Demaurion Moore v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2026

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2025-SC-0267-MR

DEMAURION MOORE APPELLANT

V.

ON APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE SAMUEL TODD SPALDING, JUDGE

NO. 24-CR-00023

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

Demaurion Moore¹was convicted by an Adair County jury on charges of first-degree rape, complicity to first-degree sodomy, promoting a sexual performance by a minor, first-degree riot, and two counts of fourth-degree assault. He received a total sentence of twenty-five years in prison and appeals to this Court as a matter of right.²Having carefully reviewed the law, record, and briefs, we affirm.

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FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Adair Youth Development Center is a maximum-security detention facility which has two wings: a residential hall and a detention hall. The residential hall houses juveniles who have been committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for serious crimes, while the detention hall houses juveniles charged with lower-level status offenses such as truancy and running away from home.

On November 10, 2022, an inmate damaged a sprinkler, causing extensive flooding throughout a section of the facility. The next evening, November 11, 2022, the facility was short-staffed, and Mark Caffee came to work as the night-shift supervisor. His job duties also included acting as a guard and a medical liaison. A few other employees were present on-site to help clean up the flooding.

When Caffee appeared for duty, he was immediately informed by another employee that two male inmates had requested medicine for headaches. Typically, two employees are present when cell doors are opened for medical or hygiene purposes. But that evening, Caffee attended to these matters alone. One of the inmates, D.W., was in a cell that had been flooded, so Caffee could not slide the medicine under the door. He cracked the cell door open and took a step inside to set the medicine down. As Caffee started to back out of the cell, his foot slipped in the water, and D.W. exploited the opportunity to attack. He struck Caffee repeatedly, shoved him into the cell, and locked him inside. Caffee suffered severe injuries including six hemorrhagic

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strokes, a traumatic brain injury, a broken orbital, a broken face, a broken nose, a broken knee, a deviated septum, a torn rotator cuff, a torn labrum, and impairment of sight in his right eye.

After brutally assaulting Caffee, D.W. then released M.P. and another male individual from their cells. The trio left their immediate area and continued through the remaining units, releasing other inmates along the way. As the three males exited one unit, they encountered maintenance worker, Douglas Hadley, in a hallway. Hadley had been cleaning up water from the previous day's flooding incident and had just put his supplies up when the inmates opened the doors between two different units. Hadley managed to get one of the unit doors closed, but then one of the inmates struck him on the head, and the group proceeded to viciously attack him.

Hadley's fellow worker, Karl Kugler, arrived in the midst of this awful scene when the group immediately turned to attack him as well. Eventually, Hadley and Kugler were able to get away and locked themselves in a recreational area until the police arrived. Hadley was taken to the emergency room and treated for numerous injuries, including a concussion and head trauma. Kugler was also treated at the emergency room for a broken nose and other injuries.

After assaulting Hadley and Kugler, the rioters continued to roam the facility, releasing other inmates. At some point after the assaults on the staff, Moore was freed from his cell. The mob grew and singled out various individual inmates for pitiless violence. The victims were beaten, kicked, and

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stomped. Moore admittedly participated in at least two of the group assaults on other inmates.

Eventually, the rioters arrived at the unit of seventeen-year-old A.L.³and unlocked her cell. Once released, she asked them to let twelve-year-old D.R. out of his cell, so they did. A.L. did not immediately realize the significance and gravity of the situation but became scared when she saw a staff member in the hallway outside the unit who had been beaten up and had blood running down his face.

A.L. did not leave her unit and simply stood in the doorway to the hall observing the mayhem. At some point, M.P. and Moore returned to A.L's unit along with other rioting inmates. M.P. and Moore pushed A.L. to the ground as they came through the door. She did not know Moore or M.P. One of them then helped her up. Then they put their arms around her and led her to an unoccupied cell. She did not want to go with them, but she feared what they might do to her if she refused, especially after seeing the injured staff member in the hall.

Inside the unoccupied cell, M.P. grabbed A.L. by the hair and forced his penis into her mouth. Then Moore placed her on the metal bed frame (there was no mattress) and started trying to take off her pants. When he finally got them off, he climbed on top of her and raped her. She begged him to stop and tried to push him away, but was unable to.

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After Moore raped her, other boys came in and sexually assaulted her. At the same time, a different group of males targeted D.R., who had locked himself back in his cell before the rioters arrived and attacked A.L. An inmate with whom D.R. had a prior conflict saw him in his cell, found the keys, and opened the cell door. D.R. tried to run, but the mob cornered him in the back of the unit, beat him mercilessly, and stabbed him with a pencil. After beating D.R., the group shoved him in the cell directly across from the cell where A.L. was being sexually assaulted. He witnessed a total of three inmates rape A.L. and specifically identified M.P. and Moore as the individuals who led A.L. to the back cell and as two of the males who had raped her. D.R. observed various inmates holding her legs open so she could not resist. N.W., who was 12 years old at the time, also witnessed the assault on A.L. When she noticed several males going in and out of the cell where A.L. was, she went back to investigate and saw males were holding A.L. down and having sex with her. It was clear to N.W. that A.L. had not consented to the acts that were occurring. She saw A.L. trying to push them and get away, but she was unable because there were too many of them. At first there were only two, but the number eventually increased to six. She described the inmates coming in and out of the cell as if they were taking turns. N.W. found her way to the counselor's office and called her father and stepmother to inform them of the perilous situation, but they did not believe her.

When A.L. was finally able to leave the cell after the assault, she went to the door of D.R.'s cell and asked for someone to get the keys to let him out.

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She then collapsed to the floor in the doorway of his cell. N.W. came to A.L. and asked her to come to the counselor's office to talk to her parents because they did not believe a riot was occurring at the facility. A.L. went to the office and verified the events to N.W.'s parents. A.L. stayed with N.W. from that point on because she was worried about N.W. being attacked as she had been. A.L. and N.W., along with one other unidentified male, stayed in the office on speakerphone with N.W.'s parents until the police arrived. Just before the police arrived, A.L. was sitting in a chair in the office when she suddenly passed out and fell to the floor. N.W. was terrified and did not know what to do. Then the police arrived, and although A.L. started to awaken, she could not stand and was crying uncontrollably. Two officers helped her up and escorted her to the main entrance, where she waited until she was taken to the hospital.

A police officer interviewed A.L. briefly as she waited for treatment in the emergency room. A.L. told the officer that she was in her cell trying to sleep when someone banged on her door. She thought it was a guard, but when she got to the door, it was the group of boys who let her out of her cell. Moore asked A.L. if she wanted to "f--k." A.L. said no and told him that she had a boyfriend. The group initially left her unit, but when they returned, they took her to the back cell and gang-raped her.

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Registered Nurse⁴Renee Perkins treated A.L. and assisted in the collection of the rape kit. A.L. told Nurse Perkins that she had been vaginally and anally penetrated by at least six males. Nurse Perkins described A.L. as being distraught, crying, and shaking during the examination. Kentucky State Police Detective Josh Dicken interviewed Moore a few days after the riot. Moore initially told police he did not see anyone get sexually assaulted that night. He claimed to have seen several male inmates going in and out of the empty cell but had only learned of the alleged sexual abuse later.

When Detective Dicken advised Moore that the police had surveillance video of him going into the cell with A.L., Moore asserted they had planned to have consensual sex but then declined because other people were in the room. He stated that A.L. told the others to get out, but they refused, and so he left. Upon further questioning, Moore eventually admitted having sex with A.L. and specifically confirmed that he had placed his penis in her vagina. He also claimed he heard some unidentified person or persons tell A.L., "come here b---

-h" or "stop moving b----h," but said he did not know anyone had raped her. Moore repeated his claim that A.L. wanted to have sex with him. The police collected physical evidence from the cell where A.L. was attacked, including the suspects' clothing and buccal swabs for DNA testing.

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Those items, along with the rape kit, were sent for analysis. The vaginal swabs revealed at least two male DNA profiles. The major profile matched another inmate, D.P., but the remaining DNA was insufficient to make any further analysis. The anal swabs revealed at least three male DNA profiles, with D.P. again being the major contributor. As with the vaginal swabs, the remaining DNA from the anal swabs was insufficient for further analysis. DNA samples taken from M.P.'s underwear matched both M.P. and A.L. Likewise, DNA taken from Moore's underwear matched both Moore and A.L.

Moore was indicted on February 8, 2024, and testified in his own defense at trial. The jury rejected his version of events and convicted him of first- degree rape, complicity to first-degree sodomy, promoting a sexual performance by a minor, first-degree riot, and two counts of fourth-degree assault. He received a total sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Moore first argues he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of complicity to commit first-degree sodomy. We disagree. A trial court's failure to grant a directed verdict should not be reversed unless the appellate court determines "it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt." Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). When confronted with a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must assume the truth of the Commonwealth's evidence and "draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth." Id. A

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conviction must be based on "evidence of substance, and the trial court is expressly authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant if the prosecution produces no more than a mere scintilla of evidence." Id. at 187-88. Ultimately, the directed verdict standard depends on "the statutes creating the offense[,]"

and "is not controlled by the law as described in the jury instructions[.]"

Acosta v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Ky. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Ray v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 250, 266 (Ky. 2020). A finding of guilt by complicity requires: "(1) proof of commission of an offense by another person and (2) proof of the defendant's participation in commission of that offense." Parks v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 318, 327 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune, Kentucky Criminal Law § 3-3(d)(2), at 117 (1998)). The scope of complicity under KRS⁵502.020 is

"broad enough to embrace acts, words, agreements, encouragement, incitement, and every form of participation in concerted criminal activity."

Young v. Commonwealth, 426 S.W.3d 577, 582 (Ky. 2014) (quoting George G. Seelig, Kentucky Criminal Law § 3-3(b)(4) at 107 (2d ed. 2008)). Further, the manner of complicity is "definitional, not substantive[,]" meaning the various types of conduct listed in KRS 502.020 are "not to be viewed as a separate or alternative theory." Finney v. Commonwealth, 638 S.W.2d 709, 710 (Ky. App. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Hibbard v. Commonwealth, 661 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1983). In other words, "the acts giving rise to accomplice liability are

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not so readily defined and may encompass a continuum of events." Mills v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 366, 371 (Ky. 2001). Under Kentucky law, an accomplice "occupies the same status as one being guilty of the principal offense." Parks, 192 S.W.3d at 327 (quoting Wilson v. Commonwealth, 601 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Ky. 1980)). Therefore, "to convict a defendant of guilt by complicity, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was, in fact, committed by the person being aided or abetted by the defendant." Id. KRS 510.070 defines first-degree sodomy in pertinent part:

(1) A person is guilty of sodomy in the first degree when:

(a) He engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion[.]

"Deviate sexual intercourse" is defined as "any act of sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another; or penetration of the anus of one person by any body part or a foreign object manipulated by another person." KRS 510.010(3). Penetration is not required to sustain a conviction for first-degree sodomy where the act of sexual gratification involves the sexual organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another. Bills v. Commonwealth, 851 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Ky. 1993). In such cases, mere contact is all that is necessary under the statute. Id. The evidence of record is sufficient to support the trial court's denial of the motion for directed verdict. A.L. testified that after Moore and M.P. knocked her to the ground and helped her up, they led her to the empty cell. She did not know who they were and did not want to go with them, but she

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was afraid to resist. When they entered the cell, M.P. grabbed her by the hair and forced his penis into her mouth, and then Moore began taking off her pants before raping her on the bedframe. A.L. also told Nurse Perkins that the first two boys who had initially approached her (later identified as M.P. and Moore) held her down while other males sexually assaulted her. A.L. further reported that she had been anally penetrated by unknown individuals. Medical testing confirmed the presence of D.P.'s DNA and that of two other unidentified males on the swabs taken from her anus.

In addition, D.R. testified that he saw at least three males having sex with A.L. while she tried to push them away and begged them to stop. He identified Moore and M.P. as the two individuals who led A.L. into the cell and had sex with her. He also stated the attackers had held A.L.'s legs so she could not resist the sexual assault. Viewing the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we are convinced a reasonable jury could conclude Moore was guilty of complicity to first-degree sodomy. The trial court properly denied the motion for directed verdict.

Second, Moore argues the trial court improperly instructed the jury on complicity to first-degree sodomy. Specifically, Moore contends the instruction conflated the legal theories of complicity and facilitation. We disagree. The trial court instructed the jury on complicity to first-degree sodomy as follows:

You will find Demaurion Moore guilty of Complicity to First Degree Sodomy under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following:

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A. That in this county on or about November 11, 2022, and before the finding of the Indictment herein, [M.P.] and/or [D.P.] engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with [A.L.];

AND

B. That [M.P.] and/or [D.P.] did so by forcible compulsion;

AND

C. That Demaurion Moore aided and assisted [M.P.] and/or [D.P.] in so doing by leading [A.L.] into the cell at the Adair Youth Development Center or holding her down;

AND

D. That in aiding or assisting [M.P.] and/or [D.P.], it was Demaurion Moore's intention that [M.P.] and/or [D.P.] engage in deviate sexual intercourse with [A.L] by forcible compulsion. At the conclusion of the second day of trial, the parties discussed the drafting of the jury instructions with the trial court. Pertinent to the complicity to first-degree sodomy instruction, Moore requested the trial court qualify Section C to read as follows:

That Demaurion Moore aided and assisted [M.P.] and/or [D.P.] in so doing by leading [A.L.] against her will into the cell at the Adair Youth Development Center or holding her down[.]

(Emphasis added). The Commonwealth objected to the inclusion of the phrase,

"against her will" and the trial court did not include it in the final instruction. Kentucky criminal procedure requires the "the [trial] court to instruct the jury in writing on the law of the case[.]" RCr⁶9.54(1). "The function of instructions . . . is only to state what the jury must believe from the evidence . .

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. in order to return a verdict in favor of the party who bears the burden of proof." Webster v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Ky. 1974). "This general rule requires instructions applicable to every state of case covered by the indictment and deducible from or supported to any extent by the testimony." Lee v. Commonwealth, 329 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Ky. 1959). In Thompkins v. Commonwealth, 54 S.W.3d 147, 150-51 (Ky. 2001), we explained the difference between complicity under KRS 502.020(1) and facilitation under KRS 506.080(1) as follows:

Under either statute, the defendant acts with knowledge that the principal actor is committing or intends to commit a crime. Under the complicity statute, the defendant must intend that the crime be committed; under the facilitation statute, the defendant acts without such intent. Facilitation only requires provision of the means or opportunity to commit a crime, while complicity requires solicitation, conspiracy, or some form of assistance. Skinner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 290, 298 (1993). "Facilitation reflects the mental state of one who is 'wholly indifferent' to the actual completion of the crime." Perdue v. Commonwealth, Ky.,

916 S.W.2d 148, 160 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 855, 117 S.Ct. 151, 136 L.Ed.2d 96 (1996).

Thus, intent is the primary factor that distinguishes complicit conduct from the indifferent mental state relative to mere criminal facilitation. The "jury may infer a defendant's intent to commit a criminal offense from the surrounding circumstances." Stieritz v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 353, 361 (Ky. 2023) (citing Commonwealth v. Wolford, 4 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Ky. 1999)). In addition, "[c]omplicit conduct may be proven through either the existence of a basic conspiracy, or aid and counsel, or failing to make a proper effort to prevent the commission of an offense when the defendant has a legal

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duty to do so." Id. at 360. However, "[e]ach of these types of conduct 'is not to be viewed as a separate or alternative theory,' because complicity is 'definitional, not substantive,' i.e., as long as the evidence supports the jury's finding of intentional complicity, the 'manner of operation' is 'essentially irrelevant.'" Leslie W. Abramson, Ky. Prac. Substantive Crim. L. § 3:5 (2025) (footnotes omitted). Simply put, "[t]he act requirement for accomplice liability is very broad." Jens David Ohlin, 1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 10:11 (16th ed.). Here, the record supports the complicity instruction as drafted because Moore aided and assisted with the commission of first-degree sodomy by leading A.L. into the empty cell, whereupon M.P. grabbed her by the hair and forced her to perform oral sex. At, around, or immediately after the time M.P. was sodomizing A.L., Moore tried to forcibly remove her pants with the intent to rape her. These circumstances "clearly evidence separate criminal motivations on the part of [Moore]; he intended to rape . . . the victim himself, and independently intended to aid [M.P.]" in committing sodomy. Dean v. Commonwealth, 844 S.W.2d 417, 422 (Ky. 1992). "In short, it is difficult to imagine a more complicitous scenario[.]" Id. We perceive no error in the jury instructions.

Third, Moore argues the trial court erred by allowing Nurse Perkins to testify that A.L. told her she had been anally penetrated because the Commonwealth failed to lay a proper foundation for the use of a prior

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inconsistent statement under KRE⁷801A and KRE 613. He concedes this alleged error is unpreserved and requests palpable error review. RCr 10.26 authorizes an appellate court to review an unpreserved error as follows:

A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error. A palpable error is "easily perceptible, plain, obvious, and readily noticeable."

Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006). To demonstrate manifest injustice, a party must show the "probability of a different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law." Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006). In other words, a palpable error occurs where "the defect in the proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable." Id. at 4.

On direct examination, A.L. variously testified she had not been anally penetrated during the attack and that she did not remember if such activity had occurred. The Commonwealth then asked her if she remembered speaking with "various folks" at the hospital about the circumstances of the attack. After A.L. responded in the affirmative, the Commonwealth did not follow up with reference to any specific statements A.L. made to police or medical

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personnel. Similarly, on cross-examination, A.L. stated that she did not remember if any of the attackers had penetrated her anus. Later, during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, Nurse Perkins testified that she examined A.L. at the emergency room after the assault and collected evidence for the rape kit. She described A.L. as distraught during the examination and stated that A.L. told her that she had been vaginally and anally penetrated by multiple individuals. Perkins then described the evidence she collected from A.L., including vaginal and anal swabs.

"The bar on out-of-court statements, whether they are consistent with trial testimony or not, is not in KRE 801A or any other hearsay exception rule; it is in the hearsay rule itself." Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Ky. 2014) (citing KRE 802). KRE 802 provides, "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky." KRE 801(c) defines "[h]earsay" as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."

Testimony is not inadmissible simply for failure to satisfy the requirements of a single hearsay exception. Edmonds, 433 S.W.3d at 314. On the contrary, "an out-of-court statement will often fall under multiple hearsay exceptions in KRE 801A, 803, or 804" and such testimony "need only satisfy one of those exceptions (and, of course, be relevant and survive KRE 403) to be admissible." Id. In other words, the failure to lay a proper foundation for the use of prior inconsistent statements under KRE 801A(a) "is irrelevant [when]

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there is another ground to support admission of the out-of-court statement."

Id. at 314.

In Edmonds, we applied KRE 803(4), the exception for statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, and held a SANE nurse was permitted to repeat a sexual assault victim's statement that she had not previously had anal intercourse with the defendant before the night he sexually assaulted her, notwithstanding "the fact that there was no allegation of a recent fabrication, which is necessary for the statement to be admissible as a prior consistent statement under KRE 801A(a)(2)[.]" Id. The same logic applies with equal force to the present appeal.

KRE 803(4) excepts from the hearsay rule, "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis." In interpreting this exception, we have set forth a two-step analysis. Edmonds, 433 S.W.3d at 315. First, "it must be determined whether the content of the declarant's statement was of the type 'reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or diagnosis[.]'" Id. (quoting Colvard v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.3d 239, 245 (Ky. 2010)). Second, the statement must have arisen "from the declarant's purpose of promoting treatment." Id.

Here, as in Edmonds, "[t]here is little doubt that a statement about recent anal sexual activity is . . . the type of statement that a physician may

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rely on in treatment or diagnosis" in the aftermath of alleged nonconsensual intercourse. Id. Because we perceive Nurse Perkins' testimony to have been independently admissible as a statement for the purpose of a medical diagnosis or treatment under KRE 803(4), we need not address Moore's claim that the Commonwealth failed to adequately lay a foundation for the use of A.L.'s prior inconsistent statements under KRE 801A(a)(1) and KRE 613. Thus, the admission of Nurse Perkins' testimony was not error, much less palpable error. For his final contention of error, Moore argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. We disagree.

During voir dire, the Commonwealth questioned the venire if they had experienced any negative interactions with law enforcement. A juror responded in the affirmative and described his prior encounter with police. The Commonwealth proceeded to examine the juror in the presence of the other jurors. The juror expressed confidence in his ability to decide the case fairly on the evidence despite his prior experiences. However, the juror continued, unprompted, that he was from Louisville and knew about Moore's past. The trial court immediately interrupted the juror and ordered the parties to approach the bench. Before the trial court or the parties asked any further questions, the juror simply stated the name, "Tyree Smith." In response to the trial court's inquiry into the significance of "Tyree Smith," the juror stated, "the

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incident."⁸At this point, Moore moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The juror was excused for cause.

The trial court admonished the venire as follows:

All right, ladies and gentlemen, that last comment. First of all, nobody knows if he even has a past. Nobody knows anything about this young man. So that is to be completely disregarded by you. Whatever he meant by that statement, I have no idea what he meant. Okay. We need a replacement for that juror.

Voir dire resumed and defense counsel later inquired whether the fact of Moore's detention at the time of the charged crimes would prejudice the jury pool. No jurors responded in the affirmative. Following a later bench conference concerning another juror's ability to hear a case involving allegations of sexual assault, the trial court expanded upon its reasoning for denying Moore's motion for a mistrial, stating:

So, I just want to clarify. In addition to the fact that, with that one juror, the one that mentioned his past criminal history, I just want to note this for the record, in addition to thinking I was denying the motion for a mistrial, because I thought I'd cut it off quick enough. The other reason is, obviously, by virtue of the charge itself and what happened, I mean, they're going to note that there's some criminal history here.

"It is well established that the decision to grant a mistrial is within the trial court's discretion, and such a ruling will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion." Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147

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S.W.3d 63, 68 (Ky. 2004) (citing Bray v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 375, 383 (Ky. 2002)). Additionally, "a mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings and there is a 'manifest necessity for such an action.'" Id. (quoting Bray, 68 S.W.3d at 383). The cause of the need for mistrial "must be of such character and magnitude that a litigant will be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way." Id. (quoting Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc., 929 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Ky. 1996)). We discern no abuse of discretion here as there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial. The trial court immediately interrupted the juror as soon as he said he knew about Moore's "past." Moreover, as the trial court aptly observed, the fact that the charged crimes occurred inside a detention facility would necessarily inform the jury that Moore had previously faced criminal charges. We further perceive the trial court's admonition to have effectively cured any potential error or prejudice and reject Moore's speculative contention that the jury was unable to follow the admonition or that the prospective juror's fleeting remark was devastating to his defense. Lampkins v. Commonwealth, 701 S.W.3d 99, 119-20 (Ky. 2024).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Adair Circuit Court is hereby affirmed. All sitting. All concur.

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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Molly Mattingly

Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky Stephanie L. McKeehan Assistant Attorney General