United States v. Antonio Miguel Carrow

2 Opinion of the Court 25-13650 Court improperly considered the need for retribution as described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). He further argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to achieve the sentencing purposes identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We affirm his sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

In August 2017, Carrow pleaded guilty to charges of posses- sion with intent to distribute controlled substances and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The Court sentenced Carrow to a total term of 100 months' imprisonment and five years of supervised release. According to the conditions of Carrow's supervised release, Carrow was to refrain from any un- lawful use of a controlled substance, to submit to periodic drug tests, to live at a place approved of by a probation officer, to notify said officer at least 10 days before any change in living arrange- ments, to participate in a substance abuse program, to submit to searches pursuant to the search policy of the court, to participate in a mental health treatment program, and to follow the instruc- tions of the probation officer assigned to him. Carrow began serv- ing his supervised release term on October 4, 2024. By July 2025, Carrow's probation officer had filed multiple violation reports alleging five violations of supervised release.¹The

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25-13650 Opinion of the Court 3 officer alleged that Carrow (1) refused to comply with recom- mended treatment services, (2) submitted a urine sample that tested presumptive positive for methamphetamine and ampheta- mine and admitted that he used methamphetamine, (3) again sub- mitted a presumptive positive test and admitted to continued use,

(4) left his approved residence and failed to notify the officer of the change in address, and (5) failed to report to the probation office as instructed.

The parties filed a joint motion to impose judgment and waiver of final probation revocation hearing. The parties agreed that the applicable guideline range for the supervised release viola- tions was 8 to 14 months and proposed a sentence of 9 months' imprisonment with no supervised release to follow. The Court de- nied the joint motion and moved forward with the revocation hearing.

At the revocation hearing, Carrow pleaded guilty to all five violations. At one point during the hearing, after Carrow men- tioned that he had totaled his car, the Court responded, "I heard this week that 43 percent of deceased accident victims in the state of Ohio two years ago . . . were high on marijuana. Just the drug marijuana . . . And you've got methamphetamine and ampheta- mines and other things. Ecstasy." The Court dismissed the plea agreement, stating that there was "too much disrespect here for the law; too much disrespect for the Court; too much new criminal to four violations. In July 2025, the probation officer amended the report to include the fifth violation.

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-13650 activity, absconding, and a criminal history of category of VI before all this even started."

The District Court accepted Carrow's plea of guilty and or- dered the term of supervised release revoked. The Court stated that it considered all the factors authorized under § 3583(e) and in- tended to avoid sentencing disparities in other similar cases. The Court considered Carrow's history and the need to promote deter- rence. The Court expressed that it had initially considered a five- year sentence but was swayed by Carrow's words at sentencing. Despite this, the Court still determined that Carrow owed the gov- ernment and the law "a payment." Ultimately, the Court sentenced Carrow to 24 months' imprisonment, an upward variance, based on "pre-existing criminal history and the conduct of this particular defendant since he's been on supervision, actually, just a year."

Carrow objected to both the procedural and substantive rea- sonableness of the sentence, stating that the violations were all technical and yielded a guideline range of only 8 to 14 months. Car- row believed the Court had treated him as if he had committed an offense other than a technical violation and argued that a sentence within the guideline range would have been reasonable. The Court overruled the objection and stated that it was "entitled to consider in the sentencing any conduct, particularly the conduct that has happened in the last year since he's been on supervision."

II. PROCEDURAL REASONABLENESS

In considering whether to revoke a term of supervised re- lease, a district court may consider a variety of factors set out in

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25-13650 Opinion of the Court 5 section 3553(a). However, as Carrow correctly argues, it may not consider, under § 3553(a)(2)(A), the need for a sentence "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense." The Supreme Court has held that "a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sen- tencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution." Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 196, 145 S. Ct. 2031, 2041 (2025). It is the role of fines, probation, and imprisonment to serve as "just deserts"

for an underlying offense, while supervised release is intended to serve rehabilitative ends. Id.

The issue for Carrow here is that he did not properly object on these grounds. When a defendant does not object to a court's improper reliance on retribution at a revocation hearing, we may review only for plain error. Id. at 202-03, 145 S. Ct. at 2045. Specif- ically, a defendant must "make the district court aware that it may be impermissibly relying on § 3553(a)(2)(A)" in order to avoid this standard of review. Id. Otherwise, the trial court will not have the ability to "recognize its potential error and clarify its revocation de- cision to make clear that it is not taking account of § 3553(a)(2)(A)."

Id.

Carrow's general objection to the procedural reasonable- ness of his sentence was not sufficient to put the District Court on notice of its potential reliance on improper evidence. Therefore, we must affirm the District Court's order "unless it is 'clear' or 'ob-

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6 Opinion of the Court 25-13650 vious' that the district court actually relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A)—be- cause it did so either expressly or by unmistakable implication. Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770,

1777 (1993)).

In revoking Carrow's term of supervised release, the District Court made one express reference to the "payment" Carrow owed the Court and the government and noted Carrow's disrespect for the law and the Court. But, when taken in the context of the Court's other remarks at the revocation hearing, it is clear the Court's comment concerned Carrow's violations of supervised re- lease rather than the underlying offense. This is made clear by the Court's reference to "too much new criminal activity," demon- strating a consideration of Carrow's violations of release rather than a focus on retribution. When briefly commenting on Car- row's prior criminal history, the Court noted its ability to sentence Carrow "particularly" on his past year of supervised release viola- tions.

Beyond generally referring to Carrow's criminal history, the Court did not discuss any aspect of the underlying offense, includ- ing any of the conduct involved. In fact, the Court gave a much plainer consideration to deterrence, one of the "forward-looking"

factors permissible under Esteras. 606 U.S. at 196, 145 S. Ct. at 2041. Considering how minimal the Court's comments implicating retri- bution were and the overall context of the District Court's words, we must conclude that Carrow failed to show that the District

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25-13650 Opinion of the Court 7 Court plainly erred. Therefore, Carrow's sentence was not proce- durally unreasonable.

III. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS

This Court reviews the substantive reasonableness of a sen- tence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1, 10 (11th Cir. 2022). The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of establishing that it is unreasonable based on the facts of the case and the factors provided by § 3553(a). United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).

In considering whether a sentence is substantively unreason- able, we must give "due deference" to the district court to consider and weigh the proper sentencing factors. United State v. Shabazz,

887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Cubero,

754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2014)). A district court's unjustified re- liance upon a single § 3553(a) factor is a symptom of an unreason- able sentence. United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2020). However, the district court does not have to give all the fac- tors equal weight, and it is granted discretion to attach great weight to one factor over another. United States v. Gomez, 955 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2020). We have explained that a district court abuses its discretion when it "(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors." Id. (quoting United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).

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8 Opinion of the Court 25-13650 Whether these factors justify a variance is a discretionary call; a sentence outside the guideline range is not presumed to be unreasonable. United States v. King, 57 F.4th 1334, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 2003). This Court will reverse on these grounds only if "left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court com- mitted a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case." United States v. McBride,

511 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 2006)). Carrow failed to show the District Court abused its discre- tion in imposing its 24-month sentence. We must give due defer- ence to the District Court's weighing of the relevant factors. Shabazz, 887 F.3d at 1224. Throughout its discussion, the District Court noted its consideration of the proper § 3353(a) factors. It spe- cifically referenced deterrence and Carrow's personal history fol- lowing his release. Carrow argues that the Court relied on facts not in evidence, citing the Court's car accident statistics, but these com- ments merely were in response to Carrow's statement that he to- taled his car. The Court displayed concern that Carrow would drive his car while under the influence, potentially harming himself or others. This comment relates the need to protect the public and deter future crime, both of which are permissible considerations. The Court acted well within its discretion in imposing a 10- month upward variance after considering all the factors and justi- fying its reason for doing so. See King, F.4th at 1338-39. Moreover,

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25-13650 Opinion of the Court 9 the sentence imposed, while an upward variance, remained well below the 60-month statutory maximum, indicating its reasonable- ness. See United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014). Thus, Carrow has not met his burden of showing that the 24-month term of imprisonment was substantively unreasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

Carrow has failed to show that his sentence was either pro- cedurally or substantively unreasonable. For these reasons we af- firm.

AFFIRMED.

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