People v. Kent

Despite the lack of preservation, defendant asks this Court to invoke its interest of justice jurisdiction to reverse the judgment of conviction based upon the alleged improper empaneling of an anonymous jury (see CPL 470.15 [3] [c]). Under the circumstances presented, we decline to do so. This is not a situation where the names of the prospective jurors were withheld from defense counsel (compare People v Zakrzewski, 249 AD3d 1314, 1327 [3d Dept 2026], lv dismissed ___ NY3d ___ [July 30, 2026], lv denied ___ NY3d ___ [July 30, 2026]; People v Rahaman, 248 AD3d 1607, 1609 [3d Dept 2026]; People v Flores, 153 AD3d 182, 185, 191 [2d Dept 2017], affd 32 NY3d 1087 [2018]), which would have

"materially heighten[ed] the risk of prejudice" to defendant by impeding his ability to investigate potential conflicts of interest or bias (People v Cassell, 248 AD3d 1433, 1438 [3d Dept 2026]). Rather, the record indicates that defense counsel was provided with a list of the prospective jurors' names prior to the start of jury selection, thereby enabling defendant to meaningfully participate in the voir dire process (see People v Goberdhan, 241 AD3d at 999; People v Reinfurt, 241 AD3d at 1021).

Defendant raises a concern that referencing the prospective jurors by their assigned juror numbers and initials may have indicated that he was a dangerous person from whom their names were being shielded for safety purposes. However, any such prejudice was mitigated by County Court's statements during the voir dire process explaining that defendant was presumed innocent, that it was the People's burden to prove the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt and that, if the prospective jurors were selected to serve on the jury, they would be required to render a verdict based upon an honest [*3]evaluation of the evidence presented at trial and not based upon any "fear, favor, sympathy, bias [or] prejudice." Notably, at one point during the jury selection process, the prosecutor emphasized to the prospective jurors that the charges against defendant constituted financial crimes and did not involve violence, effectively mitigating the concern raised by defendant. We take further note that County Court asked certain of the prospective jurors who indicated that they had friends or family members who worked in law enforcement to identify such individuals by their full names and to explain their relationship to them, "signaling that prospective jurors' identities were not being shielded from defendant" (People v Goberdhan, 241 AD3d at 999). In these circumstances, particularly since defense counsel had a list of the prospective jurors' names and the prospective jurors were informed that the charges against defendant did not involve violence, we discern no prejudice to defendant flowing from County Court's failure to call the names of the prospective jurors aloud during voir dire. We do not view this as one of those

"rare cases where invocation of this Court's interest of justice jurisdiction is warranted" to correct the error in statutory procedure (People v Goberdhan, 241 AD3d at 1000; see People v Reinfurt, 241 AD3d at 1021). For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded by defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim relative to his trial counsel's failure to object to such procedure. "In determining whether a defendant has been deprived of effective assistance, a court must examine whether the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation" (People v Fernandez, ___ NY3d ___, ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 03915, *2 [2026] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]). To sustain such a claim, "it is incumbent on defendant to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel's alleged shortcomings" (People v Fernandez, ___ NY3d at ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 03915, *2 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "A single error may qualify as ineffective assistance, but only when the error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial as to compromise a defendant's right to a fair trial" (People v Watkins, 42 NY3d 635, 640 [2024] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], cert denied ___ US ___, 145 S Ct 459 [2024]). "Such cases are rare and typically involve the failure to raise a defense so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense counsel would have failed to assert it, and it must be evident that the decision to forgo the contention could not have been grounded in a legitimate trial strategy" (id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

There is no dispute that County Court deviated from the statutory procedure [*4]set forth in CPL 270.15 (1) (a) by referring to the prospective jurors by their initials and assigned juror numbers and did not articulate "a case-specific justification" for doing so (People v Cassell, 248 AD3d at 1438). However, counsel's failure to object may have been a deliberate strategy given that the record indicates that he had a list of the prospective jurors' names and the prospective jurors were explicitly informed that the charges against defendant concerned only financial crimes and not violent crimes. In these circumstances, defense counsel may have concluded that the procedure utilized by County Court did not actually prejudice defendant. By objecting, it could have been more prejudicial to defendant by alerting the prospective jurors to the deviation from normal procedure, running the risk of the jurors concluding, without any founded basis, that their names were being shielded from defendant due to safety concerns. On this record, defendant was not deprived of meaningful representation from his trial counsel's failure to object to the voir dire procedure utilized in this case. Our original decision on defendant's initial appeal remains unchanged. Pritzker, Ceresia, Mackey and Corcoran, JJ., concur.