W.3d at 854 (quoting the Act, subd. 5(h)). But if the court concludes that "there is a reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief," then the court files a notice allowing the individual to move to the second step—the petition. The Act, subds. 5(g), 6(a).

From the filing of the notice, the individual has 60 days to file a petition to vacate their conviction. Id., subd. 6(a). The State must then file a response to the petition. Id., subd. 6(c). The petitioner has an opportunity to reply to the State's response. Id., subd. 6(d). The district court then has three options: (1) issue an order scheduling the matter for resentencing if the State supports the petition, (2) issue an order denying the petition if the district court determines that additional submissions or information establish that there is not a reasonable probability that the petitioner is entitled to relief, or

(3) schedule the matter for an evidentiary hearing. Id., subd. 6(e)(1)-(3). Ultimately, a petitioner seeking to vacate a first-degree felony murder conviction under an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability is entitled to relief if they show "by a preponderance of the evidence" that they "(1) did not cause the death of a human being;

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and (2) did not intentionally aid, advise, hire, counsel, or conspire with or otherwise procure another with the intent to cause the death of a human being." Id., subd. 7(a).

Crow's Preliminary Application for Relief Under the Act

Crow filed a preliminary application under the Act in January 2024. In his preliminary application, he alleged that "he (1) did not cause the death of a human being"

and (2) did not intentionally aid another "with the intent to cause the death of a human being." The district court summarily denied Crow's preliminary application under subdivision 5(e)(4) of the Act. In its order, the court stated that "[t]here is NOT a reasonable probability that [Crow] is entitled to relief" and checked the box stating that

"[t]he issue(s) raised in the application have previously been decided by the court of appeals or supreme court in this case." The district court provided its reasoning in its memorandum, relying solely on this court's opinion in Crow's direct appeal. See Crow I,

730 N.W.2d at 280-81. The district court determined that the issues raised in Crow's preliminary application had been "previously decided by" this court in our decision

"rejecting [Crow's] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and affirming [Crow's] conviction." Crow appealed the district court's order summarily denying his preliminary application to this court.⁷

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ANALYSIS

We consider whether the district court erred when it summarily denied Crow's preliminary application on the basis that this court had previously decided that Crow caused, or aided with the intent to cause, the victim's death in Crow I. Because we conclude that Crow I did not resolve either issue and that the district court erred in concluding to the contrary, we next consider the appropriate relief. We conclude that remand to the district court is warranted so that the district court can evaluate whether there is a reasonable probability that Crow is entitled to relief pursuant to the standard we set forth in our recent decision in Zielinski. Finally, we consider and reject the arguments raised in Crow's pro se supplemental briefs.

I.

We review a district court's summary denial of a preliminary application for abuse of discretion. Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d at 856. "A [district] court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011). Here, our decision turns on the district court's determination—under subdivision 5(e)(4) of the Act—that this court had "previously decided" that Crow caused, or aided with the intent to cause, the victim's death. This is a question of law, which we review de novo.⁸

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To answer this question, we first interpret the meaning of subdivision 5(e)(4). We then apply that interpretation to decide whether the district court erred when it determined that we previously decided the issues raised in Crow's preliminary application.

A.

We begin by clarifying what it means for "the issues raised in the application … [to] have previously been decided by the court of appeals or the supreme court in the same case." The Act, subd. 5(e)(4). Our goal is to ascertain the Legislature's intent, and the plain language of the text is our best guide in that endeavor. State v. Latino,

15 N.W.3d 654, 659 (Minn. 2025). If there is "only one reasonable way to read the text,"

we generally enforce the statute's plain meaning. State v. Fugalli, 967 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Minn. 2021).

The text of the Act—which allows for summary dismissal when this court or the court of appeals has "previously … decided" an issue—plainly requires that either this court or the court of appeals has actually resolved the same legal question raised by the applicant in their preliminary application. The postconviction relief statute, Minnesota Statutes section 590.04, subdivision 3, contains a similar provision that requires an assessment of whether "issues raised in [a petition] have previously been decided." In applying that provision, we have held that an issue had previously been decided when the issue in question was raised, considered, and rejected on direct appeal. Evans v. State,

788 N.W.2d 38, 44 (Minn. 2010) (concluding that a postconviction claim was barred under section 590.04, subdivision 3, because this court had already considered and

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rejected the claim on direct appeal). We see no reason to interpret the term "previously been decided" differently here. We therefore conclude that, for an issue to "have previously been decided" under subdivision 5(e)(4) of the Act, there must be a match between (1) the issue raised in the preliminary application and (2) an issue that was raised, considered, and resolved in an appellate decision in the same case. In other words, to rely on subdivision 5(e)(4) to summarily deny a preliminary application, the district court must be able to identify the legal question presented in the preliminary application and point to where that question was previously raised, considered, and resolved by this court or the court of appeals.

We reject the State's apparent contention that the mere identification and discussion of facts in an earlier appellate decision amounts to "deciding" an issue. The State argues that "the facts [in Crow I] demonstrate that [Crow] had the intent to cause death and subsequently caused death." In pursuit of this argument, the State relies on State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142 (Minn. 2024). But the State's analysis conflates the present inquiry—whether we previously decided the issues raised in Crow's preliminary application—with the sufficiency of the evidence analysis that we conducted in Segura under the expansive liability provision that predated the Act.⁹For purposes of

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subdivision 5(e)(4) of the Act, a court has not previously decided an issue when, in an earlier opinion, it has simply recited facts without considering and resolving the issue.

B.

We next consider whether we actually resolved either of the two issues raised in Crow's preliminary application in Crow I—whether Crow (1) caused the death of the victim or (2) aided with the intent to cause the death of the victim. The district court relied on the following language from Crow I to determine that we had decided these issues:

Crow asserts that the state failed to establish accomplice liability. A person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if he intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with another person, or otherwise procures another person to commit the crime. Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2006). To impose liability under the aiding and abetting statute, the state must show that the defendant played a knowing role in the commission of the crime. State v. Gates, 615 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn. 2000). Mere presence at the crime scene does not alone prove that a person aided or abetted, because inaction, knowledge, or passive acquiescence do not rise to the level of criminal culpability. See id.; State v. Russell, 503 N.W.2d 110, 114 (Minn. 1993). "However, active participation in the overt act that constitutes the substantive offense is not required, and a defendant's presence, companionship, and conduct before and after an offense is committed are relevant circumstances from which the jury may infer criminal intent."

Gates, 615 N.W.2d at 337.

Here, evidence of Crow's knowing role in the commission of first-degree murder (kidnapping) and circumstances from which criminal intent may be inferred included testimony that Crow sought and obtained a blanket; that he directed the other men to wrap the victim in the blanket; that all five men carried the victim out of the house; that Crow opened the tailgate of the victim's SUV so they could place the victim in the cargo area; that Crow intent to cause the victim's death, as is now required under the amended aiding-and- abetting statute. And we did not grapple with the specific issue presented here—whether this court had previously decided whether a defendant had aided a crime with an intent to cause death.

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directed Williams and L.B. to clean up the blood in the residence; that all five men traveled in the SUV to the location in Redwood County where the victim was dragged down an embankment to the river; that all five men went down to the river bank where the victim was stabbed; that after the group returned to the reservation, Crow aided in attempts to get someone to follow them to where the Tahoe was set on fire; that he abandoned his boots and sweatshirt near the burning vehicle; and that both items had blood matching the victim's DNA profile. There was also evidence of flight and an attempt by Crow to persuade Connor to withdraw her plea so that she would not have to testify against him. Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, there was ample evidence to support the jury's finding of guilt.

Crow I, 730 N.W.2d at 280-81 (emphasis added).

As a preliminary matter, to the extent that the district court determined that the above excerpted language from Crow I demonstrates that this court previously decided that Crow acted as a principal—that he "caused the death of a human being"—such a finding is clearly unsupported by the quoted passage. The language at issue from Crow I contemplates Crow's assertion "that the state failed to establish accomplice liability," and it does not address whether Crow acted as a principal. See id. at 280 (emphasis added). As to whether the excerpted language from Crow I shows that we previously decided that Crow aided with the intent to cause the victim's death, our analysis turns on the contours of the aiding-and-abetting statute as it existed when Crow was convicted. Crow I was decided in 2007. Then and now, under the accomplice liability provision in section 609.05, subdivision 1, "[a] person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime." (emphasis added). And, before enactment of the Act, if a person was liable as an accomplice for a crime under subdivision 1, the person could also be liable under the expansive liability provision in

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subdivision 2 "for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by the person as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended." Id., subd. 2 (2022). In other words, when we referred to Crow's "criminal intent" in Crow I, we could have been referring to two possible theories of liability: (1) an accomplice liability theory in which Crow intentionally aided the murder or (2) an expansive liability theory in which Crow intentionally aided the kidnapping and was liable for the murder because it was "reasonably foreseeable … as a probable consequence" of the kidnapping. Either of these theories would have supported Crow's conviction in 2007. But today the two theories lead to different results under the Act.

If we were considering the first theory in Crow I, then we did decide that Crow aided with the intent to cause the victim's death in Crow I. But if we were considering the second theory, then we did not decide whether Crow aided with the intent to cause the victim's death. Rather, as Crow points out, we would have decided only that there were circumstances from which a jury could infer that Crow was a knowing participant in the kidnapping that led to the murder, that he had criminal intent to aid in the kidnapping, and that the murder was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the kidnapping. It is unclear which theory of liability we were analyzing in the excerpted language from Crow I. We began by reciting the accomplice liability provision, Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2006), and did not cite the expansive liability provision, id., subd. 2 (2006). See Crow I, 730 N.W.2d at 280. This emphasis on the accomplice liability provision lends support to the first theory of liability. On the other hand, the facts that we

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relied on as evidence of Crow's intent focus on kidnapping. We did not mention Connor's testimony regarding the statements that Crow made about throwing Berry in the river or stabbing and cutting off Berry's head—evidence that relates more directly to Crow's possible intent to aid in causing Berry's death. See id. at 280-81. Our lack of focus on such evidence indicates that we may have been considering the sufficiency of the evidence under a theory of expansive liability—relying on Crow's intent to aid the kidnapping.¹⁰

Because we cannot determine the theory of liability that we were considering in Crow I, we hold that the district court erred when it determined that Crow I previously decided that Crow either caused, or aided with the intent to cause, the death of the victim. Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying the preliminary application under subdivision 5(e)(4).

II.

Having held that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying Crow's preliminary application under subdivision 5(e)(4), we next address the appropriate remedy.

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Under the plain language of the Act, Crow's preliminary application cannot proceed to the petition stage without a determination that there is a reasonable probability that he is entitled to relief. The Act explains that an individual can file a petition to vacate their conviction only after the district court determines that "there is a reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief." See the Act, subds. 5(h), 6(a). Here, our reversal of the district court's summary denial under subdivision 5(e)(4) does not constitute a determination that there is a reasonable probability that Crow is entitled to relief. In other words, our determination that the district court erred in its interpretation of our decision in Crow I is not a conclusion that Crow has "allege[d] facts that would cause a rational person to believe that at an evidentiary hearing, [Crow] might be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] neither caused nor intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured another with the intent to cause the death of a human being." See Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d at 858. This is because a summary denial under subdivision 5(e)-(f) and a denial for lack of reasonable probability under subdivision 5(h) are distinct. See id. at 856.

In Zielinski, we explained that "a reviewing judge can deny a preliminary application without summarily denying it." Id. (alteration in original). We held that a lack of reasonable probability could not be the basis for a summary denial because a summary denial is expressly limited to the scenarios in subdivision 5(e)-(f). Id. at 857. Likewise, a basis for summary denial is not a basis for a denial for lack of reasonable probability. We also highlighted the substantive differences between the analysis required for a summary denial under subdivision 5(e)(4) and a reasonable probability determination. See id. at

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860 n.9. We explained that "look[ing] backwards at earlier proceedings" is only appropriate when considering a summary denial under subdivision 5(e)(4). Id. On the other hand, to conduct a reasonable probability analysis, the district court needs to "look forward to the question of whether, at an evidentiary hearing, the applicant might be able to present evidence, including personal testimony regarding their intent, that satisfies the applicant's burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that they" are entitled to relief under the Act. Id. (emphasis added).

Accordingly, because a summary denial and a denial for lack of reasonable probability are distinct, our reversal of the district court's summary denial does not necessarily mean that there is a reasonable probability that Crow is entitled to relief. It is immaterial that the district court stated that its summary denial under subdivision 5(e)(4) meant that "[t]here is NOT a reasonable probability that [Crow] is entitled to relief." The district court simply did not conduct a forward-looking reasonable probability analysis because it instead concluded that this court had previously decided the issues raised in Crow's preliminary application.

In the absence of a reasonable probability determination, we are left to decide whether we should remand to the district court for it to conduct a reasonable probability analysis or conduct our own reasonable probability analysis. We again look to Zielinski for guidance. In Zielinski, we concluded that the district court abused its discretion by summarily denying a preliminary application on the basis that there was not a reasonable probability of relief and elected to apply the reasonable probability standard ourselves to the facts alleged in the preliminary application. Id. at 857, 859. We acknowledged that we

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could have remanded the issue to the district court, but we chose to reach the issue in "the interest of judicial economy because the district court made a determination as to reasonable probability, the parties briefed and argued the issue, and we [could] resolve it on the record presented." Id. at 859 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the first two factors noted in Zielinski point strongly in favor of remand to the district court to conduct this analysis, even though we likely could evaluate reasonable probability based on the record before us.

First, as discussed above, the district court did not make a reasonable probability determination here. Instead, the district court relied on an incorrect determination that Crow I previously decided the issues raised in the preliminary application and summarily denied the preliminary application under subdivision 5(e)(4). As noted above, a summary denial under subdivision 5(e)-(f) and a denial for lack of reasonable probability under subdivision 5(h) are distinct. See Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d at 856. Second, the parties did not brief whether there was reasonable probability that Crow would be entitled to relief. Rather, their briefs focused on whether Crow I decided the issues raised in Crow's preliminary application. And, at oral argument, counsel for both Crow and the State agreed that—if we were to determine that the district court erred—we should not conduct our own reasonable probability analysis but should instead remand for the district court to conduct its own analysis.

Because the district court did not make a reasonable probability determination, the parties did not brief whether there was a reasonable probability that Crow was entitled to relief, and the parties asked us to refrain from making that determination ourselves, we

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remand to the district court for it to conduct its own reasonable probability analysis. The district court should conduct that analysis in light of Zielinski—where we defined the reasonable probability standard and clarified that credibility determinations cannot be made without an evidentiary hearing.¹¹

III.

Finally, we address the arguments raised by Crow in his pro se supplemental briefs. These arguments can be grouped into two categories: challenges to the jury instructions given at his trial¹²and challenges to the Act's constitutionality. Crow's

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challenges to the jury instructions are not properly before us because they do not constitute grounds for reversing the district court's summary denial of his preliminary application under the Act. See Griffin V, 24 N.W.3d at 255 n.9 (noting that arguments regarding hybrid jury instructions were not grounds for reversing the district court's denial of a preliminary application under the Act). And even if those challenges were properly before us, they would be procedurally barred because Crow raised them in previous petitions for postconviction relief.¹³See Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (explaining that a court may summarily deny a petition for postconviction relief when

"the issues raised in it have previously been decided by the court of appeals or the supreme court in the same case").

Crow's two constitutional challenges require further analysis, and we address each below.

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A.

Crow's first constitutional challenge concerns this court's 2023 administrative order regarding the filing of preliminary applications. See In re The Filing of Requests for Relief in Aid and Abet Felony Murder Cases, No. ADM09-8010 (Minn. filed Aug. 18, 2023). The Act states that preliminary applications must be submitted to the Ramsey County District Court. The Act, subd. 4(a). But after the Act went into effect, this court instead ordered that "all preliminary applications should be filed in the criminal case in the district court of the county where the conviction was entered." See The Filing of Requests for Relief in Aid and Abet Felony Murder Cases, Order at 2. Crow contends that our order was unconstitutional because the Legislature intended for the Ramsey County District Court to review preliminary applications, noting that the district court where the applicant was convicted may have "preconceived notions on overturning the [applicant's] sentence."

The 2023 order was properly issued pursuant to our inherent authority. "[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our inherent authority to govern court procedures." Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. True Gravity Ventures, LLC, 23 N.W.3d 837, 845 (Minn. 2025); see also State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 147 (Minn. 2005) ("The authority to regulate matters of court procedure arises from the court's inherent judicial powers."); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Minn. 1983) ("[T]he judicial function constitutionally empowers the courts to make their own rules of procedure."). And we also have inherent authority "to superintend the lower court system, control its appellate jurisdiction, and to ensure the efficient administration of justice throughout the judicial system." State, Dep't

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of Pub. Safety v. Ogg, 246 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Minn. 1976) (footnotes omitted). As explained in the 2023 order, that order was intended to effectuate "the efficient administration of justice" by requiring that "court administration for the district court of the judicial district in the county where the conviction was entered be assigned to act and serve in place of the court administrator of the Ramsey County District Court with respect to the processing of preliminary applications under the Act."

Further, our exercise of inherent authority is consistent with Minnesota Statutes section 2.724, subdivisions 1 and 2, and with the Act, subdivision 5(b). Section 2.724 expressly provides the chief justice with authority to reassign cases. When public convenience and necessity require it, the chief justice of the supreme court may assign any judge of any court to serve and discharge the duties of judge of any court in a judicial district not that judge's own at such times as the chief justice may determine …. To promote and secure more efficient administration of justice, the chief justice of the supreme court of the state shall supervise and coordinate the work of the courts of the state. Minn. Stat. § 2.724, subds. 1-2. We have said that this provision grants our court "broad residual powers." In re Pub. Hearing on Vacancies in Jud. Positions in Fifth Jud. Dist.,

375 N.W.2d 463, 470 (Minn. 1985). As noted above, the 2023 order explained that "[t]he efficient administration of justice" required that the judges of, and court administration for, the district court where the conviction was entered be assigned to review and process preliminary applications. And the Act itself also indicates that the Legislature intended to afford the judicial branch flexibility in reviewing preliminary applications. Subdivision 5(b) of the Act expressly authorizes the judicial branch to assign "a special

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master to review preliminary applications and [to] assign additional staff as needed to assist in the review of preliminary applications."

For all of these reasons, we hold that our 2023 order requiring the filing of preliminary applications in the district court of the county where the conviction was entered was both within our inherent authority under the Minnesota Constitution and authorized by statute.

B.

We next consider Crow's second constitutional challenge—that the Act's preliminary application requirements violate the separation of powers doctrine. Crow specifically argues that the preliminary application review procedures in the Act are unconstitutional because the Act "dictat[es] how courts must adjudicate [a] preliminary application, thereby encroaching on core Judicial functions," and imposes "rigid deadlines and evidentiary restrictions on preliminary application[s], stripping courts of their inherent authority to manage cases."¹⁴

"We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo." State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn. 2006). And we exercise our power to declare a statute unconstitutional

"with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary." State v. Lemmer,

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736 N.W.2d 650, 657 (Minn. 2007). Because "[t]he judicial branch governs procedural matters, [and] the creation of substantive law is a legislative function," the constitutionality of the preliminary application review procedures would generally turn on whether they are procedural or substantive in nature. See Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 657. But we need not decide whether the portions of the Act challenged by Crow are procedural or substantive, because—in any event—we would accept the Act's preliminary application review procedures as a matter of comity. "When a statute encroaches upon a judicial function, this court may permit the statute to stand as a matter of comity so long as the statute does not conflict with the court's inherent authority to make the final decision." Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 663 (emphasis added). Here, the Act's preliminary application procedures do not conflict with this inherent authority because they do not dictate the final decision that a court must reach. See, e.g., Clerk of Ct.'s Comp. for Lyon Cnty. v. Lyon Cnty. Comm'rs, 241 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn. 1976) (holding that inherent judicial power "comprehends all authority necessary to preserve and improve the fundamental judicial function of deciding cases"); Sharood v. Hatfield,

210 N.W.2d 275, 278-80 (Minn. 1973) (noting that we have "acquiesced in legislative acts prescribing administrative procedures for admission and discipline of attorneys as long as such acts did not usurp the right of the court to make the final decision"). Because the Act's preliminary application review procedures do not conflict with our inherent authority to decide cases, we "may permit [them] to stand as a matter of comity." Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 663. We choose to do so here because the procedures establish a reasonable framework for district courts to review preliminary applications.

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See State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 160 (Minn. 2004) (noting that we can afford comity to "a reasonable statute"). The preliminary application review procedures screen out applications that either are categorically ineligible for relief under the Act, see the Act, subd. 5(e)-(f), or have no reasonable probability of being eligible for relief, see id., subd. 5(h). Such a framework establishes a sensible means of reviewing preliminary applications and discerning which applicants should be permitted to move forward in the process. To be clear, we accept only the preliminary application review procedures in subdivision 5—not the entirety of the Act—as a matter of comity. We express no opinion about potential constitutional challenges to other portions of the Act. For these reasons, we conclude that Crow is not entitled to relief based on his separation of powers argument.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.

ALIGADA, Jr., J., not having been a member of the court at the time of submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

C/D-1 C O N C U R R E N C E & D I S S E N T GAÏTAS, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree that the district court erred in summarily denying Crow's preliminary application under subdivision 5(e)(4) of the Act. See Act of May 19, 2023, ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, 2023 Minn. Laws 810, 864-68 (the Act).¹But I write separately because I disagree with the court that the appropriate remedy is a remand to the district court to determine whether Crow is entitled to proceed to the petition stage under the Act. Given our precedent and the record in this case, we can—and we should—conclude as a matter of law that Crow has satisfied his low burden for moving to the petition stage under the Act. Thus, I respectfully dissent from Part II of the court's decision. An applicant for relief under the Act must submit a preliminary application. The Act, subd. 4. If the reviewing judge determines that "there is a reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief," the applicant may proceed to the next step of the process—filing a petition. See id., subds. 5(g), 6(a).

As we explained in State v. Zielinski, the reasonable probability standard requires an applicant to "allege facts that would cause a rational person to believe that at an evidentiary hearing, the applicant might be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they neither caused nor intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured another with the intent to cause the death of a human being." 32 N.W.3d 847, 858 (Minn. 2026). Conversely, an applicant fails to

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C/D-2 satisfy the reasonable probability standard if the application and records "would cause no rational person to believe that at an evidentiary hearing, the applicant might be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they neither caused nor intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured another with the intent to cause the death of a human being." Id. at 858-59.

After explaining the reasonable probability standard in Zielinski, we opted not to remand to the district court in that case but to apply the standard ourselves in the interest of judicial economy. Id. at 859. Applying the standard, we then concluded as a matter of law that a rational person would believe that at an evidentiary hearing the applicant

"might be able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she neither caused nor intentionally aided, advised, hired, counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured another with the intent to cause the death of a human being." Id. We cited two bases for this conclusion: (1) the applicant's preliminary application alleged that she did not cause the victim's death, and she did not intentionally aid an accomplice with the intent to cause death and (2) the applicant's allegations were not considered and rejected in previous proceedings or on appeal. Id.

Both of these circumstances also exist here. Crow's preliminary application alleged that he "did not cause the death of a human being" and did not intentionally aid another "with the intent to cause the death of a human being." And the court today determines that Crow's allegations were not considered and rejected in his direct appeal.²

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C/D-3 Because these circumstances exist here, our decision in Zielinski directs that Crow is entitled to proceed to the petition stage as a matter of law. As the court observes here, we chose to address the issue on appeal in Zielinski because the district court "made a determination as to reasonable probability, the parties briefed and argued the issue, and we [could] resolve it on the record presented[.]"

32 N.W.3d at 859. Here, the court chooses not to address the issue because the district court did not make a reasonable probability determination, and the parties did not brief whether there was a reasonable probability that Crow would be entitled to relief. But given our decision in Zielinski and the record here, remanding to the district court to address this issue would be pointless. First, based on our holding in Zielinski, Crow is entitled to proceed to the petition stage. That is because his preliminary application alleged that he "did not cause the death of a human being" and did not intentionally aid another "with the intent to cause the death of a human being," and these allegations were not considered and rejected in previous criminal proceedings or on appeal. See Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d at 859. Given these circumstances, Crow has already satisfied the reasonable probability standard.³See id. at 859. argue that Crow's allegations were considered and rejected in the postconviction proceedings. A review of the previous postconviction proceedings establishes, as a matter of law, that Crow's allegations were not considered and rejected in those proceedings. See Supra at 11, 11 n.8 (stating that determining what we previously decided is a question of law).

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C/D-4 Second, additional briefing in the district court on the question of whether Crow has satisfied the "reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief"

requirement is unnecessary. The State is not a party during the preliminary application stage of the proceedings under the Act. See the Act, subd. 5. Thus, the State would not ordinarily be afforded the opportunity to weigh in on this question before the district court. Moreover, during the proceedings before our court, the State had just one theory— that our decision in Crow's direct appeal considered and rejected his allegations. The State was given multiple opportunities at oral argument to identify an alternative basis in the record for denying Crow's application. But the State offered none, simply arguing that the district court should be allowed to decide whether Crow had satisfied the "reasonable probability" requirement.

There is no need for further briefing on this issue. Crow has satisfied the

"reasonable probability that the applicant is entitled to relief" requirement. Accordingly, he must be permitted to petition for relief under the Act.

Remanding to the district court in this instance—where we can make the decision ourselves without further proceedings—does not serve judicial economy. It also suggests to the district court and the parties that there is additional work to do before determining whether Crow may file a petition. This may be perceived as an invitation to further scrutinize the record for evidence of Crow's intent. But in Zielinski, we held that this type of review at the preliminary application stage is improper. Zielinski, 32 N.W.3d at occurred before we issued our decision in Zielinski, Crow's counsel did not have the benefit of that decision at oral argument.

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C/D-5 859-60. A district court reviewing a preliminary application for relief under the Act

"cannot make credibility determinations." Id. at 860. Thus, in Zielinski, we held that it was error for the district court to deny the applicant's preliminary application based on evidence in the trial transcript "without observing [the applicant's] demeanor during testimony presented at an evidentiary hearing on the issue of her intent." Id. Likewise, it would be error here for the district court to weigh any evidence on remand in deciding whether Crow should be allowed to move to the petition stage under the Act. Our precedent and the record in this case allow us to decide that Crow is entitled to proceed to the petition stage under the Act. We should do so in the interest of judicial economy. I would reverse the district court and remand with instructions to allow Crow to file a petition under the Act.

HENNESY, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I join in the concurrence-dissent of Chief Justice Gaïtas.

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