Carolyn Smith v. City of Philadelphia

Dependency Court appointed Smith, T.A.H.'s maternal grandmother, as the child's permanent legal custodian ("PLC"). In 2024, Harris Griffin filed a petition to adopt T.A.H., and Smith consented to the adoption. After several hearings, in July 2025, the Juvenile Branch of the Philadelphia Family Court dismissed the adoption petition without prejudice and transferred the petition to the Domestic Relations Branch of the Family Court.²It reasoned that transfer was proper because the PLC order had been issued by the Domestic Relations Branch of the Family Court and provided that any modification of the order should go through that court.³

In September 2025, Harris Griffin and Smith initiated the underlying federal lawsuit, alleging civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as related conspiracy claims under §§ 1985 and 1986, and state law claims.⁴As relevant here, the complaint

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named the City of Philadelphia, various DHS and state court employees, and Harris Griffin's former court-appointed counsel as defendants. Harris Griffin and Smith also sought injunctive relief in connection with their claims. On defendants' motions to dismiss, the District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and denied injunctive relief. Harris Griffin and Smith timely appealed.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court's dismissal of appellants' complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009). A motion to dismiss may be granted "if, accepting all well- pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that [the] plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility."⁵Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any basis 2017). We note that the District Court made several alternative rulings when dismissing some of appellants' claims, and we need not reach any alternative determinations beyond the issues discussed here.

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supported by the record. Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

III.

We will affirm.⁶Appellants do not contest the District Court's determination that, to the extent they sought review and rejection of any order entered by the state court, their claims would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See T. M. v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1748 (2026). However, any claims alleging independent constitutional injuries fall outside the scope of that doctrine. See Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 172-73 (3d Cir. 2010). Appellants' central argument alleges a sweeping civil rights conspiracy against them in the underlying state court proceedings, because appellants believe that Smith should have been able to unilaterally consent to Harris Griffin's adoption of T.A.H. without further state involvement. They alleged that the following conduct supported their conspiracy claims: (1) an appointed child advocate told appellants that she found favorable evidence but did not share it with them and then withdrew from the case; (2) a guardian ad litem participated in hearings without notice to appellants; (3) various defendants maintained a similar legal position regarding the PLC order; (4) various

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individuals appeared at court hearings even though appellants sent them cease and desist letters; and (5) the form appellants signed in 2015 was somehow "suppressed."

Appellants' Br. at 26-29.

"[T]o properly plead an unconstitutional conspiracy, a plaintiff must assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred," which requires a plaintiff to plead "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made."

Great W. Mining & Min. Co., 615 F.3d at 178 (citation modified). None of appellants' allegations suggest that the defendants "reached an understanding" to violate appellants' civil rights. See Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 295 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation modified). Rather, at most, appellants' vague, conclusory belief that individuals involved in the underlying state court proceedings somehow conspired against them shows parallel conduct, but "parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality." Great W. Mining & Min. Co., 615 F.3d at 176 (citation omitted); see also Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that a complaint that presents "conclusory allegations of concerted action but is devoid of facts actually reflecting joint action" is insufficient).

Appellants next claimed that their due process rights were violated and that they were denied access to the court when defendants allegedly: (1) excluded them from hearings, (2) denied them electronic filing privileges, (3) somehow modified and then

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withheld a court order so others could "obtain unauthorized standing" to "obstruct" the adoption proceedings; and (4) withheld a document that appellants signed in 2015. See Appellants' Br. at 15-16, 20-21. Harris Griffin has maintained that she was not notified about and did not appear at certain hearings, but the transcripts attached to the complaint show her attendance, and although she claims to have provided a declaration stating that the record was falsified, no such declaration actually appears in the attachments to the complaint.⁷Further, appellants have not alleged that they were prevented from pursuing their legal claims or suffered any actual injury by being denied electronic filing privileges in state court, and the record establishes their extensive litigation of the underlying issues.⁸Cf. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that a plaintiff pursuing an access to the courts claim must allege an "actual injury" from losing an opportunity "to pursue a 'nonfrivolous' or 'arguable' underlying claim") (citation modified).

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Appellants have also not provided sufficient factual allegations to explain how they believe their due process rights were violated when the 2021 PLC order, or a document they signed in 2015, were somehow withheld from them in connection with their state court proceedings.⁹See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring a complaint to include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face"); Parker v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 158 F.4th 470, 481 (3d Cir. 2025) ("A Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim consists of three elements: (i) a deprivation of life, liberty, or property; (ii) by a state actor; (iii) without due process of law."). Accordingly, their claims were properly dismissed.¹⁰

Under the circumstances of this case, where appellants have not provided clarity on their speculative and implausible allegations in any of their filings, we agree with the

9 Appellants argue on appeal that the PLC was order was somehow "fraudulently modified," seemingly because some of the language in the order differs from the language in a separate order from 2019 in the underlying proceedings, and that unspecified "forensic metadata" would prove the alleged fraud. See Appellants' Br. at 19-20, 23-24. Even if appellants had included a claim that the PLC order had been

"fraudulently modified" in their complaint, however, these speculative allegations would have been insufficient to state a fraud claim. See Alpizar-Fallas v. Favero, 908 F.3d 910,

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District Court's conclusion to deny them leave to amend as futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002). Finally, appellants have not challenged the District Court's decision declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims after all of their federal claims were dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (1999). However, because the dismissal of those state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should have been a dismissal without prejudice, we modify the District Court's order, in part, to dismiss appellants' state law claims without prejudice. See N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. President of U.S., 653 F.3d 234, 241 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are "by definition without prejudice"). For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court's judgment as modified.¹¹

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