United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., LTD

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BACKGROUND⁵

The defendants move to suppress four laptops seized from Huawei employees in 2013 and 2018, a recording of a telephone call between two Huawei employees, and a recording of a conversation with a Huawei executive. (ECF Nos. 541, 542; ECF No. 562 at 1.) As an initial matter, the government has represented that it does not intend to rely in its case-in-chief upon any contents of the laptop seized in June 2018 or the recorded conversation with a Huawei executive, and argues

questions about these searches because the motion to suppress this evidence should be denied as moot. (ECF No. 562 at 1, 10 11.) In light of this representation, the Court denies the suppression motion as moot as to this evidence and evidence derived from these sources. See United States v. Rivera, 89 F. Supp. 3d 376, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).⁶ The Court addresses the lawfulness of the January 2013 search of a laptop and the recorded telephone call between two Huawei employees in the Ex Parte Classified Supplemental Memorandum Decision and Order. The searches of the remaining devices are discussed below.

Factual Background

The devices at issue are: (1) a Dell Latitude laptop assigned to and seized from a Huawei employee on February 12, 2018 (the February 2018 Laptop ) and (2) a Dell Latitude laptop assigned to and seized from a Huawei employee on April 27, 2018 (the April 2018 Laptop ).

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(ECF No. 541 at 2 3; ECF No. 562 at 2 3; ECF No. 541-1 ¶¶ 4 7.) Huawei owned the devices. (ECF No. 541 at 3; ECF No. 541-1 ¶¶ 4 7.)

a. The Huawei Investigation⁷

United States authorities investigated Huawei for years before a grand jury returned the first indictment in 2018. For example, on January 9, 2013, a Huawei employee arrived at San No. 625-3 ¶ 8.) Agents searched his baggage and seized various electronic devices, including the January 2013 Laptop and a Toshiba hard drive. (Id. ¶¶ 8 9

devices. (Id. ¶¶ 10 12.)⁸An agent processing data acquired during the search discovered child pornography on the image of the Toshiba hard drive. (Id. ¶ 13.) According to an April 16, 2013 memorandum about the

the documents of interest [the Huawei Senior Engineer had] were 133 files containing information on Huawei projects with the two Internet service providers in Iran, Iran MobinNet -1 at 1 2.)

On April 5, 2016, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security

exports. (ECF No. 573, Ex. D. at 2.) On August 16, 2016, Huawei, through counsel, responded to the subpoena and provided the government

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including MTN Irancell. (Id. - the sale of goods and services to MTN Irancell . (Id.) On December 23, 2016, OFAC issued an administrative subpoena to Huawei, seeking information about potential illegal exports to Cuba, Sudan, Syria, and Iran. (See ECF No. 573, Ex. E.) By March 2017, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security was [FBI] and the [BIS]

targeting [Huawei] . . . for possible violations of United States export laws. (ECF No. 573, Ex. D at 1.) The government suspected that Huawei had exported telecommunication equipment to Iran or other countries that are subject to economic sanctions pursuant to regulations of [OFAC] Id.) The government also received information that Huawei using front companies to purchase the United States goods and to conceal that the goods were destined to be id.), and that Huawei had transacted with s,

including id. at 3).

On April 11, 2017, a grand jury in the District of Columbia issued a subpoena to Huawei for

technology from the United States, or with an ultimate end destination, provided directly or indirectly by or on behalf of Huawei and/or Huawei/USA, in . . . Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, and/or the Sudan, th Korea, and/or

3, Ex. G ¶¶ 1 3, 8.) The subpoena also requested a detailed description of (Id. ¶ 1(c).) In

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addition, throughout 2017, the DOJ received information from an international bank about See ECF No. 573, Ex. F.)

b. The February 2018 Laptop Search

On February 12, 2018, at approximately 9:00 a.m., the same Huawei employee entered the United States at Dallas- from Cairo, Egypt. (ECF

No. 562 at 2.) At about agent, with

the assistance of HSI, conducted a secondary inspection of the employee. (Id. at 2 3.) The employee told them that he had four electronic devices, one of which was the February 2018 Laptop. (Id. at 3.) Agents reviewed prior visa applications, and found that he had declared travel to Italy, Thailand, and the Philippines. (ECF No. 625-2 at 3.) They told him that travelers sometimes went to the Philippines and Thailand to have unlawful sexual encounters with children, and that law enforcement often found evidence of those crimes on Id.) The agents asked the employee for consent to search his

devices for child pornography and other violations, and the employee gave verbal and written consent. (Id.)⁹The employee gave the agents the passwords for the devices and signed a consent form, witnessed and signed by two agents, that included the following statements:

(1) agents ; (2) he , including a

and acknowledged that

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administrative proceedings; (3) promises, threats, coercion, or other intimidation, and he read the above statement and understand[s] [his] rights. (ECF No. 562 at 3; ECF No. 562, Ex. A (emphasis in original).) The agents imaged the devices and returned them to the employee. (ECF No. 562 at 3.) c. The April 2018 Laptop Search

On April 27, 2018, the same Huawei employee arrived at DFW for an international flight. (Id.) The FBI arrested him pursuant to a federal criminal complaint charging him with possession and transportation of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1) and 2252(a)(4)(B), based on the evidence seized during the January 2013 search. (Id.; ECF No. 625- 3 ¶ 1.)

Agents interviewed the employee and searched his luggage. (ECF No. 562 at 3.) During the search, the agents found electronic devices, including the April 2018 Laptop. (Id.; ECF No. 562, Ex. B at 13:33 14:40, 18:50 24:00.) The employee gave the agents verbal consent to search all the devices, and provided the passwords for the devices. (ECF No. 562, Ex. B at 15:00 15:25, 22:58 23:01, 23:47 24:02, 25:10 25:45, 55:54 56:12). In addition, the audio recording of the interview of the employee reflects that they gave him a consent form, told him to him to read it it; after a short

pause, the employee gave the form back to the agent, who thanked him and stepped out of the room briefly. (Id. at 25:10 25:50.)¹⁰Based on the recording, the Court finds that the employee also gave written consent to search the devices. Law enforcement agents subsequently imaged the April 2018 Laptop. (ECF No. 562 at 3.)

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Two agents interviewed the employee in a private room. (ECF No. 562, Ex. B at 00:35 01:20.)¹¹The employee spoke English, but an interpreter was also present. (Id. at 01:28 02:00.)¹²The door was partially opened during the interview, and the agents gave the employee water, offered him bathroom breaks, and told him to let them know if there was anything they during the interview. (Id. at 00:47 00:53, 01:20 02:05.) One

agent read the employee his constitutional rights; he acknowledged that he understood his rights and waived them. (Id. at 02:05 04:25.) The employee was not handcuffed during the questioning, the tone was conversational throughout the interview, and agents did not use or threaten to use any force.

At the outset of the interview, the agent told the employee

you had child pornography (Id. at 05:17 05:35.) At another point, the agent mentioned the Toshiba hard drive imaged in January 2013, and said that he wanted to on your external hard drive many years ago. (Id. at 09:05 09:37, 13:13 13:20.) The employee admitted that he downloaded child pornography from the Internet and stored it on the Toshiba hard drive. (Id. at 08:56 09:58.)

The employee also said that he was a wireless engineer at Huawei and its department in the United States. (Id. at 56:56 57:51, 59:05 59:26.) He explained that his direct supervisor reported to the head of Huawei in the United States, and was third in the management chain in the United States. (Id. at 1:00:48 1:01:16.) The employee described his work at the company, and said that he was in Iran from 2006 to 2007 to work on an

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Iran MTN cell site project (Id. at

1:08:51 1:11:00, 1:27:33 1:29:30.)

Procedural Background

The defendants are charged with racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count One); conspiracy to violate and violations of the International Emergency violation of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1705(a), 1705(c), and 1702 (Counts Nine through Twelve); conspiracy to steal trade secrets, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832(a)(5) and 1832(b) (Count Two); wire fraud and wire fraud conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2, and 1349 (Counts Three, Five, and Seven); bank fraud and bank fraud conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 2, and 1349 (Counts Four and Six); conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count Eight); money laundering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Thirteen); and conspiracy to obstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k) (Count Fourteen). (See ECF No. 689.)¹³

On June 24, 2025, the defendants moved to suppress four devices, two recordings, and evidence derived from these sources. (ECF Nos. 541 (sealed), 542 (redacted).) The government opposed (ECF Nos. 561 (redacted), 562 (HSD)), and the defendants replied in support of their motion (ECF Nos. 573 (HSD), 576 (redacted)). The Court ordered the government to address (1) whether the federal agents had of the contents of those devices was inevitable. (ECF Order dated Dec. 5, 2025.) The

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government filed its supplemental memorandum (ECF Nos. 609 (sealed), 610 (redacted)), and the defendants replied (ECF Nos. 612 (sealed), 613 (redacted)). On February 13, 2026, the defendants asked to file a supplemental brief because the -trial discovery disclosures. (ECF No. 624 at 1.) The Court granted the request. (ECF Order dated Feb. 13, 2026.) The defendants filed their supplement (ECF Nos. 625 (sealed), 627 (redacted)), and the government responded (ECF Nos. 634 (sealed), 635 (redacted)).

LEGAL STANDARD

warrantless searches are per se United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973)). that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by reason of an illegal search or seizure may, by filing a motion to suppress, seek to prohibit the government from using the fruits of such search United States v. Brito, 771 F. Supp. 3d 157,

166 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (citing United States v. Pena, 961 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1992)), reconsideration denied, No. 24-CR-1, 2025 WL 1826390 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2025). On a motion to suppress, the defendant bears the initial burden of establishing that a government official acting without a warrant subjected the defendant Brito, 771 F. Supp. 3d at 166 (quoting United States v. Herron, 18 F. Supp. 3d 214, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)). Case 1:18-cr-00457-AMD-JAM Document 756 Filed 07/21/26 Page 9 of 36 PageID #:

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a preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure did not violate the Fourth Id. (quoting Herron, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 221).

United States v. Fox, No. 23-

CR-227, 2024 WL 3520767, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2024) (citing United States v. Cacace, 796 F.3d 176, 188 (2d Cir. 2015)), appeal withdrawn sub nom. United States v. Cross-Mcknight, No. 24-2262, 2024 WL 4925220 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 2024).

evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the

Government acts with an objectively reasonable good-

Id. (quoting United States v. Zodhiates -faith

exist

Id. (first

quoting Zodhiates, 901 F.3d at 143; and then quoting United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 118 (2d Cir. 2015)).

DISCUSSION

because the government has not met its burden of showing that the searches fell within one of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement. (ECF No. 541 at 5 9.) The government responds that the searches were permissible under the border search exception, that the employee consented to the searches, and that the employee had apparent authority to do so. (ECF No. 562 at 6 9; ECF No. 609 at 2 5.) In any event, the government argues, the discovery of the contents of the devices was inevitable, and the good Case 1:18-cr-00457-AMD-JAM Document 756 Filed 07/21/26 Page 10 of 36 PageID #:

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faith doctrine applies. (ECF No. 609 at 5 10.) Finally, the government cites the reasons described in its ex parte classified supplemental memorandum. (ECF No. 562 at 1.) Border Searches

a. Border Search Exception

The government argues that the February 2018 and April 2018 Laptop searches were No. 609 at 1.) According to the defendants, the searches

were not covered by the border search exception, and the agents needed a search warrant in any case. (ECF No. 541 at 5 9.)

With few exceptions, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. Irving, 452 F.3d at 123 (citation omitted). Border searches, however, are an exception to this rule. In has never been any additional requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable cause. This longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a warrant are nonetheless reasonable has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (citation modified); see also United States v. Asbury

ernment has exercised the right to control the movement of people

.

Customs area of an international airport is the functional equivalent of a border for purposes of United States v. Levy, 803 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing

Irving, 452 F.3d at 123). There is, moreover, no distinction between border searches of passengers arriving and leaving the country. See United States v. Walden, No. 24-CR-521, 2025 WL 3154359 at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2025)

(collecting cases)).

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United States v. Kamaldoss, No. 19-CR-543, 2022 WL 1200776, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2022) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)). Courts have justified the border exception based on historical practice United

States v. Gavino, No. 22-CR-136, 2024 WL 85072, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2024) (first citing Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619; then citing United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S 149, 152 53; and then citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)); see also Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537

is judged by

promotion of legitimate governmental interests. s omitted)). The government has a strong interest in stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country to prevent the entry of unwanted persons and effects Gavino, 2024 WL 85072, at *3 (first quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616; and then quoting Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (citation modified)). This interest is Flores-Montano,

541 U.S. at 152. While people traveling in and out of the country undoubtedly have an expectation of privacy, that less at the border than it is in Id. at 154 (citation omitted). As a consequence, of

the Government and the privacy right of the individual is [ ] struck much more favorably to the Government Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540.

Law enforcement officers at the border are permitted to [r] searches of a person and his

warrant. Id. at 537 38. For more invasive searches, officers must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Irving, 452 F.3d 123 24 (finding reasonable suspicion existed for Case 1:18-cr-00457-AMD-JAM Document 756 Filed 07/21/26 Page 12 of 36 PageID #:

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reviewing diskettes and undeveloped film found in luggage); see also United States v. Ogberaha,

771 F.2d 655, 658 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring reasonable suspicion for body cavity searches); Asbury, 586 F.2d at 976 77 (requiring reasonable suspicion for strip searches); Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 42 (requiring reasonable suspicion for the overnight detention of a traveler for the purpose of monitoring her bowel movement). The suspected criminal activity fall[ ] outside the primary scope of [border official duties whether an reasonable suspicion arises entirely from her own investigation or is prompted by another federal agency is irrelevant to the validity of a border search. Levy, 803 F.3d at 123 24. However,

. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 42 (citation modified).

There is no binding authority in this Circuit requiring an officer to have probable cause or to obtain a search warrant for a border search of electronic devices like those at issue in this case. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. a This interpretation, that border searches were not subject to the (citation omitted)). 14,15

14 Cases involving these issues are pending before the Second Circuit. See United States v. Alisigwe, No. 24-960 (2d Cir.) (argued Mar. 28, 2025) (warrantless manual search of cell phones at the border based on reasonable suspicion); United States v. Kamaldoss, No. 24-824 (2d Cir.) (argued Mar. 31, 2025) (warrantless manual and forensic searches of cell phone and laptop at the border); United States v. Smith, No. 24-1680 (2d Cir.) (argued June 24, 2025) (warrantless manual and forensic searches of cell phone at the border based on reasonable suspicion); United States v. Robinson, No. 25-1428 (2d Cir.) (argued Apr. 14, 2026) (warrantless manual search of cell phone at the border).

15 Consistent with Levy, two circuit courts have held that the government may search cell phones at the border without a warrant or reasonable suspicion in at least some circumstances. See United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1231

Court has never required reasonable suspicion for a search of property at the border, however non- see also Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 13, 19 (1st Cir.

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searches . . . from before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered Irving, 452 F.3d at 123 (quoting Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619).

Citing United States v. Fox, No. 23-CR-227, 2024 WL 3520767 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2024), the defendants say that the border search exception does not apply at all, because while the officers seized the devices at the border, they did not search them at the border. (ECF No. 541 at 1, 5 7; ECF No. 616 at 2 4.) According to the defendants,

if a search is too geographically or temporally distant from the border crossing, the border search exception ceases to apply. (ECF No. 616 at 3.)

In Fox, an HSI agent started tracking international travel in 2021

investigation into fraud and money laundering scheme involving Paycheck Protection Program

. 2024 WL 3520767, at *1 2. Agents seized the devices at Miami International Airport when the defendant arrived from Colombia. Id. at *2. They sent the devices to New York without searching them. Id. at *3. An HSI agent in New York searched the devices for the ion of contraband on a phone for a forensic search.

United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1018 21 (9th Cir. 2019).

Some appellate courts have considered the crime at issue and whether it implicates border interests. See United States v. Xiang, 67 F.4th 895, 900 02 (8th Cir. 2023) (upholding the denial of a motion to suppress the fruits of a warrantless forensic search of electronic devices seized at the border because CBP had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in economic espionage for a Chinese company); United States v. Aigbekaen

search of electronic devices], the Government must have individualized suspicion of an offense that ollecting

see also Alasaad, 988 F.3d at 21 (finding that the border-

activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP or [Immigration and Customs Case 1:18-cr-00457-AMD-JAM Document 756 Filed 07/21/26 Page 14 of 36 PageID #:

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first time three days after the Miami agents seized them. Id. Twenty-seven days after the devices were seized, the HSI agent applied for a warrant to do a forensic search, which a magistrate judge signed. Id. at *3 4.

Judge Nicholas Garaufis found that the forensic search

thousand miles from where Fox

was not for the purpose of searching for contraband, evidence of contraband, or evidence of a e purpose of [the

border search] exception Id. at *6, 9. Judge Garaufis

concluded that part from the seizure of Fox phone taking place at the airport upon her return from an international trip, the justifications for the border-search exception border integrity, stopping contraband or individuals from entering the country, exigency, national security are not present Id. at *9.

The searches at issue here are easily distinguished from the searches in Fox. First, in this case, law enforcement agents conducted the searches as part of ongoing investigations into the illegal exports of goods, services, and technology to Iran in violation of IEEPA. (ECF No. 573 at 7.) The law in this circuit is that officers at the border have the authority to search and documents and other items at the border when they reasonably suspect that the traveler is engaged in criminal activity, even if the crime falls outside the primary scope of Levy, 803 F.3d at 124. Even so, the investigations in this case clearly implicate[ ] border interests Fox, 2024 WL 3520767, at *8 (citing United States v. Xiang, 67 F.4th 895, 901 02 (8th Cir. 2023) (applying the border search exception when there was reasonable suspicion by CBP of evidence that Xiang engaged in economic espionage for a Chinese company) and collecting cases). The parties agree that

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(early 2018), the government had already launched multiple investigations into Huawei and its related to violations of export controls. (ECF No. 573 at 7; ECF No. 609 at 3; see also ECF No. 573, Ex. E (Dec. 23, 2016 letter from OFAC

ECF No. 573, Ex. D

(Mar. 27, 2017 HSI

ECF No. 573, Ex. G ¶¶ 1 3, 8 (Apr. 11, 2017

grand jury subpoena to Huawei for documents and information

goods, services, and/or technology from the United States, or with an ultimate end destination, provided directly or indirectly by or on behalf of Huawei and/or Huawei/USA, in . . . Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, and/or the Sudan

).)

Nor were the searches in this case the border search exception. Fox, 2024 WL 3520767, at *6 (quoting Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 595 (2018)). The searching these devices as part of an ongoing criminal investigation into illegal exports of goods, services, or technology by a Chinese telecommunications company operating in the United States to Iran in violation of IEEPA was . Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152; see also Xiang, 67 F.4th at 900 (rejecting the argument that a border search to investigate economic espionage by a Chinese company was statute

at issue, the Economic Espionage Act, was to protec

ations omitted)); Fox, 2024

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n a case with different facts the search occurred near in location or time to the seizure, related to a cross-border crime, was of a personal item other than a cell phone

The defendants also say that the border search exception does not apply because the government imaged, but did not search, the devices at the border. (ECF No. 541 at 1, 5 7; ECF No. 616 at 2 4). But in United States v. Levy, the Second Circuit upheld a border search in which agents seized evidence from Levy, copied it, and then returned it. Levy was suspected of participating in stock manipulation schemes for which his wife had already been charged. Levy,

803 F.3d at 121. CBP officers stopped him at the border, photocopied the contents of his notebook, and returned it to him. Id. The district court found that the border search exception applied, and ion to suppress the photocopies. Id. at 122. The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the officer was justified in copying the notebook because he had reasonable suspicion to believe that Levy was committing a financial crime. Id. at 123 24 Levy was engaged in a

financial crime, the CBP officer in this case was entitled to inspect and copy the notebook [at the see also Kamaldoss, 2022 WL 1200776 at *5, 11 (holding

that the forensic imaging of electronic devices at the border was within the scope of the border search exception to the warrant requirement). In this case, CBP officers, assisted by HSI agents, took the February 2018 Laptop during a secondary inspection of the employee, copied it, and returned it to him. (ECF No. 562 at 3.) The Levy rationale applies here, and agents were entitled to search the evidence seized at the border by making forensic copies of it. Case 1:18-cr-00457-AMD-JAM Document 756 Filed 07/21/26 Page 17 of 36 PageID #:

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Nor did the agents need to have a warrant based on probable cause to search the laptops at the border. As explained above, there is no binding appellate authority requiring more than reasonable suspicion for searches of electronic devices at the border. Nonetheless, two district courts in this circuit have concluded that, absent exigent circumstances, agents at the border must have a search warrant based on probable cause to search cell phones. United States v. Smith, 673 F. Supp. 3d 381, 395 96 (S.D.N.Y. 2023); United States v. Sultanov, 742 F. Supp. 3d 258, 291 94 (E.D.N.Y. 2024); United States v. Robinson, No. 23-CR-192, 2025 WL 1359352, at *7 9 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2025). Those courts relied on Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), in which the Supreme Court balanced the public interest in the search-incident-to arrest warrant exception and the privacy interest in cell phones and held that the exception did not apply to searches of cell phones. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 385 97; see also Smith, 673 F. Supp. 3d at 391

96 (

believes it is applying in straightforward fashion the logic and analysis of Riley to the border ); Sultanov, 742 F. Supp. 3d at 279

officials the authority to briefly detain and question air travelers and search their physical belongings based on something more than a hunch but obviously less than is necessary for probable cause. But it is an entirely different matter for courts to exempt those agents from the (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 394) (citation modified)); Robinson, 2025 WL 1359352, at *5 9 (same). The Court respectfully disagrees that Riley requires that border agents have a search warrant to search electronic devices because as explained below, the balance of interests at the border is different than the balance of interests in searches incident to arrest. Moreover, the Case 1:18-cr-00457-AMD-JAM Document 756 Filed 07/21/26 Page 18 of 36 PageID #:

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rationale in Smith, Sultanov, and Robinson expansive approach to border searches articulated by the Second Circuit in Levy Gavino, 2024 WL 85072, at *6; see also Irving, 452 F.3d at 124 (finding that the border search of diskettes and film was supported by reasonable suspicion).¹⁶

The Court adopts Judge Rachel Kovner reasoning in United States v. Gavino. Judge Kovner found that Riley did not support the conclusion that border agents needed search warrants to search cell phones. See Gavino, 2024 WL 85072, at *4 6. Riley s discussion of privacy interests establishes that searches of cell phones should be treated as intrusive border searches, rather than standard ones, but did not support requiring more than reasonable suspicion for cell phone searches at the border. Id. at *4 5. In concluding that warrantless searches of cell phones incident to arrest did not meaningfully advance governmental interests in protecting officer safety or preventing the destruction of evidence, Judge Kovner reasoned that the Riley Court balanced the governmental interests underlying the exception

and the private interests at stake with cell phones, which

Id. (citing Riley, 573 U.S. at 385 86, 393 94) (citation

modified)).¹⁷

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As Judge Kovner found, the balance of interests is different in the border search context; unwanted persons and effects, Court has described as at the heart of the border- Id. at *5 (quoting Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152).

documents, or images on a phone may also reveal that a traveler is carrying drugs, weapons, or Id. The private interest, on the other hand, has to do with the intrusive nature of the search, but courts consistently have deemed reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify even the most intrusive of nonroutine border searches, including body cavity and alimentary canal searches Id. (citations omitted); see also Irving, 452 F.3d at 123 24 ( this country, more invasive searches, (citing

Asbury, 586 F.2d at 975 76)).

or curate its contents, even if doing so is inconvenient; a traveler seeking to avoid an intrusive Gavino, 2024 WL 85072, at *5 (citing United States v.

Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2018)). If reasonable suspicion is sufficient for strip searches or body cavity searches, which are arguably far greater intrusions, it is sufficient to support the search of an electronic device at the border. See id.

no appellate court has required a greater quantum of suspicion for cell phone searches at the It is equally clear that the searches were supported by reasonable suspicion, (See ECF No. 616 at 4 7.)

requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and Case 1:18-cr-00457-AMD-JAM Document 756 Filed 07/21/26 Page 20 of 36 PageID #:

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particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal Levy, 803 F.3d at 123 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397, 404 (2014)); see also Asbury, 586 F.2d at 976 (noting that the issue simply whether the border

(citations omitted)).

Navarette, 572 U.S. at

reasonable suspicion, United States v. Weaver, 9 F.4th 129, 140 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Ornelas v. United States picion is a relatively low standard and

Abidor v.

Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 542).

The government has met this burden;

the defendants and their employee of criminal activity. Id.

(citation omitted); see also Levy, 803 F.3d at 123 (same). As the

demonstrate, the government was conducting a wide-ranging investigation before the 2018 a grand jury subpoena to Huawei

where the employee worked for documents and information

with Iranian telecommunications companies,

including MTN Irancell. (ECF No. 609 at 3.)¹⁸Before the 2018 searches, the government knew

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from the lawful search of the January 2013 Laptop that the Huawei employee had documents tion on Huawei projects with the two Internet service providers in Iran, Iran MobinNet and MTN Irancell,

related to internal policies, security protocols, data configurations, [ ] network [ ] solutions, and -1 at 2 3.)¹⁹The government also had

conceal that the goods were destined to be diverted to prohibited end users, and that Huawei had transacted with . (ECF No. 573, Ex. D at 1, 3). And

the Huawei employee told agents during the April 2018 interview that he worked on MTN cell site project in Iran from 2006 to 2007. (ECF No. 562, Ex. B at 1:08:55 1:11:00.) In addition, the government cites the news articles from around 2011 to 2013, described in the Third Superseding Indictment, reporting that Huawei had sold embargoed U.S.-origin goods to Iran in violation of U.S. law. (ECF No. 609 at 4 5 (citing ECF No. 126 ¶¶ 73 75).) According to a 2011 Wall Street Journal article, Huawei ies in Iran, while

it had a contract to provide telecommunications services to a company controlled by the Iranian government suspend text messaging

and block internet phone service as part of a crackdown on anti-government protests in 2009. See The Wall Street Journal

https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204644504576651503577823210. Moreover, (ECF No. 573, Ex. G.)

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according to the FBI memorandum about the January 2013 Laptop document review the documents of interest were 133 files containing information on Huawei projects with . . . Iran MobinNet and MTN Irancell -1 at 2.)

When agents stopped the Huawei employee at the border in February 2018, and again in April 2018, he was involved in a transnational

[criminal] to export goods, technology, or services to an Iranian telecommunications company in violation of IEEPA. Kamaldoss, 2022 WL 1200776, at *11. Within months, the government filed the initial underlying indictment charging the defendants with a years-long criminal conspiracy. (See ECF No. 1.) Based on the investigation records submitted by the parties and the allegations in the original indictment in this case, the government had, at the very least, reasonable suspicion y and the likelihood the

before the 2018 searches. See Levy, 803 F.3d at

123 (

(filed within [months] of the search) . . . confirm[s] that the search was justified by the going [ ] participation in [criminal]

.²⁰

Accordingly, the Court finds that the February 2018 and April 2018 Laptop searches were lawful based on the border search exception.

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b. Good Faith Exception As explained above, law enforcement officers lawfully searched the electronic devices at issue in this case. Even if those searches violated the Fourth Amendment, however, the fruits of those searches should not be suppressed, because law enforcement officials were acting in good reasonable good-

Zodhiates, 901 F.3d at 143 (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011)) the

fruits of a search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule, as that rule is designed to deter future

Kamaldoss, 2022 WL 1200776, at *12 (quoting United States v. Aigbekaen, 943 F.3d 713, 725 (4th Cir. 2019)) (citation modified); see also Davis, 564 U.S. at 249 conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent, the When

Supreme Court nor Second Circuit precedent limiting warrantless forensic searches to digital Kamaldoss, 2022 WL 1200776, at *12 (discussing precedent at the time of an April 23, 2019 border search).

the context of border searches in general, at most reasonable suspicion was required for some Id. (first citing Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152; and then citing

Irving, 452 F.3d at 123). As explained above, this Court is bound by Second Circuit and Supreme Court precedent holding that agents at the border need only reasonable suspicion for intrusive searches.

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inaccurate, at least as of this writing. (ECF No. 616 at 10.) Levy and Irving, as well as more than two centuries of jurisprudence establishing the extraordinary breadth of border search Walden, 2025 WL

3154359, at *9. Courts addressing these very issues including those courts holding that border agents need more than reasonable suspicion to search cell phones have applied the good faith exception in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Walden, 2025 WL 3154359, at *9 (applying good faith exception to April 2024 border search); Kamaldoss, 2022 WL 1200776, at *12 (applying good faith exception to April 2019 border search); Smith, 673 F. Supp. 3d at 386 87 (applying good faith exception to March 2021 border search); Sultanov, 742 F. Supp. 3d at 267, 299 (applying good faith exception to March 2022 border search). It was reasonable for the agents to rely on the existing case law, which,

Accordingly, suppression of the fruits of the February 2018 and April 2018 Laptop searches is unwarranted.

Consent to Search Exception

The government also argues that the February 2018 and April 2018 Laptop searches were lawful because the employee consented to the searches. (ECF No. 562 at 6 9.) The defendants maintain that the employee did not have authority to consent to the searches, and that the agents could not have reasonably assumed that he did without further inquiry. (ECF No. 573 at 1 7.) Amendment requirements that private property not be searched without a search warrant issued United States v.

, 926 F.3d 57, 75 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, Case 1:18-cr-00457-AMD-JAM Document 756 Filed 07/21/26 Page 25 of 36 PageID #:

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it Id. at 75 76 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222) (citation modified). [V]o Id. (quoting

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227).

United States v. Pecoraro, 568 F. Supp. 3d

169, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting United States v. Gandia, 424 F.3d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 2005)). The government argues that the

employee ps was

at 6 7.) The government cites the employee verbal and written

consent, as well as the recording of the April 2018 interview, which demonstrate that the agents did not employ coercive tactics, and that the employee was calm and cooperative. (Id.)²¹ The Court has reviewed the submissions, including the recording (ECF No. 562, Ex. B), and finds that the employee voluntarily consented to the search of his devices. He gave his written consent for the February 2018 Laptop search. (See ECF No. 562, Ex. A.) In that consent form, which the employee and two witnessing agents signed, he confirmed that agents informed freely given and not the result of any promises, threats, Id.)

According to the consent form, the employee consented to a search of which is the February 2018 Laptop as well as other devices. (Id.)

The employee consent to the April 2018 Laptop search was also voluntary, as reflected by the recording of the interview. There was an interpreter present, which ensured that he

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(ECF No. 562, Ex. B at 01:28 02:00.) They advised him of his constitutional rights, which the employee waived. (Id. at 02:05 04:25.) The employee gave the agents written and verbal consent to search the devices. (Id. at 15:00 15:25, 22:58 23:01, 25:10 25:45.) The tone of the interview was conversational and calm; the agents did not raise their voices, threaten the employee, or handcuff him. They also left the door to the interview room partially open, gave him water, offered him bathroom breaks, and told him to let them

. (Id. at 00:47 00:53, 01:20 01:28.) The employee did not ask to stop the interview, or express any discomfort about the See United States v. Murphy, 16 F. Supp.

Accordingly, based on the

totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the government has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee

United States v. Garcia, 554 F. Supp. 3d 421, 429

(E.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Nissho-Iwai Co. v. M/T Stolt Lion, 719 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1983)). The parties disagree about whether the employee had the authority to consent to searches The defendants say that he did not, and cite their internal policies about employees and computers. (See ECF No. 573 at 1 7.) The government says that he did have the authority to consent, and even if he did not, he had apparent authority. (ECF No. 562 at

7 9.)

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was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient United States v. Matlock, 415

U.S. 164, 171 (1974).

common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person Rodriguez v. United States, No. 13-CR-85, 2021 WL

4078621, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2021) (first quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170; and then citing United States v. McGee, 564 F.3d 136, 138

cuit law establishes that . . .

officers may nevertheless rely on consent from a third party who has the requisite authority to United States v. Lewis, 386 F.3d 475, 481 (2d Cir. 2004) (first citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166, 171 (holding that a warrantless search may be justified based on the consent of a third party with proper authority even when the arrested defendant was on the scene and available to give consent); and then citing United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84, 86 88 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that third-party consent justified a search and seizure despite the fact that the defendant was in the custody of police in a squad car outside and was never asked to consent)). A third party has and, second, either: (a) common authority over the area; or (b) a substantial interest in the area; McGee, 564 F.3d at 139 40 (quoting Davis, 967 F.2d at 87).

Id. at 140. The government

must prove adequate authority to consent to the search by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lewis, 386 F.3d at 481 (citing Matlock, 415 at 171).

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may nonetheless validate the search if the person reasonably appeared to the police to possess McGee

actual authority, law enforcement may rely upon apparent authority so long as the reliance is not United States v. Nayyar, 221 F. Supp. 3d 454, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 187

an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (citation modified).

The government argues that the employee had authority to consent to the searches under Davis. (ECF No. 562 at 7 9.) First, the defendants gave him access to and near absolute control over the February 2018 and April 2018 Laptops, which satisfies the first Davis element. (Id. at 7 8.) Second, the employee used the laptops for work, and had common authority over, a substantial interest in, and permission to gain access to the laptops, which satisfies the second Davis element. (Id. at 8 9.) Finally, the government argues that the agents reasonably believed that the employee had authority to consent to the searches. (Id. at 9.) The defendants argue that the employee did not have actual authority to consent to law half. (ECF No. 573 at 1 7.)

information security policies in effect at the time of the searches, which prohibited employees from disclosing corporate information and data stored on or accessible via Huawei devices, as well as domain account credentials, outside of Huawei, without permission. (Id. at 2 4; ECF No. 573, Ex. A ¶¶ 8 12, 14 15.) In particular,

instructed

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Department before disclosing any data. (ECF No. 573 at 3; ECF No. 573, Ex. A ¶ 10.) The employee agreed to follow these policies as part of his July 17, 2013 employment contract and reaffirmed his agreement to abide by information security policies annually. (ECF No. 573, Ex. A ¶¶ 13, 16 17.) Additionally, each time the employee logged onto the February 2018 Laptop, Huawei required him to acknowledge

authorized user and that you have read and consent

573 at 3; ECF No. 573, Ex. B ¶¶ 13 16.)²²Citing McGee, 564 F.3d at 139 40, the defendants argue that b Davis

and Huawei authorized the employee to use his company-issued laptops for work but prohibited him from exposing them to third parties or voluntarily handing them over to law enforcement, he did not have authority to consent to the searches. (ECF No. 573 at 3 5.) The defendants distinguish the cases on which the government relies. In those cases, the defendants argue,

property. (ECF No. 573 at 4 5 (first quoting United States v. Jenkins, 46 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 1995); and then quoting United States v. Murphy, 506 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)).) The defendants also point out that in United States v. Zhu, 23 F. Supp. 3d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) the only laptop case the government cites the employer consented to a work (Id. at 4 5.)

Finally, the defendants contend that it was not reasonable for the agents to believe that the employee had authority to consent to the searches, and in any event, the agents were required

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to take affirmative steps to confirm that the employee was authorized to consent the search. (ECF No. 573 at 5 7.) The defendants argue the government knew that Huawei, not the employee, owned the February 2018 and April 2018 Laptops, because the February 2018 authorized users and only for the legitimate business purposes of Huawei that the agents could not reasonably assume that a Huawei employee could consent to a law enforcement search of computers, particularly in light of the ongoing government investigations into Huawei. (ECF No. 573 at 5 7; ECF No. 573, Ex. B ¶ 14.) The Court assumes without deciding that the employee did not have actual authority to consent to the searches. However, the government has met its burden to show that the agents reasonably relied on the e The employee

had physical control of the devices and the means to get access to . He was traveling internationally with the laptops, had the passwords for them, and could log in using his own credentials. See Davis, 967 F.2d at 87; see also McGee uppose [a] padlock had been on the door of the study, but [the defendant] had explained to [his girlfriend, who consented to the search] that he kept it locked only to keep out others, and that she was welcome to enter it at will, needing only to ask him for the key. . . . [I]n those circumstances, she would be found to have access to the study as the term is used in Davis, and her consent would have been The employee also told the agents that he was fairly senior in Huawei Device USA he was head of a department and his supervisor reported to the head of Huawei Device USA. (ECF No. 562, Ex. B at 57:21-57:51, 1:00:48 1:01:16.) Law enforcement officers confronting these circumstances a senior employee who is travelling internationally with company devices, who has the passwords to those devices, and who agrees to allow the officers Case 1:18-cr-00457-AMD-JAM Document 756 Filed 07/21/26 Page 31 of 36 PageID #:

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to search them could justifiably and reasonably conclude that the employee has authority to give his consent. It would be unreasonable under these circumstances to require law enforcement agents to familiarize themselves with and analyze a company policies or to delay authority to consent on behalf of the company ence of actual authority, law enforcement may rely upon apparent authority so

Nayyar, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 464 (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 187 88). In this case, es

caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the [devices], Rodriguez, 497 the employee to have authority to

, Nayyar, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 464.²³

The defendants cite Moore v. Andreno, 505 F.3d 203 (2007), and Nayyar for the proposition that Second Circuit law required the

affirmative steps to confirm that the employee was authorized to consent to the searches. (ECF No. 573 at 6.) In Moore, a civil case, police officers knew that Moore had not given his girlfriend access to his office; she told them as much, and said that she had cut the locks on the office door. 505 F.3d at 205 06. Nevertheless, they searched the office and recovered drugs and drug paraphernalia from a desk drawer and a closet in the office. Id. at 206. As the Second Circuit found, the his

32

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The common thread in [Supreme Court precedent] upholding searches conducted pursuant to third-party consent is an understanding that a Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 134 (2006) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S., at 171, n.7). The defendants, aware that they were under investigation, nevertheless permitted their employee to travel internationally with his work devices, thereby assuming some risk that the employee, like all international travelers, might consent to a search of their shared property by the host country

during his journey.

The defendants also argue that the government was aware that Huawei had retained counsel to represent it in multiple investigations, and counsel was negotiating with government attorneys about the production of information in response to those investigations. (ECF No. 573 at 7.) Thus, the defendants say, it was not reasonable for the agents to think that Huawei had authorized its employees to give the government company information in their possession. (Id.) However, even ant is present . . . the officers may nevertheless

Lewis, 386 F.3d at

481 (first citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166, 171; and then citing Davis, 967 F.2d at 86 88); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 108 (noting that the Supreme Court held in Matlock the consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent,

. The agents were not required to ask ECF No. 573, Ex. A ¶¶ 14 16.) Additionally, during the April 2018 search, the employee told agents that he had a work laptop in his bag. (ECF No. 562, Ex. B at 13:33 13:53.) Case 1:18-cr-00457-AMD-JAM Document 756 Filed 07/21/26 Page 34 of 36 PageID #:

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the defendants who were obviously not present for permission to search the February 2018 and April 2018 Laptops. The agents reasonably relied on the e consent to the searches.

Finally, the defendants argue that the employee

child pornography. (ECF No. 573 at 8.) This is not supported by the record. The written consent for the February 2018 Laptop was broad he

562, Ex. A.) Similarly, in addition to telling the (ECF

No. 562, Ex. B at 22:50 23:02), the employee signed a form, which he confirmed he could read and understand, id. at 25:10 25:45). He did not do or

say anything that limited his consent to a particular device or location on a device. See Davis,

967 F.2d at 87 -party] authorized [law enforcement] to search his footlocker and . . .

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991))). Accordingly, the Court finds that the February 2018 and April 2018 Laptop searches were also lawful based on the apparent authority to consent exception. For the reasons described in Parts III and IV above contents of the

February 2018 and April 2018 Laptops.²⁵

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, motion is denied.

SO ORDERED.

S/ Ann M. Donnelly

ANN M. DONNELLY

United States District Judge Dated: Brooklyn, New York June 18, 2026

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