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United States v. Sedarious Lawrence
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________
No. 26-11136
Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, versus
SEDARIOUS LAWRENCE,
a.k.a. Jerome Mitchell, a.k.a. Jermey Leonhard, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00448-LMM-CCB-1 ____________________
Before ABUDU, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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2 Opinion of the Court 26-11136 Upon revocation of his supervised release for a second time, the district court sentenced Sedarious Lawrence to one year and one day of imprisonment. He now appeals, challenging the district court's findings at his revocation hearing and the reasonableness of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Lawrence was sentenced to ninety-six months of imprison- ment and three years of supervised release for possessing a stolen firearm. When Lawrence began his supervised release term in March 2024, he had to comply with certain conditions, including:
(1) not committing another federal, state, or local crime, (2) refrain- ing from unlawful possession and use of controlled substances,
(3) residing at a place authorized by his probation officer, and
(4) not knowingly leaving the Northern District of Georgia with- out first receiving permission from either the court or his probation officer.
A. First Supervised Release Revocation
Less than a year after Lawerence completed his custodial sentence, the district court revoked his supervised release. Law- rence admitted to two violations—failing to live at his approved residence and knowingly leaving the Northern District without permission. Following a hearing and supplemental briefing, the dis- trict court also concluded that the government had shown by a pre- ponderance of the evidence that Lawrence had committed a third violation—physically assaulting the man with whom Lawrence be- lieved his wife to be having an affair. Lawrence was sentenced to
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26-11136 Opinion of the Court 3 ten months of imprisonment, to be followed by two years of super- vised release. The district court reimposed the same relevant su- pervised release conditions with two additional requirements, in- cluding that Lawrence shall "have no contact with [his wife] unless [Lawrence] ha[d] permission from [his] probation officer."
Lawrence began his new supervised release term in Septem- ber 2025. He thereafter moved to modify the term of his supervised release requiring that he have no contact with his wife, but the dis- trict court denied Lawrence's requests.
B. Second Supervised Release Revocation
In late February 2026, a U.S. Probation officer again peti- tioned for revocation of Lawrence's supervised release, alleging that he tested positive for THC on four occasions, and that he con- tacted his wife without permission. As it related to the second al- leged violation, the probation officer indicated that Lawrence had reported on November 20, 2025, that he had been living with his wife since late October. The probation officer explained to Law- rence that he could not reside with his wife without court approval, but he still refused to move out, as he could not afford to relocate. Lawrence ultimately provided his probation officer with an address for his friend's home, and he was given permission to move to this address. However, data from an ankle monitor Lawrence was re- quired to wear for pending state charges showed that he went to his wife's house every day for nearly a week in February 2026— after he had purportedly moved out—each time for several hours.
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4 Opinion of the Court 26-11136 At a revocation hearing, Lawrence admitted the conduct al- leged in the petition but denied the willfulness of his violation of the no-contact condition. The government presented testimony from Lawrence's probation officer to support its theory that Law- rence's contact with his wife was not an accident. To rebut the gov- ernment's assertions, Lawrence and his aunt testified. Following this testimony and brief argument from the parties, the district court found that Lawrence committed the first alleged violation of unlawfully using a controlled substance, as he had admitted. As to the second alleged violation, the court found that the evidence showed that Lawrence's contact with his wife was willful and intentional, explaining that this "thoughtful" condition was im- posed for the safety of Lawrence, his wife, and the community. In relevant part, the court emphasized that the contact between Law- rence and his wife occurred over a prolonged, five-month period and that Lawrence continued to return to his wife's home even af- ter finding another place to stay. It also explained that, despite Law- rence's arguments to the contrary, it was not his probation officer's job to find him alternative housing.
The court then announced that Lawrence's advisory guide- line range was eight to fourteen months of imprisonment, and both parties agreed with this calculation. After the court heard the par- ties' sentencing recommendations, Lawrence allocuted, explaining the circumstances that led to him having contact with his wife and how he had been working to better his life.
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26-11136 Opinion of the Court 5 The district court revoked Lawrence's supervised release and imposed a sentence of twelve months and one day of impris- onment. The court explained that it was "ironic" that Lawrence blamed his wife for much of his conduct during his allocution, which is what he did at the last revocation hearing that resulted in the imposition of the no-contact condition at issue. It elaborated that Lawrence failed to take responsibility for his actions and, in- stead, placed "a lot of blame on other people and circumstances."
The court acknowledged that Lawrence was able to do
"good" things while on supervised release, including finding work and a stable place to live. However, it remarked that Lawrence told different stories throughout the hearing about why he had been in contact with his wife and described even more instances of unau- thorized contact during his allocution than previously raised. The court explained that it told Lawrence "not to do something" when it previously revoked his supervised release but he "ha[d] [his] own plans and ways of going about things" that violated the court's con- ditions. The court further opined that Lawrence was "someone [who was] going to continue to do [what was] in [his] best interest"
and did not find that he was "someone that [was amenable] to com- plying" with the conditions of supervision. The court also noted that Lawrence was not allowed to use marijuana, and while there were some allegations that he had a medical marijuana card, nei- ther the court nor probation had seen proof. The court concluded by stating that the previously articulated willfulness findings con- tributed to its determination that the imposed sentence was appro- priate and consistent with the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
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6 Opinion of the Court 26-11136 Lawrence objected to the district court's willfulness finding and the substantive reasonableness of the imposed sentence. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court's revocation of supervised re- lease, as well as the substantive reasonableness of sentences im- posed upon revocation, for an abuse of discretion. United States v. King, 57 F.4th 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2023) (sentence); United States
v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014) (revocation). A district court's findings of fact made during a revocation hearing
"are binding on this Court unless clearly erroneous." United States
v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation modified).
III. DISCUSSION
A district court may revoke a defendant's supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment if it "finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of super- vised release." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). On appeal, Lawrence chal- lenges the district court's determination that he violated the no- contact condition of his supervised release as well as the substan- tive reasonableness of his imprisonment sentence. We will address each argument in turn.
A. Revocation of Supervised Release
Lawrence first takes issue with the district court's factual de- terminations made in revoking his supervised release. He argues that our Court should read a mens rea element in to § 3583(e) and
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26-11136 Opinion of the Court 7 that the rule of lenity favors viewing the statute in the light most favorable to him. As it relates to the specifics of his case, Lawrence asserts that the district court failed to weigh certain facts—includ- ing his indigent status—in reaching its conclusion that his contact with his wife was willful.
We will assume, without deciding, that the district court clearly erred in finding that Lawrence willfully violated the no-con- tact condition. Even so, the error would not be reversible. That is because the district court needed to find only one violation of the supervised release conditions to support its revocation determina- tion. See Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1307 (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant's supervised release, despite his argument that he did not commit two of the five alleged violations, because he pleaded guilty to the other al- leged violations).
Here, Lawrence admitted to the first violation alleged in the revocation petition—that he unlawfully used a controlled sub- stance and tested positive for THC on four occasions. He does not challenge the validity of this admission on appeal. As such, any pos- sible error in determining the willfulness of Lawrence's conduct re- garding the second violation was harmless. See United States v. Brown, 656 F.2d 1204, 1207 (5th Cir. Unit A Sep. 1981) (finding it unnecessary "to decide the claims of error advanced in regard to . . . three grounds for revocation" where the defendant's "con- viction for possession of a controlled substance serve[d] as an ade- quate basis for the discretionary action of the district court").
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8 Opinion of the Court 26-11136 We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to revoke Lawrence's supervised release. B. Reasonableness of Sentence
To determine a defendant's sentence following a revocation of supervised release, the district court must consider certain fac- tors set forth in § 3553(a). United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2006). Those § 3553(a) factors require the sentenc- ing court to consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the of- fense, (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant, (3) the applicable guideline range, and (4) the need to provide the defend- ant with needed training, medical care, or correctional treatment.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(D), (4); 3583(e). Additional factors for consideration include (1) pertinent policy statements of the Sen- tencing Commission, and the need to (2) deter criminal conduct,
(3) protect the public from the defendant's future criminal conduct,
(4) avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, and (5) provide restitu- tion to the victims. Id. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), (5)-(7); 3583(e). Lawrence contends that his sentence is substantively unrea- sonable because the district court failed to "genuinely [consider] the nature and circumstances of the offense," including his indi- gency and his "tireless efforts" to improve his situation, and unrea- sonably focused on his disregard for the court's previous orders. We disagree.
The weight given to the sentencing factors lies within the district court's sound discretion. See King, 57 F.4th at 1339; United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). As such,
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26-11136 Opinion of the Court 9 the court was permitted to attach greater weight to the need for deterrence, given Lawrence's status as a repeat violator, over any other factors discussed at sentencing. The district court was not re- quired to articulate its consideration of all of Lawrence's mitigating arguments, especially where the "record reflects that [it] consid- ered all of the [relevant] factors." United States v. Hayden, 119 F.4th 832, 837 (11th Cir. 2024). Indeed, while the court did not expressly discuss Lawrence's housing search or his indigency when imposing sentence, it heard lengthy testimony on the matter and credited the fact that, while on supervised release, Lawrence found a stable place to live and obtained two jobs. See United States v. Amedeo,
487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the court's failure to discuss every piece of mitigating evidence does not "mean[] that the court erroneously 'ignored' or failed to consider [such] evi- dence").
Lawrence's sentence of twelve months and one day of im- prisonment is also within the applicable guideline range, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), and well below the two-year statutory maximum,
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Both of these factors are further indicative of the sentence's reasonableness. See Sweeting, 437 F.3d at 1107; United States v. Sotelo, 130 F.4th 1229, 1245 (11th Cir. 2025). For these reasons, we are not "left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judg- ment in weighing the [relevant] § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dic- tated by the facts of the case." United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
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10 Opinion of the Court 26-11136 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation modified). We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court's imposition of Law- rence's sentence.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment and sentence imposed upon the second revocation of Lawrence's supervised release.
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