Tristan Mitchell v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2026

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2025-SC-0145-MR

TRISTAN MITCHELL APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM CARTER CIRCUIT COURT

V. HONORABLE REBECCA K. PHILLIPS, JUDGE

NO. 23-CR-00177

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

Tristan Mitchell was convicted by the Carter Circuit Court after a jury trial on various criminal counts relating to an incident of escalating domestic violence involving victims K.C.¹and her one-year-old daughter P.C. (child). He received a twenty-five-year sentence. Mitchell raises one issue on appeal: that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the kidnapping charge because the evidence could not establish that he took child for the purpose of terrorizing K.C. We affirm because Mitchell failed to establish that any error occurred.

I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

Mitchell and K.C. met online. After dating only a month, in June 2023, K.C. and child moved into Mitchell's house.

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According to K.C.'s testimony, Mitchell was extremely jealous and controlling. He smashed her phone (which was on her parents' phone plan) and got her a new phone on his phone plan. He insisted that she keep this phone unlocked and accessed the phone to monitor her activities. K.C. quit her job at Mitchell's request because he was worried about her flirting with coworkers and customers.

At the end of September 2023, K.C. decided to end the relationship and left with child while Mitchell was at work. She was only able to take some of her belongings and moved in with her parents. She got a new phone on her parents' phone plan and was able to use the same number she had previously used on their plan. Mitchell kept calling and texting her. In the hope of getting her remaining possessions back, after he had thwarted an attempt to retrieve them earlier, on or about October 6, 2023, K.C. agreed to meet Mitchell and talk about their relationship. K.C. brought child and met Mitchell to pick up a pizza, and then they drove separately to his house. Mitchell parked behind K.C.'s vehicle, blocking her vehicle. Once inside the house, Mitchell demanded to see K.C.'s phone and for her to provide the passcode. He asked her who she was talking to and then revealed he had previously accessed some of her messages through her old phone. According to K.C., he proceeded to break her phone by throwing it against brickwork and against the wall, leaving a hole in the wall, and then took her phone outside and threw it across the street into a field. Then he

"started wailing on [her]" by smacking her back and forth in the head.

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K.C. testified Mitchell pushed her to the ground, and kicked and punched her in her head, ribs, stomach, and legs. He asked her, "Why do you think you can hide sh*t from me?" Child was crying, and K.C. begged Mitchell to stop. K.C. testified that Mitchell dragged her by the hair, got on top of her and choked her, and told her "You're not such a bad b*tch when you're about to die."

K.C. testified that when he released her, she picked up her child, but Mitchell told her, "You have about five seconds to put her down before I beat your skull in." After she put child down, Mitchell grabbed her by the hair and made her sit next to him on the couch.

Mitchell started undressing and told her to "get naked, you're going to have sex with me, or I'm going to rape you—either way—we're having sex." He ordered her to go upstairs, which was where the bedroom was located, and when she did not obey, pulled her by the hair up the stairs while smacking, punching, and pushing her. Then he pushed her onto the bed. K.C. testified he ordered her to get on her knees and perform oral sex on him. K.C. explained she thought she had no choice, so complied, but he continued to smack her, telling her, "If you bite me, I'll put a bullet in your skull." K.C. believed the threat as she knew that Mitchell had a handgun in the nightstand and a shotgun in the closet.

After they came back downstairs, K.C. testified she saw an opportunity to escape, grabbed child, and ran out the front door to the road in her bare feet. She hoped to see a car and get help. Mitchell ran after her. He pulled her hair,

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and she purposefully plopped down in the middle of the road, becoming "dead weight" while holding child tight. Mitchell dragged her by the hair from the road into the ditch, through the grass as she tried kicking at him. He ripped child from her arms and, while holding child, pulled K.C. by the hair again. K.C. testified that while she struggled, she could not fight back while Mitchell was holding child, because she was afraid of hurting child. K.C. testified Mitchell released her when he became tired but continued to hold child. He told her, "If you just come up here, I'll let you go," but she knew it was a lie. She explained she made the tough decision to leave child with him so she could get help. While Mitchell took child into the house, K.C. ran through a creek to reach a neighbor's trailer and begged the neighbor to call 911.

Deputy Bobby Hall testified he arrived first and observed K.C. was distraught, crying, traumatized, hysterical, "almost in shock," and was unable to converse until she calmed down a little. She said, "my baby, my baby, he's got my baby, he's got my baby" and pointed at Mitchell's house. K.C. was taken to an ambulance and then to the hospital. Medical personnel observed she had bruised eyes, swelling to her face, a hematoma on the side of her head, blood on the top of her head, abrasions to her legs, and a handprint bruise on her back.

K.C. testified after the incident she could feel her face swelling, she was dizzy, her head hurt, her throat hurt from screaming so much, her cartilage

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earring had been ripped out, she had two black eyes and numerous bruises and bald spots on her head. She testified that since the incident she had an increase in the frequency and duration of her migraine headaches. On cross-examination, K.C. was shown a photo taken before the incident which showed bruising on her legs and asked whether she bruised easily; K.C. responded that the photo showed bruising from when Mitchell had previously thrown a chair at her.

When the police came to Mitchell's home, he cooperated, and they retrieved child from a bedroom where she was standing up in a crib and screaming. Child was observed by medical personnel to have red marks on her body and bruising to her back.

The police found K.C.'s shoes and phone case in the trash. They also found shards from the phone screen, a piece of K.C.'s artificial fingernails, and clumps of her curly auburn hair throughout the house. They noticed a clock hung at waist-level; it covered the hole in the wall; this formed the basis for the tampering charge. They found Mitchell's firearms where K.C. reported they would be, discovered he had an active domestic violence order from another relationship which prohibited his possession of firearms, and learned he had an outstanding warrant. They recovered K.C.'s broken phone from the field across the road. They seized Mitchell's firearms later pursuant to a search warrant.

Numerous photographs of K.C.'s physical condition and that of child were admitted into evidence, along with crime scene photos. Photographs of

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K.C. showed her bruising, a handprint on her side, black eyes, missing and broken acrylic fingernails, and grass and dirt stains on K.C.'s shorts and legs. Photographs of child showed red marks on her arm and elbow, bruising, and dirt stains on her shirt. Photographs taken inside Mitchell's house showed chunks of K.C.'s hair, a piece of the phone in the brick of the fireplace, the hole in the wall, broken glass from the phone screen, a broken acrylic nail, smeared pizza, and K.C.'s phone case in the garbage can. Pictures of K.C.'s phone showed that it was smashed on both sides.

When Mitchell was interviewed by the police, he provided a different account of what transpired, denying that any assault took place or that he was the instigator of any conflict. He reported that K.C. agreed to come to his house to have pizza, and once there began asking him questions about one of his ex- girlfriends. He indicated that K.C. wanted to see his phone and threw her phone at him, putting an indentation in the drywall. Mitchell stated he asked K.C. to leave and she left child with him. Mitchell stated he put child to bed after she left, and the police arrived thirty minutes later. Mitchell admitted to cleaning up his home and showering after K.C. left, and putting the clock over the hole in the wall. Other than Mitchell's face being red, the police did not observe that he had any injuries.

In Mitchell's superseding indictment, the grand jury indicted him for: (1) second-degree assault with serious physical injury; (2) first-degree wanton endangerment; (3) first-degree sodomy with serious physical injury, forcible compulsion; (4) fourth-degree assault, child abuse; (5) intimidating a

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participant in the legal process; (6) first-degree strangulation; (7) tampering with physical evidence; (8) kidnapping of a minor; (9) second-degree unlawful imprisonment; (10) first-degree criminal mischief; and (11) first-degree criminal abuse, victim under twelve.

During the trial, Mitchell received a directed verdict on two charges (second-degree assault with serious injury and first-degree sodomy with serious injury). The trial court amended the second-degree assault charge to fourth-degree assault and amended the first-degree sodomy charge with serious physical injury to ordinary first-degree sodomy.²The Commonwealth voluntarily dismissed the charge for intimidating a participant in the legal process.

During the guilt phase, the jury found Mitchell: (1) guilty of fourth-degree assault (K.C.); (2) not guilty of first-degree wanton endangerment, but guilty of the lesser included charge of second-degree wanton endangerment; (3) not guilty of first-degree sodomy; (4) not guilty of fourth-degree assault (child); (5) not guilty of first-degree strangulation; (6) guilty of tampering with physical evidence; (7) guilty of kidnapping; (8) not guilty of second-degree unlawful imprisonment; (9) guilty of first-degree criminal mischief; (10) not guilty of first- degree criminal child abuse but guilty of the lesser included charge of second- degree criminal child abuse. During the penalty phase, the jury recommended sentences of three years for tampering, sixteen years for kidnapping, one year

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for first-degree criminal mischief, and five years for second-degree criminal child abuse, with the sentences to be served consecutively for a total of twenty- five years of incarceration. The trial court sentenced Mitchell in accordance with these recommendations and imposed twelve months to be served concurrently on the three misdemeanor convictions.³

II. ANALYSIS

Mitchell acknowledges that in his motion for a directed verdict, he did not ask for a directed verdict on the kidnapping charge and requests palpable error review pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26. While Mitchell admits there is sufficient evidence to establish that he unlawfully restrained child, he challenges whether there was proof he had the requisite intent in taking such an action. He states the prosecution was required to prove each element included in the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and did not satisfy its burden because "there was no testimony or proof, even taking [K.C.'s] testimony in the most favorable light, that he had taken

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[child] to terrorize [K.C.]" and that was the intent provided in the jury instructions.

In evaluating whether a motion for directed verdict should be granted, the trial court is required to "draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth." Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). "The totality of circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are sufficient to sustain a jury conviction against a defendant" so long as the circumstantial evidence is "more consistent with guilt than with innocence[.]" Commonwealth v. Woods, 657 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Ky. 2022). "A directed verdict should not be granted if a reasonable juror could find that the elements of the offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Murphy v. Commonwealth, 509 S.W.3d 34, 43 (Ky.

2017).

"[A]n unpreserved error may be noticed on appeal only if the error is 'palpable' and 'affects the substantial rights of a party,' and even then, relief is appropriate only 'upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.'" Brown v. Commonwealth, 718 S.W.3d 776, 788 (Ky. 2025) (quoting RCr 10.26). Our focus is on reviewing "whether the defect is so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process." Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006).

"A failure to grant a directed verdict based on the . . . insufficiency of the proof is necessarily palpable error[.]" Commonwealth v. Goss, 428 S.W.3d 619, 627 (Ky. 2014). "[A] defendant convicted on insufficient proof should be

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acquitted" because "[a] conviction based on insufficient proof is by definition a manifest injustice." Id.

"On a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must compare the proof presented at trial with the statutory elements of the alleged offense." Smith v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.3d 421, 434 (Ky. 2021). "[J]ury instruction issues and directed verdict issues are distinct for purposes of appeal." Sutton v. Commonwealth, 627 S.W.3d 836, 847 (Ky. 2021). Whether a directed verdict should be granted "is not controlled by the law as described in the jury instructions, but by the statutes creating the offense." Acosta v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Ky. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Ray v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 250 (Ky. 2020). See Martin v. Commonwealth, 686 S.W.3d 77, 98 (Ky. 2023); Bennington v. Commonwealth,

348 S.W.3d 613, 618-22 (Ky. 2011). Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 509.040(1) provides:

A person is guilty of kidnapping when he unlawfully restrains another person and when his intent is:

(a) To hold him for ransom or reward; or

(b) To accomplish or to advance the commission of a felony; or

(c) To inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the victim or another; or

(d) To interfere with the performance of a governmental or political function; or

(e) To use him as a shield or hostage; or

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(f) To deprive the parents or guardian of the custody of a minor, when the person taking the minor is not a person exercising custodial control or supervision of the minor as the term "person exercising custodial control or supervision" is defined in KRS 600.020. Accordingly, Mitchell can be guilty of kidnapping by unlawfully restraining child even if his intent was not to terrorize K.C., and it does not matter that the jury instructions were limited to that intent if the evidence would establish one of the other intents.

We are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to uphold Mitchell's kidnapping conviction on multiple grounds, including intending to terrorize K.C. While "terrorize" is not defined in the Penal Code, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024), defines "terror" as either: "1. Extreme fear" or "2. One or more violent acts that cause extreme fear." The intent to terrorize does not require that Mitchell in fact terrorized K.C. when he took child into the house, but her frightened and upset reaction afterward is relevant in establishing that this was his intention. McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 469 (Ky. 1986). See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 99, 109 (Ky. 2006)⁴ (concluding that the defendant's statement to victim about going into hundreds of people's homes was relevant to establish he intended to terrorize her). Mitchell's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to establish he intended to terrorize K.C. is dependent on his interpretation of her testimony in the manner that is most favorable to him (rather than the Commonwealth)

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regarding what Mitchell told her after he grabbed her child from her arms, which he paraphrases as him telling her "if she would get up out of the road, she would be free to go with [child]" but "[i]nstead . . . [she ran] to a neighbor's house leaving [child] with [Mitchell]." This is an attempt to reframe his actions as reasonable and her response in leaving child as wholly voluntary. It ignores reasonable inferences as to his intent, which naturally flow from the whole sequence of events prior to this statement and ignores the context of the statement itself.

K.C. testified that she had previously left the road, Mitchell ripped her child from her arms, and in retaining child she believed Mitchell was trying to get her to go back into his house, and she believed that if she went back there, Mitchell would not let them go. The jury could believe K.C.'s inferences were reasonable based on Mitchell forcibly controlling her and controlling her interactions with child, while she was in his house just prior to running away, to pressure her into doing what he wanted her to do. It was not unreasonable for the jury to infer that given Mitchell's previous acts of physical violence, threats to shoot K.C. if she did not obey, and the presence of firearms in the house, that by forcibly taking child away and bringing her back into the house, Mitchell intended to terrorize K.C.

However, even if Mitchell was correct that the evidence did not establish that he intended to terrorize K.C., if the evidence would support a different intent enumerated in the statute, he would not be entitled to a directed verdict.

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See Acosta, 391 S.W.3d at 817. There are, in fact, two other alternative intents sufficient to establish kidnapping that were supported by the evidence. By using child's forcible removal and retention in the house to attempt to get K.C. to come back into the house, the evidence supported the conclusion that Mitchell was intending "[t]o accomplish or to advance the commission of a felony" in the form of committing felony assault against K.C. KRS 509.040(1)(b). While the evidence failed to establish that serious physical injury occurred, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Mitchell was intending to inflict serious physical injury on K.C. if she came back into the house to punish her for leaving. Additionally, the jury could conclude that K.C. was correct in her belief that if she went back to the house with Mitchell, he would keep them there and thus infer that Mitchell was planning to kidnap K.C. with the intention of inflicting bodily injury upon her or terrorizing her. Alternatively, the evidence supported the conclusion that Mitchell was intending to use child "as a shield or hostage[.]" It could be inferred from Mitchell grabbing child from K.C. that he had used child as a shield, and could do so again if K.C. came into the house. Or it could be concluded that Mitchell was using child as a hostage to force K.C. to comply with his demands. Mitchell has failed to establish that any error occurred, much less a palpable error from the trial court failing to grant him a directed verdict on the kidnapping charge. There was sufficient evidence to establish that his conduct satisfied all elements of this crime.

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III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the Carter Circuit Court's judgment and sentence of Mitchell. There was sufficient evidence to convict him of kidnapping child. All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Adam Meyer

Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky Joseph A. Beckett

Assistant Attorney General