406 People First v. County of Butte-Silver Bow

On April 29, 2026, Proponents submitted a proposed petition to place on the November ballot an initiative regarding data centers. Under § 13-28-201(4), MCA, the City-County government had 21 days to reject or approve the sample petition. However, the government did not act until May 28, 2026, at which time it approved the sample petition. In her letter of approval, Clerk and Recorder/Election

Administrator Cynthia Sherman advised Proponents that they needed to gather at least 3,652 valid signatures by 5:00 p.m. on August 14, 2026.

On June 3, 2026, Proponents proposed to Sherman, in writing, that they submit signature sheets on a weekly basis to "help everyone

involved^andavoid delivering approximately 4,000 signatures on the final day of signature collection." Sherman agreed. Proponents thereafter submitted signature sheets to

Sherman^onaweekly basis through July 31, 2026. ^

On the afternoon of July 31, 2026, Sherman emailed Proponents and advised them that they had met the signature requirement. She ftirther advised Proponents, "I need to have the County Attorney look over the certificate

before signing it... On August 10, 2026, Sherman issued a "Notification ^ofStatutory Issue,"ⁱⁿwhich she informed Proponents that the Butte-Silver Bow County

Attorney's Office^had identified "an issue concerning the statutory deadlines applicable to the proposed . .. local initiative." Sherman further explained that, although Proponents had been "informed that they would need 3,652 signatures, and the signatures could be gathered beginning May 29, 2026 through August 17, 2026," the County Attorney's

Office concluded^thatthedeadline

"must be evaluated in light of the more specific requirements

containedⁱⁿ Sherman advised Proponents that under § 13-28-206, MCA, they would have had to submit signatures by July ^13,2026. Thus,^theinitiative^did not meet the statutory requirements.

Notwithstanding the August 10,2026 Notification, on August 11,2026, Proponents advised Sherman that they intended to deliver another batch of signature sheets. Sherman confirmed receipt of this batch and stated that she would process those signatures. Sherman [§] 13-28-206[, MCA (2025)].

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later advised Proponents that she had processed all

received signatures^andaccepted 3,850 of them—198 more than the 3,652 required signatures. On August 12, 2026, Proponents filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Application for Alternative and Peremptory Writ of Mandate; Request for Expedited Hearing in the Second Judicial District Court,

Butte-Silver^BowCounty. Proponents fiirther filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Brief in Support, and an Application ^forAlternative^WritofMandate^and Order to Show Cause. Proponents alleged, in part, that the City-County should be estopped from rejecting the signatures as untimely and that ^§13-28-206,^MCA,isunconstitutional as applied in this case. Proponents requested declaratory judgment in their favor along with temporary and permanent injunctive relief

Proponents and the City-County then filed a Stipulation ^forEntry^ofTemporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause. The parties explained that the Stipulation would preserve the status quo and the integrity of

the petition records and signatures while allowing the election process to proceed without prejudice to either party's legal position and permitting the District Court opportunity to address the parties' respective positions at a hearing on preliminary injunctive relief

On August 12, 2026, the District Court issued a Temporary

Restraining Order^and Order to Show Cause, in which it ruled that a temporary

restraining order would issue^and remain in effect until the court conducted a hearing on the request for injunctive relief and entered frirther order of the court.

On August 18, 2026, the City-County filed its answer to Proponents' Complaint. The City-County took no position for or against the

proposed local initiative,^orwhether^it should appear on the ballot. The City-County requested ^thattheDistrict Court determine the parties' rights and obligations and enter an order directing Sherman as to how to proceed. The City-County explained that it believed ^theissue before^theDistrict Court^was not whether the City-County should be compelled to give Proponents additional time beyond the statutory deadline to gather signatures. ^Itbelieved^theissue^waswhether^the City-County, after providing Proponents with a deadline of August 14, 2026, to submit

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signatures, accepting and processing signatures pursuant to that deadline, and confirming to Proponents that they had obtained the required number of signatures, could then reject the petition as untimely because § 13-28-206, MCA,

established^anearlier deadline. Section 13-28-206, MCA, was enacted in 2025. Section

13-28-206(l)(b), MCA, provides that proponents must submit signed petition

sheets^totheeounty eleetion administrator no later than four weeks before the ballot certification date. Section 13-28-206(2), MCA, sets the ballot certifieation date for local government ballot issues at no later than 85 days before the election. Thus, under § 13-28-206, MCA, Proponents needed to submit the signatures for their local initiative to Sherman no later than July 13, 2026, for the local initiative to appear on the November 3, 2026 ballot. The City-County asked the court to determine whether, under the facts

of this case, its prior actions and representations to Proponents have legal consequenees under equitable-estoppel principles. The District Court held a show cause hearing on August ^19,2026.^Itthenordered the parties to provide it with supplemental briefing "on the issue of equitable estoppel and other arguments provided during the hearing."

The parties submitted their respective briefs to the

Distriet Court^onAugust^24,

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Proponents' arguments in making its determination. Proponents alleged that they made a sufficient showing that they were entitled to an injunction pending appeal. Proponents also filed the present appeal on August 31,2026. On September 3,2026, the District Court issued an Order on Plaintiffs' Request ^forInjunction Pending Appeal,ⁱⁿ which it stated that it was "defer[ing] consideration" of Proponents' motion. On September 4, 2026, Proponents filed an emergency motion requesting an injunction pending appeal. Noting that they could not request relief under M. R. App. P. 22(2) because the District Court had declined to rule on their motion for an injunction pending appeal, Proponents requested this Court find that extraordinary circumstances warrant consideration of their request for injunction

as provided in M. R. App. P. 22(4), because the District Court's failure to rule constitutes

"a functional denial where delay defeats all relief" In their motion, Proponents also advised this Court that the City-County indicated it would take no position on the motion, thus making it an unopposed motion ready for immediate consideration by this Court. However, ^duetoaclerical error,^this motion was not brought to the Court's attention until Proponents filed farther notice with this Court on September 21, 2026.

Proponents first assert that the District Court's August 12, 2026 Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause established a preliminary injunction notwithstanding the court's characterization of a temporary restraining order. Proponents then ask us to reinstate the purported preliminaiy

injunction. However,^weneednot determine whether the District Court in fact issued

a preliminary injunction because this Court has the statutory authority to grant an injunction pending appeal if such is warranted. Section 3-2-205(1), MCA, provides, in relevant part:

"Upon^suchterms^andunder such rules as the supreme court may establish, the supreme court may . . . grant an injunction order and writ pending an appeal to the supreme court from an order of a district In deciding whether to grant an

injunction pending appeal, courts are guided by the standard employed when considering a motion for preliminary injunction. Lopez v. Heckler^ ^713F.2d1432,^1435(9thCir, 1983). A preliminary injunction may be granted when the applicant establishes that:

court or judge refasing or dissolving an injunction.

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(a) the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits; (b) the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (c) the balance of equities tips in the applicant's favor; and (d) the order is in the public

interest. Section 27-19-201(1),^MCA. Pursuant to our statutory authority to grant an injunction while appeal from a district court's denial of an injunction is pending before this

Court,^wethusconsider whether Proponents are entitled to an injunction under the factors set forth in § 27-19-201(1), MCA. First, we consider whether Proponents are likely to

succeed^onthemerits. Section 27-19-20 l(l)(a), MCA. A "likelihood of success on the merits" merely requires a prima facie case on the underlying claim; it does not require that the party has established entitlement to relief at a trial on the merits. Planned

Parenthood of Mont. v. State^ Prima facie" is 2022 MT 157, t 35, 409 Mont. 378, 515 P.3d 301 (citation omitted). defined as "at first sight" or "on first appearance but subject to further evidence or information.

Driscoll V. Stapleton, 2020 MT 247, H 15, 401 Mont.

405, 473 P.3d 386 (citations omitted). Moreover, "when the balance of

equities tips sharply in the plaintiffs favor, the plaintiff need demonstrate only 'serious questions going to the merits. Driscoll, t 16 (quoting Davis v. Stapleton, CV 20-62-H-DLC, ^2020U.S.Dist. LEXIS 150267, '"'12 (D. Mont. Aug. 19, 2020). As we conclude below, the balance of equities indeed tips in Proponents' favor.

Here, as to the first element. Proponents argue that ^theDistrict Court overlooked^a key component of their argument, thus causing that court to incorrectly conclude that Proponents are not likely to succeed on the merits of their as-applied constitutional challenge. Specifically, they argue the district court ^{didnottakeinto}account^thatthe purpose of § 13-28-206, MCA—^to allow election administrators sufficient time to process signatures and determine whether a local initiative has qualified for the ballot—^was satisfied.

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At this juncture, we agree that this factor tends towards Proponents' favor. However, our determination is based only on a prima

facie consideration^ofthematter before the Court and in no way stands as our final

conclusion^onthematter.

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Second, we consider whether Proponents are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. Unquestionably, they will. If we do not grant Proponents the injunctive relief they seek while we consider the matter on appeal, the subject initiative will not appear on the November ballot—a result which, if erroneous, has no timely remedy.

Third, we consider whether the balance of equities ^tipsinProponents' favor.^In assessing the balance of equities, the court weighs the competing interests based on the record before it, without finally resolving the underlying constitutional questions. Kalarchik v. State, 2026 MT 76, H 40, 427 Mont. 333, 587 P.3d 784. Here, we weigh Proponents' right, having obtained the necessary-signatures, ^tohaveitslocal initiative appear on the ballot against the government's right to compel the people to comply with a duly enacted statute. In balancing the equities, we take note of Proponents' argument that they complied with the intent of the statute because Sherman had sufficient time to process their signature sheets even though Proponents submitted sheets after the statutory deadline. Furthermore, the statute was enacted and created a new deadline in 2025; it is not a longstanding law. We also consider the fact that the

City-County takes no position on Proponents' request for injunctive relief. This leads ^ustoconclude^thatthisfactor^also favors injunctive relief while this appeal is pending.

Fourth, we consider whether the requested order is in the public interest. Of this there can be no question: well over the threshold 3,652 individuals signed Proponents' petitions to place this initiative on the ballot. Article ^XI,Section^8,oftheMontana Constitution, provides, "The legislature shall extend the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by the constitution to the qualified electors of each local government Preventing constitutional injury is always in the public

interest.^AllEarns. Healthcare v. State, 2026 MT 64, K 59, 427 Mont. 238, 586 P.3d 803. The public interest

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receives sufficient votes to be approved by the electorate, it is possible that the initiative may ultimately be invalidated—a result we are loathe to contemplate. However, if we deny Proponents injunctive relief with the result that the initiative does not appear on the November ballot and we ultimately determine the District

Court erred,^theresult would^be that the electorate would be denied their right to ^voteonaninitiative^thatmetthethreshold requirements to appear on the ballot. The latter is the greater evil.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Proponents' motion for injunction pending appeal is

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the City-County of Butte-Silver Bow and Cynthia Sherman, in her official capacity as Clerk and Recorder/Election

Administrator^are ENJOINED from denying certification of Local Initiative

00-02^onthebasis^thatitfailed to comply with the deadline for submission of signatures as set forth in § 13-28-206, MCA

(2025).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this injunction shall remain in place until such time as this Court disposes of this appeal.

The Clerk is direc^ to provide a true copy of this

Order^toallparties^ofrecord.

DATED this ^*2^ day of September, 2026.

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Justices

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