Kimberley Laris, as Trustee of the Hope for a Better Tomorrow Revocable Trust v. Stephen P. Weglarz, Jr., Trustee of Mary T. Weglarz Revocable Trust u/d/t/ Dated May 28, 2002 & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2024-0391, Kimberley Laris, as Trustee of the Hope for a Better Tomorrow Revocable Trust v. Stephen P. Weglarz, Jr., Trustee of Mary T. Weglarz Revocable Trust u/d/t/ Dated May 28, 2002 & a., the court on August 14, 2026, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on appeal, has considered the oral arguments of the parties, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). Following a bench trial, the Superior Court (Howard, C.J.) ruled that land owned by the plaintiff, Kimberley Laris, as Trustee of the Hope for a Better Tomorrow Revocable Trust, benefits from an easement to access a right-of-way across land abutting property owned by defendants Stephen P. Weglarz, Jr. and Mary T. Weglarz, as co-trustees of the Mary T. Weglarz Revocable Trust. The trial court also awarded attorney's fees to Laris. The Weglarzes appeal both rulings, and Laris cross-appeals the trial court's attorney's fees ruling as to the awarded amount. We affirm.

I. Background The trial court found, or the record otherwise supports, the following facts. Laris and the Weglarzes both own property in Durham located between Route 4, also known as Piscataqua Road, and Little Bay. Laris's property abuts Route 4 to the north and is located to the north of the Weglarzes' property, which abuts Cedar Point Road to the south. The parties dispute the existence and location of, as well as Laris's right to use, a right-of-way to access Cedar Point Road and Little Bay. The parties used, and the trial court incorporated into its order, the following demonstrative exhibit showing a general, although not entirely accurate, orientation of the current properties.

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A. History of Disputed Property The parties' properties were once part of a larger parcel formerly owned by Mary Ackroyd. In the 1940s, Ackroyd subdivided her property and began conveying various parcels, beginning with those to the south of what is now Cedar Point Road. Between Cedar Point Road and Little Bay, Ackroyd conveyed parcels to Joseph and Elizabeth Picard and Edward and Alice Putney. Ackroyd used her own land as the easterly boundary of the Picard property and the westerly boundary of the Putney property, thus retaining some portion of land between the two parcels extending from Cedar Point Road to Little Bay. Ackroyd next conveyed properties to the north of what is now Cedar Point Road. She first conveyed to the Picards the lot to the north of their other property, directly across Cedar Point Road. Ackroyd then conveyed another parcel to Alfred Pomerleau but again retained some portion of land between that property and the northern Picard property. The Weglarzes eventually purchased the former Pomerleau property.

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Pomerleau conveyed his parcel to Howard Page in 1953. The deed conveying the property to Page contains an express reference to a north-south right-of-way. The deed describes the property's bounds, in relevant part, as

"running Westerly by said Ackroyd land a distance of fifty (50) feet to a right of way which extends Northerly and Southerly between the land herein conveyed and the land of Joseph Picard."

In 1960, Eleanor and Elizabeth Towle (Towle sisters) inherited from Ackroyd a "[p]arcel of land in Durham, N.H. at Cedar Point, containing eight acres, more or less." Given the lack of specificity in this description, the Towle sisters retained a surveyor to create a plan (Towle Plan) of the property they inherited. The Towle Plan depicts a "R.O.W." between the Picard (mistakenly labeled Parker) and Page properties, although it does not show Cedar Point Road. Nor does the plan specify who owns the land on which the "R.O.W." is located. The Towle Plan, which shows the Towle sisters' land to the north and west, is shown in relevant part below.

In 1965, the Towle sisters conveyed their land to Jacob Ciborowski by warranty deed, which incorporated the Towle Plan by reference. The meaning and intending clause of the deed describes the property intended to be conveyed as "all of the premises located on Cedar Point . . . which were inherited by [the Towle sisters] from the said Mary H. Ackroyd . . . . Subject to any easements and rights of way outstanding of record." The metes-and- bounds description in the deed describes the property as running along the

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northerly side of the Page property, "a right-of-way," and the Picard property. It does not, however, appear to include the land underlying the right-of-way. Ciborowksi retained the same surveyors to prepare another plan (Ciborowski Plan) based upon the Towle Plan. The Ciborowski Plan subdivided Ciborowski's property into lots 1A, 1B, and 1C. Lot 1C included the western portion of Ciborowski's property abutting the "R.O.W." and neighboring lots. The Durham Planning Board's stamp of approval notes: "Access to Lot C from right of way on south side of lot only."

Ciborowski conveyed Lot 1C to the Salvation Army in 1974. After a series of conveyances, the Sahoveys purchased Lot 1C. The Sahoveys and their neighbors, the Deludes, agreed to an adjustment of the boundary line between their properties. The plan memorializing the boundary line adjustment shows the "R.O.W." abutting the Delude property (Lot 2), not the Sahovey property to the northeast (Lot 1).

The Deludes subsequently purchased the Sahovey property and conveyed that property, Lot 1 as shown on the boundary line adjustment plan, to the Nickersons in 2002. The deed conveying the property to the Nickersons incorporates the boundary line adjustment plan. It also creates an easement over the Delude property (Lot 2 on the boundary line adjustment plan) to access a right-of-way by providing the following:

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The Grantors also convey to the Grantees a certain easement with a width of no greater than fifteen (15) feet across Lot #2 on the above-referenced Plan in favor of the above-described Lot #1 to be mutually marked and further identified by the Grantors and the Grantees to allow all appropriate and reasonable ingress and egress, specifically to an established, but currently unsurveyed Right of Way, if said Right of Way abuts Lot #2, as is currently shown on the above-referenced Plan.

Laris eventually purchased the former Nickerson property in 2017 by deed incorporating the boundary line adjustment plan and containing the same above-quoted language granting an easement. She then conveyed the property to the plaintiff trust, of which Laris is trustee.

The Weglarzes purchased the former Pomerleau-Page property in 1996. The deed conveying the property to the Weglarzes describes the property's bounds, in relevant part, as follows:

thence westerly by land of said Ackroyd a distance of fifty (50) feet to a right of way that extends Northerly and Southerly between the premises herein conveyed and land now or formerly of Joseph Picard; thence Southerly by said right of way a distance of one hundred fifteen (115) feet . . . .

The Weglarzes conveyed their property to the defendant trust by deed using the same language describing the property's westerly boundary as the north-south right-of-way.

B. Present Dispute

Laris testified at trial that she purchased her property with the expectation that it benefited from a right-of-way to access Cedar Point Road. After moving into the property, Laris and her husband contacted the abutting neighbors regarding their intent to "clean up" the right-of-way. Laris's husband met with Stephen Weglarz, who communicated his understanding of the location of the right-of-way with respect to the Weglarz property. Laris and her husband testified that from 2018 to 2020, they and their daughter regularly used the right-of-way to access Little Bay for kayaking. Laris's daughter also used the right-of-way to access a school bus stop on Cedar Point Road, rather than the busier Route 4.

In 2018, Laris submitted a variance request to the Town of Durham proposing to subdivide her property. Her proposal contemplated establishing a driveway to one of the subdivided properties over the right-of-way to access Cedar Point Road. The Weglarzes, as abutters, opposed Laris's variance

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application. Although they acknowledged that "[t]his right of way was established many years ago as a pass through," they claimed that "[t]he original spirit and intent of this right of way was not for an additional driveway to add traffic to" Cedar Point Road. The Weglarzes also commissioned a survey of the area surrounding their property. Regarding the land between the Weglarz lot and the Russel Realty, LLC (former Picard) lot, the survey plan notes: "This land appears to be remaining unconveyed land of Mary H. Ackroyd, status of right-of-way unknown." The plan is depicted, in relevant part, below.

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In 2019, the Weglarzes filed a petition to quiet title to the adjacent pentagonal 0.0818-acre parcel (the disputed parcel) to the west of their property under the theory of adverse possession. They at some point installed a fence and "no trespassing" sign to prevent Laris from accessing the right-of- way over the disputed parcel. They did not, however, name Laris in the 2019 action despite knowing that Laris claimed a right-of-way over the disputed parcel. The trial court initially granted the Weglarzes' petition to quiet title to the disputed parcel "free and clear of any claims of said Respondents."

In 2021, upon learning of the Weglarzes' petition, Laris moved to intervene, vacate the trial court's decree, and reopen the quiet title action. Laris also filed a separate quiet title petition seeking declaratory and equitable relief. The court amended its final decree in the Weglarzes' 2019 action, granting the Weglarzes title to the disputed parcel "except any easements or rights of way or other encumbrances that may exist as a matter of record or by statute, or that may be decreed by the court."

Laris's quiet title action proceeded to a bench trial in September 2023. The trial court thereafter issued an order concluding, in pertinent part, that

"the doctrine of estoppel by deed precludes the Weglarzes from denying the existence of the" right-of-way. The court also granted Laris's request for attorney's fees and costs with respect to the 2021 action "under the bad faith litigation exception." It determined that the Weglarzes "initiated [their] quiet title action as a calculated effort to improperly extinguish [Laris's] easement rights, and [Laris's 2021] suit therefore should have been unnecessary."

Although the court granted Laris's request in part, it denied her request for attorney's fees relating to her intervention in the Weglarzes' 2019 quiet title action.

The Weglarzes moved for reconsideration regarding the trial court's legal rulings and for clarification of certain factual findings. The court reiterated its determination that the right-of-way at issue "includes the entire disputed parcel." Based upon its conclusion regarding the existence of the easement, the court further clarified that the Weglarzes had failed to establish the required elements to prevail on their adverse possession claim for the disputed parcel.

Regarding attorney's fees, the court on reconsideration concluded that

"due to the complex nature of this action, the causal connection between the attorney's fees [Laris] incurred and the [Weglarzes'] bad faith is lacking." It therefore ordered the Weglarzes to pay Laris's attorney's fees "associated with filing suit in this action, but not those fees associated with prosecuting this action because [Laris] would have incurred those fees in defending or prosecuting a counterclaim in the Weglarzes' earlier quiet title action."

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This appeal and cross-appeal followed. We denied Laris's motion to dismiss the Weglarzes' appeal and stayed the matter pending the trial court's resolution of the attorney's fees issue. The trial court ultimately awarded Laris $31,944.12 in attorney's fees and costs. The parties thereafter filed amended notices of appeal and cross-appeal.

II. Analysis A. Amendment of Complaint As an initial matter, the Weglarzes contend that the trial court erred by allowing Laris to amend her complaint to argue for the existence of an easement under the doctrine of estoppel by deed. "Whether to allow a party to amend its pleadings rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb the trial court's decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion." New London Hosp. Ass'n v. Town of Newport, 174 N.H. 68, 76 (2021). "When reviewing whether a ruling made by the trial court is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we determine whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made." Id.

"Generally, a court should allow amendments to pleadings to correct technical defects but need only allow substantive amendments when necessary to prevent injustice." Id. at 75; see RSA 514:9 (2021) (granting trial court discretion to permit substantive amendments to pleadings "in any stage of the proceedings, upon such terms as the court shall deem just and reasonable, when it shall appear to the court that it is necessary for the prevention of injustice; but the rights of third persons shall not be affected thereby").

"Accordingly, liberal amendment of pleadings is permitted unless the changes would surprise the opposing party, introduce an entirely new cause of action, or call for substantially different evidence." New London Hosp. Ass'n, 174 N.H. at 76.

In her original complaint, Laris requested that the court "[f]ind, rule, and declare that the Ackroyd Right-of-Way is a valid easement and continues to exist for the benefit of the Laris parcel and [its] owners." On September 20, 2022, one day after the Weglarzes moved for summary judgment, Laris moved to amend her complaint. In her motion to amend, Laris asserted that "[t]he facts of the case establish two additional alternate theories of recovery" — specifically, estoppel by deed and estoppel by recitals in instruments. Laris argued that amending her complaint would not change the cause of action, surprise or prejudice the defendants, or require substantially different evidence. She also submitted that the amendment would permit the court "to consider all relevant claims and theories of recovery in a single proceeding."

Contrary to the Weglarzes' argument that allowing Laris's amendment

"prejudiced [them] by frustrating their discovery strategy," Laris's assertion of

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additional theories of recovery did not alter the factual basis underlying the parties' dispute. As the trial court put it, "the proposed amendment does not seek to allege alternative or new factual assertions, but, rather, seeks to add the additional theories of recovery based on the same facts asserted in her original complaint." We therefore conclude that the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion by granting Laris's motion to amend her complaint. See id.

B. Estoppel by Deed

Turning to the merits, the trial court ultimately ruled that the Weglarzes are estopped by deed from denying the existence of an easement over the disputed parcel for the benefit of Laris's property. "[W]here property is conveyed in a deed and one or more of the calls is an abuttal on a private way there is a grant or at least a presumption of a grant of an easement in such way when the way is owned by the grantor." Martin v. Far Echo Harbor Club,

177 N.H. 778, 784 (2026), 2026 N.H. 9, ¶18. "In these circumstances, the grantor, and all claiming under him, are estopped by deed from denying such an easement exists." Id. (quotation omitted). "[I]t is of no consequence that the fee to the private way remains in the hands of the original grantor or his assigns, or that the grantor did not intend to grant an easement." Id. (brackets omitted). "Such an estoppel is one by deed because the deed on its face makes either an express grant or one arising by necessary implication and prevents the grantor from denying the representation made." Id.

1. Location of Right-of-Way The Weglarzes first dispute the trial court's determination regarding the location of the right-of-way. They argue that the trial court erred by finding that the original grantors of the disputed parcel — the Towle sisters — owned the land underlying the right-of-way abutting the land conveyed to Ciborowski. In the Weglarzes' view, the evidence at trial established that the right-of-way is located not on the disputed parcel but, rather, on the former Picard property to the west.

Resolving this issue requires the interpretation of deeds. "As a question of law, we review the trial court's interpretation of a deed de novo." White v. Auger, 171 N.H. 660, 663 (2019). "We base our judgment on this question of law upon the trial court's findings of fact." Id. "If the language of the deed is clear and unambiguous, we will interpret the intended meaning from the deed itself without resort to extrinsic evidence." Id. at 663-64. "If, however, the language of the deed is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions and the circumstances surrounding the conveyance may be used to clarify its terms." Id. at 664. While the interpretation of deeds presents a question of law, "[t]he location of monuments and the determination of boundaries conforming to a description in a deed is a question of fact." Chao v. The Richey

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Co., Inc., 122 N.H. 1115, 1119 (1982). When "the fact-finder's determinations as to the location of boundaries are supported by evidence, they will not be disturbed." Id.

The trial court determined that the right-of-way "is located on the entirety of the slice of land Mary Ackroyd retained between the Picard/Putney/Pomerleau lots, fee to which the Towle sisters never validly conveyed to Ciborowski." The court found the language in the Towle and Ciborowski plans and deeds ambiguous in that "the location of the [right-of- way] and its width could be applied to two different subjects," locating the right-of-way either on the former Picard lot or "on whatever land sat between Page and the Picard northern lot" — the disputed parcel. Based upon the entire record, the court ultimately concluded, "as a matter of law and fact, that the Towle sisters intended to describe the [right-of-way] as the entire disputed parcel" of land between the Picard and Pomerleau-Page lots. The Weglarzes' challenge to the trial court's finding relies upon the Towle and Ciborowski plans and the deeds that incorporate them by reference. At trial, however, the Weglarzes questioned Laris's title examiner about the right- of-way's location, cross-referencing the courses and distances in the plans with the Towle and Ciborowski deeds and other surveys. The court concluded — and the Weglarzes now emphasize — that these deeds and plans, "read in a vacuum, would place the [right-of-way] on land to the left/west of the disputed parcel — land formerly of Picard . . . not on the disputed parcel."

As the trial court also observed, however, the Towle Plan, upon which the Ciborowski Plan is based, contains numerous errors in the measurements of abutting properties. Laris's title examiner testified at trial that, while the measurements of the property surveyed for the Towle and Ciborowski plans are correct, the plans are "not a survey of the right-of-way" and, instead, merely list the abutting properties. Comparing the depicted measurements of the abutting properties, specifically the Picard northern and Pomerleau-Page properties, to the metes-and-bounds descriptions of those properties reveals inaccuracies on the Towle and Ciborowski plans.

Laris's title examiner testified that the Pomerleau-Page property "is the 50 feet outside of the westerly boundary of the upper [Dutilly] land." This testimony comports with the metes-and-bounds description in the deed conveying the property from Pomerleau to Page, which provides the following:

running thence Northerly by other land . . . deeded to Mary F. [Dutilly] and Katherine E. Farrell a distance of one hundred and fifteen (115) feet to an iron marker at land of Mary H. Ackroyd; thence running Westerly by said Ackroyd land a distance of fifty

(50) feet to a right of way which extends Northerly and Southerly between the land herein conveyed and the land of Joseph Picard.

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(Emphasis added.) This description is inconsistent with the measurements of the Page property shown on the Towle Plan. That plan shows the "Dutilly & Farrell" property running fifty feet westerly from the boundary of the "M.F. Dutilly" property and thus places the Page property beginning fifty feet to the west of the "upper" Dutilly property. According to the metes-and-bounds description in the deed, the Page property is located on what was labeled as the

"Dutilly & Farrell" property on the Towle Plan. The Towle Plan likewise mislabels the size of the Picard northern property. According to the deed conveying the property from Ackroyd to the Picards, the property runs "easterly along other land of [Ackroyd] sixty-six and one-half (66½) feet." By contrast, the Towle Plan shows the Picard northern property running only fifty feet easterly to the right-of-way. Together, these deeds reveal that the Towle and Ciborowski plans misplace the Picard northern property, the unconveyed Ackroyd land, and the Page property. This conclusion finds further support in the original conveyances by Ackroyd to the Picards, Putney, and Pomerleau, all of which retained land to Ackroyd running north and south between the parcels. Thus, we agree with the trial court's determination that these plans are not reliable surveys from which to locate the right-of-way. By erroneously measuring the Picard property as running only 50 feet easterly to the right-of-way, the Towle Plan places the right-of-way and the Page property further to the west than their actual locations. The metes-and-bounds descriptions in the deeds for abutting properties support the conclusion that the portion of unconveyed land the Towle sisters inherited is larger than the "R.O.W." shown on the Towle and Ciborowski plans.

Indeed, the survey the Weglarzes commissioned when commencing their quiet title action places the Pomerleau-Page-Weglarz property further to the east than does the Towle plan. Specifically, it shows the Weglarzes' parcel running 50.51 feet between the unconveyed Ackroyd land and the neighboring property to the east. To the west of the Weglarz parcel, the survey shows "land [that] appears to be remaining unconveyed land of Mary H. Ackroyd" running

31.91 feet easterly to a pin, and 17.35 feet southwesterly to the former Picard property. Other surveys support this location of the unconveyed Ackroyd property.

Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the Towle and Ciborowski plans, while recognizing the existence and approximate location for the

"R.O.W.," are not dependable sources for the right-of-way's precise location. Because the Picard and Pomerleau-Page properties abut Cedar Point Road, the only property depicted on the Towle Plan that would benefit from the north- south right-of-way is that of the Towle sisters. We therefore conclude that the record supports the trial court's determination that the right-of-way is located

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on the property Ackroyd retained. This property includes the entire disputed parcel to which the Weglarzes sought to quiet title. Additionally, given our conclusion that the Towle Plan does not accurately locate the right-of-way, we are not persuaded by the Weglarzes' argument that the right-of-way is no wider than the 17.3-foot "R.O.W." depicted in that plan.

2. Existence of Easement Based upon our conclusion that the right-of-way is on the unconveyed Ackroyd land, we agree with the trial court's application of the doctrine of estoppel by deed. This analysis turns on the fact that the Towle sisters never validly conveyed the land underlying the right-of-way to Ciborowski. Although the "[m]eaning and intending" clause in the Towle-Ciborowski deed purports to convey "all of the premises located on Cedar Point . . . which were inherited by [the Towle sisters] from the said Mary H. Ackroyd," the metes-and-bounds description makes no mention of the land between the Picard and Page properties. See Town of Newbury v. Landrigan, 165 N.H. 236, 240 (2013) ("[A]n unambiguous metes and bounds description will prevail over a general reference to a prior deed in a 'meaning and intending clause.'"). Therefore, as the trial court determined, the Towle sisters did not convey the disputed parcel when they conveyed their property to Ciborowski, and they retained ownership of the land underlying the right-of-way.

In the deed conveying the rest of the Towle sisters' property to Ciborowski, "one or more of the calls is an abuttal on a private way . . . owned by the grantor" — the disputed parcel — the fee to which the Towle sisters owned. Martin, 177 N.H. at 784; 2026 N.H. 9, ¶18. The deed provides: "thence running by said land now or formerly of H. Page and by the northerly side of a right-of-way and by land now or formerly of J. [Picard] . . . a distance of 84.3 feet." Therefore, "there is a grant or at least a presumption of a grant of an easement in such way." Id.

The Weglarzes also claim that the deed conveying the Towle sisters' property to Ciborowski did not describe "an abuttal on a private way," id., because the right-of-way runs perpendicular, rather than parallel to, the property. We are not persuaded. Nothing in our precedents suggests as narrow a reading of the word "abuttal" as the one for which the Weglarzes advocate. See Martin, 177 N.H. at 784; 2026 N.H. 9, ¶18; 700 Lake Avenue Realty Co. v. Dolleman, 121 N.H. 619, 623 (1981).

Nor are we persuaded by the Weglarzes' argument that estoppel by deed is inapplicable here because Laris failed to prove reliance upon language in her deed. Our precedents look to reliance by the original grantees, but they do not require that the party asserting estoppel by deed establish their own reliance upon language in the deed. See Martin, 177 N.H. at 784; 2026 N.H. 9, ¶18; Loeffler v. Bernier, 173 N.H. 180, 185 (2020). Even if such reliance were

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required, Laris and her husband both testified that they relied upon the language of the deed and a tax map describing access to Little Bay for kayaking when purchasing the property. The deed conveyed to Laris "a certain easement

. . . across [the Delude property] . . . to allow all appropriate and reasonable ingress and egress, specifically to an established, but currently unsurveyed Right of Way." We are therefore not persuaded by the Weglarzes' argument, and we affirm the trial court's determination as to the location of the right-of- way and the court's conclusion that the Weglarzes are estopped from denying the existence of an easement to use the right-of-way. Accordingly, we need not address Laris's remaining arguments regarding whether an easement exists under alternative theories.

The Weglarzes also assert that the trial court's adverse possession determination in its order on their motion for reconsideration "would be additional reversible error" to "the extent that [it] could be read" to alter the final decree in the Weglarzes' 2019 action. However, the Weglarzes' briefs address this argument in two short paragraphs alleging that the trial court may have erred, and they do not cite any legal authority supporting their claim. This argument, therefore, is insufficiently briefed to warrant review. See State

v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003) ("[I]n the realm of appellate review, a mere laundry list of complaints regarding adverse rulings by the trial court, without developed legal argument, is insufficient to warrant judicial review."). C. Attorney's Fees

We now turn to the parties' arguments regarding the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Laris. "We will not overturn a trial court's award of attorney's fees unless it is an unsustainable exercise of discretion." Jesurum v. WBTSCC Ltd. P'ship, 169 N.H. 469, 481 (2016). When applying this standard,

"we keep in mind the substantial deference given to the trial court's decision on attorney's fees, and uphold the decision if the record provides some support for it." Id.

1. Weglarzes' Arguments The Weglarzes first contend that the doctrine of res judicata barred Laris from seeking attorney's fees in her 2021 action after she did not appeal the trial court's refusal to grant attorney's fees in its second amended final decree in the Weglarzes' 2019 action. After reconsidering its initial award of all fees relating to the 2021 action, the trial court awarded Laris the fees she incurred

"in preparing and filing" her 2021 quiet title petition, but not those she incurred "in prosecuting the action."

"Res judicata precludes the litigation in a later case of matters actually decided, and matters that could have been litigated, in an earlier action between the same parties for the same cause of action." Sleeper v. Hoban

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Family P'ship, 157 N.H. 530, 533 (2008). As Laris aptly observes, the fees she incurred in filing her 2021 petition "could not have been litigated as part of"

the Weglarzes' 2019 quiet title action, "which was all but concluded by the time Laris initiated the instant action." At the time the trial court declined to award fees in the first action, the extent of the fees incurred by Laris in the 2021 action was still unknown. Accordingly, we reject the Weglarzes' argument that res judicata barred the trial court from awarding attorney's fees relating to Laris's 2021 quiet title petition.

The Weglarzes next assert that the trial court erred by finding that: (1) they brought their 2019 quiet title action "to eliminate Laris's easement claim"; and (2) Laris was a necessary party in the 2019 quiet title action. (Capitalization and emphasis omitted.) We disagree with both arguments. First, although the Weglarzes claim that they "never intended nor considered the quiet title order [in their 2019 action] to have any effect on Laris's easement claim," the original final decree in that action quieted title to the Weglarzes "disencumbered of any claim, right or title of the Respondents [and] all unknown persons who claim any interest or estate in the premises."

Further, as the trial court acknowledged, the Weglarzes stipulated "to the fact that they knew Laris claimed such an interest, but they brought suit without naming her anyway." Laris and her husband contacted their neighbors, including the Weglarzes, after purchasing the property in 2017 regarding their intent to clean up and use the right-of-way, and Stephen Weglarz communicated his understanding of the right-of-way's location to Laris's husband. After that discussion, the Weglarzes constructed a fence and posted a "no trespassing" sign preventing Laris from using the right-of-way. Based upon the Weglarzes' awareness of Laris's claim to the easement and the Weglarzes' demonstrated intent to prevent Laris from accessing the right-of- way, the trial court did not err by finding that the Weglarzes initiated their 2019 quiet title petition in an attempt to extinguish Laris's claimed easement right.

Second, we conclude that Laris was a necessary party in the Weglarzes' 2019 action. "The necessary parties to any proceeding, . . . are those . . . who have an interest in the subject-matter of the suit and whose rights may be concluded by the judgment." Porter v. Coco, 154 N.H. 353, 357 (2006). RSA 498:5-a sets forth the standard for petitions to quiet title. It provides that such a petition "shall describe the property in question and state the plaintiff's claim, interest or title and the manner in which the plaintiff acquired such claim, interest or title and shall name the person or persons who may claim such adverse estate or interest." RSA 498:5-a (2010) (emphases added). As mentioned above, the Weglarzes' awareness of Laris's claim to an easement on the disputed parcel required naming Laris as a party in the quiet title action, even if Laris's entitlement to the easement was uncertain. See id.; Porter, 154 N.H. at 357.

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The Weglarzes also contend that the trial court erred by awarding fees in accordance with Harkeem v. Adams, 117 N.H. 687 (1977). In Harkeem, we explained that "when overriding considerations so indicate, the award of fees lies within the power of the court, and is an appropriate tool in the court's arsenal to do justice and vindicate rights." Harkeem, 117 N.H. at 690. Bad faith conduct held to justify the award of counsel fees has been found where one party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons; where the litigant's conduct can be characterized as unreasonably obdurate or obstinate; and where it should have been unnecessary for the successful party to have brought the action.

Id. at 690-91 (quotation and citations omitted). "Where an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right, which should have been freely enjoyed without such intervention, an award of counsel fees on the basis of bad faith is appropriate." Id. at 691. The Weglarzes submit that there "is no evidence of bad faith . . . in connection with this easement action, and no finding of the same by the trial court." They also maintain that Laris's easement claim was not clearly defined, as evidenced by the amount of time Laris's attorneys spent on research in relation to this case. In its order reconsidering the award of attorney's fees, the trial court recognized that "even had the [Weglarzes] named [Laris] in the prior action, however, substantial litigation would have ensued." Accordingly, the court limited the award of attorney's fees to only the "fees associated with filing suit in this action" on the theory that Laris "should not have had to bring this action." (Emphasis added.)

The trial court's conclusion recognizes that, while Laris would have incurred fees by litigating her easement rights in the Weglarzes' 2019 action, she would not have incurred the cost of filing a separate quiet title petition had the Weglarzes properly named her as a party in their 2019 action. As Harkeem contemplates, a court may award attorney's fees "where it should have been unnecessary for the successful party to have brought the action." Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion by awarding attorney's fees under Harkeem. See id.; Jesurum, 169 N.H. at 481.

2. Laris's Arguments In her cross-appeal, Laris argues that the trial court erred by reducing the award of attorney's fees to only those associated with filing her 2021 action. She maintains that the Weglarzes' "extraordinary misconduct" throughout both the 2019 and 2021 matters "satisfies the bad-faith litigation standard" and

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warrants awarding her "not only the full fees incurred by her in the underlying trial court action, but also in the instant appeal."

As discussed previously, the trial court's purpose in narrowing the attorney's fees award was to recognize that "even if the [Weglarzes] had properly named [Laris] in the prior suit, the vast majority of the legal work would still have had to be performed in order to prosecute [Laris's] claims to the right of way." Laris either would have had to defend against or assert a counterclaim in the Weglarzes' action or litigate her easement rights in the instant dispute. As the trial court's extensive orders on the merits and the motions for reconsideration, as well as the foregoing discussion in this order, demonstrate, Laris's right to the easement was not "a clearly defined and established right." Harkeem, 117 N.H. at 691. Accordingly, the trial court's attorney's fees award strikes the appropriate balance by recognizing that "it should have been unnecessary for" Laris to have brought her 2021 quiet title petition. Id.

In these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion by awarding Laris only the fees "incurred in preparing and filing the instant action, but not ultimately in prosecuting the action." See Jesurum, 169 N.H. at 481. As to Laris's request for fees incurred in this appeal, the same reasoning applies. Even had Laris been named as a party in the Weglarzes' 2019 action and avoided filing a separate quiet title petition, she or the Weglarzes may well have filed an appeal in that matter. We conclude that the trial court's award in its April 23, 2025 order constitutes a sustainable exercise of its discretion, and we decline to award additional attorney's fees Laris incurred relating to this appeal.

Affirmed.

DONOVAN, COUNTWAY, and GOULD, JJ., concurred; MACDONALD,

C.J., sat for oral argument but did not participate in the final vote.

Timothy A. Gudas, Clerk