Timothy McLaughlin v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 249

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 25-1613

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TIMOTHY MCLAUGHLIN,

Appellant

v.

THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL 249; MARC SCOTT; KATIE SCOTT; BYRON ROLAND; DON KRAUS; MICHAEL A. CEOFFE; FRANK CONFORTI; JOSEPH ROSSI; CBS STUDIOS, INC.; TRISTAR PICTURES, INC. ______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00832)

District Judge: Honorable William S. Stickman, IV ______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

May 15, 2026

Before: SHWARTZ, MASCOTT, and McKEE, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: August 10, 2026)

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OPINION^

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McKEE, Circuit Judge.

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

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Timothy McLaughlin appeals three District Court orders denying his claims that his blacklisting from work as a driver on movie and television productions violated the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA").¹

McLaughlin's arguments on appeal rest on the assertions that (1) the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 249 ("the Union") has some authority to dictate who the production companies hire for driver positions,²and (2) that his age compared to the average age of drivers selected suggests age-related animus. However, the record shows that the Union has no authority in the production companies' decision-making process and merely comparing McLaughlin's age to the average age of the selected drivers ignores the many qualified individuals, forty or older, who were chosen to fill those positions. Additionally, McLaughlin's arguments fail because his Amended Complaint

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lacks allegations supporting an inference of discriminatory or retaliatory conduct by the producers or the Union.

For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court.³

I. CBS's Motion to Dismiss and TriStar's Motion to Dismiss in Part⁴

In dismissing McLaughlin's claims of ADEA age retaliation against CBS Studios Inc. and TriStar Pictures Inc., the District Court held that "McLaughlin failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his protected activity and [the producers'] failure to hire him as a movie driver for [their respective productions]."⁵We agree. We apply McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green's⁶burden-shifting framework where, as here, there is no direct evidence of retaliation.⁷Under this framework, "[a] prima facie case of illegal retaliation requires a showing of '(1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee's

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protected activity and the employer's adverse action.'"⁸McLaughlin did not sufficiently allege the third element, which requires that (1) "the temporal proximity between [his protected activity and the employers' adverse action is] unusually suggestive," or (2)

"any intervening antagonism by the employer, inconsistencies in the reasons the employer gives for its adverse action, and any other evidence suggest[] that the employer had a retaliatory animus when taking the adverse action."⁹Two and three years passed between McLaughlin's latest protected activity and his failure to be hired by TriStar and CBS, respectively. While "there is no bright line rule as to what constitutes unduly suggestive temporal proximity," we have declined to find an inference of causation without additional evidence for gaps of far less time between a protected activity and adverse employment action.¹⁰

McLaughlin argues that "[b]ecause it determined that Roland[, CBS's agent who failed to hire McLaughlin on the CBS production,] could be liable for [his]

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discrimination claims," the District Court erred in dismissing his claims against CBS.¹¹ McLaughlin argues that the Amended Complaint supported the inference that the CBS production One Dollar was Roland's first opportunity to retaliate against him.¹² However, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of McLaughlin,¹³the allegations in the Amended Complaint show that Roland had other earlier opportunities to retaliate against McLaughlin before One Dollar.¹⁴

Thus, we will affirm the grant of dismissal regarding McLaughlin's ADEA retaliation claims against CBS and TriStar.

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II. TriStar's Summary Judgment Motion¹⁵

We also agree with the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TriStar. The court concluded that McLaughlin did not establish a prima facie case of age discrimination and, even assuming arguendo that McLaughlin had established a prima facie case, McLaughlin failed to establish pretext to rebut TriStar's explanation for not hiring him.¹⁶

The ADEA provides that it is unlawful for an employer to "discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."¹⁷"To succeed on an ADEA claim, a plaintiff must establish, by a

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preponderance of the evidence, that age was the 'but-for' cause of the adverse employment action."¹⁸

To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination McLaughlin must establish that: (1) he was forty years old or older; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action;

(3) he was qualified for the position; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that support an inference of discrimination such as filling positions with significantly younger drivers.¹⁹After establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to TriStar to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action.²⁰If TriStar offers a nondiscriminatory justification for the adverse employment action, then the burden shifts back to McLaughlin to show that this reason was pretext for discrimination.²¹

The District Court correctly found that McLaughlin had not established the fourth element of a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas.²² McLaughlin maintains that he was older than the average age of the drivers hired in the initial shoot and reshoot of the TriStar production for which he was not hired.²³ However, even if true, this does not establish an inference of age discrimination on this

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record. First, relying on the average age of the selected drivers says nothing about how many qualified individuals, forty or older, were chosen to fill those positions. In fact, the record shows that many of the hired drivers were forty or older, and thus that TriStar's agent simply chose to work with drivers he had previously worked with, irrespective of age:

It [was] undisputed that Kraus had a group of predominately older men that he liked to work with, and that McLaughlin was not one of them. The overwhelming majority of drivers hired for A Beautiful Day were over the age of 50, and a number of hired drivers were over the age of 60.²⁴ Additionally, this average age metric does not demonstrate that sufficiently younger individuals were discriminatorily favored. In fact, the cases McLaughlin proffers as support for his claims rely on individual comparisons, not age averages, in applying the "sufficiently younger" standard.²⁵Because the record lacks individual comparisons, it does not support McLaughlin's claim of age discrimination against TriStar. Accordingly, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment regarding McLaughlin's ADEA discrimination claim against TriStar.

III. The Union's Summary Judgment Motion

McLaughlin argues that the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Union. However, the District Court correctly found that "[n]o concrete evidence has been brought forth to viably dispute the existence of a

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nonexclusive hiring hall."²⁶Because the production companies, not the Union, control all access to employment, the District Court correctly held that while McLaughlin met his burden of establishing that he engaged in protected speech by publicly criticizing the Producer's Choice system, he failed to proffer evidence of retaliation by the Union.²⁷ The District Court also correctly concluded that "the Union ha[d] no obligation to [refer McLaughlin] given that it had to enact the Producer's Choice system after a [National Labor Relations Board] decision against it finding that a Union official violated federal labor law by recommending certain individuals be hired on productions."²⁸ McLaughlin's LMRDA retaliation and NLRA breach of duty of fair representation claims against the Union on appeal necessarily fail as a result.²⁹ Likewise, because the Union was not responsible for the production companies' hiring decisions, the District Court correctly granted summary judgment for it on McLaughlin's ADEA age discrimination and retaliation claims for lack of an adverse

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action.³⁰His PHRA age discrimination and retaliation claims against the Union fail for the same reason.³¹

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court's Orders granting (1) CBS's Motion to Dismiss and TriStar's Motion to Dismiss in part, (2) summary judgment in favor of TriStar, and (3) summary judgment in favor of the Union.