Carlos Figueroa-Gibson v. Warden

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________

No. 24-10658

____________________

CARLOS FIGUEROA-GIBSON, Petitioner-Appellant, versus

WARDEN,

Respondent-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cv-00025-LGW-BWC ____________________

Before B RANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,^∗Dis- trict Judge.

P ER CURIAM:

∗ Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10658 Carlos Figueroa-Gibson is a federal prisoner set for release in January 2030. Under the First Step Act, most federal prisoners can participate in programs to earn "credits," which may push up their release dates. But not Figueroa. He is ineligible to earn cred- its because the Act bars prisoners convicted of attempted child sex trafficking—like him—from earning early-release credits. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxvii).

Figueroa petitioned the district court for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. section 2241, asserting that the Act's bar on him earning early-release credits violated his procedural-due-process and equal-protection rights. The district court dismissed Figueroa's petition. After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument and supplemental briefing, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL

HISTORY

In 2019, Figueroa pleaded guilty to attempted child sex traf- ficking. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), 1594(a). He was sen- tenced to 120 months' imprisonment.

As a general rule, the First Step Act allows a prisoner to earn credits for early release by taking classes and working in areas that are recommended by the Bureau of Prisons based on the prisoner's individual needs plan. Id. § 3632(d)(4)(A); 28 C.F.R. § 523.41(a)-(b). These credits are applied toward prerelease custody or supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C); see also id. § 3624(g)(1). But some prisoners, because of the nature of their convictions, are in- eligible to earn credits, including those convicted of attempted

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24-10658 Opinion of the Court 3 child sex trafficking like Figueroa. See id. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxvii). Figueroa calls this the exclusionary provision. Figueroa filed a habeas petition under section 2241, claiming that the Act's exclusionary provision violated his procedural-due- process and equal-protection rights. First, he alleged that the "de- nial of access" to credits based on his offense, without any "individ- ual determination[]" of his risk of recidivism, violated the Due Pro- cess Clause because it created an "irrebuttable presumption" that ineligible prisoners are "irredeemable." This was a "procedural[- ]due[-]process claim," he emphasized.

Second, Figueroa claimed that the exclusionary provision vi- olated the Equal Protection Clause because it created a "non-sensi- cal classification system" that discriminated between eligible and ineligible prisoners based solely on their offense of conviction. As for a remedy, Figueroa requested a declaration that the exclusion- ary provision was "[u]nconstitutional both on its face and as ap- plied to [him]."

He had standing to challenge the exclusionary provision, he alleged, because he was injured by his inability to collect "more than half a year's worth" of credits, which could apply to his re- lease. His injury was "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant." And it was "likely, not merely speculative," that his injury would be redressed by a declaration that the Act's exclu- sionary provision was unconstitutional, since he did eligible work and had already participated in a "plethora" of programs that would otherwise earn him credits.

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10658 Figueroa conceded that he hadn't exhausted his administra- tive remedies in challenging the constitutionality of the exclusion- ary provision. But he argued that he should be excused from the exhaustion requirement because the Bureau couldn't declare its own governing statute unconstitutional.

The government, in response, moved to dismiss. First, it ar- gued that Figueroa lacked standing. A declaration that the exclu- sionary provision was unconstitutional would not redress his in- jury because he failed to show participation in credit-earning pro- grams. Second, the government asserted that Figueroa did not ex- haust his administrative remedies. And third, Figueroa's claims failed on the merits. His procedural-due-process claim failed be- cause Figueroa had no "protected liberty interest" in the earned- time credits. And his equal-protection claim failed because he wasn't similarly situated to prisoners convicted of different, non- disqualifying offenses.

The district court granted the government's motion and dis- missed Figueroa's petition. He appeals the dismissal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review standing de novo. CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006). And we review de novo the dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Siebert v. Allen, 455 F.3d 1269, 1271 n.2 (11th Cir. 2006). "We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, regardless of whether that ground was relied upon or even considered below."

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24-10658 Opinion of the Court 5 Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per cu- riam).

III. DISCUSSION

We divide our discussion into two parts. We start with whether Figueroa had standing to bring his petition. Then, we turn to whether Figueroa failed to state a claim.

A. Standing

The Constitution limits the "judicial [p]ower" of federal courts to the resolution of "[c]ases" and "[c]ontroversies." U.S. Const. Art. III § 2. Rooted in the case-and-controversy require- ment is the standing doctrine. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330,

338 (2016).

Standing requires (1) an injury in fact (2) that is fairly tracea- ble to the defendant's actions and (3) likely redressable by a favor- able decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). These elements are the "irreducible . . . minimum" required by the Constitution. Id. at 560. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of alleging standing. Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020). Figueroa has met his burden as to the three elements. As to injury, he alleged that, were it not for his "'ineligible' status," his participation in a "plethora" of eligible programs and activities would earn him "more than half a year's worth of '[t]ime [c]red- its.'" These programs and activities included the "necessary" clas- ses recommended to him by the Bureau; his current educational

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10658 work assignment, which also "count[ed] as a 'productive activity'"; and "more than a year's worth of 'qualified programming.'"

The injury was traceable to the Bureau's decision to deny him credits for early release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), (C). And his injury would be redressed if the district court declared that the exclusionary provision was unconstitutional and Figueroa was entitled to the credits. "A declaratory judgment in [Figueroa's] fa- vor would accordingly redress his injury by removing the allegedly unconstitutional barrier [that the Act] erected between [Figueroa] and the requested [credits]." See Gutierrez v. Saenz, 606 U.S. 305,

319 (2025).

The government makes two points in response. First, it ar- gues that Figueroa's injury isn't redressable because Figueroa hasn't alleged that he met all the requirements of the Bureau's in- dividual needs plan.¹But Figueroa alleged compliance with the Bureau's requirements, and his individual needs plan supports that allegation. At the pleading stage, we accept these allegations as true. See Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 1989)

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24-10658 Opinion of the Court 7 (stating that, for standing purposes, we accept the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations).

Second, the government contends that the path to awarding credit time is speculative because, even if Figueroa completed all the requirements, "other contingencies"—like a hospital stay or transfer to a non-Bureau facility—could prevent him from receiv- ing enough credits to earn early release. Redressability, however,

"need only be likely, not certain," Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal.

v. Norton, 338 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified), and speculation about possible contingencies does not make Figueroa's eligibility for the credits unlikely. B. Merits

With standing out of the way, we turn to whether Figueroa stated a claim. First, we'll consider the procedural-due-process claim. Then, we'll review his equal-protection claim.²

1. Procedural-Due-Process Claim Beginning with Figueroa's procedural-due-process claim, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that

"[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with- out due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. V. "In order to

2 Because exhaustion is not jurisdictional, we need not decide it before turning to the merits of Figueroa's claims. See Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 475 (11th Cir. 2015); see also White v. Lemma, 947 F.3d 1373, 1376 (11th Cir.

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-10658 establish a violation of the Due Process Clause, a petitioner must have been deprived of a liberty or property interest protected un- der the Fifth Amendment," Cook v. Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000), and he must also allege state action and a constitution- ally-inadequate process, Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003).

Figueroa did not make out a procedural-due-process claim because he was not deprived of a liberty or property interest in the early-release credits. Under the Act, only eligible prisoners are en- titled to earn early-release credits. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), (D). But Figueroa was never eligible to earn early-release credits because he was convicted of a crime that made him ineligible— attempted child sex trafficking. Figueroa cannot have a liberty in- terest in credits he was never eligible to earn in the first place. See Cruz v. Skelton, 543 F.2d 86, 89 (5th Cir. 1976) ("At the constitutional level, there is a clear distinction between the loss of a statutory priv- ilege once obtained and the denial of that same privilege, never given." (quoting Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050, 1052-53 (5th Cir. 1976))); see also White v. Warden of Fed. Corr. Inst. - Cumberland, 164 F.4th 326, 334 (4th Cir. 2026) ("Although awarding [First Step Act] time credits is mandatory if the prisoner qualifies for and earns them, those conditions, which are solely determinative of the right to credits, indicate that the prisoner cannot legitimately expect that he has a right to them."); Cheng v. United States, 132 F.4th 655, 659 (2d Cir. 2025) (per curiam) (determining that a noncitizen prisoner with a final order of removal had no protected interest in earned- time credits).

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24-10658 Opinion of the Court 9 Section 3632(a)(5)(C) of the Act is not to the contrary. That section requires the Attorney General to develop a risk-assessment system to ensure that "all prisoners are able to successfully partici- pate" in anti-recidivism programs and productive activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a)(5)(C). Figueroa is certainly entitled to a risk as- sessment so he can participate in anti-recidivism programs and pro- ductive activities. And he has one and has participated. But sec- tion 3632(a)(5)(C) doesn't require that he earn credits for participat- ing in the programs and activities. See id.

Figueroa argues that the Act's "mandatory language"—that prisoners "shall earn" credits which "shall" be applied—creates a

"liberty interest" in the credits. See id. § 3632(d)(4)(A), (C); see also id. § 3632(a) (directing the Attorney General to develop a risk-as- sessment system). But he leaves out the critical part of the Act. Prisoners "shall earn" credits under the Act other than "ineligible prisoner[s] under subparagraph (D)." See id. § 3632(d)(4)(A). Figueroa is an ineligible prisoner under subparagraph (D) because he was convicted of attempted child sex trafficking. See id. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxvii). Thus, the Act offers Figueroa no "legiti- mate[] expect[ation]" that he'll earn credits. See White, 164 F.4th at

334.

Figueroa also contends that the Act's exclusion of certain of- fenses like attempted child sex trafficking from earning credits is based on a "false" premise or presumption that ineligible prisoners are "irredeemable," a premise that he has no "reasonable" and "in- dividualized" opportunity to rebut. But this contention is a

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10 Opinion of the Court 24-10658 substantive attack on the Act, challenging the wisdom of the law in categorically excluding certain sex traffickers from earning credits for early release. See Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) ("[T]hat [the respondent] [was] not currently dangerous"

was "of no consequence" because "the law's requirements turn[ed] on an offender's conviction alone."). Figueroa was emphatic that he brought a "procedural"-due-process claim. We take him at his word.

Under the procedural component of the Due Process Clause, he is only entitled to constitutionally adequate process if he was deprived of a liberty or property interest. See Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1232. Because he had no interest in the credits, his procedural- due-process right was not violated.

2. Equal-Protection Claim Next is Figueroa's equal-protection claim. Equal-protection principles provide that the government shall not deny to any per- son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. Amend. V. To state an equal-protection claim, Figueroa must allege that he "was treated differently than similarly situated persons." Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260, 1270 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Strickland v. Alderman, 74 F.3d 260, 264 (11th Cir.

1996)).

If he does, we then ask what level of scrutiny applies. If a challenged classification is designated as "suspect" (e.g., those based on race or national origin) or burdens a fundamental right, we apply heightened scrutiny. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

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24-10658 Opinion of the Court 11 Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (stating that strict scrutiny ap- plies to state statutory classifications based on race, alienage, or na- tional origin; state laws that impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution also require "[s]imilar oversight by the courts"; and "[l]egislative classifications based on [sex] . . . call for a height- ened [intermediate] standard of review"). If not, we apply rational basis review, meaning we presume the constitutionality of the chal- lenged classification and require only that it be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes,

427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). "[I]n assessing whether Con- gress had such a rational basis for passing the challenged law, 'we must assume that, if a state of facts could exist that would justify such legislation, it actually did exist when' Congress passed the challenged law." United States v. Green, 152 F.4th 1239, 1243-44 (11th Cir. 2025) (first quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132 (1876); then citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-90 (1955); and then citing FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508

U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).

"Because [Congress] [is] not required to articulate reasons for the enactment of a statute, 'it is entirely irrelevant for constitu- tional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated [Congress].'" See Panama City Med. Diagnostic Ltd. v. Williams, 13 F.3d 1541, 1546 (11th Cir. 1994) (foot- note omitted) (quoting Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 315). "There- fore, in evaluating the rational basis for a statute, it is entirely per- missible to rely on rationales that were not contemplated by [Con- gress] at the time of the statute's passage." See id. (citing Cash Inn

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12 Opinion of the Court 24-10658 of Dade, Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 938 F.2d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 1991)). "Only if 'no state of circumstances could exist to justify' the statute at issue 'may [we] declare' it 'void.'" Green, 152 F.4th at 1244 (quoting Munn, 94 U.S. at 132).

Since child sex traffickers aren't a suspect class, rational basis review applies. See Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1346 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of Ala., 80 F.4th 1205, 1220 (11th Cir. 2023) ("[L]aws that do not burden the exercise of a fun- damental right (and do not discriminate against a suspect class . . .) are subject to rational basis review . . . ."). So, even assuming Figueroa is similarly situated to other prisoners not covered by the exclusionary provision, the government "may discriminate on the basis of [his conviction] without offending [equal-protection prin- ciples] if the . . . classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate [government] interest." See Eknes-Tucker, 80 F.4th at 1230 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000)). Here, the exclusionary provision is rationally related to a le- gitimate government interest. "Denying [credits] to prisoners based on their criminal record is rationally related to the [govern- ment]'s interest in preventing the early release of serious offend- ers." See Cook, 208 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Conlogue v. Shinbaum, 949 F.2d 378, 380 (11th Cir. 1991)). "The sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). "The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of chil- dren constitutes a government objective of surpassing

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24-10658 Opinion of the Court 13 importance." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982); see also United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1214 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) ("Studies and reports in this field are consistent with what judicial decisions show: pedophiles who have sexually abused children are a threat to continue doing so, and age does not remove the threat."); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (recognizing "grave concerns over the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex of- fenders and their dangerousness as a class"); McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33-34 (2002) (plurality opinion) (calling sex offenders' risk of re- cidivism "frightening and high," finding that "[w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault"). Denying early-release credits to child sex traffickers like Figueroa serves the government's interest in protecting children by keeping sex offenders in prison and by deterring others. Since there are

"plausible reasons for Congress' action, our [equal-protection] in- quiry is at an end." See Moore, 410 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 313).

Despite our inquiry ending, Figueroa offers two responses. First, he points to other prisoners who, he says, are similarly situ- ated and treated more favorably since the Act allows them to earn credits: "prisoner[s] [who] have served a previous sentence for a disqualifying offense, be[en] released, then return[ed] under a new sentence for an eligible offense." But a statute is not unconstitu- tional because it is underinclusive. Rational basis review does not require that the statute be perfectly tailored to the government's legitimate interest or even that it be a good fit. All that's needed is

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14 Opinion of the Court 24-10658 a plausible reason, and, here, Congress had a good reason to deny child sex traffickers early release. See Moore, 410 F.3d at 1346; Cook,

208 F.3d at 1323. Second, Figueroa contends that the exclusionary provision is not rational since it was motivated by animus. In support, he cites two sources: (1) the comments of an individual senator; and

(2) a report from the Senate Judiciary Committee. The first source is an article by Senator Tom Cotton about the First Step Act. In it, he wrote that, "[i]n reality, early release is always a risky proposition, because one of the best predictors of committing a crime in the future is having committed a crime in the past." Tom Cotton, Cotton Op-Ed in National Review 'Fix the First Step Act and Keep Violent Criminals behind Bars', Tom Cotton: Sena- tor for Arkansas (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.cotton.sen- ate.gov/news/op-eds/cotton-op-ed-in-national-review-and- 145fix-the-first-step-act-and-keep-violent-criminals-behind-bars- and-146 [https://perma.cc/G4DD-8TQ9]. Those convicted of

"certain kinds of child molestation and sex trafficking, assaults on law-enforcement officers, violent bank robberies, carjackings, and hate crimes," he continued, should not be allowed early release to

"protect public safety." Id. We don't read this as a statement of animus. But even if we did, "the statement of a single . . . senator [cannot be said] to impute discriminatory intent to the entire [Con- gress]." See Shen v. Comm'r, Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs.,

158 F.4th 1227, 1258 (11th Cir. 2025).

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24-10658 Opinion of the Court 15 In the second statement, the Senate Judiciary Committee re- ported that the Act "[r]enders violent and high‐risk criminals con- victed of certain serious offenses ineligible for the pre‐release cus- tody program, including dangerous sexual offenders, murderers, and others. . . . Offenders who have committed serious crimes against children will not be able to shorten their sentences." The Revised First Step Act of 2018 (S.3649), S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/me- dia/doc/2018-11-15%20-%20Revised%20First%20Step%20Act% 20-%20Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PZP-66EZ]. But this is a statement of fact about the Act. The Act does make sex offenders ineligible for early release. It is not an expression of animus toward sex offenders.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Figueroa's ha- beas petition.

AFFIRMED.

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