United States v. Pedro Santacruz

2 Opinion of the Court 25-11943 Pedro Santacruz appeals his 187-month sentence for conspir- acy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and pos- session with intent to distribute methamphetamine -- a 23-month downward variance that was imposed upon resentencing. In an earlier appeal, Santacruz challenged the 192-month sentence im- posed at his first sentencing hearing. United States v. Santacruz, No. 23-12391 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024) (unpublished). We affirmed the district court's drug quantity and base offense level calculations and its application of a firearm enhancement, but vacated and re- manded as to its application of an aggravating-role adjustment. Id. In the instant appeal of the 187-month sentence imposed on re- mand, Santacruz argues that: (1) the district court erred in denying him safety-valve relief under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(18) and 5C1.2(a);

(2) the court clearly erred in its drug-weight attribution between him and his codefendant; and (3) his sentence is substantively un- reasonable. After thorough review, we affirm.

I.

We review a district court's factual findings concerning safety-valve relief for clear error. United States v. Maisonet, 121 F.4th 194, 199 (11th Cir. 2024). We review the sentence a district court imposes for "reasonableness," which "merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion." United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation modified).

II.

First, we are unpersuaded by Santacruz's claim that the dis- trict court erred in denying him safety-valve relief. A defendant is

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25-11943 Opinion of the Court 3 eligible for safety-valve relief if he meets the five criteria set forth in § 5C1.2(a), including that the defendant did not possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connection with the offense. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2). If a defendant convicted of a drug-traffick- ing offense meets the criteria set forth in the safety-valve provision, § 5C1.2(a), his offense level is decreased by two levels. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(18).

A defendant possesses a firearm in connection with a drug offense if the firearm is in proximity to drugs or if the firearm facil- itates the drug offense. United States v. Carillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82, 96 (11th Cir. 2013). A firearm can facilitate a drug offense if it embold- ens an actor who had the ability to display or discharge the weapon, serves as an integral part of a drug transaction, instills confidence in others who relied on the defendant, or serves as a "badge of of- fice" to help the defendant avoid detection. Id. (citation modified)

"Where any of these possibilities are shown by the evidence, the safety valve is unavailable unless the defendant negates the proof by a preponderance of the evidence, or unless the government pre- cludes relief by proving the fact by a preponderance of the evi- dence." Id. The presence of a gun within a defendant's dominion and control during a drug-trafficking offense will ordinarily show that he possessed the firearm in connection with the offense. Id. However, under United States v. Keene, when "a decision ei- ther way will not affect the outcome" of a sentence, it is unneces- sary for us to decide it. 470 F.3d 1347, 1348 (11th Cir. 2006). "A

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-11943 decision about a disputed guidelines issue will not affect the out- come either way where (1) the district court states it would have imposed the same sentence, even absent an alleged error, and

(2) the sentence is substantively reasonable." United States v. Olson,

127 F.4th 1266, 1275 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). If the sen- tencing court makes such a statement, we assume there was an er- ror, calculate the guideline range without the error, and analyze whether the sentence would be substantively reasonable under that guideline range to determine if any error was "truly harmless."

Keene, 470 F.3d at 1349-50.

Here, after the district court heard the parties' arguments and issued its 187-month sentence, it clearly said that it would have imposed the "same sentence . . . regardless of the application of [] safety-valve" relief. It reiterated that "even if the guidelines were lower because of this firearm issue, which I think was handled cor- rectly, but even if it's not, this is the correct sentence to me." The court made this determination based its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, including the quantity of drugs, the seriousness of Santacruz's offense, and the mitigating factors concerning his be- havior while incarcerated. In light of these unambiguous state- ments from the district court, we will not vacate and remand for resentencing so long as its error in denying safety-valve relief -- as- suming there was one -- did not affect the outcome of the case. See Olson, 127 F.4th at 1275; Keene, 470 F.3d at 1348-50. Under the analysis in Keene, which assumes the district court erred in not applying a safety-valve reduction, Santacruz's adjusted

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25-11943 Opinion of the Court 5 offense level without the error would have been 35 with a criminal history category of I, yielding a guideline range of 168 to 210 months' imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(18). This means that Santacruz's 187-month sentence would have been within the ad- justed guideline range that would have applied assuming an error. Further, as we'll discuss, Santacruz's 187-month sentence is sub- stantively reasonable. Thus, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the district court erred in declining to apply safety-valve relief because that error, if any, was "truly harmless." See Keene,

470 F.3d at 1349-50. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

III.

Next, we find no merit to Santacruz's claim that the court clearly erred in attributing 542,000 kilograms of converted drug weight to him, and only 12,588 to his codefendant. The law-of-the-case doctrine precludes us from "revisiting issues that were decided explicitly or by necessary implication in a prior ap- peal." United States v. Stein, 964 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). There are three exceptions to the law-of-the- case doctrine: (1) the evidence in a subsequent trial was "substan- tially different"; (2) there is a change in controlling law; or (3) the prior decision was "clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Id. at 1323 (citation modified).

Here, the law-of-the-case doctrine bars Santacruz's chal- lenge to the drug-quantity attribution because we affirmed the dis- trict court's drug quantity and base offense level calculation during his first appeal. See Santacruz, No. 23-12391, manuscript op. at 3-4,

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11. Additionally, no exceptions to the law-of-the-case doctrine ap- ply. See Stein, 964 F.3d at 1323. There was no second trial, nor was any of the evidence raised at his resentencing hearing substantially different. Further, Santacruz raises no change in controlling law, and our prior decision -- holding that the district court did not clearly err in its base offense level calculation -- was not clearly er- roneous. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue as well.

IV.

Finally, as we've noted, Santacruz's 187-month sentence was not substantively unreasonable. In reviewing the "'substantive reasonableness of [a] sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discre- tion standard,'" we consider the "'totality of the circumstances.'"

Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). The district court must impose a sentence "sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes" listed in

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).¹The court must consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, but "the weight given to each factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court," and the court may attach

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25-11943 Opinion of the Court 7 great weight to one factor over the others -- a decision that is within its sound discretion. United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015).

The advisory guideline range is "but one of many consider- ations" that a sentencing court must take into account when sen- tencing a defendant. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. Further, one of the purposes of the Guidelines is to provide certainty and fair- ness in sentencing and to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct. United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1102 (11th Cir. 2009). But even though a district court is required to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among simi- larly situated defendants, defendants who provide assistance to the government are not similarly situated to defendants who do not do so. Id. at 1101. In addition, "[d]isparity between the sentences im- posed on codefendants is generally not an appropriate basis for re- lief on appeal." United States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation modified).

The district court is not required to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors, and an acknowledgement that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors will suffice. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). Additionally, the court's "failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate that the court erroneously ignored or failed to consider the evidence." Butler, 39 F.4th at 1356

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8 Opinion of the Court 25-11943 (citation modified). However, a sentence may be substantively un- reasonable when a court unjustifiably relies on any single § 3553(a) factor, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, bases the sen- tence on impermissible factors, or selects the sentence arbitrarily. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191-92. A sentence that suffers from one of these symptoms is not per se unreasonable; rather, we must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine the sentence's reasona- bleness. Id. at 1192. "We will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the [court] accorded to a given [§ 3553(a)] factor . . . as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented." United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation modified).

As the reviewing court, we may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness to a sentence outside of the advisory guideline range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We "may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district court's deci- sion that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance." Id. We will vacate a sentence only if we are left with the "definite and firm" conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriv- ing at a sentence that is outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191 (citation modified). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the rec- ord, the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and the substantial def- erence afforded sentencing courts. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256.

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25-11943 Opinion of the Court 9 Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deter- mining that a 187-month sentence -- which was a 23-month down- ward variance from the advisory guideline range -- was warranted. The record reveals that the district court considered the advisory guideline range, the parties' arguments, and the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstances of Santacruz's offense, his history and characteristics, the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, deterrence, protection of the public, his training, the kinds of sentences available, all pertinent policies, and the need to avoid sentencing disparities. In so doing, the court ex- pressly noted that Santacruz had committed a serious drug crime, but also that he had worked hard on his education while incarcer- ated and that the sentence was well below the recalculated guide- line range. In addition, despite Santacruz's claims to the contrary, the court acknowledged Santacruz's arguments concerning the proposed changes to the methamphetamines guidelines and the disparity between his sentence and his codefendant's. Further, the court acted within its discretion to find that Santacruz's conduct warranted a different sentence than his codefendant's, based on the differences between their offense conduct and between their level of cooperation with the government. See Docampo, 573 F.3d at 1101. As for Santacruz's argument that his sentence was substan- tially above the national average of sentences for comparable of- fenders, he has not shown how his record is similar to the average defendant in the statistics. Id. at 1102.

On this record, the court acted well within its discretion to vary downward based on Santacruz's mitigating behavior and to

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10 Opinion of the Court 25-11943 give greater weight to need to reflect the seriousness of the offense in crafting its sentence. See Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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