State v. Morgan

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1

Opinion Number: 2

Filing Date: July 13, 2026 3

NO. S-1-SC-40449 4

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 5

Plaintiff-Respondent, 6

v. 7

JAMES MORGAN, 8

Defendant-Petitioner. 9

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI 10

George P. Eichwald, District Judge 11 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 12 Kimberly Chavez Cook, Appellate Defender 13 MJ Edge, Assistant Public Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15

for Petitioner 16

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General 17 Santa Fe, NM 18

Charles J. Gutierrez, Senior Solicitor General 19 for Respondent20

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OPINION 1

VIGIL, Justice. 2

{1} This case requires us to determine whether a police officer had reasonable 3 suspicion to seize Defendant James Morgan. The district court ruled that the officer 4 lacked reasonable suspicion and ordered suppression of the evidence of Defendant's 5 crimes committed "subsequent to the unlawful seizure." The Court of Appeals 6

"decline[d] to address whether the [officer] had reasonable suspicion" and then held, 7 under the new crime exception, that evidence of Defendant's subsequent crimes was 8 admissible. State v. Morgan, 2024-NMCA-057, ¶¶ 1, 6, 553 P.3d 501. We vacate 9 the Court of Appeals opinion and hold that the officer had reasonable suspicion 10 Defendant had committed or was committing a crime. Therefore, it is not necessary 11 to address the parties' arguments regarding the new crime exception. 12

I. BACKGROUND 13

A. Facts 14

{2} Around midnight on July 19, 2020, dispatch called out Sergeant Carlos Railey 15 of the Rio Rancho Police Department to a reported fight at Pine Court, a small cul-16 de-sac in Rio Rancho, New Mexico. As he drove to Pine Court, dispatch notified 17 him that the caller said the fighting had stopped. The caller also reported that there 18 had been a party going on all day at the house at the end of the cul-de-sac and that 19

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there was laughing and dancing in the street. Sergeant Railey testified that he was 1 concerned, first, "that there was a report of a fight in progress with somebody being 2 dragged through a street, that's pretty descriptive; so I believe[d] that the anonymous 3 party had witnessed that. The second issue was, there was a mention of a party that 4 had been going on all day, so there was a concern, in my head, that there was a 5 possible noise ordinance violation as well." Sergeant Railey testified he was 6 investigating an assault and a noise complaint. 7

{3} When Sergeant Railey reached Pine Court, he parked his marked patrol car 8 around the corner from the cul-de-sac. He did not use his lights or sirens. He testified, 9

"As I exited my vehicle I hear a loud argument between what appears to be a male 10 and female; the male voice is noticeably louder and I could hear it from my location, 11 which is around the corner." When Sergeant Railey came around the corner he saw 12 four people in the cul-de-sac, later identified as Defendant, Jennifer Morgan, 13 Defendant's friend Jose Gurrola, and a fourth individual who was never identified. 14 Sergeant Railey testified there was sufficient light to clearly see Defendant from 15 some distance. Sergeant Railey was concerned because "there was a male yelling 16 very loudly at a female; there was a friend near him that appeared to be kind of 17 holding on to him. I wasn't sure if he was trying to restrain this male or not, but my 18 concern was that there was a domestic dispute going on and that may have resulted 19

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in the call of somebody dragged through the street of a fight in progress." Sergeant 1 Railey testified that based on what dispatch reported and his own observations, he 2 had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant to investigate a noise violation, 3 disorderly conduct, or possible assault. Sergeant Railey's lapel footage was provided 4 to the district court. The footage confirmed that Sergeant Railey could hear the 5 argument from around the corner and that there was sufficient light from the houses 6 to see the group from some distance. 7

{4} Sergeant Railey approached the group without announcing that he was a 8 police officer because he wanted to hear what the argument was about. He was 9 wearing a black Covid mask and his navy police uniform with a metallic badge of 10 office, metallic gold name plate, blue and yellow shoulder patch, and yellow 11 shoulder stripes. As Sergeant Railey approached the group, he made eye contact with 12 Gurrola who said, "Hey can I help you?" Sergeant Railey replied, "yeah." Defendant 13 said to Sergeant Railey, "I'll leave, I'll leave, I'll leave," but Sergeant Railey told 14 him, "Hang out, sit on the ground." Gurrola pulled Defendant away from Sergeant 15 Railey, then both turned and ran. Sergeant Railey testified he chased after them, 16 yelled "stop" multiple times, and then grabbed Defendant by the right wrist. When 17 Sergeant Railey grabbed Defendant, Defendant fell. Sergeant Railey lost hold of 18

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Defendant's wrist, and as he bent over to try to regain control of Defendant, Gurrola 1 tackled him. 2

{5} While being taken to the ground, Sergeant Railey yelled "police" or "police 3 department" multiple times and managed to radio for back-up. Gurrola sat on 4 Sergeant Railey's chest and held down the Sergeant's right arm to prevent him from 5 reaching his sidearm. Defendant in turn held down Sergeant Railey's left arm. 6 Sergeant Railey testified that Jennifer Morgan ripped Sergeant Railey's badge from 7 his uniform, grabbed his radio from his hand, and yelled "you better hope your 8 backup comes." Defendant and Gurrola held down Sergeant Railey for about a 9 minute and a half until backup arrived and Defendant was arrested. 10

B. Procedural History 11

{6} Defendant was indicted by a grand jury for aggravated battery upon a peace 12 officer, false imprisonment, criminal damage to property (over $1000), and criminal 13 damage to property (under $1000). Jose Gurrola and Jennifer Morgan were also 14 charged with the same four crimes. In district court, Defendant filed a motion to 15 suppress all evidence of crimes committed after Sergeant Railey seized Defendant 16 by grabbing his wrist. Defendant argued that Sergeant Railey lacked reasonable 17 suspicion to seize him because "Sergeant Railey did not identify himself, was 18 wearing a dark uniform and a mask, did not ask any questions or undertake any 19

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investigation," and in addition, "did not have a description of individuals to look for, 1 [and] the call out had changed from a fight to . . . a possible noise violation." The 2 State responded that the motion should be denied because, based on the information 3 from dispatch and his observations, Sergeant Railey "had reasonable suspicion that 4 a crime was being committed." The State also argued in a surreply that assuming 5 there was no reasonable suspicion because Sergeant Railey did not identify himself 6 as a police officer until he seized Defendant, evidence of Defendant's crimes was 7 nevertheless admissible under the new crime exception. 8

{7} After hearing Sergeant Railey's testimony and argument from the parties, the 9 district court orally found there was no reasonable suspicion because the street was 10 dark and Sergeant Railey did not announce himself. The district court's written order 11 granting Defendant's motion to suppress states that (1) Sergeant Railey did not have 12 reasonable suspicion, (2) Defendant was unlawfully seized, and (3) "all evidence 13 subsequent to the unlawful seizure is suppressed." In accordance, after granting the 14 motion to suppress, the district court then dismissed the case. 15

{8} The State appealed. In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals reversed 16 the district court. Morgan, 2024-NMCA-057, ¶ 24. The majority reasoned that under 17 the new crime exception, Sergeant Railey's identification as law enforcement was 18 an intervening circumstance which sufficiently attenuated the seizure of Defendant 19

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from Defendant's subsequent battery upon a peace officer. Id. ¶ 18. The majority 1 concluded that "Defendant's actions following the seizure constituted a new crime, 2 and thus the district court erred in ordering suppression." Id. ¶ 6. The dissent argued 3 the seizure was not attenuated from the new crimes, so the evidence should be 4 suppressed. Id. ¶ 35-36 (Yohalem, J., dissenting). The majority "decline[d] to 5 address whether the sergeant had reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant as, in this 6 case, the result is the same." Id. ¶ 6. 7

{9} We granted certiorari to determine whether the new crime exception applies 8 in this case. 9

II. DISCUSSION 10

{10} As a preliminary matter, we address the Court of Appeals decision to reach 11 analysis of the new crimes exception without determining the existence of 12 reasonable suspicion, stating "in this case, the result is the same." Morgan, 2024-13 NMCA-057, ¶ 6. This decision was error. 14

{11} At the outset of its discussion, the Court of Appeals correctly framed the issues 15 as, first, whether Sergeant Railey had reasonable suspicion regarding Defendant and, 16 second, "if the sergeant lacked reasonable suspicion, whether Defendant's actions 17 following the seizure amounted to 'new crimes.'" Id. Under this framing, it 18 necessarily follows that the new crime exception would only apply in the absence of 19

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reasonable suspicion. This is correct, because the new crime exception is only 1 applicable when a seizure is unconstitutional. See State v. Tapia, 2018-NMSC-017, 2 ¶¶ 14-15, 414 P.3d 332 (explaining that the attenuation doctrine is an exception to 3 the exclusionary rule for a violation of the Fourth Amendment and applies "'when 4 the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote'" 5 (quoting Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016))). Thus, the Court of Appeals was 6 required to review the district court's ruling that Sergeant Railey lacked reasonable 7 suspicion before considering whether the new crime exception applies. We therefore 8 begin our analysis by determining whether Sergeant Railey had reasonable suspicion 9 to detain Defendant. 10

A. Standard of Review 11

{12} A suppression ruling presents a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. 12 Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 9, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032. We first review factual 13 determinations for substantial evidence, "viewing the facts in the manner most 14 favorable to the prevailing party." Id. We then review questions of reasonable 15 suspicion "de novo by looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine 16 whether the detention was justified." State v. Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 5, 146 17 N.M. 70, 206 P.3d 579 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "All 18 reasonable inferences in support of the district court's decision will be indulged in, 19

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and all inferences or evidence to the contrary will be disregarded." State v. Jason L., 1 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (text only)¹(citation omitted). 2

B. Investigatory Stop 3

{13} Defendant claims that under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 4 Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, Sergeant 5 Railey's seizure of Defendant was unconstitutional, so evidence of possible 6 subsequent crimes should be suppressed. Although Defendant cites both the United 7 States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution, he does not argue that the 8 state constitution provides greater protection against unreasonable search and 9 seizure than the federal constitution. Nor does he argue that we should adopt a 10 constitutional analysis other than the interstitial approach. See State v. Beauchesne, 11

868 A.2d 972, 975, 978-84 (N.H. 2005) (using the primacy test to construe the state 12

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constitution and concluding the state constitution was violated).²Because Defendant 1 does not argue that the New Mexico Constitution provides greater protection than 2 the Fourth Amendment, under either approach, jurisprudence under the Fourth 3 Amendment controls. State v. Harbison, 2007-NMSC-016, ¶ 16 & n.3, 141 N.M. 4 392, 156 P.3d 30. 5

{14} The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. 6 Const. amend. IV. Reasonableness is determined "by balancing the need to search 7 (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails." Terry v. Ohio, 8

392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Terry, the 9 United States Supreme Court held that brief investigatory stops are reasonable if the 10 officer's action is (1) "justified at its inception" and (2) "reasonably related in scope 11 to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. at 20; see 12 also State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 13, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922. An 13 officer's search or seizure is justified at its inception if the officer has reasonable 14

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suspicion. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; see also Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 1

13. An officer has "reasonable suspicion if the officer is aware of specific articulable 2 facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that, when judged 3 objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or 4 was occurring." Hubble, 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks and citation 5 omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S at 21-22. We look to the totality of the 6 circumstances to determine if the stop is reasonable. State v. Vandenberg, 2003-7 NMSC-030, ¶ 19, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. 8

{15} Evidence "obtained in a manner that runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment" 9 must be suppressed. State v. Santiago, 2010-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 148 N.M. 144, 231 10 P.3d 600. This exclusionary rule applies to both "primary evidence obtained as a 11 direct result of an illegal search or seizure and evidence later discovered and found 12 to be derivative of an illegality, the so-called fruit of the poisonous tree." Tapia, 13 2018-NMSC-017, ¶ 13 (text only) (citation omitted). 14

{16} The district court excluded evidence of Defendant's crimes subsequent to his 15 seizure because it believed, based on the fact that the cul-de-sac was dark and 16 Sergeant Railey did not announce himself, that Sergeant Railey lacked reasonable 17 suspicion. However, this was legal error. Under the law, to have reasonable 18 suspicion an officer must be "aware of specific articulable facts" which would 19

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reasonably lead the officer to believe a crime had occurred or was occurring. Hubble, 1 2009-NMSC-014, ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Officer 2 identification is irrelevant to whether an officer reasonably believes a crime was 3 committed. Id. Sergeant Railey's failure to announce himself did not per se negate 4 reasonable suspicion. See State v. Hernandez, 2016-NMCA-008, ¶ 20, 364 P.3d 313 5 (holding that two undercover agents had reasonable suspicion based on prior 6 undercover drug buys). 7

{17} Defendant provides a number of arguments as to why Sergeant Railey did not 8 have reasonable suspicion. He asserts that Sergeant Railey's testimony was 9 contradictory; the district court did not believe the Sergeant's testimony; Sergeant 10 Railey did not witness a crime or was mistaken as to law or fact; and Sergeant Railey 11 was not aware of enough specific articulable facts to justify his detention of 12 Defendant. 13

{18} We reject Defendant's arguments. Sergeant Railey consistently testified 14 during direct and cross-examination that based on information from dispatch and his 15 own observations, he believed he had reasonable suspicion that Defendant had 16 committed an assault or was exhibiting disorderly conduct and violating the 17 unreasonable noise municipal ordinance. His uncontradicted testimony was that 18 dispatch reported a fight took place in the small cul-de-sac, and that someone was 19

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being dragged through the street. Additionally, dispatch told Sergeant Railey a loud 1 party was ongoing at the house at the end of the cul-de-sac and the partygoers had 2 been in the street singing and dancing. Sergeant Railey also testified as to his 3 personal observations. He saw Defendant in the cul-de-sac shortly after the reported 4 fight. Defendant was in a very loud verbal altercation and appeared to have been 5 restrained by a friend. Video evidence from Sergeant Railey's lapel camera 6 corroborated this testimony. The facts from the Sergeant's observations and what he 7 was told by dispatch are enough for a reasonable person to believe an assault, 8 disorderly conduct, or unreasonable noise had occurred or was occurring. 9

{19} Accordingly, we hold that Sergeant Railey had reasonable suspicion to initiate 10 an investigatory stop. See State v. Wing, 2022-NMCA-016, ¶ 15, 505 P.3d 905 11 (holding that the defendant's proximity to the area known for certain crimes, late at 12 night, in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances, provided the officer with 13 reasonable suspicion). 14

C. Seizure of the Defendant 15

{20} Defendant argues his seizure was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth 16 Amendment. A seizure is the use of physical force or show of authority by an officer 17 which causes a defendant to submit to that authority. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19; 18 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). "[T]here is no seizure without 19

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actual submission; otherwise, there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the 1 Fourth Amendment is concerned." Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007). 2

{21} In this case, when Sergeant Railey approached Defendant and Gurrola he told 3 them to stay and "hang out." Instead, they turned and ran. Thus, they were not seized 4 when the Sergeant first tried to detain them using his words because they did not 5 submit to the Sergeant Railey's authority. See id. Not until Sergeant Railey grabbed 6 Defendant's wrist was Defendant seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 7

{22} When Sergeant Railey seized Defendant by grabbing Defendant's wrist, he 8 had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant. He was aware of facts reported in the 9 assault and noise complaint which, when combined with his observations of a verbal 10 fight, disorderly conduct, and unreasonable noise, gave him reasonable suspicion 11 that a crime was being committed or had been committed. When Sergeant Railey 12 approached Defendant, Defendant fled, furthering the Sergeant's reasonable 13 suspicion. See Harbison, 2007-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 16-20 (holding that flight may be 14 considered in determining reasonable suspicion where the officer did not unlawfully 15 provoke the flight and following Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (applying 16 the Fourth Amendment)). When the Sergeant seized Defendant's wrist, Defendant 17 was fleeing from law enforcement, and the Sergeant had reasonable suspicion, 18 making the seizure "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified 19

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